Why did the Korean and Vietnam wars produce such different results?

[Dissonance]

@nevadaexile

Some reasons:
The UN (read: US) forces were essentially winning the conflict - People today forget that the DMZ lies roughly 25 miles south of what was the front line at the time of the armistice. While the UN couldn’t force China out of North Korea, they were going to win a war of attrition against them.

Untrue. The DMZ lies exactly where the front line was at the time of the armistice, see map here. The UN didn’t move 25 miles south upon agreement to the ceasefire, and it wasn’t winning the conflict at the time of the ceasefire. The war had been stalemated for two years when the armistice was agreed upon. Neither side was winning the war of attrition as neither side was suffering losses large enough to be unsustainable virtually indefinately, and both sides were growing weary of the conflict.

@nevadaexile

Had the US invaded North Vietnam and driven its forces into southern China or defeated them, then it’s a reasonable assumption that the results in that war would have been the same or similar. However, that’s not how the US fought that war and the quagmire that became the Vietnam War was the result.

Had the US invaded North Vietnam, China would have directly intervened in the conflict just as it had in Korea and for the same reason: it didn’t want a US client state as a neighbor. This isn’t speculation, as it was China had a peak troops strength in North Vietnam of 170,000 during the conflict:

The most immediate need was for anti-aircraft artillery, units to counter the overwhelming American air power over North Vietnam. Ho would request Chinese AAA units during a meeting with Mao in May of 1965 and PLA forces would begin flowing into North Vietnam in July of 1965 to help defend the capital of Hanoi and the transportation network to include railroad lines and bridges.[50] This movement of troops from China was not lost on the U.S. as reported in a Top Secret CIA Special Report which identified seven major PLA units in North Vietnam to include the 67th AAA Division, and an estimated 25,000 to 45,000 Chinese combat troops total. [51] Recent Chinese sources indicate that this PLA AAA Division did indeed operate in the western area of North Vietnam. [52] In addition to AAA forces the PLA also provided missiles, artillery and logistics, railroad, engineer and mine sweeping forces. These forces would not only man AAA sites but would also build and repair Vietnamese infrastructure damaged or destroyed by U.S. airstrikes. [53] Such units would have quite a bit of repair work to do given that there would be more than a million tons of bombs dropped by U.S. aircraft upon North Vietnam from 1965 to 1972. [54] The Second Vietnam War would drag on for years as a sort of operational stalemate existed in the skies over North Vietnam. The U.S. could and did bomb the North at will, but the sheer numbers of Chinese forces, to include a total of 16 AAA divisions serving with a peak strength of 170,000 troops attained in 1967, would ensure that a high price would be paid by U.S. pilots with targets often rapidly rebuilt after destruction. [55] Chinese engineering and logistics units would perform impressive feats of construction throughout their stay in North Vietnam effectively keeping the transportation network functioning.

Invading the North would have meant full and direct intervention by China with more than a million men and the Korean War all over again, only this time China had the bomb as well.

@Desert_Dumpster

Then came the Tet offensive, during which US forces delivered a smashing defeat to NVA regular forces, so much so that they ceased to exist as a fighting force.

Totally incorrect. The Viet Cong committed itself fully to the Tet offensive and suffered heavy losses both to its mobile and its local forces. The NVA suffered as well, but wasn’t anything near as badly mauled, and neither the NVA nor the VC had come close to “ceasing to exist as a fighting force”. What did happen was that because of its losses, the majority of NLF forces in South Vietnam ceased to be Viet Cong and became increasingly more NVA percentage-wise.

@Desert_Dumpster

The war could have been won in three weeks after the Tet offensive, as there were no significant armed forces standing in the US’s way.

Utter tripe. The Tet Offensive was followed up by fresh US offensives against the VC to exploit their weaknesses in the wake of Tet. They of course failed to win the war, or dislodge the VC shadow government and widespread support for the communists. The reason Tet was a disaster for the US was it exposed the huge credibility gap: the US public was being told we were winning the war in Vietnam and that the light was at the end of the tunnel. General Westmoreland had publicly stated that the US was winning the war, and made the rather unfortunate statement that

At an address at the National Press Club on 21 November he reported that, as of the end of 1967, the communists were “unable to mount a major offensive…I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing…We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view.”

