Just to nitpick, Cecil did not write the article. Bricker did. A very well done report IMHO.
As others have suggested, that’s likely to be viewed as deliberately inflammatory. The judge will either just have directed, or be just about to direct, the jurors that their duty is to judge the case according to the law, not to judge the law. Making judgments about whether a law is a good one or not is the duty of the legislator, not the juror. Separation of powers, and all that.
Tone this down considerably. Jurors who have a conscientious objection to the death penalty get a lot of slack cut for them; try to position your case on all fours with theirs. Do not claim the right to act as an unelected legislator.
How is that not a right? “De facto power that I can exercise without anybody able to stop me” sounds a lot like a way of saying “right” with lots of words.
I’m not saying it’s a good idea, but I’m not seeing how it’s technically not a right. (It may be that getting up and preaching about it isn’t a right, just like I assume it’s not a right to stand up in the middle of jury service and loudly announce that you’re a fully armed juror, or a fully unsearched juror, or a fully unenslaved juror, or a Republican-voting juror, even though actually being those things is legal.)
No, you won’t be cited for contempt. Instead you won’t be selected for the jury. And the judge will have you come in every day, for the full day, set forth in the summons (recall, the veniremen have to be excused by the judge before they can leave, merely not being selected is not technically enough — although that often happens if you refrain from fucking around) and have you sit through as many voir dires as that takes. In other words, they’ll see to it that your time is colossally wasted.
If I’m a witness, I have the de facto power to lie during my testimony, and no one can stop me. They may be able to punish me afterwards, but no one can prevent me from speaking the words. Doesn’t mean I have a right to do it. De facto almost always refers to something not officially established.
Only if the judge is a colossal jerk. There are other ways to put a self-important or grandstanding juror in his or her place.
No, I don’t think the concept of “right” can be reduced simply to a question of enforceability. If you have a duty to do X, they you can’t have a right to do something-inconsistent-with-X. And if, in practical terms, it is true that you will suffer no legal sanction for doing something-inconsistent-with-X, that doesn’t dissolve or negate your duty, or turn your breach of that duty into a right.
The findings of the Supreme Court, for example, are not reviewable by any higher tribunal. Yet the Supreme Court has a duty to decide cases according to law, and nobody suggests that it has the right to decide cases capriciously, on a whim, in disregard of the law, or as directed by the litigant offering the highest cash payment. It may get away with doing that, but that’s not the same thing as having a right to do it.
I don’t think it’s that jerkish. First, it’s within the plain command of the jury summons. If it says, “you’re summoned for the week of May X to X+4,” then you’re summoned for all five of those days. If one wants some judicial grace, then one needs to refrain from being a ball-buster.
Second, I don’t think there’s any right to jury nullification; there’s just no mechanism to punish it. Reading a prepared statement to the effect of “If you choose me, I’m going to do whatever the hell I want” is like being one of those shitty kids on Halloween who raid the candy left out unattended.
I don’t see any reason why this attitude needs to met with indulgence. In fact, I think a dose of “I fought the law and the law won” might be a very topical corrective in this instance.
What about impractical terms? What are the unenforceable laws against jury nullification? If there aren’t any, then there isn’t actually a duty not to do it. There might be good opinions about why you shouldn’t do it, but that doesn’t make it a duty that nullifies a right.
Say someone walks out of a courthouse at a high-profile drug case, walks over to a reporter, and proudly announces on live TV that they thought the guy did it and just thought the law was moronic. What could happen, even implausibly?
Well, it depends. If you joined the jury honestly, and after due consideration thought that the law was stupid-* as applied in this case*- you’d likely be OK.
But a public statement beforehand would be grounds for contempt.
And note- I think drugs laws are in general stupid. But if you see the actual dudes in court, they aren’t some hapless stoners, most are hard core violent gang-bangers. Stupid drug laws or no, most of us would be very happy to see those guys off the streets.
In this case, your duty being on the jury, regardless of whether you thought the law was stupid, is to decide if the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the law(s) broken based on the evidence presented in the case. You can certainly make that decision and still believe the law was stupid - it shouldn’t affect your ability to make that decision.
