# What went wrong in Arab culture? **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [December 19, 2003, 3:09pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-went-wrong-in-arab-culture/219972 "2003-12-19T15:09:20Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 8
**Author:** ![Malthus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/85f322/32.png) [@Malthus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Malthus)\ **Post date:** [December 23, 2003, 8:30pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-went-wrong-in-arab-culture/219972/141 "2003-12-23T20:30:52Z")
Thank you for responding! And now, the debate can begin … > [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Tamerlane \* > **Not really, unless we reach back to the archetypal example in the distant past of the later Roman Empire ( and even then it was an incomplete dominance that only popped up in a couple of stretches ). Real military _castes_, or for that matter the idea of slave-soldiers, remote and to some extent foreign to the native population, have little parallel in Europe and certainly not the multi-century rule we see in places like Egypt and the Ottoman state ( which, again, were the dominant powers of their times and hence respectively the most stable centers of Islamic culture ). You’ll certainly see in European history examples of rulers weaker than their vassals ( say early Capetian France ) and the rare occasion where outside mercenaries seized control of the state apparatus ( but generally with some internal support, as with the Sforzas in Milan ), but in no cases were these really long-term institutional systems and we see no continuity of multiple, successive figure-head rulers dominated by a purely extractive and parasitic group as with Mamluk Egypt ( which admittedly is about as an extreme example as you’ll find anywhere ).** I think you missed my all-important “not” in the following sentence you quote: “For example, he correctly points out the role of the political rise of the Janissarry and Mamluk classes, and the Harem intrigues … but why did the same thing, or something similar, **not** happen in Europe?” So I will ask it again - why did it _not_ happen in Europe? > [@](#): > > _Originally posted by Tamerlane \* > \*\* > That’s an oft-suggested explanation and I like it to some extent ( compeitition spurring development ). But only to some extent. It isn’t the whole answer IMO, because it implies an inevitability to European dominance which I would suggest is unrealistic. It’s a piece in the puzzle at best and it doesn’t really explain Japan, for instance ( the old-comparison of feudal Japan to feudal Europe as a cultural parallel holds up less well when you consider the long, stagnant period of the Tokugawa Bakufu )._\* Why does it imply inevitability? Europe could well have been dominated by a single, stagnant empire. And the long stagnation of Japan under the Tokugawa seems to _strengthen_ the theory, not weaken it. > [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Tamerlane \* > \*\* > Right. Luck is a big part of it, IMHO. And remember - the stagnation was in the later period of these states. Yuan China was quite cosmopolitan and internationalist, as destructive as it otherwise was. Ming China reacted against that with isolationism, but aggressively expansionist Qing China, another example of an outside conquest dynasty, need not have followed that path - they certainly had other potential role models. \*\* I don’t think that the Qing _could_ have been anything other than conservative. As an alien set of overlords, they were in the same difficult position as the Mamluks - unwilling to change anything, lest the oppressed majority turf them out. Why, for example, would an alien ruling class adopt more modern methods of warfare which would have the inevitable effect of eroding the military supremacy of the mounted archer - which was the only basis for their continued control? The solution adopted by the Turks - creation of a Jannisary class - just changes the problem from dominance by steppe horsemen, to dominance by military caste. > [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Tamerlane \* > \*\* > Okay, but again IMO it would be excessively reductionist to blame _one_ factor :). The above is _a_ factor. > \*\* Yes, but I would submit that it is by far the most _significant_ factor. Naturally, any discussion of cause and effect in history is hamstrung by the fact it is non-reproducable. But I am so bold as to claim (purely for debate) that without the military dominance of the steppe nomad, the Middle East, Kievian 'Rus, India and China would **all** have been serious rivals for Europe - and the smart money would have been on the Chinese, followed by the Middle East. 😉 ---
**Author:** ![Aldebaran](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/c6cbf5/32.png) [@Aldebaran](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Aldebaran)\ **Post date:** [December 23, 2003, 8:34pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-went-wrong-in-arab-culture/219972/142 "2003-12-23T20:34:05Z")
Tamerlane, No insult intended, but you make it needed that I point out to you that since I’m an adult I shall rarely find myself forced into a postion you describe as “defensiveness”. Let be when posting on a message board. It should be clear that my posts are merely a respond to what others write. Experience teaches that in some cases one needs (be it regrettable) to approach people on their own terms in order to be understood. Your remark brings me also in a position that in addition I need to point out to you - in order to have a clear understanding - that I don’t post on this message board with the goal to gather applauds for my posts. Meaning: I’m not in a desperate mental state that makes that I’m in desperate need for applaud and approvement by complete strangers (and I also don’t desperately need it from not-strangers), let be that I would be in such a desperate situation that I need to make use of such a medium to get it. As for the other word you used to describe my posts, can you give a translation in understandable English-for-English-illiterates please? (My online dictionary seems to be on a strike.) Thank you. Question: how come even interesting topics like this one is tend to denegrate into nothing more then back-stage talk. I think that is a question that deserves a thread on its own. Can we proceed with the OP and leave the back-stage talk for the back stage? Salaam. A ---
**Author:** ![Malthus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/85f322/32.png) [@Malthus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Malthus)\ **Post date:** [December 23, 2003, 8:44pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-went-wrong-in-arab-culture/219972/143 "2003-12-23T20:44:38Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Aldebaran \* > \*\*1. “steppe nomads” ? > \*\* I use the term to refer to the waves of central asian horsemen that overwhelmed the various civilizations surrounding the central asian steppe, often either destroying them or ruling them. Notable examples which impacted the Middle East are the Mongols, the Ottoman Turks, and the Mamluks (although the latter did not come as invaders, but as slave-soldiers). All this was made possible because until relatively recently in historical terms, the civilized nations had no real military defence against the mounted nomad archers, except to hire them to defend the state (with the result that the hirelings often took over the state). Example: the Mongols were defeated at Ain Jalut by an army of Mamluks, hired (or bought) by Egypt - and these Mamluks were mounted central asian archers, just like the Mongols. For reasons which can only be speculated at (terrain? the Khan died and they all had to go home for his funeral?), the nomads never made inroads into Western Europe (other than the Maygars of Hungary). The middle east, on the other hand, suffered repeatedly from them. As did China, the 'Rus (what is now Russia), Northern India, etc. In my opinion, this is the most significant factor that best expains their relative fates - as opposed to something inherent in their culture or religion. Western Europe was never ruled by or ruined by horsemen from central asia; this was a huge comparative advantage. No “Mongol yoke”. No pyramids of skulls where thriving cities once stood. No centuries of domination by inherently conservative alien warlords. No centralized empires ruled by said warlords. ---
**Author:** ![Tamerlane](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tamerlane/32/7602_2.png) [@Tamerlane](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Tamerlane)\ **Post date:** [December 23, 2003, 10:08pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-went-wrong-in-arab-culture/219972/144 "2003-12-23T22:08:53Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Malthus \* > > I think you missed my all-important “not” in the following sentence you quote: Heh. You’re absolutely right, I did. My sincere apologies - I actually dropped the “why” and thought you were making a rhetorical question - “but did the same thing, or something similar, not happen in Europe?” oops :D. > [@](#): > > So I will ask it again - why did it _not_ happen in Europe? Interesting question, then. I’d chalk it up to culture to some extent. For one, I think the institution of slavery was sufficiently different in conception in Islam that the idea of a loyal contingent of slave troops was not necessarily a contradiction in terms and offered a number of practical advantages to both ruler and ruled. For the ruler, a detached private army that can act as a theoretically uncorruptible bulwark againbst other factions/vassals. For the slaves, close proximity to power and wealth which was transferrable. Slaves in European society were more generally slaves for life or close to it, with little guarantee that meritous service would produce results. Whereas Islam has an oddly contradictory take where slavery seems permitted, yet freeing slaves is regarded as one of the noblest of acts and is highly lauded. Consequently servitude could actually be a reasonable career path - you are a an absolute servant, yet can get a nice salary and can retire free with a pension ( or in Egypt become the ruling demi-class of nobility - as they were promoted to political office, slave troops were automatically manumitted under that system - though they remained part of the “Mamluk class”, they were no longer technically Mamluks ). The harem concept never seems to have been a common feature of European cultures, even from ancient times, unlike in the Middle East. Muhammed circumscribed and limited polygamy to some extent, but the practice of concubinage allowed an end-around. One thing that became common to Turkic dynasties were patricidal revolts and fratricidal struggles for the throne. The pre-existing institution of the harem offered a fine solution - Ottomans and Safavid rulers found cloistering sons and brothers in controlled conditions of a harem much safer on a personal level. Of course the above short-term solutions, reasonable from a narrow perspective and in a moment of time, produced long-term disaster. > [@](#): > > Why does it imply inevitability? Europe could well have been dominated by a single, stagnant empire. Possible, sure, though geography argues against it. Europe is highly fractured in geographic terms, more so than the central areas of the Middle East or what is today eastern China. Rome is the obvious counter, but Rome was Mediterranean-centered for a reason - ease of expansion and communication across a mild waterway. Further once we reach a certain point, post-Rome, I think a single European empire becomes even more unlikely. Cut-off by Islam from the resource centers of the east, dominance of the scattered resource centers of continental Europe to impose wisespread control becomes even more problematic. I don’t think Charles V’s empire ever had much chance at real permanence, let alone further expansion. Too many sufficiently balanced competeing powers. The implication of inevitability lies in the idea that fractured Europe would have inevitably triumphed over the large, centralized empires of Asia, which I don’t think is true ( and you don’t seem to either - I’[m just pointing ouyt such an argument could be made and rebutting it ). > [@](#): > > And the long stagnation of Japan under the Tokugawa seems to _strengthen_ the theory, not weaken it. In some respects, you’re quite right. I was just looking at it long-term - long stagnation of the Japanese state didn’t prevent it from reforming and reaching world-power status. i.e. I am arguing against a theoretical proposition, again not necessarily your position, that European disunity was the long-term engine that drove it to eventual success. > [@](#): > > I don’t think that the Qing _could_ have been anything other than conservative. As an alien set of overlords, they were in the same difficult position as the Mamluks - unwilling to change anything, lest the oppressed majority turf them out. Yes and no. The Mongols were also alien overlords and had no problem being aggressively internationalist. > [@](#): > > Why, for example, would an alien ruling class adopt more modern methods of warfare which would have the inevitable effect of eroding the military supremacy of the mounted archer - which was the only basis for their continued control? Reasonable point, although by the time the archer was becoming outmoded, the reliance of the Manchus on non-Chinese cultural bulwarks was also pretty well-eroded by their cultural assimilation into Chinese society. I think the stronger argument for retention of isolationist ways, was simply that until far too late, the outside world seemed ( and truly was ) superfluous to the health of the Chinese state. > [@](#): > > Yes, but I would submit that it is by far the most _significant_ factor. > > Naturally, any discussion of cause and effect in history is hamstrung by the fact it is non-reproducable. But I am so bold as to claim (purely for debate) that without the military dominance of the steppe nomad, the Middle East, Kievian 'Rus, India and China would **all** have been serious rivals for Europe - and the smart money would have been on the Chinese, followed by the Middle East. India is much tougher to argue, isolate as it was in a relative sense. If anything occasional penetration by outside forces actually served to modernize military technique. I consider Kievan Rus part of Europe, but anyway their problem was internal unity and distance from other cultural centers, which were issues long before the Golden Horde arrived on the scene - unification by one party was by no means a given ( anyway Lithuania did take much of that area - fat lot of good it did them in the long run 😉 ). In both cases steppe nomads were detrimental in some respects, but I’m not sure I’d consider them the overriding issue. China and the Middle East are stronger cases - even here, though, I’m not quite willing to say it was the ultimate cause, just a very significant one. **Aldebaran** - You have no reason to write posts to please anyone or garner kudos. However the phrase “you can catch more flies with honey, than vinegar”, though a bit trite and more than a little overused, is not without some merit. There is a pretty broad line between being a doormat and being over-aggressive. Supercilious = haughty or arrogant manner. IMO you sometimes cross over into that mode. The proper response to a comment or argument you find misinformed or ignorant, assuming you can make a reasonable assumption that it _might_ not be _intended_ that way ( and given the limitations of written discourse, that is the default position you have to start with - obvious trolls are obvious trolls, but some seemingly ignorant comments are made in a genuine spirit of enquiry and just poorly phrased or expressed ), is not to dismiss that person by saying they can’t understand or snapping at them, but to try to correct them without denigrating them. One of my favorite former posters on this board, now banned, was also occasionally guilty of this, which is why he ended up banned. Yet, I’d argue that though much more caustic than you, he was arguably more discerning at times about where he turned his venom. **David Simmons** first comment was entirely innocuous from my POV. Replying that it ( paraphrased ) “showed ignorance and complete lack of ability to understand”, was both rude and uncalled for. I think at times you lean too much and too snidely on simple appeal to authority arguments, when your claimed authority is you. The equivalent of “it’s a Muslim/Arab thing, you wouldn’t understand”, is generally not going to be a well-accepted argument in a forum such as this. Mind you, I don’t claim any special merit that gives me carte blanche to criticize - I’m sure to some extent the opposite charges could be laid at my feet. It’s just MHO, which you can feel free to disregard. It is also wayyyy outside the boundaries of this discussion, so I’ll leave it at that. - Tamerlane ---
**Author:** ![Tamerlane](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tamerlane/32/7602_2.png) [@Tamerlane](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Tamerlane)\ **Post date:** [December 23, 2003, 