Except, of course with that Two Ocean navy, about half was on the Atlantic side, and the Japanese did know that Roosevelt wanted to get into a war with Japan. So- maybe- they only had to deal with half the US Navy.
But yes, your points are valid and well taken. Good analysis.
And a Admiral. Vs you had no cites whatsoever. Yes, the Zimm cite is pretty good, thank you TokyoBayer.
I am still leaning on the side of Adm Nimitz, who my Dad knew and had great respect for. But yes, that is a solid cite. Which you can learn from, Mr. Miskatonic.
Howeverm the cite does have a few issues with it:
It’s a quote of a quote. We dont know what the original said.
It’s out of context. We can see in what context the Author may have put it, with perhaps another argument for attacking the oil.
The author clearly is unqualified to give any opinion on the subject, as per **Mr. Miskatonic ** he is NOT “an expert on Petroleum storage”. 
Actually he is a “A former naval officer, he served as a nuclear power qualified surface warfare officer…”.
Which I explained that I did not have access to my copy pf the book, now however, see below.
Nimitz was a fine Admiral. He is worthy of respect. But if he thinks a single bullet can wipe out the entire oil field…he’s wrong.
I know you say he had petroleum engineers working for him but did he consult those engineers before making that quip? I really rather doubt it.
Since I finally have access, I will quote his summary:
“This analysis indicates that Kimmel’s and Nimitz’s statements were wrong . (p 320)” (author goes on to explain the reason they may have made this statement in error).
And perhaps this
" The idea the Japanese could have achieved a “cheap kill” by machine gunning the fuel storage tanks is a myth." (p.317)
On discussing computer models of Japanese bombing (where the Japanese hit with all their bombs):
“the radiant heat from one tank dike can eventually ignite oil in neighboring tanks or dikes, but it would take at least and hour. The tank farms had a system of water piing and stray monitors to cool the surrounding areas to prevent spread of the fire. Every tank would also have built-in firefighting foam systems… Fuel from a burning tank or dike area could also simply be pumped into a safe tank. Transfer pumps were installed outside the diked area for this purpose.”
"The model suggests that about half the oil storage tanks would be destroyed. This is probably a high estimate. Setting fuel tanks on fire is a lot more difficult than it would seem. For example, the Haifa refinery and tank farm was shelled by Italian cruisers during World War II, without starting any fires. "
My memory was incorrect about the tank thickness, which he states as being .75 to 1.5" thick. Not the 3" I remember (sorry, I’ve been reading too much about AFV armor thickness lately). But much more than the .5" proposed and still immune to the machine guns and 20mm cannon shells of the Japanese planes.
In conclusion, the author mentions how, in the absolute worse case scenario (all the oil destroyed) how long it would take to replace it. Depending on the number of oil tankers it could take as little as 1 month. Ironically, devoting more oil tankers to that duty (i.e. moving them from the Atlantic to the Pacific) would have resulted in fewer US Oil Tankers lost to German U-Boats.
The original “quote” is a 10 page (on my Kindle) analysis. Zimm covers multiple factors from shell & bomb analysis, to Japanese training runs, to fuel tank design, and more. If I quoted it all I’d probably be violating fair use and forum rules.
:rolleyes:
However- Zimm is NOT “an expert on Petroleum storage”, thus according to several of your own posts, he is unqualified to give an opinion on this. Those are your words. Not “an expert on Petroleum storage”= unqualified.
However, Zimm was a naval Officer, on nuclear powered ships, not oil powered. He wasnt around when Pearl was attacked, Nimitz was. Zimm never saw the oil tanks in the pre Dec 7th 1941 condition, Nimitz did. Zimm also wasn’t a Admiral in WW2, which is the period under consideration.
Winner- Nimitz.
This…this is the angle you want to take?
In the Acknowledgments secrtion:
“Ralph Norton, a petroluem expert, generously provided extensive information on fuel oil storage tank construction and firefighting measure dating back to the 1930s. He provided of the information on fuel tank specifications, operations, and fire prevention measures, along with information on the experiences of the Haifa refinery. Edward Rudnicki, an Army ordnance expert, assisted with several technical points.”
