However, this is not constitutional. In the context of the War Powers Act, there have been various similar proposals for congressional concurrence with the deployment of troops, but there’s a big problem if this consultation would require any kind of permission or agreement of certain congressional leaders. In INS v Chada, courts considered whether one house of Congress could pass a resolution that vetoed a legal order by the Attorney General to deport an individual.
The Supreme Court ruled that Congress could not grant itself a “legislative veto” over Executive Branch actions outside of the context of the Presentment Clause. (That is, the House and Senate vote on an identical bill or resolution that is then transmitted to the President for his signature or veto.)
Moreover, the idea that the President is required to pass military decisions by Congress before he can act is surely counter to the Commander in Chief clause.
I’m generally resigned to recognizing the risks of electing an incompetent President… but I can muster a smile when I think of the aphorism, “Democracy is the concept that the people know what they want, and deserve to get it good and hard.”
There are standards for when a nuclear strike can be called. When a nuclear strike CAN be called and when a nuclear strike MUST be called overlap quite a bit.
You can’t call a nuclear strike because Kim Jong Un said you have a tiny peepee.
There is no circumstance when a nuclear strike – or any military action, really – is required to be done in the strict sense of the word. The idea of can/must really does not apply here; it is more like a question of justified/not justified.