10:15pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-went-wrong-in-arab-culture/219972/145 "2003-12-23T22:15:59Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Tamerlane \* > I am arguing against a theoretical proposition, again not necessarily your position, that European disunity was the long-term engine that drove it to eventual success. That should be, **inevitable** success. - Tamerlane ---
**Author:** ![Aldebaran](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/c6cbf5/32.png) [@Aldebaran](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Aldebaran)\ **Post date:** [December 23, 2003, 10:23pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-went-wrong-in-arab-culture/219972/146 "2003-12-23T22:23:53Z")
Mathus, The question “why” the steppe hurds didn’t reach Western Europe can be be sought in the fact that Attila the Hun was defeated by the Romans, and that for the rest the hurds were concentrating on territories which didn’t exactly bordered closely Western Europe. However, you leave out of the picture the devastating result for the Roman Empire of the mere appearance of those steppe hurds : The migration of Germanic tribes on the run for the Huns. This was one of the main causes of the crumbling and finally the fall of the Empire and caused the chain reaction that molded the history of the region into the form that resulted in what it is now. There still is no coherence inside Europe. The invasion of Steppe Peoples of the Levant began already in the the 11the century, when Turkmanian bands invaded Syria. Later the Seldjuks followed and in the 13the century the Mongols, who invaded the territory of the Anatolian Seldjuks in 1243 AD. From there they targetted Persia and Mesopotamia. Only in 1260 they took Aleppo and in march of that year Damascus under the lead of Kitbugha Noyon, A Turk of Christian origin. Only Egypt and the Arabian peninsula were spared of these invasions, and even the little Latin Empires in Syria where bothered by them. The Egyptian sultan Qutuz received free passage from the Franks, ans o the battle of 'Ayn Djuhut took place with the Muslim under the lead of Baybars. This defeat was the end of the Mongolian threath for this part of the Islamic world. The Mongols caused a lot of trouble, but it is not correct to imply that they caused a ruin of the Islamic world in that period of its history. The Mamluks and the Ottomans on the other hand had a determinant role in the development of strong Islamic Empires. That they were at the same time a changing factor is indisputable. Your description of the Mamluks as only slaves is a bit incorrect though. Most of them were Turkish, coming from the regions north ans south west of the Kaspian sea, an out of peoples that were deplaced by the arrival of the Mongols. Among those mamluks were also Kurds and Mongols. They arrived in Egypt, voluntarely or as exiled, as refuges and as slaves. Only in a later period, under Kushkuda and Qa’it-Bay you see the evolution that children of Mamluk soldiers couln’t become Mamluk soldiers anymore. That resulted in an army of completely bought and imported non-Muslim slaves, who were brought to Egypt at a very young age, were educated there and set free. After that they could climb to a very high rank and even become sultan. Originally they were for the greatest part Kiptchak- Turks coming from north of the Black sea. But there were also Kurds, Turks, Europeans and so on among them. The decline of the Mamluks began under Qa’it Bay and was the result of internal and external factors. The organisation of the army by the Ottomans by the use of the Janissars, while in a later period also changing their status, is also one of the causes leading to their decline. Salaam. A ---
**Author:** ![Aldebaran](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/c6cbf5/32.png) [@Aldebaran](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Aldebaran)\ **Post date:** [December 23, 2003, 10:49pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-went-wrong-in-arab-culture/219972/147 "2003-12-23T22:49:31Z")
Tamerlane, > [@](#): > > Supercilious = haughty or arrogant manner. IMO you sometimes cross over into that mode. Maybe I come across as such… I wouldn’t know. In my opinion this resorts under these slightly different interpretations -of a style of expressing- one can’t put a direct name on. The interesting line in your next comment is “assuming you can make a reasonable assumption that it might not be intended that way” and can be applied to some comments on my posts also. People tend to “assume” a lot of what isn’t there, willfully overlooking what I explained alreadyso many times: English is not a language I studied and therefore I write sometimes: 1. black and white where colours and shades would be preferred. 2. unclear in my use of words or sentence structure 3. upto lending towards incoherent when twinbrother Dyslex adds to the difficulties I have with expressing myself clearly in this language. Some members however do show me the courtesy to ask for simple clarification if they get confused by my particular writing style, of which I am the first to admit that it can cause others difficulties to follow. Others prefer to simply go in attack mode. Nothing wrong with that since everybody is entitled to have a hobby. But in my opinion they thus only interrupt ongoing discussions with what I prefer to call back-stage talk. God… maybe we should open a mail conversation about this instead of interrupting the topic? I think that could be interesting… 🙂 Salaam. A ---
**Author:** ![New\_Iskander](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/n/db5fbb/32.png) [@New\_Iskander](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/New_Iskander)\ **Post date:** [December 23, 2003, 11:19pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-went-wrong-in-arab-culture/219972/148 "2003-12-23T23:19:32Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by DSeid \* > \*\*Once upon a time Arab cuture was heads above the West in intellectualism and literacy… > > Now education is sparse in Arab lands. Intellectualism is the exception. Illiteracy is high and there is little available to read for those who can and desire to. The only education available to many is that provided by fundamentalist extremists. > > How did this happen and how can it change? How did a long tradition of intellectual pursuit and excellence get so waylaid? \*\* What if we try to broaden the historical horizons? Muslim civ. was “declining” in Western eyes since the second siege of Vienna, about 300 years ago. I think it is perfectly conceivable that some Muslim intellectuals might have been discussing similar question in similar terms in relation to the West some time in XI century, 300 years after meteoric emergence of Islam, saying > [@](#): > > \*Once upon a time **Greek** cuture was heads above the **East** in intellectualism and literacy… > > Now education is sparse in **Western** lands. Intellectualism is the exception. Illiteracy is high and there is little available to read for those who can and desire to… > > How did a long tradition of intellectual pursuit and excellence get so waylaid? \* They could be saying that only few years before the Crusades. Could it be possible that whole civilizations are periodically engaged in obscure difficult transformations, lasting 100s of years, followed by sudden and unpredictable effusions of destructive and creative energy, that change the world? Who knows what future will bring? ---
**Author:** ![Malthus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/85f322/32.png) [@Malthus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Malthus)\ **Post date:** [December 24, 2003, 12:32am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-went-wrong-in-arab-culture/219972/149 "2003-12-24T00:32:06Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Tamerlane \* > \*\*Heh. You’re absolutely right, I did. My sincere apologies - I actually dropped the “why” and thought you were making a rhetorical question - “but did the same thing, or something similar, not happen in Europe?” > > oops :D.\*\* Hey, no worries - I get one free mistake. 