Congenital mental defects do not always manifest themselves at birth, though I will contend that AFAIK all the more ‘severe’ ones do. However, we as a society tend to lump all people with mental handicaps into one lump group, and treat them all very similar. So while it may be impossible for me to have cerebral palsey, that doesn’t mean it’s not possible for me to have a stroke or injury that causes similar effects on brain functions.
You’re right that if we as a society seperated the two types of people with mental handicaps out, I would have little self interest involved in protecting the congenatally handicapped (except that since I personally see all humans as human, I am better off trying to preserve at the very least all ‘basic human rights’ for them, as a step in preserving them for myself). However, since we do not make this distinction as a society, I do have self interest involved in their protection, since I might one day be lumped in with them.
That strikes me as especially silly. If we as a society didn’t make a distinction between cats and people, then you’d also have a vested interest in protecting cats, is that it?
You would be acting equally within your self-interest if you advocated strongly for the separation of the severely mentally disabled into two categories: those disabled from birth (who would have no rights at all, no protection from abuse, torture, or death), and those disabled after becoming moral agents (who would receive as much protection from harm as any current moral agent). This would make your self-interest-based society rational.
I submit, however, that it wouldn’t match anyone’s definition of good.
And furthermore, no one has explained why it’s in my self-interest to protect infants: I know for certain that I’ll never be an infant again.
Remember: my challenge is to explain, from a self-interest perspective, why infants and the congenitally mentally disabled receive protection, but dogs and pigs do not.
(I will grant you one semantic point: some congenital mental disabilities only manifest after adulthood. Obviously, I’m not talking about those particular disabilities; I’m talking about ones present from birth).
I don’t normally allow myself to repeat what I said one post above, but you obviously skipped this when reading my post.
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I lump all humans (read:members of the human species) into one logical group. Humanity. ALL humans in this group, in my opinion, should have certain, ‘fundamental’ rights. To blatently steal a quote; the chiefest among these being the right to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.
By lumping all humans in this group, and petitioning to keep all humans in this same group, it (hopefully) prevents some other group from coming in behind me and petitioning that for whatever reason (race, religion, mental ability, age, sexual preference, genetic defects, physical handicap, nation of origin, et cetera) I no longer fit into the ‘human’ group, and don’t deserve those rights.
Sure there is very little affect on me if someone took those rights away from infants, or from the congenitally mentally disabled, but it will affect me when someone comes along behind them saying I don’t fit their definition of ‘human’ and taking MY rights away.
I didn’t skip it – it just didn’t come close to answering my question. Why do you lump all humans into the group, instead of lumping all mammals into the group?
Furthermore, it seems to me that this is overbroad, from a social-contract perspective: you’re suggesting lumping beings into the group of protected beings despite their not being able to join a social contract. Instead, why not clearly define what constitutes being able to join the social contract? Then, when someone decides to exclude you based on race/religion/sexual preference, you can say, “No, stupid – my race has nothing to do with my ability to join the social contract!”
If you’re not arguing from a social contract perspective, then my question doesn’t apply to you.
This is what you asked, and what I was attempting to answer.
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From a self interest perspective, it is not logical for me to assume that anyone who wants to take rights away from dogs also wants to take them from me (and if they do, not logical to assume the nutbag is going to get any support). However, since it has happened before, it is logical for me to assume that someone who wishes to take away the rights of the congenitally handicapped may also wish to take them away from me for some other reason, normally race or religion, and is less likely to be considered a nutbag, at least by fewer people.
First, why are you hedging your own morality against the risk of nutbags? If your own morality doesn’t protect the congenitally mentally disabled (CMD from now on), can’t you conceive of a non-nutbag who would want to kill off his adult CMD son rather than put up with the hassle of caring for him, but who would never harm a member of the social contract?
Second, what about mothers who kill their infants – in what sense do they threaten you?
Third, this seems an awfully weak protection you offer the CMD and infants: you’re protecting them only to keep some nutball who doesn’t understand the social contract from harming you. It really opens the door to a non-nutball targeting the CMD and infants; personally, I’m not the least bit comfortable with that loophole.
Which is why you (read: I) make the ARBITRARY distinction that ALL humans have certain, equal, and inalienable rights, and fight to uphold those rights, PERIOD. It (hopefully) prevents anyone from abolishing those rights, and sets a precedent in the future, should they or someone else wish to abolish rights for me or someone I care about.
It’s like that old saying about the holocaust, which I will horribly butcher here, since I am running out the door and can’t even remmber who said it to look it up. paraphrase
When they came for the diseased, I didn’t speak up, because I wasn’t diseased.