Two months after stating the communists were unable to launch a major offensive, they launched the largest offensive of the war in a surprise countrywide coordinated attack.

[Musicat]

@Desert_Dumpster

The Korean war received relatively little media coverage, but the Vietnam war was the first war ever with blanket mass media coverage, embedded journalists, etc. The media’s focus on the carnage of the war was a primary reason for the growing antiwar sentiment in the US. Then came the Tet offensive, during which US forces delivered a smashing defeat to NVA regular forces, so much so that they ceased to exist as a fighting force.

All I can say to your post is **WTF? ** You haven’t the slightest idea what you are talking about.

I was there.* I was there during the Tet event.* I was on the “front lines” during the Tet event. (There were no “front lines.”) I woke up to rocket and mortar attacks that the most senior military dude, Westmoreland, said would never happen because the NVA was defeated. Yet the USA had never been handed such a surprising and definitive defeat since Pearl Harbor.

The war could have been won in three weeks after the Tet offensive…

Sure, easy-peasy. A coupla well-placed nukes in Hanoi and Shanghai would have done the trick. Throw in Moscow for good measure. Why do you think that didn’t happen?

@Dissonance

Two months after stating the communists were unable to launch a major offensive, they launched the largest offensive of the war in a surprise countrywide coordinated attack.

I rest my case.

[nevadaexile]

@Dissonance

Untrue. The DMZ lies exactly where the front line was at the time of the armistice, see map here. The UN didn’t move 25 miles south upon agreement to the ceasefire, and it wasn’t winning the conflict at the time of the ceasefire. The war had been stalemated for two years when the armistice was agreed upon. Neither side was winning the war of attrition as neither side was suffering losses large enough to be unsustainable virtually indefinately, and both sides were growing weary of the conflict.
Had the US invaded North Vietnam, China would have directly intervened in the conflict just as it had in Korea and for the same reason: it didn’t want a US client state as a neighbor. This isn’t speculation, as it was China had a peak troops strength in North Vietnam of 170,000 during the conflict:Invading the North would have meant full and direct intervention by China with more than a million men and the Korean War all over again, only this time China had the bomb as well.

Totally incorrect. The Viet Cong committed itself fully to the Tet offensive and suffered heavy losses both to its mobile and its local forces. The NVA suffered as well, but wasn’t anything near as badly mauled, and neither the NVA nor the VC had come close to “ceasing to exist as a fighting force”. What did happen was that because of its losses, the majority of NLF forces in South Vietnam ceased to be Viet Cong and became increasingly more NVA percentage-wise.

Utter tripe. The Tet Offensive was followed up by fresh US offensives against the VC to exploit their weaknesses in the wake of Tet. They of course failed to win the war, or dislodge the VC shadow government and widespread support for the communists. The reason Tet was a disaster for the US was it exposed the huge credibility gap: the US public was being told we were winning the war in Vietnam and that the light was at the end of the tunnel. General Westmoreland had publicly stated that the US was winning the war, and made the rather unfortunate statement thatTwo months after stating the communists were unable to launch a major offensive, they launched the largest offensive of the war in a surprise countrywide coordinated attack.

Sorry, but I have been to the DMZ.
Have you?

[Musicat]

@nevadaexile

Sorry, but I have been to the DMZ.
Have you?

I have not. But what’s your point?

[slowlearner]

Anyone interested in this question should read Col. Hackworth’s book About Face. He writes about his multiple combat tours in both wars and the journey from 15 year old Pvt to disillusioned Colonel. Great war stories, and a great deal of history you won’t get anywhere else, especially considering how so much of the history of those wars has been rewritten by the political Right. According to Hack we lost the Korean war, too…
And why is it always limited rules of engagement and one hand behind our back in Vietnam? Man, we made a great slaughter there, we turned everything we had in our great American killing machine loose on those people. They were willing to sacrifice everything because they wanted to be free, free from us. That’s why we keep losing all these ignorant wars we start.