😃 > [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Tamerlane \* > \*\* > Interesting question, then. I’d chalk it up to culture to some extent. > > For one, I think the institution of slavery was sufficiently different in conception in Islam that the idea of a loyal contingent of slave troops was not necessarily a contradiction in terms and offered a number of practical advantages to both ruler and ruled. For the ruler, a detached private army that can act as a theoretically uncorruptible bulwark againbst other factions/vassals. For the slaves, close proximity to power and wealth which was transferrable. Slaves in European society were more generally slaves for life or close to it, with little guarantee that meritous service would produce results. Whereas Islam has an oddly contradictory take where slavery seems permitted, yet freeing slaves is regarded as one of the noblest of acts and is highly lauded. Consequently servitude could actually be a reasonable career path - you are a an absolute servant, yet can get a nice salary and can retire free with a pension ( or in Egypt become the ruling demi-class of nobility - as they were promoted to political office, slave troops were automatically manumitted under that system - though they remained part of the “Mamluk class”, they were no longer technically Mamluks ). > > The harem concept never seems to have been a common feature of European cultures, even from ancient times, unlike in the Middle East. Muhammed circumscribed and limited polygamy to some extent, but the practice of concubinage allowed an end-around. One thing that became common to Turkic dynasties were patricidal revolts and fratricidal struggles for the throne. The pre-existing institution of the harem offered a fine solution - Ottomans and Safavid rulers found cloistering sons and brothers in controlled conditions of a harem much safer on a personal level. > > Of course the above short-term solutions, reasonable from a narrow perspective and in a moment of time, produced long-term disaster.\*\* Hmmm. You are beginning to convince me that culture plays a larger role than I would at first have argued. I have grown positively allergic to “cultural” explainations - smack too much of triumphalism in many cases. But this seems a quite reasonable and significant example of cultural impact, and one I have not really seen before - naturally, as discussed above, most observers can point to the existence of Jannisarries and Mamluks as conservative elements, and harem politics are usually a conventional source of corruption (the same was highly true in China). I guess my issue is whether these are cultural phenomina in their own right and quite seperate hinderances to development, or all part of the process of running a centralized empire. Would a Hapsburg emperor, absolute master of Western Europe, have had something approaching a Jannisary or Mamluk system, and harem politics - if the empire remained stable for a couple of centuries? I honestly don’t know. > [@](#): > > _Originally posted by Tamerlane \* > \*\* > Possible, sure, though geography argues against it. Europe is highly fractured in geographic terms, more so than the central areas of the Middle East or what is today eastern China. Rome is the obvious counter, but Rome was Mediterranean-centered for a reason - ease of expansion and communication across a mild waterway. Further once we reach a certain point, post-Rome, I think a single European empire becomes even more unlikely. Cut-off by Islam from the resource centers of the east, dominance of the scattered resource centers of continental Europe to impose wisespread control becomes even more problematic. I don’t think Charles V’s empire ever had much chance at real permanence, let alone further expansion. Too many sufficiently balanced competeing powers._\* I am not sure I buy the “geography determines destiny” argument. Certainly, there were many competing powers, which is why a Hapsburg Imperium was unlikely - but which was cause and which was effect? Was the fact of difficult geography the cause of the existence of competing powers - or was that just an accident of history? I agree that Rome proves nothing either way. What is interesting is to compare the role of Britain in Europe to that of Japan in China. In Europe, Britain was able to very successfully play the role of “empire spoiler” - aiding in the frustration of the Hapsburgs, Louis XIV, Napoleon and Hitler in their various attempts at European imperium. For various reasons, geography being one, Japan was unable or unwilling to do the same with China. > [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Tamerlane \* > **The implication of inevitability lies in the idea that fractured Europe would have inevitably triumphed over the large, centralized empires of Asia, which I don’t think is true ( and you don’t seem to either - I’[m just pointing ouyt such an argument could be made and rebutting it ).** I think that neither the fracture of Europe nor the centralization of China or the Middle East was “inevitable”. In particular, I find it odd that China is considered “naturally” to be one country - for long periods of history it wasn’t, and the Chinese themselves speak a variety of mutually-unintelligible languages (Mandarin, Cantonese, etc.). > [@](#): > > _Originally posted by Tamerlane \* > \*\* > In some respects, you’re quite right. I was just looking at it long-term - long stagnation of the Japanese state didn’t prevent it from reforming and reaching world-power status. i.e. I am arguing against a theoretical proposition, again not necessarily your position, that European disunity was the long-term engine that drove it to eventual success._\* Japan’s reformation hold out hope that others can do the same thing. > [@](#): > > _Originally posted by Tamerlane \* > \*\* > Yes and no. The Mongols were also alien overlords and had no problem being aggressively internationalist._\* But the Yuan didn’t last very long. And being aggressive is not the same as being progressive. > [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Tamerlane \* > \*\* > Reasonable point, although by the time the archer was becoming outmoded, the reliance of the Manchus on non-Chinese cultural bulwarks was also pretty well-eroded by their cultural assimilation into Chinese society. > > I think the stronger argument for retention of isolationist ways, was simply that until far too late, the outside world seemed ( and truly was ) superfluous to the health of the Chinese state.\*\* Isolationism is only part of the problem. The Ch’ing positively regressed, technologically. Example: I read some time ago (I think in Needham’s text on Chinese technology) that the blast furnaces which had been operating for hundreds of years in China were closed down in the same year - 1760s? That the first blast furnaces were _opened_ in England. > [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Tamerlane \* > \*\* > India is much tougher to argue, isolate as it was in a relative sense. If anything occasional penetration by outside forces actually served to modernize military technique. I consider Kievan Rus part of Europe, but anyway their problem was internal unity and distance from other cultural centers, which were issues long before the Golden Horde arrived on the scene - unification by one party was by no means a given ( anyway Lithuania did take much of that area - fat lot of good it did them in the long run 😉 ). In both cases steppe nomads were detrimental in some respects, but I’m not sure I’d consider them the overriding issue. > > China and the Middle East are stronger cases - even here, though, I’m not quite willing to say it was the ultimate cause, just a very significant one. > > \*\* I would agree that India was a long shot. Kievian 'Rus I would not count as “Europe”, but as a potentially seperate centre (as Muscovy was later to become). For the Kievian 'Rus, there is in my mind no question - the Mongols destroyed them; in their place, we get the very nasty centralized gunpowder empire of Muscovy, a very different (and much less plesant and progressive) place. There is no sadder episode in history than the destruction of Novgorod by the pyscopathic Ivan the Terrible - a vision of what Russia _could_ have been like (independant city-states, like Italy during the renaissance) versus what Russia actually _became_ (a backwards empire, in some ways the Christian mirror image to the Islamic Turks). ---
**Author:** ![DSeid](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/dseid/32/20194_2.png) [@DSeid](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DSeid)\ **Post date:** [December 24, 2003, 5:59am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-went-wrong-in-arab-culture/219972/150 "2003-12-24T05:59:21Z")
Well Malthus, you and Tamerlane have swam into historical waters that are too deep for me, though I am trying to follow your thoughts at least. I am torn between hypotheses about why cultures lose their intellectual edge. Yes Europe’s Dark Ages while Islam was at an intellectual peak is a good counterpoint to the Arab world of today. They share the feature of religious leaders who percieved secular studies as a threat to