What do you mean by slack? I was in the pool for a death penalty case, and potential jurors expressing opposition to the death penalty were explicitly not excused on the first round. I don’t know about the second, and they never got to me so I don’t know how it played out.
You probably wouldn’t need to make such a statement.
Most lawyers, as part of the jury selection process, will ask if you have a moral issue with the law in question, and obviously the prosecutor wouldn’t want someone like that on the jury.
It’s would be a novel formulation of the term “right” (to say the least) to suggest that you have a right to do something if you can’t be prevented from doing it.
From Bricker’s SDSAB article:
In short, you can’t be punished for voting to nullify, but you could be punished for failing to disclose your nullification view on voir dire.
Allow me to express an opinion on GQ on the issue of jury nullification. I believe it to be a power (rather than “right”) which juries unquestionably have, but one that is subject to grave danger of misuse and so should be used seldom if ever.
By way of parallel, the President has the unquestioned Constitutional power to dissolve or adjourn Congress, but has never had circunstances warranting using it occur; the House has the power to impeach a Supreme Court Justice (happened once) or a President (twce, with a certain third rendered moot by his resignation); and thirty states acting jointly have the power to compel Congress to call a Constitutional Convention (never done). These powers certainly do exist but are wisely reserved for use in the vanishingly rare situations where the good of the country would depend on their use.
In his discussions on the subject, Bricker has pointed out the dangers inherent in use of jury nullification (as, I believe, have other Dopers-at-Law such as Elendil’s Heir). The example that stuck in my mind is mid-20th-century Southern juries refusing to convict white men of the murder or assault of a black man despite evidence easily surmounting the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard.
Nonetheless there regularly occur situations when strict application of the letter of the law will result in the patent working of a grave injustice. The majority of such situations are handled by the police declining to arrest – probably most American Dopers have been the beneficiaries of a trivial example of police discretion, “letting you off with a warning.” Of similar cases where the police decline or are forbidden by law from using police discretion, the prosecutor may invoke prosecutorial discretion and decline to prosecute, or move for dismissal. At the next level, a trial judge, either on his own motion or that of the prosecution or defense, may “dismiss [a case] in the interests of justice” where the purblind pursuit of the letter of the law would serve to work an instance of jinjustice.
In my mind jury nullification in its proper place is the fourth step in that progression – when a jury is convinced that the strict application of the letter of the law would result not in the doing of justice but its opposite, and for whatever reason (“old boys network”? elitism of the local Bar?) the judge and attorneys have failed to act. Such situations are going to be exceedingly rare in practice – my guess is that one case in two decades somewhere in the thousands of local courts scattered across America might be slightly oversstating it – but it is a rarely-to-be-drawn-forth-and-used tool in the arsenal of justice when just such extremely unusual situations dp arise.
None of these address nullification on the grounds that the law itself is unjust. The first three steps involve people with multiple chances to arrest or prosecute those accused of breaking a specific law, and letting people under special circumstances is different from refusing to prosecute violations of a law period. Jurors only get one shot, and refusing to vote for conviction due to special circumstance there seems different from refusing to vote for conviction because one things that a law is unjust - even though both may count as nullification.
Think of the difference between refusing to prosecute someone for possession of marijuana when the person was given a small amount without his knowledge versus refusing to prosecute someone in possession of 100 kilos. You’d refuse to convict both if you thought the law was unjust, but only the first if you thought this application of the law was unjust.
Noted. My apology to Bricker.
Doesn’t this imply HeyHomie has an obligation to bring his (or her) views on nullification to the attention of the court, albeit in some discreet way which doesn’t taint the panel?
With all the discussion of jury nullification, I’m surprised nobody has mentioned New Hampshire’s HB146 yet.
Signed into law by the governor June 18, 2012.
The New Hampshire Bar has an interesting article about it as well, for those who are interested.
Interesting. I hadn’t heard of the New Hampshire law before.