[Desert_Dumpster]

@Musicat

I was there.

I rest my case.

Unfortunately, your having been there probably gave you a less clear picture of the overall strategic picture than just about anyone else. You saw, and had to pay attention to, naturally, what was in your immediate vicinity. Much as the Marine fighting for some obscure island in the middle of the Pacific had no clue of WWII’s grand strategy, you would have had no real idea what was going on in the theater as a whole–not with mortar shells raining down on you.

I was born too late to be drafted into the Vietnam war, but not too late to know several friends and relatives who did fight in it. After listening to their experiences. I became somewhat of a scholar of the war. One unifying theme that I got both from my reading and my conversations was an immense frustration with how American troops never mounted any sustained offensive into North Vietnam. It seems obvious that with overwhelming air superiority, US troops could have invaded along the coast and never had to worry about flanking attacks from a decimated (yes, decimated) opposition. The strategy of smashing NVA and Viet Cong excursions and then hanging out and waiting for the next one allowed an enemy who had no regard for human life and an endless supply of weapons from China regroup and re-arm time after time.

I repeat–three weeks of sustained effort. Tops.

[nevadaexile]

@Musicat

I have not. But what’s your point?

My “point” is that the front lines at the end of the Korean War were farther north than the 38th Parallel (they tell you that when you go to the DMZ). The UN forces were well into what is today is North Korea.

[Monty]

The UN forces were all the way to the border with China at one point during that war. What does that have to do with the location of the DMZ now?

[Dissonance]

@nevadaexile

Sorry, but I have been to the DMZ.
Have you?

No, but I can read a map and history books.

@nevadaexile

My “point” is that the front lines at the end of the Korean War were farther north than the 38th Parallel (they tell you that when you go to the DMZ). The UN forces were well into what is today is North Korea.

This isn’t your point. What you actually said was:

@nevadaexile

The UN (read: US) forces were essentially winning the conflict - People today forget that the DMZ lies roughly 25 miles south of what was the front line at the time of the armistice.

The DMZ does not lie 25 miles south of what was the front line at the time of the armistice. It lies exactly where the front line was at the time of the armistice. The UN didn’t fall back 25 miles when the armistice was signed.

Finally, the DMZ and the front lines at the time of the armistice do not exist entirely north of the 38th parallel, which you would have plainly seen if you had looked at the linked map of the DMZ I provided. It is north of the 38th parallel on the western side of Korea, but it is south of the 38th parallel on the eastern side of Korea. That’s because it is located where the front lines were when the cease fire in place was agreed to, not a neat line like the 38th parallel and certainly not 25 miles south of what was the front line in Korea on 27 July 1953 as you originally stated.

[Dissonance]

@Desert_Dumpster

I became somewhat of a scholar of the war.

I repeat–three weeks of sustained effort. Tops.

Your scholarship of the war is woefully misinformed when you make patently false statements like the NVA ceased to exist as a fighting force as a result of Tet and you make equally absurd statements that the war could have been won with three weeks of sustained effort “as there were no significant armed forces standing in the US’s way”. Apparently you are unaware of the fact that the US, ARVN and FWA did conduct sustained offensive operations in response to Tet, and for a hell of a lot longer than three weeks. There’s a list of allied military operations in Vietnam in 1968 located here, note particularly Operation Toan Thang I

Operation Toan Thang I was a US, Australian and ARVN operation conducted between 8 April 1968 and 31 May 1968 in the Vietnam war. Toan Thang, or “Complete Victory”, was part of a reaction to the Tet offensive by forces allied with the Republic of Vietnam designed to put pressure on PLAF (Vietcong) and PAVN (North Vietnamese Army) forces.

and Operation Delaware

In January 1968, General Creighton W. Abrams, deputy commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, ordered the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) to move north from the Central Highlands to support the Marines.[2] The 1st Cavalry Division, an airmobile division with 20,000 men and nearly 450 helicopters, had the most firepower and mobility of any division-size unit in Vietnam.[3] When it arrived in I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ), the 1st Cavalry Division fought toe-to-toe with the enemy during Tet. It was fully engaged with the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) at Khe Sanh when its commander, Maj. Gen. John J. Tolson, was ordered to prepare plans for the massive air assault into the A Shau Valley: Operation Delaware.