When they came for the homosexuals, I didn’t speak up, because I am not a homosexual.
When they came for the gypsies, I didn’t speak up, because I am not a gypsie.
When they came for the Jews, I didn’t speak up, because I am not a Jew.
By the time they came for me, there was noone left to speak up for me.
But why aren’t you speaking up when they come for the animals?
The key word in your post may be “arbitrary”; if that’s the case, then I think we agree. My entire point is that I think you’re drawing the line at an arbitrary point, rather than at a rationally-derived point.
There’s another problem with referencing this quote. In this quote, all the groups may be assumed to be members of the social contract, and therefore a social-contract theorist ought to speak up when “they” come for any of the above groups.
I’m specifically asking about why you protect some, but not all, beings that aren’t members of the social contract.
Disadvantaged humans are a part of the social contract which refers to humans in society. As I have explained we deal with them in a fiduciary capacity (or at least we are supposed to.)
Pigs and cows are not a part of the social contract.
When cows as a whole show up and offer reciprocation that includes them in the social contract then presumably disadvantaged bovines would participate in the same manner and we would need to treat them in a fiduciary manner.
However, I don’t speak for the cows so that’s just a guess.
There is no general benefit for humanity in including cows in the social contract, so we don’t.
There is a benefit in including the generally disadvanted regardless of whether it is possible for us to share a particular disadvantage, as we may be subject to disadvantage ourselves that not all can share. We would want ourselves and our loved ones protected.
For example, there is pretty much no chance that I will ever suffer from MS. It simply doesn’t run in my family. Unfortunately Alzheimers does. I respect the rights of those with MS, though it is not directly to my benefit. Hopefully others will respect my Grandfather in spite of his Alzheimers though it is not directly to their benefit. Thus, it is in the best interests of members of society to protect those members who, no matter the condition, cannot protect their own.
There is no reason to include animals because, as a rule, they are incapable of reciprocating as a whole.
They have no bargaining position by which to enter into the contract.
As far as I can tell, there is only one case where a group of animals comes close to entering the social contract.
That exception is a certain groups of dogs that go beyond simple dependant pets and are more of a partnership. Seeing eye dogs, working dogs, certain companion animals. They come closest to be members of society, but ultimately they don’t make it. They give unconditionally for the most part, and don’t really care about the niceties of the social contract. They have no use for it, and play by their own rules.
Among themselves dogs have their own version of the social contract.
I think our partnerships with them work not because they adhere to our social contract, but because they expect us to adhere to theirs.
I think death is essential, and expect to die myself. I think choosing to cause death for another being is a significant choice, spiritually. Not always a wrong choice, mind you, but always a significant choice. The details are as varied as the number of deaths. In the extremes, one must choose to die oneself, or accept at least tacit complicity in the deaths of other beings. At the other extreme, to casually kill, for no greater purpose than enjoyment of killing itself has in it an inherent spiritual and emotional damage to the killer. And a pragmatic detriment in increasing the likelihood of being killed oneself.
Suffering is different. I must kill, or encourage killing to live. I do not need to cause suffering, to live. I might not be able to limit all suffering, but I can limit some of it. I can certainly choose to avoid causing suffering in all cases where I have clear alternatives. I think the harm that I do to my self if I choose to cause suffering is even greater than that which I discussed for killing Cruelty is not foreign to human nature. It is, however self destructive. Choosing to create suffering is cruelty.
Those who become cruel must inure themselves from compassion, in order to avoid pain to themselves. But the callousness of the spirit that accomplishes that covers more than just pain. It covers the exchange of all emotion with others. It isolates the cruel from all emotional contact with others. It kills the part of humans that allows love to exist.
Interesting point. I’m not sure I agree with it – it has the dual problems of being an arbitrary standard (based on genetics, not based on any morally relevant traits) and of being “fiduciary” rights instead of direct rights (fiduciary rights are much more easily taken away). But still interesting. Lemme think on it.
Because the animals, at least in the forseeable future, will never be able to speak up for me.
Before you say it, yes I know that some humans, will never be able to speak up for me either. But my concern with them, isn’t that they will or won’t, but that if I speak up for me, without speaking up for them, I may not be listned to, or may be discounted as a hypocrite. I.E. One that will speak up for himself, and his kin, but not for someone else.
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I am drawing an arbitrary line at the point at wich I rationally consider that I would cease to get any further benefit from it from a social contract perspective. The line is arbitrary, and I am sure that different people draw the line at different places, but I have yet to see a rational argument (i.e. not an emotional one) that can move that line outside of the human species and still provide a benefit from a social contract perspective.
