[QUOTE=Gangster Octopus]
Why did Saddam tempt GWB and the US in general with his defiant attitude toward weapons inspectors, U.N. dictates and such? Didn’t he simply underestimate the willingness of this administration to go to war? While the Administration really badly wanted to go to war, there were opportunities on Saddam’s side to prevent it, I believe. Why didn’t he avail himself of those oppportunities.
[/QUOTE]
[QUOTE=FRDE]
Saddam understood the Middle Eastern mind set, but he did not understand the USA
He was pretty unsophisticated
[/QUOTE]
THE IRAQI DOCUMENTS: A GLIMPSE INTO THE
REGIME OF SADDAM HUSSEIN
HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION
APRIL 6, 2006
Serial No. 109–184
Brigadier General Anthony A. Cucolo III, Usa, Director, Joint Center For Operational Analysis, United States Joint Forces Command
Lieutenant Colonel Kevin M. Woods, Usa (Ret.), Project Leader And Principal Author Of Iraqi Perspective Project, United States Joint Forces Command
[INDENT]**The Iraqi Perspective Project is a research effort conducted by United States Joint Forces Command**, specifically the Joint Center for Operational Analysis, and it focuses on Operation Iraqi Freedom in the time period from March to May 2003.
Using information gathered through dozens of interviews with senior Iraqi military and political leaders during the fall and winter of 2003–2004, and making use of thousands of official Iraqi documents, **we have a comprehensive historical analysis of the forces and motivations that drive our opponents’ decision.**
Now, to accomplish this, the project leader, Kevin Woods, led a small team of professionals in a systematic 2-year study of the former Iraqi regime and military. This book is the first major product of that effort.
Essentially, Kevin and his team crafted a substantive examination of Saddam Hussein’s leadership and its effect on the Iraqi military decision making process. Moreover, we believe it goes a long way toward revealing the inner workings of a closed regime from an insiders’ point of view.
The overall objective of the project was to learn the right lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom, and while the practice of self-critique and gathering lessons learned are distinguishing feature of the U.S. Military, **in almost every past instance our understanding of events remained incomplete because any assessment was limited to a ‘‘blue’’ or a friendly view of what happened.**
While we often had a relatively complete picture of what our adversary did, we remained in the dark as to what motivated his actions.
In this case, by shedding light on the actual ‘‘red team’s view,’’ this study hopes to contribute to a more fully developed history of the war.
It should be noted that this is the first such effort by the United States Government since World War II, when the United States conducted a comprehensive review of recovered German and Japanese documents, as well as interviews with key military and civilian leadership of our former enemies.
Though this is an important first step, we acknowledge that our understanding of Operation Iraqi Freedom remains incomplete.
The second assumption that Saddam made had to do with the nature of his opponents. Through the distortions of his ideological perceptions, **Saddam simply could not take the Americans seriously**. After all, had they not run away from Vietnam after suffering what to him was a ‘‘mere’’ 58,000 dead? Iraq had suffered 51,000 dead in just one battle on the Fao Peninsula against the Iranians. In the 1991 Gulf War, the Americans had appeared on the brink of destroying much of Iraq’s military, including the Republican Guard, but then inexplicably stopped—for fear of casualties, in Saddam’s view. Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo all added to **Saddam’s belief that the Americans could not possibly launch a ground invasion that would seriously threaten his regime.** At best they might be willing to launch an air campaign similar to OPERATION DESERT FOX in 1998 with a few small ground attacks around Iraq’s periphery. But from Saddam’s point of view, the idea that the Americans would attack all the way to Baghdad appeared ludicrous.
A few senior military officers believed that the coalition might launch a ground campaign, especially given the enormous buildup that was taking place in Kuwait. But even they believed that as in OPERATION DESERT STORM, the Americans would wage a sustained air campaign before they launched their ground forces on an invasion of Iraq. Therefore, **the entire Iraqi leadership—military and civilian— was surprised by Coalition ground forces beginning their offensive into Iraq at the same time the air campaign was starting. Adding to their incomprehension were the speed and power of the American offensive, which were simply beyond their understanding of military operations and logistical capabilities**.[/INDENT]
nobody expects the Spanish Inquisition either
