Who was Nathan Bedford Forest? And why do southerners celebrate his holiday?

As has been pointed out elsewhere, most people barely have a clue as to who Forrest is. He’s sunk into well deserved ignorance and historical apathy. I don’t know of any state that celebrates his birthday.

Calling him a “a hero because he was a rascist who killed a ot of blacks” is totally untrue today. In the past, there might have been a small minority who defended his actions, but even that is debateable. If he is remembered at all, it’s as the General who founded the original KKK, which he ordered disbanded before his death.

Personally, I’m insulted you would even THINK any southerner would think of that barely talented butcher a hero.

Lee’s day is on the same day as MLK’s.

looking for my pills now…

(Transferring prior answer on locked thread)

Forrest was quite a character…

He was, before the war, one of the leading slave traders in the country, a millionaire, he used slave trading to pull himself and his brothers up from a hillbilly birth.

He could barely read or write. He was fearless and quick to escalate disputes to violence.

He was respected (perhaps even feared) by his slaves, but there is no indication that he ever mistreated them and (like most “poor white trash”) willingly worked with them.

He opposed secession, thought the South could not exist economically without the North, resigned his elected position as City Councilman in Memphis in part to avoid the secession controversy. His business was heavily in debt to Northern banks. He was also trying to diversify away from slave trading, turning the business over to his younger brothers.

He enlisted as a private after Ft Sumter but quit and formed his own cavalry unit with his own funds. Like many hill folk , he found the Southern army controlled by the Tidewater elite and their West Point graduates. (Many hill people, even in the deep south remained loyal to the Union but not Forrest.)

He first gained notoriety when he refused to surrender his unit at Ft Donaldson to General Grant. Instead he led his men through a partially frozen river at night past the Union lines. His unit gained the respect of the South and the anger of the North with numerous raids against Union supply lines and installations, defeating every attempt to destroy him. He was not as effective in major battles, however, probably due to the small size of his cavalry as compared to the cavalry in the east under J.E.B. Stuart.

It is debatable whether he ordered the death of any African-American prisoner - even though the Confederate Congress had ordered such punishment. Forrest actually preferred to attack black garrisoned forts, feeling (correctly) that the lightly trained blacks would surrender.

His troops were involved in two war crimes during the Civil War, the massacre at Ft. Pillow and the much smaller massacre at Selma. In both cases prisoners were murdered, in the former mostly black, in the latter (at the very end of the war) white oficers. Never directly implicated, Forrest was never even held on charges. To do so would require holding Robert E Lee as well as Lee commanded the troops that murdered black prisoners during the Crater Battle during the seige of Petersburg, Virginia.

Never captured, Forrest was the last major Confederate commander to surrender (excluding Texas). He quickly endorsed loyalty to the Union and began to rearrange his finances. Northern generals were relieved, they had assumed that if the South opened a guerilla war, Forrest would lead it.

He did not form the Ku Klux Klan. Still basically illiterate after the war, Forrest couldn’t even conceive of the sophmoric organization and rules of this secret society. He probably wasn’t even the first Confederate General to endorse the group and its immediate tactics - intimidating black voters.

But he quickly joined and became its leader. Under Forrest, the Klan started to reconcile Confederates with hill people loyal to the Union but opposed to equal rights. He disbanded the organization when it became clear that the Klan would perpetuate (and worsen) Union occupation of the South. Being a secret society, the Klan also quickly got out of control of the college educated officers that created it.

Forrest struggled to pay his debts after the war and engaged in a number of failed ventures. He alienanted his racist friends by denouncing white southerners as lazy and called for Asian immigration into the South. He also made a speech calling for reconciliation between blacks and whites. He died in 1877 of typhus, not yet 60, contracted by working alongside convict laborers in the fields of a farm he managed.

The Klan did not go away but extended its reach into fertile grounds in the border and Northern states (especially Indiana). As the South stagnated (and blacks agitated for equal rights), the Klan became much more violent than under Forrest. Forrest’s last years were quickly forgotten and he became a symbol of Southern resistance, hatred and intolerance.

I have never heard of Nathan Bedford Forrest day and I am a Southerner born and bred. When I lived in Louisiana during the 80’s the state employees got Confederacy Day (marking the date of creation of the Confederacy) off, but I do not know if they still do.

Most of the holidays like this were created during the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries by people who still had memories of the war or were children of those in the war. Almost of all of them have been forgotten, it is just that nobody has bothered to take them off the books. I have lived in the South all of my life and I have never celebrated these holidays or seen any celebration of them (with the exception of the example given above).

Thank you Nixon for the truly informative mini-history lesson. I found it very interesting.