their authority and who used governments to shut off any possible debate lest the people stray from orthodoxy. (As Malthus said) Or was religion used as a tool by oppressive governments? Or both? Is the distinguishing feature isolationism? I appreciate your case histories and also again look at the history of the Jews as a case study. The ancient Kingdom of Israel produced no scientific achievements, it was quite insular. Only when the Jewish people became spread as “a nation among nations”, integrating aspects of a wide variety of cultures into its own in transformative ways, did intellectualism beyond religious learning become a value held in high regard. This is most illustrative because it shows that such a value does not per se correlate with the peak of empire, but with peak periods of open communication with other cultures. Aldebaren, If I understand correctly you are saying that there is some resentment over the perception that the West is trying to impose its secular value system upon an Islamic world whose values they feel the West fails to appreciate. I would go further. I would say that there is some outright hostility over this perception, and the more secular values or even appearences creep into the Arab world the more severely certain conservative and fundamentalist factions respond. I specifically want responses to the UN Arab Human Development Report’s (UNAHDR) action plan items (other than its bone to traditionists of encouraging study of ancient texts). They recognize the need for a home grown market for educated knowledge workers, the means to produce them from early education on, and widely available open communication with other cultures. They feel that freedom of speech and some other values that we in the West might consider secular are important prerequisites for building such structures. Yet without the knowledge infrastructure in place I feel that those values will be hard to implement. And meanwhile oppresive regiemes simultaneously use religious institutions to aid in oppression while the West fears rapid democratization lest religious fundamentalists popularly replace totaliarian despots who at least are friendly to the West’s selfish interests. How can the interests get realigned to encourage the comtemporaneous opening of society and construction of a native knowledge infrastructure while keeping those conservative Islamic fundamentalist factions that see secular studies as a threat from gaining control? ---
**Author:** ![Tamerlane](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tamerlane/32/7602_2.png) [@Tamerlane](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Tamerlane)\ **Post date:** [December 24, 2003, 4:32pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-went-wrong-in-arab-culture/219972/151 "2003-12-24T16:32:56Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Malthus \* > I have grown positively allergic to “cultural” explainations - smack too much of triumphalism in many cases. Oh, I agree - it is too often a glib argument. But I think the idea of cultural differences occasionally impacting historical outcomes does have its place. > [@](#): > > Would a Hapsburg emperor, absolute master of Western Europe, have had something approaching a Jannisary or Mamluk system, and harem politics - if the empire remained stable for a couple of centuries? > > I honestly don’t know. Nor do I. Certainly a “Praetorian Guard” scenario is perfectly plausible. But I suspect it wouldn’t be quite as institutional as what we find in the Islamic empires and frankly I doubt a harem situation would have been likely at all ( even indirectly, as a purely political cloister ). > [@](#): > > I am not sure I buy the “geography determines destiny” argument. I’m a fan of “geography can very significantly impact history” :). Really, your steppe nomad hypothesis derives in part from this - lack of adequate pasturage and otherwise inhospitable terrain west of the Hungarian Plain greatly inhibited, if didn’t completely prevent, nomadic incursions. > [@](#): > > For various reasons, geography being one, Japan was unable or unwilling to do the same with China. Relative size and proximity - Japan was generally very wary of looming China, which was usually not composed of multifarious states like Europe that could be allied with and played off of each other, but one or two _big_ states. As early as the T’ang period, worries ( not entirely unfounded given the penetration of Korea ) of Chinese invasion were pretty acute. Of course there is the somewhat extra-governmental phenomena of the _Waku_ harassing China and Korea in the 14th-15th century in particular, plus the very early ( pre-T’ang ) and late ( 16th century ) pre-modern interventions into more comparable Korea… > [@](#): > > In particular, I find it odd that China is considered “naturally” to be one country - for long periods of history it wasn’t, and the Chinese themselves speak a variety of mutually-unintelligible languages (Mandarin, Cantonese, etc.). Well, excluding mountainous Yunnan in the southwest, which was only permanently incorporated in the 13th century, eastern China from Han times _has_ tended to function very roughly as a single cultural unit ( in terms of the dominant Han culture, plenty of minority groups to be sure, but they were only very weakly and briefly ever able to assert themselves north of Vietnam ) and has more often been a single political unit than not. The fact that it was all somewhat accessible lowlands ( with major water barriers to be sure ), only accentuated that trend towards imperial unity. > [@](#): > > But the Yuan didn’t last very long. And being aggressive is not the same as being progressive. No, but they certainly weren’t isolationist. Nor were the Sung, as you mentioned, the Han or the T’ang. China’s reputation as a “closed kingdom” throughout its history has been somewhat exaggerated, I think you’d agree. > [@](#): > > Isolationism is only part of the problem. The Ch’ing positively regressed, technologically. > > Example: I read some time ago (I think in Needham’s text on Chinese technology) that the blast furnaces which had been operating for hundreds of years in China were closed down in the same year - 1760s? That the first blast furnaces were _opened_ in England. Regressed? Only in part. Lost traction, mostly, and then only gradually. In particular your example might be off just a bit - check out this article: [http://www.staff.hum.ku.dk/dbwagner/Fate/Fate.html](http://www.staff.hum.ku.dk/dbwagner/Fate/Fate.html) He notes that in 1700 it is likely the Chinese iron industry was the largest in the world and that steady importation of cheap European iron, undercutting native production, didn’t really begin in earnest until the 1810’s. What seems more likely from his analysis, is that large-scale production declined severely in the face of foreign production and only local small-scale production ( but still using small-scale blast-furnaces ) continued in remote parts of the hinterland. Though he does cite Qing government interference and, again, the problems of inefficient guilds, it would seem an equally or more significant impact was external. Especially note the chapter on Guangdong, where he says in talking about the decline in iron-work ( the below **Dalu** being “large” blast-furnaces ) : _One of many indications is that the 1835 edition of the **Liang Guang yanfa zhi** lists only 25 **dalu** in operation in 1799, compared with the 45 listed in the 1762 edition._ And other industries like textiles faired well, until relatively late ( 1880’s and '90’s ). For example Jacques Gernet cites exports of high-quality Nankeen cotton cloth went from 338,000 pieces 1785-1791 to 1,415,000 pieces 1814-1820 and silk exports rose from ~1200 piculs in 1750 to 6400 by 1830 ( and of course the tea trade absolutely exploded, but that was an agrarian achievement, though partly mediated by Qing period advances ). Unfortunately this major increase in exports just wasn’t enough to offset the value of opium impoorts after 1826. However Gernet, addressing the failure to modernize in the 19th-early 20th centuries ( which he attributes principally to the great social disturbances of 1850-1875 and foreign intervention, particularly after the unequal Treay of Shimosenki in 1895 ) says: _However one cannot pretend that, from the point of view of technology, China was very far behind many Western countries. The first modern armament factories and new shipyards for the construction of steamships had appeared there by 1865-1870. Nor can one say that China was radically incapable of industrializing herself, **since the Chinese industrial enterprises of the end of the nineteenth century are reckoned to have been as well equipped as their equivalents in Great Britain.