# What were Hitler’s long-term goals? **URL:** \ **Category:** Factual Questions\ **Created:** [June 7, 2011, 4:44pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-were-hitler-s-long-term-goals/584631 "2011-06-07T16:44:51Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 3
**Author:** ![Sailboat](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/sailboat/32/461_2.png) [@Sailboat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sailboat)\ **Post date:** [June 9, 2011, 3:09pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-were-hitler-s-long-term-goals/584631/41 "2011-06-09T15:09:53Z")
I’m going to ignore the OP and correct some misconceptions that have cropped up. > [@The\_Great\_Cornholio](#): > > At the end of the day, the Russians succeeded through the sheer brute force of overwhelming odds, in the same way that humble ants will always overwhelm a mighty elephant. That, and the bloody-minded stubborn attitude of Stalin (along with Western Allied pressure, strategic bombing etc), and a large helping of Good Luck. And tanks. Large numbers of excellent tanks – the T-34 was better than anything the Germans had significant numbers of from 1942 until the teething troubles were worked out of the Panther _after_ the battle of Kursk in July 1943. At that point, the Panther was somewhat superior to the upgraded T-34-85 for tank vs. tank combat, although never its equal for mobility and reliability. The Soviets had large numbers of very effective turretless vehicles (assault gun types) as well. The Soviet artillery arm was also very effective at set-piece battles (although markedly less so for on-call defensive use). In fact, the better German generals (Manstein in particular) advocated always fighting a moving engagement against the Soviets because standing pat and allowing them to attack was too devastating (particularly the artillery preparation). The Soviets had masses of men but they did not rely solely on human wave attacks. > [@constanze](#): > > Therefore, Hitler felt bound to be loyal to his ally Japan, just as earlier, he felt loyal to help Mussolini, although that delayed his own operation Barbarossa against the USSR; the resulting two-month delay in attacking Russia had serious problematic consequences for that campaign from the start. So a lot of tactical blunders because of his ideas and emotions. I’ve debunked this before, on this board, numerous times. Current scholarship has pointed out that Barbarossa **could not have started any earlier** that year because of the weather (the spring _Rasputitsa_ lasted longer than usual). Mussolini, the Balkans, Yugoslavia, and Greece impacted the start date of Barbarossa _not at all._ Books that imply otherwise are either pushing an agenda (it’s possible some Anglophile historians want to give the sad British misadventure in Greece a silver lining) or relying on sources that do. > [@Sitnam](#): > > He wanted war with Germany as little as France and Britain did at the time. It was because of this basic assumption that Russia was so defenceless so early during Barbarossa. Well, that and Stalin’s belief in purges to maintain control. The purges are a good point, but if you’re implying the frontier with German-held Poland was thinly garrisoned to avoid antagonizing Hitler, you’re asserting something I’ve never read. The problem was the reverse, actually. Stalin was so reluctant to lose the new territory he’d seized from the Poles (and, like everyone else, unable to conceive of the speed and depth of penetration _Blitzkrieg_ would bring) that he stacked his troops up in forward positions all along the frontier. Because the boundaries wandered, this required lots more troops than a straight line would have. He who defends everything defends nothing, of course. The Germans immediately penetrated this thick crust at key points and ran deep behind it, resulting in the huge encirclement battles of the summer of 1941 and the taking of vast numbers Soviet prisoners. ---
**Author:** ![Malthus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/85f322/32.png) [@Malthus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Malthus)\ **Post date:** [June 9, 2011, 3:21pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-were-hitler-s-long-term-goals/584631/42 "2011-06-09T15:21:20Z")
> [@Sailboat](#): > > I’ve debunked this before, on this board, numerous times. Current scholarship has pointed out that Barbarossa **could not have started any earlier** that year because of the weather (the spring _Rasputitsa_ lasted longer than usual). Mussolini, the Balkans, Yugoslavia, and Greece impacted the start date of Barbarossa _not at all._ Books that imply otherwise are either pushing an agenda (it’s possible some Anglophile historians want to give the sad British misadventure in Greece a silver lining) or relying on sources that do. Yup. This seems to be the consensus, these days. The Balkan adventure had bad consequences for the Germans