You might also want to look at the May Offensive since you imagine the NVA had ceased to exist as a fighting force after Tet and there were no significant armed forces standing in the US’s way.

During the early morning hours of 5 May, communist units initiated PHASE II of the Tet Offensive of 1968 (also known as the May Offensive, “Little Tet”, and “Mini-Tet”) by striking 119 targets throughout South Vietnam, including Saigon. This time, however, allied intelligence was better prepared, stripping away the element of surprise. Most of the communist forces were intercepted by allied screening elements before they reached their targets. 13 NLF battalions, however, managed to slip through the cordon and once again plunged the capital into chaos. Severe fighting occurred at Phu Lam, (where it took two days to root out the 267th NLF Local Force Battalion), around the Y-Bridge, and at Tan Son Nhut.[1] By 12 May, however, it was all over. NLF forces withdrew from the area leaving behind over 3,000 dead[2] and 7,500 wounded.

Quite an accomplishment for a military that you imagine had ceased to exist as an effective force and possessed no significant armed forces two months earlier. Even more so when you consider Operation Toan Thang I had been conducted from Apr 8 – May 31 (quite a bit longer than three weeks) by 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, 1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, 199th Infantry Brigade, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment in ARVN III Corp Area specifically to drive the NLF out of the Iron Triangle and keep them from threatening Saigon again. Even with their losses from Tet and a major two month long operation against them in the region surrounding Saigon, the NLF was able to slip 13 battalions into Saigon in another offensive two months after the first phase of Tet had ended.

[Little_Nemo]

I’ve offered this theory before but it’s relevant here.

As I noted above, we shouldn’t be too America-centric and only think about how the Tet Offensive affected Americans. It was a communist offensive and we need to consider the communist viewpoint.

Communism is not a monolith. There are factions within communism and they often fight each other much more bitterly than they oppose any non-communists.

During the war, we were essentially fighting two separate enemies. There was the regular military forces of the North Vietnamese government and there was the guerrilla movement that operated inside South Vietnam. These two forces were allied and nominally under the same control but they were not necessarily in perfect accord.

By 1968, the government in Hanoi may have been looking forward to an eventual American withdrawal and Southern defeat. And it might have begun seeing the guerrillas as a future rival.

So the Tet Offensive served two purposes. It had the guerrillas rise up and fight against the Americans and South Vietnamese regulars in open battle. The guerrillas inflicted heavy casualties in the beginning and then had heavy casualties inflicted upon them as the battle went on. So the final result was that both Hanoi’s current opponents and its future opponents were weakened.

[Mr_Quatro]

The years of the Korean conflict did not include China having nuclear weapons, even though a well known general had suggested to President Truman the use of ten well placed nuclear bombs to stop the Korean conflict, this thought was rejected and the general removed from making anymore major decisions.

Years go by, some ten years or more go by and by this time China and Russia have nuclear weapons. China’s first nuclear test took place in 1964 and China in Oct 1966 launched it’s first nuclear missile. Two presidents before Johnson had been supplying South Vietnam with weapons and advisors, but it took President Johnson jumping on the claim that two PT boats had come out to fight against the USS Turner Joy in a storm no less (which I now believe was just sea return on radar).

President Johnson’s fear of starting a nuclear war with China and it’s neighbor Russia takes complete charge of every attack by air. I’ll leave the problems President Nixon added with stopping the air war for peace talks and letting North Vietnam resupply their guerilla warfare fighters and using neighboring countries that we could not bomb.

The rest is history that plays out on the history channel all the time. We lost, we retreated, we pulled out, we left them to their present day fate and counted over 58,000 causalities to the ill advised and ill planned confrontation thus the term “War is hell”

Why the different outcomes? Fear of nuclear war …

by the way Vietnam up to the time we left the area had only experienced one hundred years of peace in it’s entire history.