(emphasis mine)
Seriously, do you think he just made this stuff up?
Do you not know how books are researched?!
Yes, he got his info from a expert- who wasnt around at Pearl harbor. Admiral Nimitz got his info from a team of experts- who were around at that time and place.
Do you now know how the *US Navy *researches things?
Seriously, do you think he just made this stuff up?
OK, you got a cite. Yay. From a low ranking naval officer who wasnt even alive on Dec 7 1941, never visited the oil tanks like they were back there. He got advice from a petroleum expert who likely wasnt even alive on Dec 7 1941, and never visited the oil tanks like they were back there.
Admiral Nimitz was a Fleet Admiral,Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, with operational control over all Allied units (air, land, and sea) in that area. He personally inspected the area. He had thousands of experts at his beck and call, experts who were working feverishly to finish the underground storage there. Experts who actually worked on those very tanks- as opposed to a guy who never saw them.
Really? Do you have a cite for him getting his info about Oil field vulnerability before making this off-the-cuff remark? Or do you assume he just absorbed it all because those experts were around somewhere?
This is why I made the Patton and tank design suggestions comment for comparison. One can be an excellent strategist and tactician without having a real clue about how certain aspects of your operation work.
Nimitz made an off-the-cuff remark about Oil Field vulnerability that simply was not correct. Its not the end of the world and not a source of any shame. Kimmel made a not dissimilar remark with added features that were even more wrong.
Further nitpick of the nitpick: Both Saratoga and Lexington had their 8" guns removed early in the Pacific War, in January and March 1942. Saratoga had them replaced with four, twin 5"/38 mounts in the same places; Lexington was fitted temporarily with additional light AA guns in those spaces when lost at Coral Sea. The 8 twin mounts from the two ships were used in 4 shore batteries on Oahu.
And you got the Patton remark wrong too.
No I did not. I already gave you the cites.
Seeing as you mention me by name, I’ll respond.
I enjoy discussing historical issues. I don’t enjoy arguing. So when I feel things are reaching the point of being an argument, I just stop responding.
I’ll admit I have difficulty with this sometimes. I’m human and I fall into the “someone is wrong on the internet” trap. But I’m trying to work on this and develop the attitude that it’s not my responsibility to change minds. I tell myself that I’ve said what I wanted to say on a subject; if people want to read what I think, it’s there. If they don’t want to read what I think, writing it several more times won’t change that.
Zimm is apparently wrong about the thickness. This general topic, Japanese attack on PH fuel storage, has been kicked around for years on many naval/alt history boards, whether or not specifically in reference to Zimm, and on one this primary document was produced:
It’s a description of some of the still existing tanks in 1999. Those were made of .5" riveted steel plate, built in 1924, fixed tops not floating, so at odds with Zimm’s info/assumptions on more than one count.
Zimm needs to be credited with putting a lot of details, actual and ‘what if’, in one place, but he’s not necessarily authoritative. The oil tank thing is full of assumptions (grounded in facts he got from knowledgeable people, granted) besides apparently making assumptions in some cases (the thickness of the tanks) where actual info existed which doesn’t fit the assumptions. There are unpublished enthusiasts on this topic who frankly IMO (as adenizen of some of those boards over the years) can be annoying: they sometimes suffer from confirmation bias, big time. However some of them have uncovered valuable sources which in this case Zimm apparently missed.
Two big caveats:
I’m not taking the side of Nimitz v Zimm. I agree that Nimitz made an off the cuff comment. And the general theme ‘it could have been so much worse’ I think was partly for dramatic effect, when invoked by Nimitz and others. There’s no evidence AFAIK and I view it as very unlikely that any team of USN experts studied the vulnerability of the tanks to Japanese naval a/c weapons and briefed Nimitz. Whereas Zimm, in a completely different role and context, sought specifically to determine the actual facts. But Zimm’s analysis seems to have flaws.