I’ll have to ask the Moderator to split this off into another thread; I don’t know how.

To respond to MrBlue92;

  1. The real turning point on the Eastern Front, in terms of “what send the war going the other way?”, was Kursk, not Stalingrad. Your claim that the Germans could not mount a threatening offensive after Stalingrad can’t be true, since Kursk was six months later and was one of the greatest German offenses of the war.

  2. The effect of Allied Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union cannot be underestimated. Two thirds of the Red Army’s trucks were American. Half its battle rations were made in the West, as well as much of their winter clothing. Raw materials by the megaton - aluminum, copper, you name it. The USSR’s material success had a lot to do with the Western Allies.

  3. The impact of the bombing campaign was substantially greater than has been fashionable to state in the last ten years or so. However inaccurate the bombing might have been, the Germans took it very seriously. At one point a quarter of ALL German artillery ammunition production was dedicated to antiaircraft production. Tens of thousands of 8.8cm guns and other less famous weapons were dedicated to antiaircraft defense. The Luftwaffe dedicated a large portion (and eventually the entirety) of the Luftwaffe to bombing defense, the vast majority of which was destroyed in the effort. The overall impact of the bombing campaign in terms of its drain on German resources cannot be measured merely by what oil refineries were hit; the German loss in men and material trying to defend against bombing was enormous.

It is certainly true that the Allied ground offensive wasn’t comparable to the USSR’s until 1944 and the annihilation of Army Group West (another colossal Hitler blunder) but the weight of fighting the Allies was just as great. When one considers the level of logistical, industrial and human effort required by Germany to fight fairly large-scale wars in North Africa and Italy, the submarine battle in the Atlantic, ANd the aforementioned air war, AND consider the necessity of tying up divisions in France to counter the Western threat, AND consider the Western Allies’ amazing advances in electronic intelligence and spying, AND consider Lend-Lease, the Western effort adds up. It doesn’t have the immediate visceral impact that the Red Army does because it’s a lot of things, whereas the Red Army blob delivers big numbers.

  1. As an aside, I doubt the Me-262 or the big tanks would have done the Germans much good against the Soviets. The Me-262 was effective against heavy bombers, but against fighters it was of little use. Its low acceleration, poor handling at low altitudes and lack of a high-rate-of-fire weapon made it a frequent victim of Allied fighters.

As to the Tiger tank, the Soviets had equivalent vehicles, like the “Joseph Stalin II” and other supertanks. The Tiger was a colossally inefficient weapon; big and strong though it might have been, it was easily defeated in close-in battles and was an absolute bastard to keep maintained and in the field. The Germans would have been better off building smaller tanks and more spare parts.

Nothing the Germans were producing would have given them a significant tactical advantage over what the USSR would have countered with.

sigh
RickJay:

The point I was countering was Asmodeus’s assertion that US involvement automatically insured Allied victory:

Point by point on your post:

  1. The debate about what was the turning point is a whole other story, and most historians tend to agree on Stalingrad. But frankly that’s rather trivial and I’m not going to argue it. The point I was making was that the Germans were limited to local offensive operations in the East by the time significant U.S. forces were engaged on the ground in Europe. Oh, and if you compare Barbarossa to Blue (Stalingrad) to Citadel (Kursk), you’ll notice a steady decrease in effectiveness as the German Army was worn out by the Russians. Kursk was a huge battle, but calling it a “great German offensive” is… well, I was going to say “insane”, but let’s just say it didn’t go anywhere, so how can you even suggest it was great?

  2. I’m not saying US did not lend a huge amount of help to Russia. Didn’t I mention the trucks and trains? Without that help, I might foresee a stalemate, and Stalin sends millions more Russians to die on the front. Maybe they would have taken 20 million more casualties. But Stalin had the numbers and was bloodthirsty enough to win at any cost. Also, remember Lend-Lease started in 1940, before the US entered the war. So the question of whether US military involvement was required does not necessarily pertain to US aid.

  3. Yes, the bombing campaign was quite effective in '43-'45, but not really in '42, and if you think the Germans could have won in the East after Stalingrad, well, I’d strongly disagree, even in the absence of US air power. The best they could have hoped for was a draw or loss ala WWI.

  4. I would tend to disagree about the ME-262, as possibly the Germans would have modified it appropriately (a few 20mm’s and more power?) if given a year. Not sure if they’d been able to improve the Tiger 2 to make it a real offensive weapon, but it was superior to the IS-2, if only slightly. But really the weaponry was only one factor. My thinking was more along the lines that without US intervention, Germany would have had more planes, artillery, and men in the East, thus pushing the end of the war out 6 to 20 months, depending on the breaks.