** _ Emphasis added. From A History of Chinese Civilization by Jacques Gernet, translated by J.R. Foster ( 1982, Cambridge University Press ), pg. 564. > [@](#): > > For the Kievian 'Rus, there is in my mind no question - the Mongols destroyed them; in their place, we get the very nasty centralized gunpowder empire of Muscovy, a very different (and much less plesant and progressive) place. Possibly, though there certainly remains some academic disagreement on this point. Charles J. Halperin devotes a chapter ( chptr. VIII ) to the question of “The Mongols and the Muscovite Autocracy” in his book Russia and the Golden Horde: _The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History_ ( 1985, Indiana University Press ) and concludes in part: _Thus the Muscovite autocracy did not arise because of a political morality acquired from the Mongols, uniquely conducive to absolutism. The Mongols did not destroy the institutional and social obstacles that would have prevented the emergence of an autocratic regime in Russia’s most powerful principality. Another claim, that the autocracy arose from he need to overthrow the Golden Horde, is hard to credit, since the first signs of autocratic rule do not appear in Muscovy until after the Horde was dissolved. The Mongol influence on Muscovite governmental forms was immense, and the borrowed Mongol institutions contributed much to the power and efficiency of the Muscovite state, but the Golden Horde neither directly nor indirectly determined how those models were used. Autocracy evolved in medieval Russia, as in most of medieval and early modern Europe, as the result of internal processes._ But obviously, YMMV :D. > [@](#): > > There is no sadder episode in history than the destruction of Novgorod by the pyscopathic Ivan the Terrible - a vision of what Russia _could_ have been like (independant city-states, like Italy during the renaissance) versus what Russia actually _became_ (a backwards empire, in some ways the Christian mirror image to the Islamic Turks). Yeah, I’ll agree that whatever the source of its formation, the Muscovite system wasn’t exactly the most progressive in many respects. Now since **DSeid** is probably preparing to assault me for veering so far off topic… > [@](#): > > _Originally posted by **DSeid** _ > How can the interests get realigned to encourage the comtemporaneous opening of society and construction of a native knowledge infrastructure while keeping those conservative Islamic fundamentalist factions that see secular studies as a threat from gaining control? I dunno. Great anwer, eh ;)? You’re right that there is a nasty Catch-22 at work, with the West’s very real fear that plurality = overthrow of “friendly” autocrats and risking replacing them with potentially unfriendly theocrats. Unfortunately this just may have to be the way things go ( as I recall, **Coll** thought so ). The best hopes are perhaps the gradual liberalization we are seeing in places like Tunisia and Morocco. But again, I don’t see really rapid progress happening anywhere, anytime soon ( well, maybe Iran, but as has been pointed out, they aren’t Arab 😛 and are in certain ways ahead of the game vis-a-vis the Arab world ). Yes, call me Mr. Pessimistic, but I don’t hold out especially high hopes for Iraq right now, either. - Tamerlane ---
**Author:** ![David\_Simmons](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/9de053/32.png) [@David\_Simmons](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/David_Simmons)\ **Post date:** [December 24, 2003, 5:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-went-wrong-in-arab-culture/219972/152 "2003-12-24T17:38:00Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Tamerlane \* > \*\* I dunno. Great anwer, eh ;)? You’re right that there is a nasty Catch-22 at work, with the West’s very real fear that plurality = overthrow of “friendly” autocrats and risking replacing them with potentially unfriendly theocrats. Unfortunately this just may have to be the way things go ( as I recall, **Coll** thought so ). The best hopes are perhaps the gradual liberalization we are seeing in places like Tunisia and Morocco. But again, I don’t see really rapid progress happening anywhere, anytime soon ( well, maybe Iran, but as has been pointed out, they aren’t Arab 😛 and are in certain ways ahead of the game vis-a-vis the Arab world ). Yes, call me Mr. Pessimistic, but I don’t hold out especially high hopes for Iraq right now, either. > > - Tamerlane \*\* Well, the Englightenment/Renaissance didn’t immediately throw off what I would consider the stifling effect of theocracy. In fact I don’t think we are done with it yet. All you have to do is tune in to Trinity Broadcasting and listen to Pat Robertson or John Hagee _et. al._ to get the picture. ---
**Author:** ![Malthus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/85f322/32.png) [@Malthus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Malthus)\ **Post date:** [December 24, 2003, 8:09pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-went-wrong-in-arab-culture/219972/153 "2003-12-24T20:09:41Z")
Damn, **Tamerlane** , that was a good post - lots of juicy information to consider. Unfortunately, I can’t do it justice right now - holiday affairs. Consider this as my promise to get back to this thread after the holidays. It is a real pleasure to debate these issues with you. 🙂 [Not least, the childish pleasure of debating the historical importance of the Mongols with someone called “Tamerlane” 😃] ---
**Author:** ![Aldebaran](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/c6cbf5/32.png) [@Aldebaran](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Aldebaran)\ **Post date:** [December 26, 2003, 12:58am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-went-wrong-in-arab-culture/219972/154 "2003-12-26T00:58:34Z")
> [@](#): > > posted by DSeid > Yes Europe’s Dark Ages while Islam was at an intellectual peak is a good counterpoint to the Arab world of today. They share the feature of religious leaders who perceived secular studies as a threat to their authority and who used governments to shut off any possible debate lest the people stray from orthodoxy. (As Malthus said) Or was religion used as a tool by oppressive governments? Or both? You are wrong in you perception of the problem, in the sense that: 1. The comparison many people tend to make between historical European situations and the MENA region today cannot that simply be made. There is no comparison possible between the cultures or religions at all and there is no comparison between the historical past and its influences, which formed this region to what it is now. The only thing one can vaguely refer to is the influence on daily life of the religion, but in my opinion you can’t even compare Christianity and Islam in that, not in the past and not in the present. 2. Secular studies are not perceived as a threat to religious authority. Gathering knowledge is one of the main commands of Islam. Of course in some cases one can see abuse of religious authority to criticize the so-called “Western” inventions/cultures with all the rhetorical language that is part of that game. While at the same time the Internet is used as a tool to “spread the message.” 3. Governments in general are not out on playing the religion card. Some did in the past, which turned against them when they failed to be as “religious” as they wanted to be seen, or when fundamentalists -once useful- tried to take over. (Study-cases: Algeria and also Muslim brotherhood). Some of them play that card still, which is still a dangerous path since it can easily be turned against them. 4. When you talk about the Middle Ages in Europe there was indeed occurrence of religious control on the secular authorities. When you compare that with the MENA situation now, one sees such interference in for example Iran and Saudi Arabia. On that level one could say a form of comparison is possible between situations that occurred during the Middle Ages in Europe. > [@](#): > > Only when the Jewish people became spread as “a nation among nations”, integrating aspects of a wide variety of cultures into its own in transformative ways, did intellectualism beyond religious learning become a value held in high regard. This is most illustrative because it shows that such a value does not per se correlate with the peak of empire, but with peak periods of open communication with other cultures. In Islamic culture there was always an intense interaction/learning process between the various cultures inside and outside the Islamic