down the line - notably, tying up some troops in doing down a nasty insurgency in Yugoslavia and garrisoning all those bits they took, not to mention ruining their airborne division in a (successful, but phyrric victory) attack on Crete. It was of course a total disaster for the Brits, dividing & throwing away a good chunk of their ME forces, but it did not delay Barbarossa - that was the weather. An interesting account from the Brit side is found in _Going Solo_ by Roald Dahl of Charlie and the Chocolate Factory fame. > [@](#): > > The purges are a good point, but if you’re implying the frontier with German-held Poland was thinly garrisoned to avoid antagonizing Hitler, you’re asserting something I’ve never read. The problem was the reverse, actually. Stalin was so reluctant to lose the new territory he’d seized from the Poles (and, like everyone else, unable to conceive of the speed and depth of penetration _Blitzkrieg_ would bring) that he stacked his troops up in forward positions all along the frontier. Because the boundaries wandered, this required lots more troops than a straight line would have. > > He who defends everything defends nothing, of course. The Germans immediately penetrated this thick crust at key points and ran deep behind it, resulting in the huge encirclement battles of the summer of 1941 and the taking of vast numbers Soviet prisoners. A side note - my wife’s maternal grandfather was a Soviet soldier, posted to hold on to Stalin’s ill-gotten gains in Poland. He was never heard from again after the first day of Barbarossa, and given what happened to Russian prisioners in German hands, I hope he died in battle. ---
**Author:** ![constanze](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/f9ae1b/32.png) [@constanze](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/constanze)\ **Post date:** [June 9, 2011, 3:59pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-were-hitler-s-long-term-goals/584631/43 "2011-06-09T15:59:26Z")
> [@Sailboat](#): > > I’ve debunked this before, on this board, numerous times. Current scholarship has pointed out that Barbarossa **could not have started any earlier** that year because of the weather (the spring _Rasputitsa_ lasted longer than usual). Mussolini, the Balkans, Yugoslavia, and Greece impacted the start date of Barbarossa _not at all._ Books that imply otherwise are either pushing an agenda (it’s possible some Anglophile historians want to give the sad British misadventure in Greece a silver lining) or relying on sources that do. That’s a very serious accusation, considering that normal German historians claim that Afrika and Balkans delayed Barbarossa for several weeks which turned out crucial. The quickest I could find was [German wikipedia](http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balkanfeldzug_(1941)#Folgen): > [@](#): > > Gemeinsam mit dem Afrikafeldzug trug der Balkanfeldzug dazu bei, dass sich der geplante Überfall auf die Sowjetunion um mehrere Wochen verzögerte. Der Historiker Hans-Ulrich Wehler hält es für möglich, dass bei einem früheren Beginn des „Unternehmens Barbarossa“, der Winterkrieg hätte vermieden werden können, der die Wehrmacht im Dezember 1941 daran hinderte, Moskau zu erobern.[5] > > _Together with the African campaign, the Balkan campaign led to the planned attack on the Sowjetunion being delayed for several weeks. Historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler thinks it’s possible that with an earlier start of “operation Barbarossa” the winter war could have been avoided, which hindered the Wehrmacht in December of 1941 from conquering Moscau._ > (Translation by me) > [@](#): > > The purges are a good point,… Von Gersdorff in his autobiography, I think, tells how during the advance through Russia they met russian regiments that were to be changed from cavallery to tanks, who had sent back their old weapons, but not yet received the new ones, leaving them practically defenseless. ---
**Author:** ![Sitnam](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/6a8cbe/32.png) [@Sitnam](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sitnam)\ **Post date:** [June 9, 2011, 5:18pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-were-hitler-s-long-term-goals/584631/44 "2011-06-09T17:18:00Z")
> [@Little\_Nemo](#): > > But the point was that it _was_ consolidating power. When the good times ran out (sometime around 1942) it was firmly entrenched and had eliminated any group which could serve as an organizing point for overthrowing the Nazi regime. Right, but the war crimes were already in full swing and even before the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 were the Allies demanded unconditional surrender Germany knew it’d surely face another Versailles Treaty if it lost. In for a penny, in for a pound. Every day the Third Reich lasts is another day the people in charge got to breathe. ---
