At least 100,000 just in the single raid on 9 March 1945.
By similar reasoning, why didn’t we invite them to evacuate Tokyo on 8 March?
They may have thought we only had 1, but in fact we only had 2. In your scenario, after the second demo, would we have asked them to wait a while for demo #3?
Yes, it would have been good if we’d demonstrated to the Axis that their chance of victory was less than 0.1% so they could have surrendered gracefully. In fact, that demonstration was already on view, with or without atomic bombs.
That’s rather unfair, don’t you think? You’re comparing acceptance of a completely wrong idea to a small error in geography. My main point still holds.
In fact, this mapsuggests that the flight path to Tokyo was at least marginally shorter than that to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I’ll concede, however, that the difference is trivial and not the reason those cities were left relatively intact. However, my main point was that these cities were chosen over Tokyo because they were comparatively undamaged, so the effect of the bomb could be better assessed, even if I may have erred on the specific reason.
I also think your use of excessive “No’s” doesn’t help your case.
Chances weren’t so low. It factored into Truman’s decision (according to Truman) to bomb unannounced. That in turn meant it had to be a populated area, or it might have not been noticed as being the giant force it was.
FWIW, here’s a transcript detailing a phone conversation between General Hull on Marshall’s staff and Col. Seaman of the Manhattan project, on Aug 13, talking about how many more bombs could be delivered if needed. Some fascinating points in it - according to Hull, if they had a third bomb ready then, they would have already dropped it. There was going to be a third bomb ready on the 19th, and it would possibly be dropped immediately. After that, there wouldn’t be another bomb ready until early September, but then there’d be 3/month for the next few months. Hull said there was currently a debate going on as to whether to drop them as they became available, or to hold them and drop them all at once, or to hold them and use them as part of an invasion. Essentially they were thinking that if two bombs didn’t convince them to surrender, there was no reason to think a third would, so maybe they needed to rethink how to use the bombs.
You’ve got to admit that Hirohito’s version of “L’État, c’est moi” translated into an incredible indifference to the suffering of his subjects and their victims. The mindset of his upbringing can be blamed for that, perhaps.
But look at how, afterward, the US and the Japanese scapegoated a few choice samurai, preserving the Imperial throne and the industrial magnates that had been the driving force behind Japan’s wartime aggression. All so that today, TokyoBayer can be posting “no no no” instead of “nyet nyet nyet”
It is not the minor error in geography which is the issue.
This betrays a fundamental lack of understanding of the strategy of the war, the role of strategic bombing, the direction of the war and which way the invasions were planned, and the situation of the nation of Japan in August of 1945.
It is not simply that they happen to pick Hiroshima, it is that Hiroshima, Nakasaki, Kokura and Niigata had been preserved for the atomic bombs. The rest of Japan was destroyed.
Japan had been systematically firebombed. One third of the country was driven from their homes. Their industry was in complete shambles, not the least of which was because of the workers were starved and absenteeism was skyrocketing. They were no longer able to produce much more munitions because of the lack of critical ingredients.
The US had learned that from damage assessment missions in Germany after its surrender and were changing targeting to cause more specific and costly punishment on transportation infrastructure among other key components.
I’ll agree that my comparison was unfair, but I still hold you are correct only in a trivial sense.
But yes, you’re right. Hiroshima was bombed because it wasn’t damaged.
His upbringing is an important factor. Everything I’ve read has suggested a deep sense of mission. The historians who argue against the opportunist label point to that.
I’ll disagree with your jest that only a few samurai were tossed under the bus with everything else maintaining status quo.
The Japanese nation and her people were profoundly changed. The national conscription and the subsequent insidious brainwashing which cowed the populous in the 30s and 40s was removed. Real reforms were enacted allowing the formation of a strong middle class which pulled Japan out of defeat into an economic powerhouse.
The zaibatsu were an important component of the war, but it was primarily all about the Imperial Japanese Army and its irrational believe in a destiny.
Well, champ, I’m calling your ass on this one. You’ve COMPLETELY omitted that Kyoto - a significant part of “the rest of Japan” - was spared on ethical and artistic grounds, so I have to question every other thing you’ve said on the topic.
Imagine the reaction from the 2 million Americans in uniform and their families had Truman allowed the war to drag on for even one day longer than necessary. It would have more than justified his being removed from office.
There was a third bomb, BTW. Its intended target was what was left of Tokyo.
I don’t know about that, but I do know that the US Armed Forces are STILL using up stocks of Purple Heart medals manufactured expressly for awarding during operations Olympic and Coronet (invasions of Japan).
Since my intention was not to comment on strategic bombing policy, but just to explain why Hiroshima was the target instead of Tokyo, I’ll accept being right on the actual point of my post.
I’d always heard that as the seat of government Tokyo was not on the shortlist for a-bomb targets not only because it had been firebombed to within an inch of its life but also because if the bomb killed the Emperor/PM, who would be left with the authority to surrender?
Plus killing the Emperor would also risk making even moderates far more fanatic; murdering the arahitogami, divinity in human form, might have enraged the nation and dragged the war on and on no matter how many bombs you dropped.
The third bomb would not have been Tokyo. The likely target would have been the Kokura Arsenal, the original target for the Nagasaki bomb (cloud cover obscured it on the day). Other targets considered included Kyoto, Yokohama and Niigata.
Plus there were preparations under way for troops in Europe to be sent to Japan for the invasion. My father, who was on occupation duty, was on the list.
I’m not sure people who have grown up with the bomb get what an impact a city destroyed by one plane with one bomb had. Bombing a desolate area would not have had the impact, and few understood radiation. The lab at MIT where they worked on radar was called the Radiation Lab in order to seem not war-related.
I’ve always thought that the actual impact of the bomb on people, as opposed to the theoretical impact, decreased the odds that it would be used. Not that this was a reason for anything at the time.
I’ve never heard that Tokyo was on the target list. The cities considered as possible targets were Hiroshima, Kokura, Kyoto, Nagasaki, Niigata, and Yokohama. (Kokura would have been the third city bombed. It was in fact actually the primary target on August 9 but it was covered by clouds and the mission went to its secondary target, Nagasaki.) There were also plans about using atom bombs tactically in the invasion of Japan by dropping one at the landing site to kill the defending forces before the landing or to drop one on any concentrations of Japanese troops.
