I would add, a large proportion of the British-made shells were defective (bad detonators). These shells would just bury themselves, without doing damage (unless one landed on top of a German position). So despite the massive barrages fired off (before one of their attacks), most of the German machine gun nests were able to open up and slaughter the attacking troops. Gen. Haig kept performing this little stunt…he figured that the draft boards back home would keep up the supply of cannon fodder. Te shell situation was not confined to the British Army-the Royal Navy had the problem at Jutland (despite scoring hits on every german ship), very little damage was inflicted, as the shells failed to explode and simply broke up on impact.
Quite right about the shells in 1916 at the Somme. Production had been increased incredibly rapidly at the expense of quality with the result that many (up to 30%) failed to explode. For the time the bombardment seemed massive - the British fired off 1.7M shells of all sizes in eight days. The error was to believe that it would both so cow the Germans that they would be unable to fight back and that the artillery could cut the wire for the attackers to march through. It was a mistake but not an unreasonable one, no one had used such a bombardment before and it seemed reasonable to believe that nothing could survive it.
A year later at Messine they fired 3.5M shells, again in eight days, and in late 1918 they fired nearly a million in 24 hours. Apart from the sheer weight of shells - not only were there more of them they were on average af larger calibre in 1918 - the difference was that there were far fewer duds and they knew how to use them to good effect.
What is wrong is to suggest that Haig blindly ordered “futile” attacks over and over again to no purpose. On the 2nd July should the British have said, “No, this is too bad. We’re not going to attack again.” We’ll just leave the French to fight at Verdun, the Italians at Isonzo, and the Russians in Transylvania." In each attack Haig and his subordinates tried different tactics to reduce the casualties - the trouble was - as I’ve pointed out before - there was no way of defeating a first class mass army such as the Germans had without major casualties on both sides. This applied in WW2 as well as in WW1 - it was just the Russians that fought and died in WW2.
Even if Haig and the other Generals were as callous as you seem to believe it is absurd to think that any commander cared nothing about losses. Trained men are a General’s capital, losses without gain are useless to him. Whatever else you can say about Haig he knew the war would not be over quickly and, in the long run, he would need every man he could get.
That was probably D Macs finest performance as a General. It was a risk and it paid off. He was lucky, yes, but some of the greatest performances in history have involved taking risks, Napoleon at Austerlitz, hannibal at Cannae, ceaser at Alesia, Grant at Vicksburg, Arthur Wellselly at Assyre.
MichaelQReilly
Well, yes and no. How do I put this… you are taking the last in a long string of causaiton and using it as the first cause. And it wasn’t really so. Yes, Lee was finally overcome through just not having enough troops or energy to fight back. But the only reason that situation came up at all was because he deliberately chose that option. He knew that it was the only way to hold out as long as he did. But saying that was why he lost is kinda like saying that the vase broke because there was a floor in the way. Yes, the attrition’s floor technically broke the Lee’s vase. But Grant was swinging a damn baseball bat at the vase, and Lee was desperately trying to juggle it: Grant won because he was swinging the bat, not because he put in the floor.
MarcusF
Oh, of course. Repeat lines of trenches was not new, however, and you do have to penetrate past them. However, you have the advantage of more numbers right there, at the point of contact. They can’t guard every line, everywhere well, unless they have so many men they’ve oddle to spare. WHich they don’t, or they wouldn’t be stuck behgind a trench themselves.
And that’s actually the major fault. While machine guns are nasty, the optimal solution involves doing a much tighter breakthrough (preferably with some units sneaking up under cover or darkness). It’s not pretty, and you lose a lot of men initially. But you do suffer vastly fewer casualties this way, in the long run.
On weak spots: there are always weak spots, but it’s true that sometimes they require wide flanking manuevers, or rear-guard attacks from the sea, or something. Part of the problem was that
On reinforcing attacks: This is probably my main point of criticism of any western military from the mid-medieval until very recently. There are ways to communicate over long distances even with minimal technology, but they were not well-used for some reason. That’s not to specifically hit on WW1 generals, but it’s been a serious flaw and one they did not adequately correct.
Likewise, the units to stop reinforcements don’t need any super-special secret training or gear. They just need to know their orders are to advance forward as fast as possible, disrupt the enemy’s rear, and set up ambushes to prevent any rear units from moving forward. EVen if pushed back, they can easily buy time for more other units to take the enemy trenches and troops. If the enemy remain in position, they will either need considerable reinforcements very quickly (weakening other regions for a similar assault) or become very vulnerable.
understand, I am not suggesting they never developed this. I am saying they developed this too late; It should not have taken nearly so long, particularly as they were reinventing the wheel. The pace of allied tactical and strategic improvements were much slower than in comparable wars, such as the Civil War or WW2, and I attribute this to weak leadership (particularly British and French generals).
In any case, there’s really no reason for trench warfare as they used it. Regardless of the political risks of leading the enemy into the open, at the cost of some territory, they are probably much less than the risks of squatting in a hole slowly or quickly killing off all your men for no gain whatsoever for half a decade. If it comes to a choice between the two, any sane man would choose the former.