Empires. The fact that this at a certain time in history, by a variety of causes and reasons, was interrupted and still is interrupted forms in my opinion one of the causes of the problem we are discussing here. We leave aside for a moment the Western influence, since this is mostly consumer-based although there is indeed a very great Western influence visible on the arts. > [@](#): > > If I understand correctly you are saying that there is some resentment over the perception that the West is trying to impose its secular value system upon an Islamic world whose values they feel the West fails to appreciate. I would go further. I would say that there is some outright hostility over this perception, and the more secular values or even appearences creep into the Arab world the more severely certain conservative and fundamentalist factions respond. It depends on which level of society you target with that remark and inside that level: which group. I should say that overall there is wide acceptance of Western influence and -impact in daily life, in particular when speaking about consumer items. When it comes to secularism, you should take a look at the constitutions of the countries involved and which are based on European examples. Of course a constitution is not necessarily the reflection of the situation in practice but that doesn’t mean that the population doesn’t want it to be implemented. However, the problem that Islam as religion can’t be completely separated from Islam as way of life and as a Law for Life, influences the way some so called “Western values” are perceived. It also influences the way governments must manoeuvre whenever laws are changed which touch for example those Shari’a laws incorporated in the countries constitution. I can give you a recent example: very recently the Family Law in Morocco was changed, with the aim to improve the situation and status of women. As soon as the news spread, one saw large demonstrations for and against the initiative. The result was that the process took several years to make sure that the religious fundamentalists could make no religious argument. This is a process where even a comma can make the difference. So yes, in that case there was in Morocco a great impact of religion on law making decisions. > [@](#): > > How can the interests get realigned to encourage the comtemporaneous opening of society and construction of a native knowledge infrastructure while keeping those conservative Islamic fundamentalist factions that see secular studies as a threat from gaining control? There are a few problems with their solutions. 1. If the infrastructure for education isn’t capable to keep up with the fertility rate –which is one of the main causes for the complete failure of the system almost everywhere - there is no possibility to offer what they describe as necessary (and which is of course necessary): access to sufficient education for all. 2. If the urban population can’t be convinced that sending children to school is in the long run better then letting them work at the fields, or whatever business they do, there is no way this mentality of especially letting girls drop out of the education system will change. Shortly said: As long as poverty forms a barrier to let children go to school or to let them go longer to school then is implemented by law (which has not such a great effect anyway in certain areas), one shall see the discrepancy between literacy of the more fortunate and the poor. 3. Since there are already a lot of young people who did finish university but have no sight on any job that is rewarding this education, the brain drain shall continue as long as economy isn’t reformed. When you have a diploma as engineer or in PC sciences or whatever, yet no possibility to find a job: The state has invested in your education, your family has invested in your education and since your loyalty goes to the family first, you shall go where the job is to be found and the State (=your country and what it can do with your knowledge) can go to hell. Others end up in a job that is far below their diploma qualification, which also means a loss for the nation and causes frustration. Which can end in lending the ear to certain fundamentalist groups who proclaim the “Islam is the solution” call. 4. As long as the first pages of the news papers are dedicated to what the King or the President has done the former day, you shall not see that many examples of the realisation of “freedom of press”. Free press is a good idea, but when you see that a media channel like for example Al Jazeera gets critiques and threats for reporting critical on certain figures or regimes, you know that it is mainly a good idea that still must find its way to real daily practice. Now we could say that this isn’t something of the MENA region only, and is even present in the USA and Europe, yet there is in my opinion “some” difference. 5. As I said: some regimes use the religion tool, yet others manage to manipulate it more covered in their favour for serving among others their interest of being on a white sheet with the West. Like for example in Egypt, where the so-called independent Great Sheikh of the Al Azhar is not as independent as he would like to be. Not only because of the Egyptian government, but also because of money flow of the Wahabbi regime. Seen the impact of the Al Azhar on the Sunni Islam World, this is something to reflect on. Such cases are of course adding to the grievances of the fundamentalists, but one can hardly say it is their fault. 6. Of course both the local regimes and the West fear a revolution led by fundamentalists, creating a second Algeria- scenario or worse (bit overstated by the West, especially the USA) a next Iran case. That is why this “war on terror” rhetoric of the USA serves all of them so well; you don’t need much now to be a “suspected terrorist”. (Which is by the way also handy for China and Russia to get rid of some opposition) So if we speak of “oppressive regimes” don’t forget whose interests they serve while serving their own. 7. Some distinct groups form the academic/intellectual elite, who in many cases have a lot of difficulties to express freely their opinion, and in many cases have in addition no contact with or insight in the various problems of the real poor, who are in fact the most vulnerable for the influence of fundamentalism. And I mean insight in the real problem of living with a whole family in one room without electricity or running water, for example. I can’t say from myself that I have that, yet I did lot of fieldwork for a certain project I’m working on. So I have seen a lot of cases where it becomes comprehensible that smart fundamentalists can work on- and exploit the sentiments of those people. Poverty is not the only reason, but certainly one of them. 8. In my opinion the change needs to come from those who at the moment can the easiest and most directly benefit from it, which is the rich class who has the money to invest, yet largely invests that elsewhere. In most cases they thus fail to take their responsibility and align themselves with an exploiting/oppressive government, while the whole region is literally sitting on a time bomb. If one speaks of suicide bombers… You don’t need to strap them on yourself to be one. You just need to keep ignoring the situation that enfolds itself under your very eyes. Salaam. A ---