Again I ask: if they’d consider you a hypocrite for not speaking up for the CMD, why wouldn’t they consider you a hypocrite for not speaking up for animals?
You also say that you don’t see a rational reason for moving that arbitrary line outside of humanity. I agree; however, I don’t see a rational reason for moving that line outside of moral agents (i.e., humans who are, or have been in the past, capable of entering into the social contract). Indeed, the fact that only an irrational judgement can extend the line to cover infants and the CMD is in my eyes a fatal flaw in social contract theory. Every rational argument in favor of protecting the interests of animals, as far as I know, rejects social contract theory as a sound basis for ethics.
They might. I think either situation is both extreme and hypothetical. However, if someone were to call me a hypocrite for wanting to protect human rights and not ‘human rights for animals’; I think that the general public would take them less seriously than if I supported human rights only for ‘rational members of the human species’.
By taking the second argument, many will automatically lump me in with ‘hate groups’ who advocate the same thing, only claiming that certain races or ethnic groups should not count as well.
In other words, the only people who may call me a hypocrite in the first situation are the PETA and similar groups. While, they, and most ‘racial equality’, or human rights groups might take exception in the second.
I have to confess I’m getting a little frustrated. You keep saying that not including animals and including infants and retarded folk and the like is “irrational” or “arbitrary.”
Each time I have made an argument to show you why I believe it is not.
It appears to me that you have simply repeated that it is irrational and arbitrary without engaging my counterargument.
Perhaps I missed it, or you may feel it self-evidently follows from something you said, but I’m getting frustrated and don’t care to repeat myself again.
Could you do me a favor and explain to me why I’m being arbitrary and irrational?
It seems to me that my argument that a general concession to humans who are temporarily or permanently unable to look after their rights makes good sense since I may find me or mine in similar circumstances even if the specifics cannot be duplicated.
Animals however lack any possibility for reciprocity therefore it seems logical that they should not be included.
Perhaps I am wrong and you can tell me why, but I hardly think this stance of mine is either arbitrary or irrational.
Scyl, I’m feeling equally frustrated, if it’s any consolation :). Seems to me I keep making the point that although social contract theory protects those who suffer from disabilities that members of the social contract (MSC from now on) can suffer, social contract theory does not provide for the protection of those who suffer from disabilities that no member of the social contract can suffer from.
Protect those afflicted with Alzheimer’s, sure: it helps you out in case you ever become similarly afflicted. Protect those with serious injuries from motorcycle accidents, sure: even though you don’t ride a motorcycle, you want folks who are cyclists (and who are MSC) to protect you when you become a senile old geezer. Quid pro quo.
But protect those with hydroencephalitis, or those born with extremely severe mental retardation? Where’s the quid pro quo in that? NOBODY who suffers from such will ever enter into the social contract; they’ll NEVER be a MSC. You gain nothing by protecting such people.
That’s one important distinction I’m making. The other is between direct rights (those I assign toward other people) and indirect rights (those I assign toward your collection of antique railroad signs). Direct rights provide much stronger protection: if I’m going to harm you, I have to gain your direct permission to do so. If I’m going to harm your railroad signs, however, I don’t need the signs’ permission – I just need the permission of the property owner.
This is an important distinction: when you talk about how “We would want ourselves and our loved ones protected,” I worry that you’re conflating direct rights (those we possess) and indirect rights (those rights we possess about our non-MSC loved ones). We need to tease these two sets of rights apart.
For two reasons. First, it’s unclear who exactly possesses the indirect rights for a CMD person: their parents? Their doctors? Anyone who cares about their wellbeing? I doubt it can be the latter – if it’s anyone who cares about them, then it becomes suddenly very easy for PETA to gain indirect rights for billions of farm animals, simply by caring about them.
Second, once we decide who possesses the indirect rights for a CMD person, we realize that that person is sometimes willing to relinquish such rights, leaving the CMD person completely unprotected. That doesn’t jibe with my morality.
To summarize:
You have self-interest in protecting non-MSCs who suffer a condition that you may one day suffer from. You have self-interest in protecting non-MSCs who suffer a condition that any MSC may one day suffer from. You DO NOT have self-interest in protecting non-MSCs who suffer from a condition that no MSC will ever suffer from. Both CMD and infancy are examples of this type of condition.
Although CMDs therefore don’t have direct rights under social contract theory, they may have indirect rights: my concern for a CMD person may be so great that I possess a right not to have them harmed.
It is unclear what my “standing” must be in order to possess such an indirect right. We may stipulate that parents have such an indirect right; however, if we allow too broad a category of people to claim such rights, we risk giving rights to anything and everything that anyone cares about.
