I’ve never had a case where it came up, so can’t answer the question; just know about it in a general way.
The original case that established this principle, Kienapple v the Queen, dealt with convictions for rape and unlawful carnal knowledge of a person under 14. The Supreme Court by a 5-4 majority held that the relevance of the age 14 went to consent, but since that was not an issue on the facts of that case, there should not have been convictions on both counts.
The most common example where Kienapple is used is if a person is charged with driving over .08 blood alcohol, and impaired driving. If there’s a conviction on the .08 charge, the judge may also rule on the impaired driving charge, but enter a stay on that charge if a conviction is otherwise warranted. If the .08 is set aside on appeal, then the impaired charge could be re-activated. But as far as I know, the person’s criminal record only shows the .08 conviction, not the impaired, which could be relevant down the road if the individual is charged again with an offence and convicted.
One other difference is that we don’t seem to have as many different degrees of offence as seems to be the case in the US. For example, we just have three homicide offences: murder one (premeditated intentionally causing death); murder two (intentionally causing death); and manslaughter (unlawful act causing death, but no intention). Since murder two and manslaughter are both included offences to murder one, we don’t get overlapping convictions. (Technically, there is another homicide offence, infanticide, but it is very much an outlier and not at all common.)
It sounds like the general principles might be the same or similar, but how it works, and where the dividing lines are might be different. The same is true, maybe to a lesser degree, between the states, I think.
The case you linked involves what I would call merger, in my jurisdiction. The rules are slightly different, but in my jurisdiction if there are two charges that are required to merge, the guilty verdict on the lesser offense is recorded, but a conviction is entered only for the greater offense. So in those circumstances, the defendant does not have both convictions on their record.
Not relevant to this case (I hope) but where do hate crimes fall in this hierarchy? If A murders B and it’s demonstrated to be a hate crime, does that usually supersede murder, or in addition to?
I’ve handled a lot of drunk driving matters. You’re correct; the prosecutor typically lays a charge of “over 0.08,” and a charge of “impaired.” Many accuseds decide to plead guilty, as given all the evidence (Canadian police are extremely thorough in breath and sometimes blood tests), fighting the charges will result in a conviction anyway. Of course, I am advising my clients, and if it’s a slam-dunk for the prosecution, I’ll let them know. If they, in my opinion, stand a chance at trial (and it has happened, and my client has been successful), I’ll let them know that too. They can choose how to proceed.
Anyway. If they choose to plead guilty to, say, “over 0.08,” I’ll speak with the prosecutor, let him or her know that my client will be pleading out, and see if the prosecutor will agree to withdraw the “impaired” charge. Usually, the prosecutor will, so we’re dealing with only one conviction; and the “impaired” is completely forgotten.
That sounds sensible. If the accused is going to plea, the here won’t be an appeal I was thinking if contested cases, where the crown is successful in proving both the .08 and the impaired charge.
Instead, the judge is required to consider on sentencing whether a crime was “… motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation, or gender identity or expression, or on any other similar factor,“
If so, that’s an aggravating factor for sentence.
That provision would never come into play on a murder conviction, since the sentence for murder is life combined with lengthy periods of parole ineligibility. Can’t increase a life sentence.
IANAL either, but I thought I’d read that this varied by state: that in some states, “overcharging” was more of a risk for the prosecution because the DA had to pick exactly one of the related charges. That is, they had to pick the highest offense they think they can convict on. So if I beat someone to death, assault is a slam-dunk; manslaughter probably; various n-degree murder, correspondingly less likely. And the DA has to choose among those. This relates nicely back to OP’s question about stealing $100.
The nolo article Andy_L posted hints at this but doesn’t say it, so maybe my impression is not correct.
If correct, MN is obviously not one of those states!
Hoping someone who IAL can validate or correct me here.
A ‘murder’ conviction is ‘murder’ by legal definition. And the legal definition for this kind of ‘murder’ is ‘the kind of murder that doesn’t have a life sentence’.
