# What's the deal with Al Queida bombing MOSLEM countries?

**URL:** <https://boards.straightdope.com/t/whats-the-deal-with-al-queida-bombing-moslem-countries/214953>\
**Category:** Great Debates\
**Created:** [November 24, 2003, 4:47am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/whats-the-deal-with-al-queida-bombing-moslem-countries/214953 "2003-11-24T04:47:06Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 4\
**Page:** 4

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**Author:** ![Alan\_Owes\_Bess](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/c37758/32.png) [@Alan\_Owes\_Bess](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Alan_Owes_Bess)\
**Post date:** [November 30, 2003, 10:37am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/whats-the-deal-with-al-queida-bombing-moslem-countries/214953/61 "2003-11-30T10:37:25Z")

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Ho hum.

After taking a fairly long break, I see this thread is still alive, although the last 10 or 20 posts seem to have meandered off into the good old reliable, and tedious: “Israel, a democracy or what?” theme rather than original topic which was: **What’s the deal with Al Quaeda bombing MOSLEM countries?**

My original quote and link, which showed that the primary targets were foreign Christian Arabs, was disparaged by **Demostylus** because, according to him, the link was to a “scandal sheet” (in his opinion, anyway) and we should all take no notice of the man behind the curtain.

The only reason why I decided to check this story out was the peculiar way in which the stories in the media, international and local, described the victims, ie. as Arabs from foreign countries – see the phraseology used by the NY Times and the US State Department in my previous posting. No actual lie was uttered here, that would be too obvious and, if found out and publicised, offensive. Just good old fashioned “spin” was used. Let the dupes who buy newspapers and watch the TV news make the desired inferences from the selective, but genuinely **truthful** , information provided.

I think we would all agree that to be diectly lied to is far worse than being tricked or misled.

Why would non-Saudi Arab Muslims need to live in a heavily guarded gated community in Saudi Arabia, anyway?

Another [Link](http://wlo-usa.org/Opinion/Phares/Saudialqaeda.html) provides the names of some of the victims. From a commentary by Prof Walid Phares:

> [@](#):
>
> The characterization of the Riyadh’s attacks took off without accurate data, hence ruining this wishful theory. Both BBC and CNN, and their media associates ignored the victims, their names, their socio-economic realities and the history of the Jihadists in this regard.  
> First the statistics: According to Diaspora-based Lebanese sources, among the injured from the attacks about 90 victims were Lebanese. Five Lebanese nationals were burned to death, including two children, Jad and Raya Mezher. Another newly married woman Nina Joubran was also massacred. A pregnant woman, Houry Haytaya and her husband Dany Ibrahim, were also killed. Another family, the Haidar, were murdered as well. The list of casualties is growing by the days, many persons were not found yet. But one fact is certified: The massacre of the Muhayya compound was directed at the Lebanese Christian community living in Saudi Arabia.

Of course, the guards who were killed were Moslem, but the primary target of Al Quaeda was the Maronite Christians working in Riyadh, as Prof Phares points out:

> [@](#):
>
> Al-Qaida aimed at this vibrant community as a way to cripple one the pillars of Saudi economy. With one stone -this time a police car bomb- the Jihadists wanted to kill as many of these Lebanese “infidels” as possible. These Lebanese migrant birds were both "kafirs"and economic assets. Back in October, Usama’s audio-call through al-Jazeera called on the cleansing of Arabia from all people of the Book. There are no Jews left in the Peninsula. Most of the Americans are either gone or well protected. The next on the Jihad list are the Lebanese Christians.

On further reflection, it has occurred to me that publicising this further might in some way contribute to undermining the War Against Fright in some way, so perhaps we should all agree to not let this information go beyond this thread of the SDMB until the US State Department gives us the all clear. Remember, Loose Lips Sink Ships, and all that mouth drying stuff.

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**Author:** ![Rashak\_Mani](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/ea666f/32.png) [@Rashak\_Mani](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Rashak_Mani)\
**Post date:** [November 30, 2003, 11:20am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/whats-the-deal-with-al-queida-bombing-moslem-countries/214953/62 "2003-11-30T11:20:51Z")

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So they targeted Christians in Saudi Arabia… anyone confirm this ?

