I’m not sure that’s accurate - from the link which Wumpus gave, it appears that impressment was just no longer an issue:
In other words, with Napolean at Elba, Britain was no longer impressing sailors. That doesn’t mean that Britain was renouncing the practice, or wouldn’t do it again if the situation arose.
Dex, isn’t it normal to focus on the part of a large conflict which affects you the most? For example, I would think that if you ask the French what happened in WWII, their first reaction would be to talk about the German invasion of France, not Pearl Harbour. The battles in Lousiana get more play in American histories because they happened in U.S. territory. Canadians tend to focus on the battles in Upper Canada, since that happened in our territory.
I think I need to read up a little more on this one as last time I looked, Louisiana and New Orleans weren’t too close to the Great Lakes (19th century Canadian militia invading the deep south – anyone bought the movie rights to that yet ? )
Seems to me CK is on the right lines with his last post: Perhaps the definition of a war no one won is that history authenticates as many versions as there were sides in the conflict – none of them any more authoritive than the (usually triumphant version) written by the victors.
Having said that, I’d be interested in the French version as it seems a pre-requisite that the British killed at leat one unyielding virgin martyr with a cute hairdo.
Certainly. A fine example would be the French and Indian war in colonial America, where George Washington first showed some military ability in the Battle of Fort Duquesne (now Pittsburgh) fighting with British forces against the French and their Indian allies. What? Haven’t heard of it on the other side of the pond? Oh yes, you lot call it the Seven Years’ War, and probably never even heard of the American theater of war.
On the naval front, the Brits were at first badly mauled by the four very large, very mean US frigates, President, Constitution, Chesapeake, and Congress. All four frigates had significant advantages over British frigates in both firepower and manpower, falling into a strategic niche not unlike the German “pocket battleships” which ran amok at the outset of WWII.
This was mitigated somewhat when the H.M.S. Shannon met the Chesapeake on even terms outside of Boston harbor and captured her within twenty minutes.
However, the defeat of the Royal Navy in frigate v. frigate actions prior to the capture of the Chesapeake underscored exactly how thinly spread–and worn out–the Brits were. I believe it was the perceived naval setbacks, in conjuction with active American assistance to the French cause, which encouraged Britain to settle with an adversary which they otherwise could have crushed like a bug, at least on the high seas.
One fellow worth asking about Mr. Madison’s War was Theodore Roosevelt, who wrote a pretty interesting history of the naval part of that war. Regarding the British blockade of New England, TR says it
“inflicted a direct material loss to the American people a hundredfold greater than the entire American navy was able to inflict on Great Britain from the beginning to the end of its gallant career in this war.”
In order to make a fair evaluation of the War of 1812, you have to place it in the context of the continuing European conflict between France and the rest of Europe that had been going on since the late 1600s and continued through the ultimate double defeat of France with Napoleons abdication, exile to Elba, return, defeat at Waterloo in June 1815, his second abdication and final exile to St. Helena. Throughout this extended period Britain was engaged at sea and on the periphery of the main event. Even the battle of Waterloo was a preliminary fight pending the arrival of Russian and Austrian armies on the French frontiers later in the summer. While England financed much of the European resistance to France, its principal military efforts were directed toward carving out an overseas mercantile empire while Europe was distracted by the wars of Louises XIV, XV, the Revolution and Napoleon. Thus, Britain gained an empire in India, Canadian North America, and the Caribbean. For the British the one big glitch in all this was the American Revolution.
British policies about the immunity of natural shipping to France and the insistence that British subjects were subject to impressment (forced conscription) into the British Navy even if they were serving on another nation’s war ships. The standard of Britishness for the purpose of impressment was little more than finding out if the prospective Jolly Tar spoke English. American resentment over British interference with American trade with Europe and the West Indies and the wish of political leaders in the West (Ohio, Kentucky) to exclude the British from the Great Lakes and to annex Canadian territory around the Great Lakes lead to a deceleration of war by the US in June 1812 and an abortive invasion of Upper Canada. All this gave Britain an excuse to try to reverse the results of the American Revolution.