As a second point, you will note (and actually, apprently already did) that I ignored artillery. This was intentional, because as MichaelQReilly noted, it was ridiculously ineffective. I don’t suggest it ought to have been better - the know-how for that was definitely not something which could be developed, remembered, or experimented with easily, and I know it. But it was not effective. They could rounds on a position reasonably well, but they were terribly poor at doing their job. Generals also didn’t seem to recognize this and so didn’t seem to get why it was not helping.
On Haig: Well, I would agree he ought to have thought as you suggest. We differ on whether he actually did so.
…is in doing the same thing, expecting a different result.
Yes, I concede that Gen. Haig wsn’t a complete idiot, but surely after losing 100,000 men (most of them dying horribly in No Mans land), one would develop a different strategy. Since (by 1916) it was evident that artillery barrages followed by frontal infantry assaults were not working, it is hard for me to see Gen. Haig as a man who learned from experience.
But as others have pinted out, Haig was considered a national hero-he was awarded a bonus of 1 million pounds at wars end (presumably from the grateful undertakers of GB).
Re the shells, I have read that quite a few of the munitions imported from the USA were of poor quality as the munitions industry were in it for a large profit so quality wasn’t the major factor. (I’m in the process of moving so I can’t provide a cite as I don’t have access to my library).
As regards Haig and the Battle of the Somme, it must be remembered that he was in charge of the army and whilst his plans were on a strategic level, the plans for a Divison or a Corps were drawn up by the generals in command there. At the Somme, there were some initial success- the casualties were not evenly spread (it was the VIII Corps which suffered the heaviest casualties while achieving none of its objectives. It was commanded by Hunter-Weston). Also, the Somme was a battle that Haig did not want to fight- it was a battle to assist relieve pressure on the French at Verdun. Haig’s biggest failure was persisting when it became obvious what a dogs breakfast it was- as in reinforcing failure.
Thank you, good sir. Gen. Sedgewick is well-known and respected in these parts, as the most notheasterly county of Colorado and a hamlet therein both are named after him. God knows why, and the poor man would probably be embarrassed (as would Generals Crook and Logan and Gov. Denver, but we love them nonetheless.)
IIRC, it was that the Allies relied on fragmentation shells when what were needed were high explosive shells. And for that matter, that it only turned out after the war that tests revealed that their fragmentation shells were spectacularly ineffective.
One problem with a “retreat and lead the Germans out of their trenches” strategy was that the French remembered the Franco-Prussian War all too clearly. Based on the experiences of that war, the French believed that advances made their own momentum, and that victory would go to whoever could gain the offensive. So the original French plan was a massive mobile invasion of German-held territory. When that didn’t happen, the impulse to dig in was based on the fear that yielding territory would simply feed a German sweep.
I don’t want to drag this out but just to respond to some of these points.
This is the Western Front we are talking about: there were no flanks. As to “rear-guards attacks from the sea” I assume you are talking about an amphibious landing on the North Sea coast to out-flank the trench line. Ignoring the absence of effective amphibious landing capability, the presence of continuous mine belts, and the inability of the Royal Navy to operate close to the coast since 1914 this just moves the problems for the First World War attacker - trenches, barbed wire, machine guns and artillery – to a new area. An area where reinforcement and supply is even more of a problem. Read up about Gallipoli or how difficult the Normandy landing were in 1944 despite the bulk of the German Army being engaged in Russia. Landing one or two divisions would have done nothing but get them killed.
If I’ve understood this your idea is that the British and French should have withdrawn from their lines, the Germans would then have obligingly climbed out of their trenches and advanced into an area where they could have been destroyed by the Anglo French guns. This makes no sense. The Allies move back – do they keep going back till they reach the Atlantic? Presumably not, the French might feel surrendering their whole country was a less than optimum strategy so they stop somewhere. Actually they are going to have to stop if they want to fire on the advancing Germans. So when they stop what do they do? Stand around in rows and wait for the Germans? No, they do what any soldier does, they find cover and the most effective cover is to dig a hole in the ground. But you want to move between these holes without exposing yourself to fire so you join them up by digging a trench. Now the Germans who a following the withdrawing Anglo-French armies (not sure why they are doing this – they already occupy the main industrial areas of France and Belgium) approach the new line of trenches and come under heavy fire and start losing men. So what do they do? Yes, that’s right, they dig in to get out of the line of the bullets and shrapnel. Again the foxholes get joined up and lo and behold you have two new trench lines 20 miles nearer Paris. I do not see how this is going to liberate occupied France and win the war.
To suggest that artillery was ineffective is just absurd. Artillery was the absolute prerequisite for all operations during WW1 (and subsequent wars). Whether attacking or defending artillery support was vital. Artillery was the number one killer during WW1, way ahead of machine gun and rifle fire. For the reasons I have already given – technical as well as operational – in 1916 artillery was not able to clear the way for an attack and support the attackers in holding the ground taken. What it could do was kill people and, unpleasant as it might be, killing the enemy was a major objective. Driving the Germans out of the territory they had occupied was unlikely to be possible until their magnificent 1914 field army had be ground down in size and effectiveness and it was the artillery supporting the 1915/16/17 attacks that really did this.
