I agree that there are some “apples versus oranges” things cropping up here.
The viewpoint I’ve been espousing is not intended to apply outside of a rather specific box, which is the conventional construction of scientific theory and research hypotheses, which in turn depends in part on subscribing to some conventions.
Convention One: You set up a theory. Your theory is a description of the universe or some tiny part thereof and how you think it works. A theory must account for some observable behavior or phenomenon, but it may contain huge parts that are not observed or in some cases may even be inherently impossible to observe.
Convention Two: You so not seek to “prove your theory”. (This is because theories generally attempt to map out more of “what is so” than can ever be directly tested). So when you are done your theory remains “unproven”, but “supported” insofar as it accurately predicts something (as you will see below).
Convention Three: You will instead seek to set up a counterhypothesis, one that, if true, would be inexplicable within the bounds of your theory. It is chosen for its utility value as something that can be easily and solidly disproven with an absolute minimum of abstract theory knitting together the empirical evidence; and for its utility value as something that, if not disproven, torpedoes your theory as a predictive tool.
Convention Four: The counterhypothesis does not attempt to explain stuff. It does not constitute an alternative theory. Instead, if not disproven within the experiment, it constitutes “the unexplained” and because it is unexplained your theory needs reworking or discarding.
Now, outside the box (and scientists and researchers don’t stay within its confines in real life either), sure, let’s say you formulate a theory (Bathtubs are inhabited by big green Martians at least once every 72 hours which explains where bathtub rings come from, the damn Martians put them there), you construct a counterhypothesis and set out to blow it to bits (if, in fact, there ain’t no Martians, you would not be able to capture them on time-lapse film if cameras are taped to the shower head, so let’s test that, and the photographs showing the Martians will blow that counterhypothesis to bits), and then your evidence fails to falsify your counterhypothesis and your theory fails to explain things (bathtub rings and/or the fact that the Martians who put them there didn’t show up on film) – so like most scientists you do what? Yeah, you continue to believe what you believed before and you decide the problem is that your experimental design wasn’t good (hmm, this time we’ll add film sensitive to longer and shorter wavelengths, maybe they are transparent to visible light!).
And obviously, with a bit of language manipulation most any thesis can be reworded such that if originally expressed as a negative (there are no Martians anywhere in the universe) it can be stated as a positive (the universe consists in its entirety of things that are not Martians).
My point is that the original “old saw” about “you can’t prove a negative” or “you can’t prove that something does not exist” is a half-understood / half-misconstrued ripoff of this tradition in research. You want a that your thesis describes the existence of a process that explains something in order that b you can formulate a counterhypothesis which would negate it, and in the negative this counterthesis would tend to say that the process (and its empirical “footprints”) does not occur, in order that c you can falsify the counterhypothesis by finding footprints, thus validating your thesis which would predict that you’d find them if you looked for them.
Within that framework, you don’t want to start out with the theory that “Joe’s thesis about Martians being the explanation for bathtub rings is wrong, there are no such Martians” because then your empirically-oriented counterhypothesis is positive (“Martians do exist and therefore leave Martian footprints in the tub or can be photographed as they create bathtub rings etc.”) and your falsification of it is – not, not conceptually, intrinsically demonstrable (“yeah I could study every tub throughout history and determine the perennial absence of Martians”) but pragmatically unprovable. It’s a convention based on the practical.
What you do instead is formulate an alternative theory that is positive (“bathtub rings are caused by human epidermis and soap scum floating on top of the bathwater long enough to stick to porcelain, and then when the water drains out the skin-&-scum layer stays put at water level”), generate your negative counterhypothesis (“If this is not so, then running the water without soap or humans but otherwise according to same schedule will still yield bathtub rings in 14 day experiments”), blow it out of the water (“See? No bathtub rings! Followup experiments show mild rings with humans but no soap and with soap but no humans and strong rings with combo of humans and soap”), and then you’ve explained the same phenomenon as the guys theorizing big green Martians.
There may or may not nevertheless be big green Martians (in or out of tubs) but what does their posited existence explain? Not tub rings, at this point. We have another explanation in place that doesn’t require them, and no evidence to support their existence.
Clearer?