Basically, however, the war in North America was a side show to the Peninsular Campaigns that began in 1809 and lasted until 1814, and the naval effort to blockade the French and Allied navies in their Atlantic and Mediterranean ports. By the middle of 1813, the US was effectively bankrupt. It would default on its bond obligations in November 1814. England had its troubles too. The war against Napoleon was not nearly over. France had raised new armies after its defeat in Russia and was showing a fair amount of vigor in staving off the European powers. All of Britain’s efforts to eliminate the US or confine it to the Eastern seaboard had been frustrated by the American victories on Lake Champlain and Lake Erie and the defense of Ft. McHenry. While a new effort to seize the mouth of the Mississippi was being mounted, the parties found it advisable to end the war by the Treaty of Ghent in December 1814. Britain was pretty well financially exhausted by the cost of subsidizing its European allies and keeping its navy up to strength.
By the terms of that treaty everyone promised to quit fighting and restore the situation to what it was before the war began. This did not solve the problem of neutral trade with a belligerent, but the question was rendered moot by the end of the Napoleonic wars. The question would come up again during the Civil War when the US and Britain would both take positions contrary to those advanced in 1812. In terms of war aims, neither side gained what they wanted. Britain did not reincorporate the US into the Empire. The US did not annex any part of British North America and did not get British concessions of neutral trade rights. What the US did get was the elimination of the principal obstacles to western expansion by the destruction of the power of the Western (read Midwestern) Indians, the removal of British posts from the Great Lake and the elimination of the British threat to trade down the Mississippi. Just as importantly, the US got a huge lift in self confidence in fighting a European Power to a stand still, especially at New Orleans, and humiliating the Royal Navy in frigate actions and from maintaining its independence.
Militia made up the bulk of men under arms on the British side (5,000 regulars vs. 11,000 militia, for all off what is now Canada). From what I can gather on the 'Net, though, British regulars made up a much larger proportion of the front line and were responsible for the British side’s considerable tactical edge. A search on “Canadian militia myth” is enough to convince me that the Canadian milita’s role in the war has been historically overrated.
(Of course, you’ll get many, many hits with “American militia myth” as well. I’m tickled that both Americans and Canadians share an stubborn belief that our amateur miltiamen must have been innately superior to the better trained, better equipped troops of the British.)
An interesting aspect of this for me, at this point, is the notion that the British Navy considered any English-speaking sailor as game for impressment. I hadn’t thought of it in this way before but one can understand the logic in as much as, exempting the new US, all English speaking sailors probably were British subjects by virtue of the Empire and its territories.
This leads me into a question: How and when did settlers in the original States determine their ‘nationality’ – presumably allegiance was an individual choice for some period after 1777 and, also, individual States chose their own approach.
Further, at what point was some form of documentation issued by the new US and / or State verifying an individuals status, both for the existing settlers and newly arrived immigrants, and when was this documentation recognised by the British ?
it all seems a deeply confusing set of affairs to me, especially given that the vast majority of the continental America land mass wasn’t part of the US at that time.
There is a Stan Rogers song called “MacDonald on the Heights,” lamenting that everyone (in Canada?) knows about poor old General Brock, but not one in one hundred knows about the Canadians who are buried with him on Queenston Heights and especially the Canadian lawyer – militia officer who rallied Brock’s small army and retook the ridge. A moving song of Canadian patriotism on a par with “Barrett’s Privateers.”
Actually, as the Canadian website, Northern Journey Online Journal, notes, the story of Macdonnell (their spelling) was an early example of Canadian myth-making. Macdonnell, while brave, was not the great hero of the battle that early Canadian gentry portrayed him.
John Adams estimated that the inhabitants of the thirteen colonies were equally divided among those who favored independence, those who favored remaining subjects of the crown, and those who wished that everyone would quit fighting and let them plant their crops in peace.
The Loyalists (ever known in American literature as the despised Tories), assembled several of their own militias and joined battle with their rebellious brethren on many occasions. Some of the most fierce (and cruelest) fighting
of the War for Independence occurred between the militias of the two sides. In addition, many acts of terrorism were carried out by each side against the other (although to read most American accounts, the Tories were much more brutal). Depending on the year, the region, and the mood of the neighbors, there were several outbreaks of lynching and pillaging. (One of the speculated–but not substantiated–origins of the word lynch is traced to a Virginia(?) judge who was fond of ordering Loyalists hung for treason.)
When it became clear that the U.S. would achieve independence, Loyalists found themselves being forced to choose whether they would keep their homes and live in the new country or whether they would abandon their land and most of their possessions to avoid the antagonism of their neighbors.