**Author:** ![Sailboat](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/sailboat/32/461_2.png) [@Sailboat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sailboat)\ **Post date:** [June 9, 2011, 7:13pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-were-hitler-s-long-term-goals/584631/45 "2011-06-09T19:13:55Z")
> [@constanze](#): > > That’s a very serious accusation, considering that normal German historians claim that Afrika and Balkans delayed Barbarossa for several weeks which turned out crucial. The quickest I could find was [German wikipedia](http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balkanfeldzug_(1941)#Folgen)s. Ah, of course – I forgot there’s a group other than Anglophile historians with _even more_ stake in pinning the loss in the East on something else. German generals and their fans. As Malthus has indicated, my claim seems to be consensus now. See Keegan, et al. It’s also not a new idea on the SDMB. I have harped on this issue multiple times – you can search my name and “rasputitsa” for examples. [Here](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=13773678&postcount=10) is the most recent. edit: hit post instead of preview, dangit. Didn’t mean to sound confrontational. I will also add that it’s counterintuitive to think that the idea Hitler had cherished for so long (war in the East) would have been allowed to languish to pull Mussolini’s chestnuts out of the fire. ---
**Author:** ![Sailboat](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/sailboat/32/461_2.png) [@Sailboat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sailboat)\ **Post date:** [June 9, 2011, 7:23pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-were-hitler-s-long-term-goals/584631/46 "2011-06-09T19:23:21Z")
There’s an equally silly and possibly self-serving myth in American circles that the battle of Kursk was lost because Hitler withdrew support and pulled units out to reinforce Sicily when the Anglo-Americans landed there. Kursk was the biggest battle of 1943 and perhaps second only to Stalingrad in importance for the Nazi-Soviet conflict – a titanic head-on smashup and the biggest armored battle of all time. The idea that Hitler would lose it, and the war, to reinforce Sicily is ludicrous. What happened was that after Kursk was plainly lost, Hitler diverted forces that obviously weren’t going to turn around the already-lost cause. The Soviets won Kursk face-to-face, fair and square, with huge losses on both sides, and it’s demeaning for Americans to try to claim our adventure in Sicily saved their bacon. ---
**Author:** ![mlees](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/ba8739/32.png) [@mlees](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/mlees)\ **Post date:** [June 9, 2011, 7:29pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-were-hitler-s-long-term-goals/584631/47 "2011-06-09T19:29:27Z")
huh. I never heard of that Kursk/Sicily connection before. ---
**Author:** ![ralph124c](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/8797f3/32.png) [@ralph124c](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/ralph124c)\ **Post date:** [June 9, 2011, 7:47pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-were-hitler-s-long-term-goals/584631/48 "2011-06-09T19:47:47Z")
Getting off the point a bit, but is there any evidence that the “Stalin Organs” (multiple barrel rocket launchers) were in any way an effective weapon? Many German generals mentioned them in their memoirs, but I don’t recall any of them stating that this weapon was anything more than marginally effective. ---
**Author:** ![mlees](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/ba8739/32.png) [@mlees](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/mlees)\ **Post date:** [June 9, 2011, 7:54pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-were-hitler-s-long-term-goals/584631/49 "2011-06-09T19:54:24Z")
> [@ralph124c](#): > > Getting off the point a bit, but is there any evidence that the “Stalin Organs” (multiple barrel rocket launchers) were in any way an effective weapon? > Many German generals mentioned them in their memoirs, but I don’t recall any of them stating that this weapon was anything more than marginally effective. No offense: Is there something about the wiki entry on those that you find unsatisfactory? I can’t think of a reason to doubt a German soldier if he says he feared a bombardment by these. Why would he lie? ---
