I don’t know anything about the helicopter in question but a fuel selector has to be within arm’s length for the pilot to make use of it. If it’s switched off then switch it back on. A helicopter in motion doesn’t need a starter to spool it up. it’s already spooled up.
I just read the link. The pilot flipped the fuel back on and got a positive response but turned it back off because he was 300 ft above the surface. the passengers weren’t wearing seat belts but harnesses so they could move around. There are so many things wrong with this it’s mind boggling.
The pilot said he was too low by the time he realized the fuel-cut off switch was off.
Yes and he also said he got a positive response. which means he got power back. Even with turbine lag he was a couple of seconds away from significant power.
Always fly the airplane first and always.
He seemed to think he did not have time to wait as he needed to flair onto the water NOW !!! IMO.
Of course I was not there, do not know the rotor RPM at that instant, what the downward velocity was at the decision making instant while faced with his problem.
I do know many aircraft went from very survivable emergency landings to ‘everyone dies’ on impact when the pilots changed their mind at the last minute. Was taught that from day one and before from my flying family.
IMO, the problem with the restraints the passengers had on would not change what the pilot decided to do. No one had thought of that before. That problem cause many deaths. Not the actual emergency landing procedure.
YMMV
If he was high enough to consider landing in Central Park then he was at a significant altitude to run through engine failure problems. Is the fuel selector in the right position? are the mags or ignition system on?
You trim the airfoils for maximum efficiency, scan for a good landing spot, and work through the engine management systems. Before ANY of that happens the passengers should understand how to disconnect their restraints PRIOR to taking off.
Also, engines tend to give off clues when they quit. Did it bog down? Did it sputter? Did it instantly shut down in a smooth manner?
Turbines seldom ‘sputter.’
How do you trim the airfoils on the main rotor? (Auto-rotate by lowering the collective and making sure to maintain the correct rotor speed{do not over speed the rotor} ) This needs constant monitoring usually.
I have not seen the actual location & altitude of where this all started and “I thought about trying for over there.” is not a factual point that when he thought it, it was a good or workable idea.
I agree, the passengers should have practiced getting unharnessed, or had a totally different set up. Was the pilot the sole owner, mechanic,operator, decision maker on the harness set up, etc.? Was the loss of power something that could have been found on a preflight? ( NO ) Should they have been warned about touching that lever/button/whatever before entering the aircraft? ( good question especially if this was the first time this tour was ever done?
It all falls on the pilot which is how it is and should be IMO. To after the fact complain about the pilot of a B-747-400 not finding a deeply buried fault during the preflight is just silly and pilots know that. I have been in deep do do several times because of things that happened or were done on parts of a very small plane that I would need special tools and 2-8 hours to check even if I thought I should check it. And I am an A&P mechanic.
This whole operation needs to at least do a self check at the minimum, (FAA is probably going to do it for them now.) but to critique the pilot on what little information is available is poor form IMO.
they’re no different than any other engine when parts let go. So yes, they sputter. It’s a different problem than fuel starvation and different symptoms.
you answered your own question.
“I thought about landing in the park but people posed a problem” suggests it was a viable option. I expect the NTSB will answer that question when they reconstruct the event.
It doesn’t matter if it was the first time or the thousandth time.
That’s great but that’s not what we’re talking about. There were no buried faults in this scenario.
You could very well be right. But this one looks pretty bad. Improper passenger instructions, missing a fuel control with loss of power and landing in the middle of the river with an open door helicopter are all fails. The river was the biggest fail.
initial report is out. PDF file. You can go to NTSB website and get HTML version. Pilot says passengers instructed on emergency procedures. looks like emergency pontoons didn’t inflate evenly.
Horrifying. Emergency egress from an inverted helicopter in the water isn’t something that a pre-flight talk can cover even given a lap belt.
Assuming passengers will have the presence of mind to remain calm and still while the aircraft inverts and fills with water, THEN release their restraints AND find the maintain control of the knife AND cut themselves free while upside down AND swim to safety…
Typing that out, I can’t help but think that while the operator is criminally liable, the passengers made a horrible decision in letting that helicopter take off.
The time to remove the belts and harnesses is during a controlled descent. They had removed the doors on the helicopter so everything hinges on the emergency flotation devices.
Clearly the pilot was relying on the flotation system which has worked before in a similar situation/location. Different helicopter.
I’m not saying those harnesses were a good/safe idea; clearly they weren’t but he piloted the aircraft to a safe touchdown. Had the pontoons worked as expected, he would have had plenty of time to unscrew their harnesses before they evacuated onto the first-on-scene tugboat.
Are you telling me that in an emergency, you can thing, four, six, ten (?) steps ahead beyond running thru your emergency checklist to plan for a secondary failure?
::Bump::
The latest NYTimes story where some pilots supposedly didn’t like the harnesses, which FlyNYON denies, but can’t comment further on due to ongoing investigation.
I’ve worn those harnesses. Never liked wearing them unless I added a two foot tether extension and a second binner, so I could unhook. Maybe wearing this harness backwards so the D ring is in the front would be an option.
The harnesses are very good for their intended use; having a passenger sit on the floor while dangling their feet out the doorway. Either lengthening it or moving the biner to the front would create a longer leash, possibly allowing the passenger to get far enough out as to where their center of gravity is outside of the helo body. Obviously, their intended use did not include emergency egress.
What is needed is some type of quick release that can’t be accidentally engaged by a member of the general public who’s had maybe 10-15 mins of one-time, watching-a-video training & no hands-on experience. Unfortunately, those two requirements are opposite ends of the spectrum.
Put the release on the other end so the user can reach it. Then have them attach it so they know how it works. PIC does a final inspection prior to the flight to make sure the carabiner is locked.
I just ran across the NTSB report today:
Safety issues identified in this report include the effect of the harness/tether system on the ability of each passenger to rapidly egress from the capsizing helicopter; emergency flotation system design, maintenance, and certification issues; ineffective safety management at both Liberty and NYONair; Liberty and NYONair’s exploitation of the
aerial work/aerial photography exception at 14 CFR 119.1(e) to operate FlyNYON flights under Part 91 with limited Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) oversight; lack of policy and guidance for FAA inspectors to perform a comprehensive inspection of Part 91 operations conducted under any of the 14 CFR 119.1(e) exceptions; lack of protection from inadvertent activation of the helicopter’s fuel shutoff lever; the need for guidance and
procedures for operators to assess and address passenger intoxication; and inadequacy of the review and approval process for supplemental passenger restraint systems that the FAA implemented after the accident. As a result of this investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes 10 new safety recommendations to the FAA,
1 new recommendation each to Airbus Helicopters and the European Aviation Safety Agency, and 2 new recommendations each to Liberty and NYONair.
I wonder what the situation is with regard to the other 4 who died: did they settle for a couple million each?
While this will surely be appealed I wonder if the defendants have this much insurance or other assets to pay this amount?