The vulnerability of the tanks to strafing still wouldn’t be that high, even if not as low as Zimm claims. The crashlanded Zero recovered at Akutan in the Aleutians after the Midway operation was carrying a sequence of ball-AP-incendiary in the ammo belts for its 7.7mm mg’s (ie British .303, Japanese naval ammo was basically the same). The AP rounds could probably go through .5" mild steel (the tanks would virtually certainly have been of mild steel though the document doesn’t specifically say so). At least some would hit normal enough from close enough to do so. With ball and incendiaries it’s more uncertain. An AP round existed for the Type 99 Model 1 20mm in Model 21 Zeroes but it doesn’t seem to have been used and the HE shells predominantly used would probably not break a 1/2" steel plate. And, diesel and particularly heavy fuel (‘Navy Special’ which would have been the predominant content of the fuel oil tanks) isn’t easy to ignite, so just any source of ignition plus leaks from some bullet holes won’t do it. The 9 gasoline tanks at Ford Island might be a different story, but those had fire suppression systems which Zimm again apparently erroneously attributes to the 54 fuel oil tanks also. But I think one would have to more carefully examine all the other assumptions, knowing the tanks were only .5" mild steel, to come to a definitive conclusion about strafing.
Likewise Zimm’s analysis of bombing attack on the tanks contains a lot of assumptions. I’m not saying they are wrong or that he didn’t try to research carefully, but one person’s take, not authoritative IMO.
Nope, that doesnt say anything about Patton and the Sherman. It talks about Patton getting some early French tanks to play with- which were armed only with machinegunes note- and saying “more machineguns”.
Thank you, my sources show the same thing. But they were upgraded and much was put underground afterwards.
Apparently.
Not very well, in this case.
“*These were big oil silos with thick sides, floating tops (no oxygen inside the silos), fire suppression systems…,” * Not thick sides instead industry standard (well, 10 ga, not 12 ga, so at the high end ) .5 inch thick bolted steel- just as I said. (The bolted area would rupture). No floating tops. No fire suppression systems (those were on the gasoline tanks).
First you said 3" armor, then .75 to 1.5" thick. But in reality, they were normal oil tanks, just like the ones my dad worked on, with 10ga steel. (At least the navy sprung for 10ga rather than 12ga steel).
From a US army chart I see the penetration of a 20MM High explosive round was between .25-inch (6.3 mm), to .50-inch (12.5 mm). The AP round would be well over a inch. But the IJN seemed to use only HE and tracer for the 20mm at that time.
So, could the Zeros do the oil tanks by strafing? Maybe. I guess is they really went after them. But any HE bomb would blow them apart. The oil thus spread would ignite- just like it really did at Pearl.
Hmm, that is interesting stuff. I note that the pdf doesn’t seem to correspond to the actual tank farm (which I understood to be built in the 1930s) given the images of the tank farm don’t line up with the tank positions shown in the pdf it is a little on the odd side.
Interesting stuff. Thanks. I would note that one of Zimm’s major points is that the loss of the oil tank farm would not set back the US by two years, as Nimitz commented, but more like 1-3 months (depending on how many oil tankers used) and a minor delay in building a few destroyers. These figures seem fairly hard to dispute.
Overall, Zimm’s point seems to be that attacking the oil tank farm was not the easy-peasy kill some have claimed, nor the devastating blow had it been a miraculous success. He comments much the same with regards to attacks on the repair facilities (which in the absolute best case scenario result in 6-18% damage to said facilities - again assuming all the bombers attack the repair facilities).
Uh, no. Listen again. Zaloga mentions first that Patton made suggestions to the French tanks that were rubbish, then mentions more documents he found regarding Patton’s suggestions for the Sherman which involved adding lots more machine guns.
More crucial is his quote by Clarke about Patton’s poor understanding of tank mechanics.