**Author:** ![The\_Great\_Cornholio](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/ed8c4c/32.png) [@The\_Great\_Cornholio](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/The_Great_Cornholio)\ **Post date:** [June 9, 2011, 9:24pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-were-hitler-s-long-term-goals/584631/50 "2011-06-09T21:24:47Z")
> [@Sailboat](#): > > I’m going to ignore the OP and correct some misconceptions that have cropped up. > > And tanks. Large numbers of excellent tanks – the T-34 was better than anything the Germans had significant numbers of from 1942 until the teething troubles were worked out of the Panther _after_ the battle of Kursk in July 1943. At that point, the Panther was somewhat superior to the upgraded T-34-85 for tank vs. tank combat, although never its equal for mobility and reliability. The Soviets had large numbers of very effective turretless vehicles (assault gun types) as well. The Soviet artillery arm was also very effective at set-piece battles (although markedly less so for on-call defensive use). In fact, the better German generals (Manstein in particular) advocated always fighting a moving engagement against the Soviets because standing pat and allowing them to attack was too devastating (particularly the artillery preparation). The Soviets had masses of men but they did not rely solely on human wave attacks. Indeed, the “human wave” attacks that led to German red-hot MG barrels as in the earlier part of the war were a thing of the past by Winter 1942, and this was noted by many German defenders who found themselves up against “proper” soldiers, rather than cannon fodder. The major advantage of the Soviet tanks was that they were simple and easily assembled, no highly specialised parts (relatively speaking) they were truly a tank that could be churned out on a conveyor belt, by unskilled workers. If one broke down, well, no sweat, there’s another 5 just rolled off the line behind it. German tanks took some of the Soviet concepts, like the sloping armour, but were still highly technical machines. With each model having very specific components, according to which manufacturer was making them, the Germans simply couldn’t put them together quick enough. That’s before any shortages or disruption from bombing is taken into consideration. Albert Speer was well aware of this, he kicked the German War Industry into far better and more efficient shape than it had been, but not quite good enough. Only in the final months of the war, when the Germans realised that actually getting more self-propelled guns out into action was more effective than trying to co-ordinate building single King Tigers, did they get a hint of where they had gone wrong. Too late by then, of course. ---
**Author:** ![Sailboat](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/sailboat/32/461_2.png) [@Sailboat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sailboat)\ **Post date:** [June 9, 2011, 11:00pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-were-hitler-s-long-term-goals/584631/51 "2011-06-09T23:00:08Z")
> [@The\_Great\_Cornholio](#): > > German tanks took some of the Soviet concepts, like the sloping armour, but were still highly technical machines. With each model having very specific components, according to which manufacturer was making them, the Germans simply couldn’t put them together quick enough. That’s before any shortages or disruption from bombing is taken into consideration. Now that you mention this, I’ll bring up an interesting thing I saw on one of those History Channel military hardware shows. They were restoring a Panther tank. The work crew pulled out the engine and brought out a major assembly – here my shaky knowledge of internal combustion engines fails me – I want to say it was the gearbox, but it could have been some other part of the drive train or engine block for all I can recall. But whatever it was, it was a large rectangular frame divided by vertical plates that supported moving parts. The experts pointed out that it was precisely machined from very high quality metal, tempered and lovingly fitted for optimal durability. Indeed, it was in good shape even now, almost 70 years after being abandoned. It had been built to last and last. The tank, of course, only had an expected lifespan of a few weeks or months in savage combat…less than that by the end of the war. The lump of metal appeared inert, but in light of what we know about history, spoke eloquently of the irony of such exquisite design and painstaking work as Germany collapsed around its builders. ---
**Author:** ![Little\_Nemo](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/little_nemo/32/3120_2.png) [@Little\_Nemo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Little_Nemo)\ **Post date:** [June 10, 2011, 1:39am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-were-hitler-s-long-term-goals/584631/52 "2011-06-10T01:39:06Z")
> [@Sailboat](#): > > I’ve debunked this before, on this board, numerous times. Current scholarship has pointed out that Barbarossa **could not have started any earlier** that year because of the weather (the spring _Rasputitsa_ lasted longer than usual). Mussolini, the Balkans, Yugoslavia, and Greece impacted the start date of Barbarossa _not at all._ Books that imply otherwise are either pushing an agenda (it’s possible some Anglophile historians want to give the sad British misadventure in Greece a silver lining) or relying on sources that do. A lot of people get confused over what the schedule was. They’ve heard that Hitler originally planned on a May attack date, which he then had to postpone to June. That’s incorrect - the May date was when the attacking units were all supposed to be ready at their starting positions but that didn’t mean the attack would start then. The normal procedure is to get them into place before the planned attack. ---
