Huh. I completely forgot about Hungary in my previous post.
Hm. What was the Nazi line on Magyars anyway? With Hitler’s insistence on identifying himself as German, not Austrian, I’m guessing there was a little animosity.
Well, as you know, Hungary was an ally of Germany until 1944, when they tried to switch alliances and got invaded, and Germany’s general racial policy was “If you’re our ally, you’re racially ok”. But Hungarians were generally seen as similar to Croats or Rumanians, racially inferior, but not to the extent that they needed to be exterminated.
Definitely the butt-ugly mustache.
Here’s a recent and very well-written book on this very subject. In a nutshell, Hitler should have concentrated on North Africa with an aim to seizing Middle East oilfields (and cutting off the U.S.’ Lend Lease land-based route of material assistance to the USSR). To do this, Germany needed more transport ships and military escorts to truly dominate the Mediterranean, and it needed to take Malta instead of Crete (which was very toughly defended, anyway).
Any invasion of the USSR at the time would likely have been doomed, but if you’re going to launch a Barbarossa, build more trucks first, then concentrate on Moscow, then Leningrad, and do it without pissing off the Ukrainians you want to enlist as allies or diverting half your forces to a Southern campaign to destroy, then seize, then pointlessly occupy Stalingrad.
To clarify, a more rational Hitler would’ve played a divide-and-conquer game on the Ostfront. Of course, the historical, batshit crazy Hitler despised the Ukrainians for racist reasons. Alienating potential and early allies was his specialty; he did the same with the Romanians and to a considerable degree with the Italians.
But if Hitler was going to attack the USSR, that was his only chance. The Russian army was ill-prepared and reeling from a huge purge of it’s officer corps. One year later would have been too late.
Even two weeks earlier might have turned the tide- the Russians were close to collapse. Stalingrad was thiiiiiis close.
The book was written by Bevin Alexander, who has a British bias. Many British historians see the North African (along with the Mediterranean) campaigns as pivotal because that’s where the British were fighting the Germans. Strategically however, everything that happened in Africa was insignificant - the outcome of the war was decided by operations in Russia.
Exactly. To win, Hitler has to beat Russia. Anything that distracts from the war against Russia–like the African campaign–is a loser. Once Hitler beats Russia he can do whatever he likes to the Brits.
Better that he should have sent Rommel to the eastern front to fight the Russians than waste him on a sideshow against the Brits. As long as the Brits hold Gibralter, Malta, and Suez, they dominate the Med. Which means Germany either has to close the Med to the British navy, or abandon the Med. So the whole Afrika Korp was a blunder, because the Germans couldn’t spare enough to win the campaign. They sent just enough troops to make the loss painful, but not enough to win. So Germany should have ceded the Med and concentrated on the continent.
I agree. The only problem with completely ceding the Med to the British means that his “ally”, Italy, is now vulnerable. Doesn’t make for good propaganda if one of your few, and strongest, allies is conquered.
Aligning the Euro Axis with Japan had to be a big mistake.
I believe he did it with the hope that Japan would attack the Soviets in the Far East, and pull away some reserves.
But Japan had no intention of doing so. Japan was bogged down in China. Japan’s need for oil, among other strategic materials, was what drove Japan South, not North. Japans need for oil was not exactly a surprise to Europe, and astute folks in the German foreign relations agencies should have seen that Japan had nothing to gain, and everything to lose, by sending it’s already engaged Army into the Soviet Far East.
Aligning the Euro Axis with Japan needlessly antagonised the neutral nations, primarily the USA. (Needless, because of the lack of potential gain.) If Germany had not aligned itself with Japan, and had not DOW’d the USA right after Pearl Harbor, FDR would have a hard time getting the folks into a two front war (Pacfic and Europe). The congress, who likes to try to get itself involved in military operational planning, might have thought that the USA needs to finish off Japan first, than “come to Britains rescue” later.
FDR would probably have eventually been able to swing it (since the UK/Australia/Dutch were attacked at the same time as Pearl, making them instant allies), but I am gonna guesstimate that the US build up in Europe might have been delayed substantially, maybe by as much as a year, if not more.
Except that doesn’t mean Hitler wins, it just means the future DDR goes to the borders of France, rather than just being a slice of Eastern Germany.