It could be called something else in different jurisdictions. I see that Canada has a number of different ‘unlawful death’ crimes, where perhaps aggravating factors could come into play?
In West Virginia, different charges can be stacked and the judge has complete discretion to sentence (usually an indeterminate sentence) concurrently or consecutive, there are no sentencing guidelines, and sentences are not reviewable on appeal except for illegal reasons (say the judge foolishly used a racial slur against the defendant).
This makes the prosecutor and the judge immensely powerful. So, if Chauvin was tried in WV, the judge could sentence him to anything from probation to 75 years in prison. This being GQ, I won’t give my opinion of this.
Another question: Does MN law require concurrent sentencing? Could the judge say 12.5 years on count one, 12.5 years on count two, and 4 years on count three, but I think it is especially terrible so I am sentencing you to 29 years? Everyone seems to say that 12.5 is the default sentence here. Is concurrent sentencing therefore mandatory?
By my reading of the laws that I read, for these offenses, concurrent is the default. There may be reasons to take sentences out of the default, but it seems as though none apply here.
I don’t doubt you, but could you post a link when/if you have it handy? Also what is your understanding of the type of appellate review of the sentence? Is it de novo or is some deference given to the sentencing judge?
For example what if the judge said that this case epitomized the problem with race in this country and that ticks all of the aggravating boxes so: 40 years on count 1, 25 years on count 2, 10 years on count 3, all consecutive, how would a MN appeals court deal with that? Would it look to see how much this case epitomized the problem with race in this country? Would it decide if that was permissible?
I just Googled MN sentencing guidelines, maybe also the same plus consecutive and concurrent. I don’t have time to recreate the searches right now. If I have time later I’ll post a link.
I don’t know for sure about appellate review, but in a highly structured system like MN seems to have, I would expect compliance with those laws to be reviewable on appeal.
FWIW the LegalEagle YouTube channel did a 35 second video on this. Basically he says that while Chauvin was found guilty on different crimes of murder it is unconstitutional to double (or however much more) the punishment for the same crime (not sure I said that right but I think most catch the meaning here).
So, Chauvin will be sentenced based on one crime that has the highest penalty he was found guilty of.
Why bother convicting him three times on the same crime? I suspect it could have implications in an appeal. He will now need to defeat three convictions on appeal. Chances are one will stick.
At best, that’s an oversimplification, as you might guess.
It is unconstitutional* to punish someone more than once for the same offense, but these offenses are violations of separate statutory provisions. Violations of separate statutory provisions are not considered the same offense unless they have the same elements. (Blockburger test.)
*He doesn’t even name the constitutional provision in question. (Double jeopardy.)
Chauvin can be concurrently sentenced on all three charges. I don’t think they could be made consecutive under MN law, but if they each contain an element that the others lack, there could be separate punishments under the US constitution.
I do not understand the distinction here. Can you explain? (really asking)
Are you saying that if I killed someone with forethought but it was also a crime of passion I am guilty of two offenses for the one act, each with its own punishment and I might have to serve both punishments for that one act?
A crime of passion assumes you didn’t do it with forethought. Let me try a better example:
Suppose a state has two statutes: Regular first degree murder. Premeditation, deliberation, etc. The state also has a law that says it is second degree murder to knowingly allow a child to die in your care to go without necessary food and not report it to someone.
Those crimes contain different elements. But suppose a defendant planned to kill his child by withholding food. He is guilty of all of the elements of both offenses, and may be punished under both. Whether the sentences are enhanced, consecutive, etc. depends on the state and what we are trying to flesh out in the thread.
Let’s say I have planned to murder my estranged wife. There is no question about this. The police find abundant evidence that I was planning to murder her.
But, in my diary, I write that I want one last chance at reconciliation. I decide that I will make this one last effort. So, I go to her place (which used to be my place so I have keys) and let myself in. I see her with another man and in a fit of rage I kill her.