I can’t 100% vouch for that document. The guy who posted it is as I referred to, just IMO, a little carried away sometimes in his scenario’s of greater Japanese success in the PH operation, including invasion, heavy ship bombardment and so forth. He tends to emphasize facts in favor of his arguments and de-emphasize those against it more than average IMO, though most of us do that sometimes to some degree I think. But I never caught him trying to put forward outright bogus info. I doubt that’s the case.
Also (I have a degree in naval architecture, not a shore side oil tank designer) I don’t understand why such a tank would be as thick as 1.5" in particular. Even a large modern tanker’s shell plating isn’t that thick anywhere. The parts in the relatively low stress areas toward the middle (from bottom to main deck) are typically around 1/2". The upper and lower side shell plating and deck and bottom are thicker (though not 1.5") to counter the stress of waves as the tanker’s hull acts like a big girder, wave crests and troughs spaced a few 100’ apart. Where the structure only has to resist the hydrostatic pressure of the water outside pushing in (and it has to do so assuming no liquid inside pushing back) 1/2" is plenty. Something like 1/2" for WWII era or earlier shore oil tanks is what I would have guessed, especially nearer the top where the hydrostatic pressure is less. Which isn’t to say there are no thicker shore oil tanks, just that that document gives a plausible description IMO.
Coming back to the OP:
The question of how Japan decided on going to war is one of the most interesting questions about WWII, and for me one on a deep personal interest as I spend 25 years in Japan doing business, and studying how decisions were made in Japanese organizations.
The following is an extremely abbreviated outline of what happened. This is mostly based on Eri Hotta’s Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy, a “must read” to understand the situation from the Japanese side; Herbert Bix’s Hirohito And The Making Of Modern Japan as well as other books, articles and documentaries, some of which were broadcast in Japanese.
Japanese fanatical ultranationism grew in the 20s and 30s, encompassing many military leaders, the civilian opposition weakened as prime ministers and others were assassinated and there was almost a successful coup.
With this came a Japan version of a Manifest Destiny, with Japan having a rightful hegemony over Asia. This was opposed by the US because of US interests in China, as well as the European powers with their Asian colonies. The Japanese war with China and Japanese increased aggression in Asia set a direct confrontation with Japan.
The single most important thing to remember is that there wasn’t anyone really in charge. The Meiji Constitution placed the military outside of direct civilian oversight, and allowed the military to cause cabinets to fall. The Navy and Army were completely separate organizations. Each had a representative in the Cabinet and each had its own Chief of Staff with an organization separate from the Navy and War (Army) Ministries. The Emperor had limited powers and could only “accept” the decision of the government.
There were a number of fanatical leaders who were pushing for war, and many leaders including the Emperor himself, Prime Ministers, Navy Ministers, Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Ministers and others were somewhat to strongly opposed to it. However, without a strong figure to coalesce around, they would not make strong stances against a war many of them knew they would lose.
As Japan moved closer to Nazi Germany and increased aggression in Asia, the opposition increased in America. The wild card was the war in Europe and if Germany would win or not.
In 1940, the US moved the Pacific Fleet to Hawaii. Japan invaded French Indochina, occupying the northern section, and the United States embargoed scrap metal shipments to Japan.
In 1941, the Japanese military continued its preparations for war, without any real opposition from anyone.
In early July, 1941 there was an Imperial Council, by key cabinet members, top military leaders and other key leaders. These Councils were rare and reserved for weighty matters such a declarations of war.
In this meeting, it was decided to occupy southern Indochina, and a key provision was that Japan “shall not flinch” from war.
The US embargoed oil, starting a countdown in which Japan would either have to accept what it considered impossible demands or go to war. Many leaders believed that accepting the demands would be the equivalent of losing a war, so why not go out fighting.
Because of the status given to the decision of the Imperial Conference, it became difficult for leaders to fight against the incremental steps towards war. Although they attempted to negotiated with the US, what they offered the US and what the US wanted were far enough apart that a negotiated settlement wasn’t really possible.
The leaders had agreed on a timeline for the negotiations, and when an agreement wasn’t reached, then they went to war.