I’m not sure where the 100,000 figure comes from but no, it was not “evident that artillery barrages followed by frontal infantry assaults were not working” in 1916. There was enough success from previous British, French, and German attacks to suggest that with sufficient weight of artillery and enough men it could succeed. Hence the unprecedented 8 day artillery barrage preceding the opening day of the Somme. It didn’t work but it was not launched in wilful denial of some self evident truth. As to the “bonus”, Haig was awarded GBP100,000 by both houses of Parliament and, yes, when he died in 1928 his funeral route was lined by mourning crowd – including former soldiers – who remembered him as a hero and as “the man who won the war” (Pershing).
Sorry to go on about this but it has pushed one of my buttons. There is a lot of room to argue about how good a general Haig was – as **Cicero **says he persisted too long in attacks that were running out of steam and he was too slow to dismiss incompetent subordinates – but attack him for the right reasons. Don’t just lump him (and all other WW1 generals) into one big mass of incompetence and assume that anybody with half a brain could have fought – and won – the war with a fraction of the casualties.
Haig also seems to have been very well liked by his men and did a lot for the ones (who survived) after the war. As I have mentioned, I am not a Haig advocate but on seeing the performance of other commanders of any nationality his performance was very good.
The matter of casualties is difficult to judge as well as both sides had different systems. The Allies would record whoever went to a Field station as a casualty whereas the Germans would not if that combatant went back into the field.
So it is difficult to compare.
Yes, absolute numbers are impossible to get. All you can say is they were enormous on both side. I think the point to make is that they were awful not only for both sides in WW1 but they were as bad or worse in WW2 - at least when major forces on both sides were engaged. I haven’t got a figure but my memory is that the British casualty rate per unit engaged was worse in Normany than on the Somme. The difference was that we were only having to fight a fraction of the German army - the Soviets were doing the bulk of the fighting and dying.
If the “caring” generals of WW2, who had been junior officers in WW1, could not do better, I think it is wrong to assume WW1 generals - and Haig in particular, were, as a whole and at all times, incompetent.
But such words, you are only condemning the man in the eyes of Sun Tzu. 
However, strict comparisopns to WW2 are not really viable: lives were spent in WW1 on attacks which were known, or should have been known, to be futile in advance (and the soldiers did, hence the French mutinies).
Likewise, comparing the difficult, but practical assault at Normandy to the Somme is absurd. Normandy, in addition to actually succeeding, was well-planned. It was, in fact, what I posted earlier to the letter, except against a different type of field fortification. And the soldiers involved actually were not armed much better on the offensive, and MUCH better on the defensive. High casualties, at a limited time and place, are not indivicative of failure. Repeated high casualties, to no gain, draggin on forever, are.
Yeah, WWII Generals (at least some of them, most of the time) bought movement and resolution with the blood they spilled.
One of my all time favories. Being an intellectual, Gen. Navarre conceived a plan to get the Viteminh to “come out and fight”. So he plunked down a few divisions in a remote valley, which was:
-too far away to be supplied easily
-had no natural escape route (in case things went awry)
-was ringed by high mountains (allowing the enemy to easily target artillery shells onto the garrison).
Well, the French force landed…and the Vietminh patiently encircled the camp…when the French artillery commander (Col. Proth) was aked if he considered the threat of Vietminh artillery-he laughed (“they can’t move artillery pieces through that jungle”).
Well, later, he was proven wrong-the garisson as encircled and overrun. Despite a heroic defense, it was a horrendous defeat for the French forces.
Bad generals don’t come often-Gen. Navarre was one.
Wikipedia seems to indicate that the raid is universally thought of as successful. Why did Doolittle think it was a failure?
Also, what’s the “humanizing move” referenced in a previous post about Doolittle in this thread? Who thinks it caused losses in Korea, and why?
I am conflicted about the Dolittle raid. It was a huge risk (we could have lost one of the only 3 carriers left in the Pacific), and the raid inflicted only minimal damage upon the enemy. The gesture may have boosted morale-but is resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Chinese civilians-who were killed by the Japanese army.
I never understood why the Chinese were so underrated-the Chinese ied down the bulk of the IJA, and freed up US forces for combat in the South Pacific.
Also, the US Navy submarine force won most of the war-by sinking the apanese merchant marine.
At the time of the Doolittle raid, I doubt whether the death of Chinese civilians would have been a pressing concern. Harsh and just my opinion.
“Inpenetrable terrain” again? I started a thread about that a while back. Or maybe “Lines that always spell trouble”.
Maximilian von Prittwitz, commander of the German Eight Army in charge of defending East Prussia from the Russians. When Russia advanced, he panicked and suggested a full retreat back towards the Vistula. He was replaced by Hindenburg, who only managed the near destruction of the Russian forces at Tannenberg.
ETA: The Russian commanders, Samsonov and Rennenkampf, also merit a dishonorable mention for their inability to put their personal differences aside and cooperate to leverage the numerical superiorty and initiative they held to defeat the Germans.