I wouldn’t over-analyse Hitler’s motives for anything too much, he wasn’t exactly the most rational of characters.
Unless there is documentation showing other more logical members of the OKW or whatever had reasoned out beforehand some specific plans or circumstances that would cause a declaration of war, it may just be best to accept it as one of his many ‘Crazy-Man’ actions.
FWIW I seem to recall that the Kriegsmarine did want the ability to operate U-boats in US waters in order to extend the convoy battles which squares with David Simmons note. Also Hitler did have a history of wanting to make deals with various ‘natural ally’ nations before throwing a strop when they didn’t toe the line. Britain was a case in point.
At least one carrier , the ranger was operating in the atlantic theatre and several other carriers went into service in late 42 early 43, tactics would have been ajusted and at most the war would have dragged on a bit longer
Hitler was an old school soldier, the line of battle and jutland would have his view of naval combat, carriers probably would have been concidered an extravagance or of limited utility to him,
Quite a bit longer, if we lost most (if not all) of our carriers at Pearl Harbor, we’d have a very limited capability to respond to Japanese attacks over the next several months. The Ranger was a fairly old and relatively small carrier, and I’m not sure what other carriers were in service at the time. We can look at other battles to get insight into how the early naval battles might have played out without carrier support, such as the Force Z incident, where the British lost the HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales to a Japanese air attack, something which might have been avoided if the carrier originally slated to escort them, HMS Indomitable, had not been in drydock getting repairs after running aground near Jamaica.
Early important battles, such as the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway would have had very large impacts on the overall war if we had lost them. If the Japanese won Midway, they’d find themselves with an airbase from which they could launch large scale air-raids against Pearl Harbor and our other bases in Hawaii, as well as being able to cut off resupply and reinforcement to Australia and New Zealand. We’d still win, when it came down to it, we had Japan beat in population base, agricultural capacity, and industrial capacity (we could build a Jeep Carrier in a matter of weeks, if not days, IIRC), but it would be a very bloody affair.
The Japanese were really the only navy who really understood the value of carriers, having used them extensively in support of army operations in China/Manchuria. The Germans had no carriers at all, which gives you a good indication of where they stood in the opinion of the General Staff and the Fuhrer.
The US had good carriers but didn’t really understand how to use them until they were forced to through necessity. The British had some carriers but also struggled with the things tactically, although they did have the bright idea of armouring the flight decks, which turned out to make them very resistant to kamikaze attacks relative to the the US carriers.
IIRC it was deemed necessary as British coastal waters are obviously so close to continental Europe they were more at risk from air attack by land based craft.
From what I’ve seen on the History channel, the extra armour on British carriers left them with less room to carry aircraft compared to US carriers which negated to some extent the benefit of armour, especially when defending more ships than just the carrier.
I think the Brits had carrier tactics down just fine. Wasn’t it their carrier raid on Taranto that confirmed to the Japanese the practicality of the Pearl Harbor attack?
It did reduce the complement (and the RN didn’t like a deckpark for preference, unlike the USN) and it reduced the overhead height as well which restricted the design of new aircraft types. Arguably the armour wasn’t worth the penalties it brought, once the kamikazes were rightly dismissed as a passing phase in warfare which was unlikely to recur. It made postwar modernisation extremely difficult and expensive, and only one, Victorious, was so modernised before being scrapped (prematurely for financial reasons) in 1968. Compare with the Essex/Ticonderoga class hulls which remained useful into the 1970s
I believe the reference was to the US middle west which was the strongly isolationist and anti-war section pre WWII. That term “middle west” needs to be taken somewhat broadly because it included the whole country between the Appalachian and Sierra Nevada/Cascade mountains. For example, one of the main isolationists was Senator Borah of Idaho. Also included in the Senate’s isolationists were Vandenburg of Michigan (as I recall), Taft of Ohio and Gerald Nye of Nebraska. The senate was much more controlled by a few senior committee chairmen than is the case now and the isolationist members of the senate exercised a lot of power.
Eh - the British scrapped EVERYTHING prematurely for financial reasons, because they were totally broke. They didn’t even hang on to any as museum pieces - I believe the only noteworthy WW2 ship to survive was HMS Belfast.
Your feedback prompted me to do some quick googling which threw up this very interesting article that gives background on the naval architecture and operational philosophies - just goes to show how superficial a lot of history books are, I guess. The article and site are well worth a read for anyone interested in historial naval operations.
Balle_M
Yep, Toronto was an unqualified success for the RN, but if you compare it to incidents like the sinkings of Glorious and the Repulse/Prince of Wales you can see that they really didn’t have a great handle on how carriers, aircraft and capital ships interoperated. The Japanese weren’t that brilliant at it either, but I think they had a better appreciation of how to use carriers. Once the USN had it forced upon them, they rapidly became the No1 exponents of naval air power.