**Author:** ![DSeid](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/dseid/32/20194_2.png) [@DSeid](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DSeid)\ **Post date:** [December 26, 2003, 1:28am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-went-wrong-in-arab-culture/219972/155 "2003-12-26T01:28:29Z")
I think, Aldebaren, that we are in more agreement than not. 1. If the infrastructure for education isn’t capable to keep up with the fertility rate … As a general rule fertility goes down with an educated female populus. (Although I’d have to dig for the cite for that). The best cure for excessive fertility is progress in women’s rights and education. Can this be achieved in the region (in your opinion)? 1. If the urban population can’t be convinced that sending children to school is in the long run better then letting them work at the fields, or whatever business they do, … Agreed. This is a problem in every emerging economy. The solution is seeing that education translates to better economic prospects, which it currently does not in many sections of the region. See your item below. 1. Since there are already a lot of young people who did finish university but have no sight on any job that is rewarding this education, the brain drain shall continue as long as economy isn’t reformed. … Others end up in a job that is far below their diploma qualification, which also means a loss for the nation and causes frustration. Which can end in lending the ear to certain fundamentalist groups who proclaim the “Islam is the solution” call. A critical point. I contend that such frustration feeds terror organizations new recruits who see these groups as family and fill a void in themselves with the group’s ideals. This is why developing home grown science and technology industries are such a critical part of the solution. 1. As long as the first pages of the news papers are dedicated to what the King or the President has done the former day, you shall not see that many examples of the realisation of “freedom of press”. … Agreed that this item has a long way til fruitition. 1. As I said: some regimes use the religion tool, yet others manage to manipulate it more covered in their favour for serving among others their interest of being on a white sheet with the West. … Yes, I think that it can go many ways, but all in the region (Israel too) must eventually struggle to integrate secularism and religious influences into some kind of balance. 6. Of course both the local regimes and the West fear a revolution led by fundamentalists, … So if we speak of “oppressive regimes” don’t forget whose interests they serve while serving their own. Agreed. 1. Some distinct groups form the academic/intellectual elite, who in many cases have a lot of difficulties to express freely their opinion, and in many cases have in addition no contact with or insight in the various problems of the real poor, who are in fact the most vulnerable for the influence of fundamentalism. … I’m not so sure about that. Terrorism correlates less with poverty than with loss of status, real or expected. 8. In my opinion the change needs to come from those who at the moment can the easiest and most directly benefit from it, which is the rich class who has the money to invest, yet largely invests that elsewhere… Agreed, but how to motivate them to make the needed changes when the oppression maintains their position in society as well? Happy to have you engaged! ---
**Author:** ![Alan\_Owes\_Bess](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/c37758/32.png) [@Alan\_Owes\_Bess](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Alan_Owes_Bess)\ **Post date:** [December 28, 2003, 2:19pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-went-wrong-in-arab-culture/219972/156 "2003-12-28T14:19:52Z")
You pays your money and you takes your pick, indeed. Irrespective, individuals are not what are being discussed here; it’s a cultural artefact. > [@](#): > > _originally from Tomnedebb_ > > It kinda depends on the poster. > > **Milum** wants to pretend that Christianity got ahead because of some imagined moral superiority, despite the fact that Christianity had a 589 year head start (using “traditional” dates) and took 1500 years to reach a point comparable to a point that Islamic Arabs reached in around 300 years. > > **Alan Owen Bess** wants to promote his own brand of ignorance and simply deny that that society ever did all the things that history records they accomplished. > > **Beagle** wants to cite a number of 19th and 20th century phenomena (while studiously ignoring a number of other 18th, 19th, and 20th century phenomena) and claim that those events were responsible for a decline that began several huindred years earlier. > > You pays your money and you takes your pick. The university discussions are just normal thread slippage and are not directly related to the OP. You pays (sic) your money and you takes (sic) your pick, indeed. One tiny variant on a mathematical theme becomes, in your eyes, a whole new branch of mathematics? This is absurd. I strongly and earnestly recommend that you, **Tomnedebb** read the **Koran** and the **Authentic Hadiths**. Otherwise, neither you nor **nedebb** will ever have a clue as what you are talking about when it comes to subjects Islamic, and the likes of **Tamerlane** with his “spontaneously” volunteered versions of Islamic “History”. I take it you have noticed that **Tamerlane** has been gratuitously providing a few throwaway paragraphs of Islamic “history” in quite a large number of his responses lately? Naturally, the likes of you think that it is all quite spontaneous and lap it up accordingly. ---
**Author:** ![DSeid](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/dseid/32/20194_2.png) [@DSeid](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DSeid)\ **Post date:** [December 28, 2003, 2:33pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-went-wrong-in-arab-culture/219972/157 "2003-12-28T14:33:36Z")
Uh, Alan, care to explain what you are trying to say? Because I don’t think that I’m alone in not understanding you. I _think_ that you may be implying some neferious Tamerlane agenda, which would be quite an amusing assertion to any who have read these boards for any length of time. And Tom’s knowledge base stands up quite well too. But I’m not even sure if that what is your intent. ---
**Author:** ![Alan\_Owes\_Bess](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/c37758/32.png) [@Alan\_Owes\_Bess](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Alan_Owes_Bess)\ **Post date:** [December 28, 2003, 2:51pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-went-wrong-in-arab-culture/219972/158 "2003-12-28T14:51:04Z")
_originally posted by **DSeid** _ > [@](#): > > Uh, Alan, care to explain what you are trying to say? I was simply responding to some asinine comments made by **Tomnedebb** previously. Don’t worry about it. ---
**Author:** ![Tamerlane](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tamerlane/32/7602_2.png) [@Tamerlane](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Tamerlane)\ **Post date:** [December 28, 2003, 2:53pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-went-wrong-in-arab-culture/219972/159 "2003-12-28T14:53:06Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Alan Owes Bess \* > Otherwise, neither you nor **nedebb** will ever have a clue as what you are talking about when it comes to subjects Islamic, and the likes of **Tamerlane** with his “spontaneously” volunteered versions of Islamic “History”. :dubious: You’ll have to spell that one out for me. I’m picking up on the fact that you think my version of history is a load of crap. But I’m none too sure what the “spontaneous” is implying. Some grand cabal of Islamic history falsifiers assiduously seeking to spread misinformation across the internet? I must say I’m curious. > [@](#): > > I take it you have noticed that **Tamerlane** has been gratuitously providing a few throwaway paragraphs of Islamic “history” in quite a large number of his responses lately? Gratutiously? Err…with any luck my throwaway paragraphs in Islamic “history” have at least some tangential reference to the topic in question. But hey - next time I post several throwawy paragraphs on Islamic “history” in some bird ID post, do be sure to point it out to me - I hate being “gratuitous” :p. > [@](#): > > Naturally, the likes of you think that it is all quite spontaneous and lap it up accordingly. That mysterious “spontaneity”, again. I dunno - I prefer “whimsical”. But your suspicions continue to intrigue me. C’mon - let me in on the secret? Pleeeease? Pretty please? I’ll be your…well, maybe not that. But I _will_ promise not to laugh. Loudly, anyway :). - Tamerlane p.s. - Actually, it’s be cool if you could pit me for my putative false spontaneity. I’ve only ever had but the one pitting and it wasn’t even serious. ALL the _cool_ kids get serious pittings. p.p.s. - I did have a feminine acquaintance once who accused me of lacking spontaneity. But it was in an entirely different context. No Islamic history involved at all. She just didn’t lack my lack of interest in going dancing. That probably deserves a pitting itself. ---
**Author:** ![DSeid](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/dseid/32/20194_2.png) [@DSeid](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DSeid)\ **Post date:** [December 28, 2003, 2:59pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-went-wrong-in-arab-culture/219972/160 "2003-12-28T14:59:26Z")
Can I get pitted too?! Huh? Huh? Puhleeze! (I guess I never do anything Pit worthy. Shucks.) > [@](#): > > She just didn’t lack my lack of interest in going dancing. Developing a Southern accent are you? 🙂 [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-went-wrong-in-arab-culture/219972.md?page=7) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-went-wrong-in-arab-culture/219972.md?page=9)