I tactically withdraw that statement, as the Germans might have been able to keep much of mainland Europe had they negotiated with the Soviets (if that were possible).

Can’t be done. Feel free, however, to open a fresh topic.

Sofa King wrote:

Belisarius had more to do with the reconquest of Italy than Narses did:

http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/4/0,5716,15404+1+15213,00.html

Andrew Warinner

mrblue92 wrote:

I think he meant ‘greatest’ in the sense that Germany gambled the bulk of its reserves and weapons production on the offensive, not that military success rewarded that investment.

The problem all these counterfactual arguments is that they often ignore the political dimension of warfare. It’s relatively easy to postulate a scenario like ‘if Britain and the US had not conducted the strategic bombing campaign then Germany would have had X more arms production capacity and hence Y more tanks and Z more artillery and so could have fought a conclusive offensive against the USSR in 1944.’ Political decisions are not so easy to quantify, hinging as they do on personalities.

My gut instinct is that any counterfactual that allows Germany to concentrate more force against the USSR in 1941-2 can’t assume that the USSR will stay in the war. Given a choice between a truncated Soviet Union with an intact leadership and a soundly defeated USSR and deposed leadership, I think Stalin would have chosen the former. After all, they had done it before. And Stalin had the political wherewithal to impose such an ideological backflips on the country.

Andrew Warinner

Note to self: never mention Hitler in passing.

The large growth of off-subject strands have developed into such huge trunks that I can no longer see the Forrest for the trees.

On reviewing this thread I realize the hijack was my fault. I was on 1hr. sleep. Mea Culpa. Since the thread was started by a banned troll, and the hijack has spawned an interesting debate I don’t feel too bad.

And Mr. Blue, according to my Atlas of the Second World War, By May '44 the Soviets had recaptured Crimea, and were pretty close to there pre-invasion boundaries. (Can’t be more precise 'cause the @#%# thing doesn’t come with a scale!)

RickJay, you are correct in that Hitler did not invent Blitzkrieg warfare. However he did listen to Guderian and Manstien, and encouraged them. The true theorists behind Blitzkrieg were Fuller, Liddel-Hart, and, to a lesser extent, De Gaulle. The British and the French ignored them while the Germans built their Army around their ideas. The Allies saw the Tank as infantry support, while the Germans realized that Tanks were now lords of the battlefield. As always, only the losers learn.

However this does not make up for the numerous blunders Hitler made, too many to list here. (Not to mention his being the epitome of evil. I mean, lest you think I’m some sort of Nazi here.)

If this were to continue much further, I’d suggest we open another topic, but I won’t be back until Wednesday anyway, so it might die by then.

To clear up the Kursk issue (which I should have done originally)… Kursk was small in size and scope when compared to Barbarossa and even Blue(Stalingrad) in that it was a local objective. The German offensive lasted all of two weeks at most, compared to the multi-month offensives of the previous two summers. My original post said, “[After Stalingrad the] Germans would never again be able launch a truely threatening general offensive in the East.” Kursk was NOT a general offensive. Therefore I believe I was correct.

Granted, the Soviets were very well prepared due to continual delays to start that operation and good intelligence on German deployments. Perhaps if the Germans hadn’t waffled so badly Citadel might have been the opening of a major general offensive, but I seriously doubt it would have been even as successful (toward the end of winning the war) as Blue, which failed miserably.

The fact is, Stalin felt betrayed by Hitler after the breaking of the non-aggression pact. When the war began in the East, Stalin spent weeks in seclusion from the shock. It seems he actually trusted Hitler to keep his word (though oddly enough, he trusted few of his own people). I have my doubts that Stalin would have ever trusted Hitler enough after January '42 to reach a peace settlement, but I suppose I could be wrong.

I do, however continue to maintain that without US military intervention, Barbarossa would have still failed (the Soviets launched their general counter-offensive in December '41, before we brought any significant forces to bear on Germany). That means that the US bombing campaign and involvement in North Africa would have had to have prevented Blue from succeeding in '42. I doubt that is true. After the Germans had failed to defeat Russia in the first two major offensives without serious US military contributions (when the Germans were strongest and Russians were weakest), it seems unlikely they would have been able to do in '43 or '44, regardless of American military action. Granted, the fact that the US was in the war might have been a morale boost for the Soviet infantryman in '41/'42, but it’s highly unlikely that decided any battles.

I think if we had not entered the European theater, Hitler still would have been defeated, but the war would have dragged on longer, and the vast majority of Europe would have been communist.

Has anybody moved this debate to a new thread, or is this a dead horse now?