**Author:** ![Little\_Nemo](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/little_nemo/32/3120_2.png) [@Little\_Nemo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Little_Nemo)\ **Post date:** [June 10, 2011, 1:49am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-were-hitler-s-long-term-goals/584631/53 "2011-06-10T01:49:03Z")
You want to know another major advantage the Allies had over the Germans? The Diamond T 980 and 981 tank transporters. The Americans built several thousand of these during the war and the American, British, and Soviet armies used them. They didn’t fight. But what they did was tow tanks from one battlefield to another. The Germans didn’t use tank transporters. If they were sending an armored unit from Leningrad to Rostov, the tanks in the unit drove the entire way under their own power. And that meant that hundreds of German tanks broke down before they even got to the battle. ---
**Author:** ![ralph124c](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/8797f3/32.png) [@ralph124c](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/ralph124c)\ **Post date:** [June 10, 2011, 7:23am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-were-hitler-s-long-term-goals/584631/54 "2011-06-10T07:23:32Z")
THe main “long term plan” was for Germany to colonize Russia. The (inferior slavs) would be exterminated (in giant execution factories), and ex-soldiers would be given 200 hectare farms. Where Hitler was going to get 50 million extra Germans was a problem- one proposal was for each German male to have 5-10 concubines-the offspring would be raided in SS-run bording schools. Truly an ambitious and horrifying scheme. Once Hitler ruled Europe-from Norway to Moscow, he would be secure from any attack-I don’t think he gave much thought to future wars. ---
**Author:** ![constanze](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/f9ae1b/32.png) [@constanze](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/constanze)\ **Post date:** [June 10, 2011, 7:57am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-were-hitler-s-long-term-goals/584631/55 "2011-06-10T07:57:26Z")
> [@Sailboat](#): > > Ah, of course – I forgot there’s a group other than Anglophile historians with _even more_ stake in pinning the loss in the East on something else. German generals and their fans. That is a serious accusation. I was not talking about German generals, or the apologists at the beer table. In fact, I was glad that this discussion has proceeded as purely logistical/ tactical “what-if” scenario so far without any accusations about revisionism, because even as half-pacifist, I like the pondering of how things would have to be done differently. It’s like playing a history board game, where some things are influenced by dice (weather for example), and other by you (troops moving around) - I once held France for two years longer than in real history, of course because of hindsight, and also luck with the dice. So to accuse historians who are interested in history - esp. now with two generations removed - of being apologetics for the Generals needs to be backed up with serious cites: not only that your factual claim is correct, but also, that the intent is apologetics and not simply ignorance of the fact. After all, it’s one thing to prove that the spring mud in 1941 lasted longer than usual; but the question is, did the German Army High Command know this? If they didn’t know, then their decision was not influenced by it; if they did know, it’s a perfect excuse. The blame for the starting point still falls on Hitler who gave the ultimate order, because if the optimal time was too late, the Generals would have recommended delaying the whole attack by one full year for a better time (and I think there is some mention that they did - at the very lest, delay would have meant better tanks than the first few generations which had major problems). The Generals were not eager for war in WWII as in WWI, because they didn’t believe it would be a walk in the park. (That was one the problems: because Hitlers Blitzkrieg strategy, totally unusual and against traditional tactics, was such an initial success, he listened even less than before to his Generals, who had studied tactics after all, and felt confirmed in being the greatest tactician ever). Hitler was bent on conquering Russia both because of the Lebensraum (space to live) which could be taken from the subhuman slaws, and to eradicate the devil of communism. The Generals would have liked to choose the optimal point. ---