A sizable number of people (but by no means one third of the population) did decide to leave. A great many civilians accompanied the British army when it finally abandoned New York city. Most of these refugees moved to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick with others moving to Upper Canada or the British West Indies. There were occasions where families were hounded out of their houses as a continuation of the earlier feuds, but most made the choice without coercion, either as individuals or, occasionally, as groups.
As to identification papers and such, I am not really familiar with eighteenth century bona fides.
There were actually several court cases in both the U.S. and the U.K. after the U.S. Rebellion that considered this very issue. The courts in both countries reached very similar results. The key was “Did you stay or did you go?”
a person who was born in the 13 colonies and stayed after independence ceased to be a British subject and became an American citizen;
a person who was born in the 13 colonies and left as quickly as possible after independence remained a British subject and did not become an American citizen.
There were some difficulties of fact - when did a particular colony achieve independence? The U.S. courts simply accepted July 4, 1776 as the cut-off date, but the British courts tended to look at de facto sovereignty (e.g. - they considered New York City to be under British control until the British soldiers left, some years after July 4, 1776), or at the date of the Treaty of Paris (1783), when the King formally recognized American independence.
Thank you Northern Piper and tomndebb – If I’m reading you both correctly, allegiance to the new US wasn’t a question of swearing allegiance but rather a legal presumption based on continued residence.
Putting aside the morality of impressment, it must have been pretty tricky identifying who was game given the (presumed) lack of documentation and the accents of Americans only 35-36 years after Independence. Not that that excuses the cavalier approach of the British Navy but it does explain the difficulties.
The issue was not that they were authorized by the crown to impress English-speaking sailors wherever found, but that they boarded US-flagged ships to do so. In diplomatic circles, this is referred to as an “act of war”. The Royal Navy considered all the world’s oceans as their own private pond after Trafalgar, since the RN was more than twice the size of the next two largest fleets combined until the days of Theodore Roosevelt, much to the irritation of the rest of the world. This “cavalier” attitude eventually led to the Anglo-German naval arms race that was a major factor in the tensions leading to WWI (see Massey’s Dreadnought for details).
There’s no need to get out of your chair, sewalk. I’d consult again in your diplomatic circles because merchant ships are boarded every day off the coast of most countries for the purposes of inspection. Few wars result.
That the British Navy of that time did it to identify potential recruits off the coast of the newly independent US is indeed a slightly different matter (even if the cargo remained untouched and preventing trade with France the ulterior motive). However - bringing this back somewhere near the OP - whether that itself or the desire of a new country to expand its borders and also to take control of trade on continental America provided the justification for the invasion of Canada is, perhaps, a matter for further discussion.
You seem to be implying that had the British Navy chosen to reduce its size and dominance, tension would have been alleviated and WW1 might have been avoided. That is at the very least an interesting notion - I’m currently mulling over the number of world powers that have historically followed this route (whoa, we’re too powerful ! why don’t you have some ?) If you’d care to open new threads, I’d be happy to join you in discussing the origins of WW1 and how superpowers operate.
I would like to thank everyone who has replied to this thread. I’m learning more about history here than I ever did in school.
Back to my original question - I can see how someone might consider the War of 1812 an American victory, but it is pretty weak. Myself, I am still inclined to call it a draw.
Boarding a foreign-flagged ship on the open seas is not generally considered a friendly act. Kidnapping in the course of such a boarding is a decidedly unfriendly act. There is little historical debate as to whether the US was justified in declaring war. Whether it was wise is another debate.
As far as the outcome, it is important to look at things on more than one level. In terms of tangible gains and losses, it was a draw at best for the US. However, the effect of British recognition of the US had far-reaching implications. It allowed reconcilliation to begin; now the US-UK alliance taken for granted and is probably the most important factor in 20th century history. Without the Treaty of Ghent, the world would be a very different place. Britain would probably not have remained neutral in the American Civil War. With the help of the Royal Navy, it might have been the Northern coast that was blockaded in 1861.
I’d say that in the long run, but countries came off quite well.
One might think the Stars and Stripes hanging from the jackstaff would be a pretty good clue as to the crew’s nationality, though. I can’t see that there was any reasonable confusion - the issue for America was the British govenrment’s attitude that they still rightfully owned the colonies.
“They ran through the briars and they ran through the brambles.
They ran through the bushes where a rabbit wouldn’t go.
They ran so fast that the hounds couldn’t catch 'em
Down the Mississippi to the Gulf of Mexico.”
Sorry, couldn’t resist there
)