If we give such rights to parents (or another limited group), we risk having the parents relinquish their indirect rights, leaving the CMD defenseless against those who would harm them (including their parents).
Daniel
PS Stickmonkey, proper ethics is not decided by a popularity contest.
No but lynch mobs are. Though, I do not think it likely I will ever be a victim of one, historically speaking, I do consider it a possibility. Which is why I said, extremely hypothetical when I was speaking in my above post.
In this discussion, I am kind of taking the stand point of a politician running for office. I am not only trying to find rational reasons for the opposition I will face, but the hypothetical opposition that could occur. To me, there is a greater risk of opposition should I attempt to exclude CMD’s and Infants from the social contract than if I simply try and exclude animals.
Well, let’s see if we can’t clear up this frustration.
A human being with no brain as can happen with hydroencephalitis is not human as far as I am concerned, and does not have rights and does not merit protection within the social contract. Nor does a person who is brain dead.
A human brain that is capable of human thought has the potential for making moral decisions, and for being a moral agent.
You say a severely retarded person can’t enter into the social contract. Probably this is true. They may not be sophisticated enough to understand and act upon it completely, but how do you judge that they are completely devoid of morality?
Clearly it is the potential for human though and morality that qualifies one for protection under a mutually beneficial social contract.
Otherwise, if I was in a coma I wouldn’t have rights, would I?
It is in my interests to protect the interests of moral agents whether they are merely potential or impaired, or damaged.
I judge the capacity for morality to exist within the framework of human thought in a human mind.
To ensure that my interests are protected in all possible extremes I must extend the benefit of the doubt to others in extreme circumstances. I see no problem with infants and children being included as they qualify as potential and limited moral agents respectively.
Animals are neither, so they are not included.
The class that I have the biggest problem logically resolving this stance with is Sociopaths. I hope by showing this weak point you’ll see what I’m getting at.
On the one hand a sociopathic rejects the social contract and either does not choose or is inherently incapable of morality.
Such a person is an animal as far as I’m concerned and there is no mutual benefit in protecting someone’s rights who works against the mutually beneficial social contract.
They are actually worse than animals. Animals simply aren’t included. Sociopaths betray and weaken the social contract.
So, logically it is in my best interests to oppose sociopaths in any fashion that I can to prevent their ability to weaken the contract.
On the other side of the coin they qualify as human minds with the potential for moral thought, don’t they?
The best that I can come up with to this conundrum is that a judgement call has to be made. If the demonstrated danger they represent to other people’s rights and the social contract in general cannot be accepted they lose their rights to protection within the social contract, and may be dealt with as animals (obviously we’re talking about pretty extreme sociopathy here.)
If they can be tolerated or safely contained than their rights under the social contract may be voided only insofar as is necessary to protect the rights of myself and others entitled to the full protection of the social contract.
Does this help?
Ok. I’m with you so far.
I see that as being tough. As a human mind with the potential for moral thought, impaired folk and children have their own rights.
The parents or guardian are presumed to be best able to protect those rights. It is also their privilege to decide (within limits) how to do so. My child however is not my property. I have both the right and the responsibility to behave towards her in a fiduciary capacity and protect her rights in her best interests.
True enough. As the guardian of my child I am obligated to look out for her best interests and protect her rights as a potential or partial moral agent. I am obligated to do so under the social contract. It is presumed that I will do so. This presumption does not grant me rights direct or indirect.
My role is as the Captain of a ship in respect to my daughter. I have obligations, not rights. As long as I am meeting those obligations within prescribed limits it is presumed that I have the best judgement in the matter, and therefore you may not interfere with me in the proper execution of these obligations.
However, if I am violating my obligations , both you and society are obligated to interfere. As long as I am not, you may not. If it can be demonstrated that I am incapable of fulfilling my obligations than the obligation can be placed elsewhere.
I do not have rights with respect to my daughter. I have obligations and powers to meet them which are subject to revocation.
But, she is not my property the way a signpost on my land is.
See the diff?
Again, I think you have it wrong. This is not a right granted by the social contract, this is an obligation of the social contract.
If I fail or relinquish my obligation, society must find another way to meet it. It cannot simply ignore the obligation any more than it makes sense to let a ship crash into an iceberg because the captain abdicates. Another must step in and the obligation must be met.
Another issue with respect to children is that my child is partially… welll… a version of me.
The societal presumption is than that their is a degree of alignment and synchronicity between my interests and those of my child. Or, at least and overlap.
In my case, and hopefully most parents this overlap is to such an extent that my child’s interests supercede my own.