**Author:** ![constanze](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/f9ae1b/32.png) [@constanze](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/constanze)\ **Post date:** [June 10, 2011, 8:06am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-were-hitler-s-long-term-goals/584631/56 "2011-06-10T08:06:16Z")
> [@Sailboat](#): > > As Malthus has indicated, my claim seems to be consensus now. See Keegan, et al. It’s also not a new idea on the SDMB. I have harped on this issue multiple times – you can search my name and “rasputitsa” for examples. [Here](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=13773678&postcount=10) is the most recent. Following your link, I don’t see the contradiction. > [@](#): > > Because of the annual spring floods in eastern Poland and western European Russia, 15 May was the earliest possible date for the start of the invasion of Russia.\*\* No postponement was mentioned before the Yugoslav revolt, which had an immediate effect on the plans for Operation BARBAROSSA\*\*. As early as 27 March Hitler estimated that the campaign against Yugoslavia would delay the invasion by about four weeks. This estimate was based on the diversion of forces for the assembly against Yugoslavia. Headquarters staffs, divisions, and GHQ units that were on the way to the concentration areas for Operation BARBAROSSA or whose departure was imminent had to be diverted. Those units had to be replaced by others whose departure was delayed because they were not ready for commitment. However, of the two corps headquarters and nine divisions that were diverted to the Yugoslav campaign, all but three infantry divisions were replaced from the Army High Command reserves by the time Operation BARBAROSSA got under way. > > snip > > The plans for the invasion of Russia were modified in accordance with this estimate. On 7 April Field Marshal von Brauchitsch issued an order in which he explained that Operation 25 necessitated changes in the preparations for the Russian campaign postponing it between four and six weeks. The new target date was to be 22 June. Subsequent conferences between Hitler and his military advisers confirmed this new date for D-day, and it was adhered to in the end. > > Actually, only part of the delay was caused by the campaigns in the Balkans. Operation BARBAROSSA could not possibly have started on 15 May because spring came late in 1941. As late as the beginning of June the Polish-Russian river valleys were still flooded and partly impassable as a result of exceptionally heavy rains (Bolding mine) So, in other words: first the Balkan offensive delayed Barbarossa, and then the spring rains came late in Russia. Now, we can speculate that the Army might have delayed Barbarossa without the Balkans because spring came late - or, if they had started without delayed, got bogged down in the spring rains. But obviously the sequence is that first the delay was caused by Balkans, and then the weather came. > [@](#): > > German military authors state that the diversion in the Balkans had hardly any influence on the course of the subsequent campaign, since Germany’s casualties were relatively low and the expenditure of materiel and supplies insignificant. They agree that the invasion of Russia might have started three weeks earlier if there had been no Balkan campaigns. This delay of three weeks might appear of decisive importance considering that the sudden start of severe winter weather turned the tide when the Germans stood in front of Moscow. To them the validity of this theory seems at least doubtful **considering the fact that the German offensive in Russia in 1941 collapsed because of the conflict over the strategic concepts that broke out between Hitler and the Army High Command in the summer of that year. That controversy over the strategy to be adopted after the initial successes had been achieved cost the German Army several precious weeks.** Additional time and a lot of manpower were wasted by Hitler’s insistence on making Leningrad and the Ukraine his principal objectives until he finally Greed to a drive on Moscow before the outbreak of winter. The three (weeks)creeks lost by the execution of the Balkan operations therefore seem of minor significance. > > On the other hand, postwar publications by authors of other nationalities stress that the British intervention in Greece and Crete, and even more the Yugoslav revolt, led to the postponement of Operation BARBAROSSA to 22 June, while they de-emphasize the effect of the spring floods. So it seems that authors of other nationalities (not only British) are not of the opinion “only weather”. ---