Hmmm. Your probably right. There are so many possibilities to “tweak” history a little and speculate on the outcome. I agree the the biggest mistake was to attack the USSR while still engaged elsewhere.
But by aligning himself with Japan (in Sept of 1940) ensures that Germany will be engaged elsewhere, as long as Japan remains agressive too, which was something Hitler had zero control over.
My speculative timeline:
June 1940: Fall of France, as historical.
Aug-Oct 1940: Battle of Britain, as historical. No Tri-Partite pact.
Winter, 1940/41: Italy invades Greece. By spring, Greece has pushed Italy back into Albania, as historical.
April/May 1941: Germany saves Italy’s bacon in Greece, as historical.
June 1941: Invasion of USSR. Along historical timeline.
Sept 1941: US establishes quasi-war with Nazi uboats. (As historical)
End of 1941: Africa Corps formed, as historical. (Originally just 2 German divisions, and a decent commander, Rommel. Not really a massive diversion from Barbarossa yet.) Pearl Harbor, as historical.
Med., 1942: War in North Africa continues to occupy British. (Which goes as historical, assuming historical levels of Lend lease.) Without Operation Torch, Montgomery would probably have to halt at Tunisia, and not get much further.
USA, 1942: USA continues it’s quasi-war versus Uboats. (Escorting convoys to Iceland line.) Here’s where we have to speculate more. The USN admirals will be clamoring for more and more stuff be sent to the Pacific. There were (historically) concerns of invasions of the U.S. West Coast. There would be political pressure to send stuff to the Pacific from Congress. I think it would be hard for FDR to resist this pressure, as the Japanese are overrunning the DEI, Burma, New Guinea, and threatening Australia, compared to the occasional US destroyer being damaged or sunk in the Atlantic.
USSR, 1942: Specualtion is deep here. How much did the US/UK lend lease help the USSR? How much was it increased during 1942? If the US is at war with Japan, but not Germany, could FDR had been able to increase lend lease when that material was more visibly needed in the Pacific? Would the Soviets have been able to avoid defeat in 1942 with pre-Barborossa levels of Lend Lease?
I honestly dont know how to resolve these questions.
My education has been US public school system. The Western Allied emphasis on WW2 is, of course, biased towards operations covered in W. Europe, the Med., and the Atlantic. I think it is reasonably accurate in most areas, except for possibly this Lend Lease question.
According to US dogma, the USSR was on the ropes in late '41. A ton of it’s war industrys had been overrun (Kiev, Smolensk) or neutralised (Leningrad). It was rebuilding this industry infrastructure east of the Urals, but the Soviets needed time. The Lend Lease material, which was substantial, was “just enough” to give the Russians the gear they needed to buy themselves that time.
Because of the Cold War, and nationalistic pride, the USSR accounts hardly mention Lend Lease. (I read a single USSR WW2 history book, translated to English, while I was in high school, in 1980.) It emphasised the sacrifice of the various war citizen-heros, and the brutality of the Nazi’s.
I suspect the truth is somewhat closer to the US version, but I really dont know how to cut through the BS, and find out what is the “exact straight dope”.
According to Kruschev, Spam saved the Soviet Army from starvation.
And since the advent of the internet, they’ve been very well fed indeed.
I can’t testify for Hitler, but Air Minister Goring wearing white after Labor Day —Talk about blunder!! And really, he did not have the shape for white anyway.
The mostache was bad enough for Hitler, but that hair. A mullet would have looked better or maybe a nice butch crew cut.
My God! I’m channeling Joan Rivers!!!
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You know what is coming:
Cite?
Not that I don’t believe you, I think it would be interesting to keep for posterity the bit that the ¯ Lovely Spam! Wonderful Spam! ¯ Saved the world too!
While the Russians had superb tanks their armies would have been immobilised without American trucks and we mustn’t forget the intelligence of German intentions supplied by roundabout methods to the Russians by the Brits from Enigma code decrypts.
Well, I first read it in Spam: A Biography.
It can also be found cited here.
Well, but if the Soviets hadn’t been given American trucks they would have built more of their own. Obviously this would have taken away from other production, so there would have been a lower overall level of materiel. I have no idea if Lend Lease supplies tipped the balance - they may well have - but pointing to the trucks in particular as critical is misguided.