In the third day? Definitely.
:smack:
I meant George Thomas.
Battle of Nancy, where Charles ‘the Bold’/‘the Rash’, duke of Burgundy, basically threw away his life against vastly superior forces. He was essentially beaten in the war already and should have just negotiated whatever deal he could, but that wasn’t in his nature.
Any boneheaded moves by the Americans/Allies ain WWII along these lines?
I chose WWII first because I don’t know these kind of mistakes, as opposed to bad intelligence or poor generalship or all the other myriad ways to die in war.
ETA: And I guess in this context we should stand in awe of MacArthur, but like Dunkirk maybe that shouldn’t count.
The French strategy of “attack à outrance” during WWI was a disaster. They were reacting to the Franco-Prussian War, where they made the mistake of being too defensive-minded. It led them to continue to send assaults against the Germans.
They learned their lesson and built the Maginot Line…
Burgoyne at Saratoga. He should have never fought that battle, after all of the disasters the British Army suffered reaching that point. The defeat of the British at Saratoga directly led to the French joining the war on the side of the Americans.
The Battle Of Evesham largely forgotten, but absolutely critical in European history as if it turned out differently England could have a constitutional monarchy centuries earlier.
Both before the battle itself, and earlier in the campaign, De Montfort could have retreated to his heartland (and enormous castle) at Kenilworth, but he didn’t and it didn’t end well for him or the cause of constitutional reform.
I flag down a mod re: forum choice.
Back over the Alps? I don’t recall what was going on re: both navies at the time.
Seems factual enough to me.
Not so sure on this one - Simon de Montfort was a good commander, but Prince Edward had fairly neatly hemmed him in leading up to the battle and his strategic options were poor. The unfortunate fact of the matter ( if you were a Montfortian reformer ) is that once Gloucester had defected back to the royalists, Louis IX remained steadfastly unwilling to recognize the Montfort regime and Edward was back at large, he was probably pretty much screwed barring pulling another rabbit out of his hat like at Lewes. The royalist resources were just much greater and holing up at Kenilworth ( which was exceptionally strong but had little strategic importance except as a check on the earls of Warwick ) would have just delayed the inevitable. Simon de Montfort’s “heartlands” didn’t really amount to all that much resource-wise, which is half the reason he was in rebellion in the first place.
After all the Dictum of Kenilworth really just allowed for a politically necessary reconciliation between the rebel barons and the king. It didn’t end up safeguarding Derby and I just don’t see it being extended to Montfort or his sons. Exile and confiscation is likely the very best they could have hoped for.
Of course I can criticize my own earlier example above on similar grounds :). Charles of Burgundy really had pretty much lost already. Avoiding battle would have most likely only have saved his life, not radically altered the course campaign.
More likely by sea to Africa. But it’s not like he was trapped in Italy. When Scipio eventually invades Africa, Hannibal does return to Carthage with his army, and goes on to fight the battle of Zama. I don’t recall any mentions of him having problems getting there. Getting reinforcements into Italy was a whole different issue, obviously, but if Hannibal had decided to leave earlier, I don’t see the Romans trying to stop him. They wanted nothing more than to get him off Italian soil. A kind reminder not to let the door hit him on the way out would probably have been the end of it.
Initially, MacArthur completely failed to react to Pearl Harbor.
Lees “defend Virginia” obsession probably caused him defeat and the destruction of his Army. Withdrawal to more defensible positions in the Carolinas might have been a better strategy.
What does this mean? /not snark
Actually, although interesting, it’s completely irrelevant to this thread, I think.
Though he had already heard the news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (time zone difference), McArthur (who headed both the U.S. and Filipino forces in the Philippines) did not have his air forces in the air when the Japanese bombers appeared overhead and his bombers were mostly destroyed while on the ground.:smack:
Not his decision to make. The fact that the Confederate government purposefully moved the capital from Montgomery, Ala., far from Federal lines, to Richmond, Va., just a hundred miles from Washington, D.C., had a lot more to do with how much fighting there was in Lee’s home state.
The Confederates in other theatres displayed a lot of flexibility in withdrawing when they had to,Bragg withdrew from most of Tenessee and than inflicted the reversal at Chickamauga.
Losing your national capital, even if it gives you greater strategic flexibility, is generally considered a Very Bad Thing.
The entire Japanese strategy fighting against the Allies, once the Allies were on the offensive.
Banzai charges worked well against poorly trained, poorly paid, unmotivated peasant soldiers fighting for corrupt warlords without armored vehicles or machine guns, why in the world wouldn’t they also work again motivated, well equipped, and well trained Western forces?
Not only that, he disappeared into his quarters and refused to come out to lead for several critical hours. He refused to allow the bomb attack on Taiwan which was outlined in the war plans.
He should have been court-martialled.
The destruction of your Army, your supply base, the rest of your country, is an even worse thing. As Kutuzov, Washington and Madison had demonstrated. You need one proclamation to create a new capital; far harder to replace what was lost.