**Author:** ![constanze](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/f9ae1b/32.png) [@constanze](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/constanze)\ **Post date:** [June 10, 2011, 8:11am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-were-hitler-s-long-term-goals/584631/57 "2011-06-10T08:11:20Z")
> [@ralph124c](#): > > Getting off the point a bit, but is there any evidence that the “Stalin Organs” (multiple barrel rocket launchers) were in any way an effective weapon? > Many German generals mentioned them in their memoirs, but I don’t recall any of them stating that this weapon was anything more than marginally effective. I haven’t read many German generals memoirs except von Gersdorff, but my general impression was that they were quite devastating, both because of the loud noise (wearing down the psyche) and the wide spread of their rockets. The [German wikipedia](http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stalinorgel) article confirms this: > [@](#): > > Der Katjuscha-Werfer wurde damit zum Schrecken der deutschen Wehrmacht, da er innerhalb weniger Sekunden mehrere Dutzend Raketen abfeuern konnte, was - anders als bei Artilleriebeschuss - kaum oder keine[1] Zeit ließ, Deckung aufzusuchen. > > _The Katjusha-thrower became therefore the fright of the german Wehrmacht, because in a few seconds it could fire several dozens of rockets, which left - in contrast to artillery fire - almost no time to find cover._ (Translation by me) ---
**Author:** ![constanze](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/f9ae1b/32.png) [@constanze](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/constanze)\ **Post date:** [June 10, 2011, 8:13am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-were-hitler-s-long-term-goals/584631/58 "2011-06-10T08:13:50Z")
> [@The\_Great\_Cornholio](#): > > Albert Speer was well aware of this, he kicked the German War Industry into far better and more efficient shape than it had been, but not quite good enough. Only in the final months of the war, when the Germans realised that actually getting more self-propelled guns out into action was more effective than trying to co-ordinate building single King Tigers, did they get a hint of where they had gone wrong. Too late by then, of course. Yep. One of the things in a purely theoretical “what-if” scenario, (assuming a leader who listens to his experts) would be a delay of the start of the war by a few years to get rockets (the V series), planes (beginning of a jet fighter, but not ready) and tanks (like the late models) to full capability. ---
**Author:** ![Sailboat](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/sailboat/32/461_2.png) [@Sailboat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sailboat)\ **Post date:** [June 10, 2011, 1:59pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-were-hitler-s-long-term-goals/584631/59 "2011-06-10T13:59:12Z")
> [@constanze](#): > > That is a serious accusation. I was not talking about German generals, or the apologists at the beer table. I’m not sure what’s so serious about it. Here in the US we often get people trying to sanitize slavery out of the US Civil War, or [otherwise shift the blame](http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/joan_walsh/politics/2011/06/09/civil_war_america_aflame/), for example, and we just debunk those people and go on, it’s no big thing. I don’t have cites online, and I loaned out my copy of Keegan’s _The Second World War_, but Keegan is highly reliable, and he specifically dismissed the idea that the Balkans/Greece adventures delayed _Barbarossa_. IIRC, Keegan in turn cited Victor Davis Hanson as his preferred source for understanding the Eastern Front conflict. The Wikipedia article on _Babarossa_ alludes to this: > [@](#): > > An initial delay, which postponed the start of Barbarossa from mid-May to the end of June 1941, may have been insignificant, especially since the Russian muddy season came late that year. I will try to find citations in print later. ---
**Author:** ![Malthus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/85f322/32.png) [@Malthus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Malthus)\ **Post date:** [June 10, 2011, 2:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-were-hitler-s-long-term-goals/584631/60 "2011-06-10T14:03:08Z")
> [@constanze](#): > > Yep. One of the things in a purely theoretical “what-if” scenario, (assuming a leader who listens to his experts) would be a delay of the start of the war by a few years to get rockets (the V series), planes (beginning of a jet fighter, but not ready) and tanks (like the late models) to full capability. As significant, if not moreso - a war delayed until the Nazis had _hundreds_ of U-boats, rather than the handful they started with. The Nazis came within an ace of winning the battle of the Atlantic as it was. If they had started with the huge fleet they (eventually) expanded into, they could have instituted a total blockade, with truly war-altering consequences. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-were-hitler-s-long-term-goals/584631.md?page=2) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-were-hitler-s-long-term-goals/584631.md?page=4)