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**Author:** ![OliverH](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/278dde/32.png) [@OliverH](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/OliverH)\
**Post date:** [November 30, 2003, 6:13pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/whats-the-deal-with-al-queida-bombing-moslem-countries/214953/63 "2003-11-30T18:13:15Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by Aldebaran \*  
> \*\*You have a wrong view on this problem.
> 
> What happens now is what was predicted before the US entered Afghanistan.
> 
> 1. The central command of an organisation that was named AlQaeda is gone with as result that local cells start operating on their own, that last thing already a problem before the Afghanistan adventure.
> 
> 2. Local groups who for the greatest part had nothing to do with AQ to claim they are AQ. They just jump on the wagon and every time something happens and is immediately blamed on AQ without and before any possible verification, such local groups are encouraged to play that game.
> 
> 3. Some of those local groups did have in the past some connection with AQ in the sense that one or more of the members where in Pakistan/Aghanistan camps or were volunteers in Tchetchenia or other local troubles. They returned home, back to their own environment and now they jump on the AQ wagon.  
> \*\*

I don’t quite agree 100% with this assessment. Fragmentation suggests a lack of international coherence. It is quite evident from recent arrests that the terrorists involved in recent operations are involved more than in just hopping on the bandwagon fashion in the network. A terrorist recently arrested in Hamburg (where he is reported to previously have had contact with the cell around 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta) on behalf of italian authorities was accused of recruiting terrorists for operations in Iraq. Some of the recruits had been trained in Syria, some in Turkey, in the Istanbul area. Coincidence?

Operations need logistics and money. You need middle men who can get you the tools, especially when you need to bring them in from out of country. Al Qaeda is supremely suited to provide these needs. I believe it is a fallacy to assume that 9/11 is an example of the ‘Al Qaeda mode of operations’ which had to be abandoned as a consequence of US attacks in Afghanistan. It is quite evident by the fact that 9/11 was quite a bit unusual in the way it was organized, and that the scale was not the least possible due to quite a bit of luck on the side of Al Qaeda as to (in)competence and authority disputes allowing their plan to succeed almost entirely.

I haven’t seen any real thorough evidence that Al Qaeda ever planned a heavily centralized mode of operation beyond extraordinary operations which required special care. They previously relied on local cells. 9/11 was, if you want, a publicity stunt that, along with Afghanistan and Iraq, improved their recruitment base to the point where entire organisations are willing to spread beyond their usual operations and act on behalf of Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is, so to speak, franchising some operations to others in order to have more people working for them.

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**Author:** ![OliverH](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/278dde/32.png) [@OliverH](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/OliverH)\
**Post date:** [November 30, 2003, 6:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/whats-the-deal-with-al-queida-bombing-moslem-countries/214953/64 "2003-11-30T18:27:15Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by Noone Special \*  
> \*\*OK - let’s try to clear this up a bit…
> 
> Two kinds of Palestinians under Israeli rule: Citizens (within the 1948 armistice lines + East Jerusalem) and non-citizens (all the rest)
> 
> Citizens: Enjoy the exact same legal rights as any other Israeli citizen, including the rights to vote and to be elected (there are nearly 10% Arab representatives in Parliament).  
> Comparison to Blacks in the US is a fairly good one, in that they seem to get the short end of the economic stick, and there is a fair amount of apprehension about then by non-Arabs. OTOH, there have been a fair number of Israeli Arabs colloborating with terrorists, so the leeriness towards them is (IM oh-so-objective O :)) somewhat justified - more so than toward American Blacks.
> 
> Non-citizens: they are what all the flak is about…
> 
> Hope this helps
> 
> Dan Abarbanel \*\*

I acknowledge that you are right as far as theory is concerned, but it isn’t what the practical life looks like. One only needs to compare the fact that a convicted murderer of a prime minister still enjoys Israeli citizenship, while procedures are engaged against non-jewish citizens to strip them of their citizenship before they are even legally convicted of having collaborated with terrorists, i.e. at a point in time where they are normally presumed to be innocent.

Then there was the Haim Druckman bill in 2002 which restricted apportionment of state-owned land to Jews only. I lost sight of what became of it, but think about such a bill being brought into the legislature anywhere else. Especially since the bill was introduced to circumvent a ruling by the high court prohibiting precisely such a practice. This bill even received support from the cabinet.

So, it isn’t just the short end of the economic stick.

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