Call me naive but, couldn’t the USA have dropped the bomb on a completely uninhabited area and then said “look what we can do”?
Wasn’t it “look what they can do” that stopped the war?
I remember hearing it was the threat of using it on Tokio that got them to surrender.
I’ve heard this and wondered this myself. I think that we had to demostrate not only that we had the bomb but we could deliver it right into their major population centers.
Unfortunatly the only way to demo this was to do it, twice.
This was explicitly considered. Targeting was a matter for the Interim Committee; basically a bunch of political and military types with an advisory Scientific Panel. The latter - Lawrence, Compton, Fermi and Oppenheimer - were tasked with thinking up just such a demonstration. They spent July 16-17 at Los Alamos trying to think up a scenario, but couldn’t recommend anything. Unfortunately, the reasoning here wasn’t really recorded.
Though on a related note, Oppenheimer expected the bomb to be dropped at night, as evidenced by the recollections of his conversation with Groves after Hiroshima. He expected the bombing to be maximally visable, precisely to maximise the “psychological” impact on the wider Japanese population. In practice, the US Air Force dropped both in daylight.
The very first atomic bomb was detonated in an uninhabited area, namely Trinity Site in the New Mexico desert. It wasn’t dropped from a bomber but was suspended from a tower. Some of the scientists took bets as to whether the explosion would ignite the atmospher and kill everyone on Earth.
Of course, since the Manhaattan Project was Top Secret, word of the successful testing wasn’t on the front page of the New York Times or anything like that.
There mighta been a problem inviting anyone over to Mexico to take a look though, ya know?
I can certainly imagine some lines of thought: if waiting costs both sides people, and not waiting only costs them, then we really shouldn’t wait.
P.S. - If anyone else has any bets running that project X will destroy the earth, put me down for $10,000 on “nay”.
Actually Nagasaki was not actually the intended target for the second atomic bomb. When the flight was launched, its primary target was the city of Kokura. But when they arrived there, the city was obscured by cloud cover. So they flew on to their secondary target, Nagasaki, which was having a clear day.
That we still didn’t understand it even years later is demonstrated by one of Cecil’s columns, about the film The Conqueror, online at http://www.straightdope.com/classics/a2_016.html . Or at least I sure hope that’s what it demonstrates – I like to think that if the powers that be had known the consequences of testing nuclear weapons above-ground and letting the fallout drift over populated areas repeatedly, they wouldn’t have been so cavalier about it.
That still doesn’t change why Nagasaki was on the Christmas list. Maybe it was in second place but it was near the top. Even that late in the war, many people were still smarting from Pearl Harbor.
This is more of a Great Debate than a General Question with a factual answer, so I’ll move this thread to GD.
bibliophage
moderator GQ
What, an attack conducted from the air, by surprise, upon military targets? The decision to launch the attack was possibly a little questionable (Then again, citing that another nation is becoming a threat to another nation’s interests have been a common excuse for war for a long time), but as far as the attack itself, it’s not really any more “awful” than any other starting offensive of a war.
Well, regardless of my own opinions of it… That would still leave open the question “…But will they?” Dropping a huge bomb in an empty area might be seen as a reluctance to actually use them, or even a bluff. IIRC, that was one of the reasons why it should be dropped on a city. Another was that the devestation the bomb could cause would be much more visible if it were done in a city, so they could see exactly how much devestation it could cause if they continued to use them.
We dropped the 2nd bomb because the 1st one didn’t lead to Japan’s surrender. Since the destruction of Hiroshima didn’t cause Japan to surrender, the destruction of some uninhabited area certainly wouldn’t have done so.
That sounds plausible, december, but doesn’t fit with the facts.
Bomb 1: August 6.
Bomb 2: August 9.
Surrender: August 15.
How can it be known that Bomb 1 didn’t cause surrender, but Bomb 2 did?
They still didn’t. I’ve read accounts written about the Bikini Atoll tests (and my middle brother’s FIL was there at the tests and I’ve spoken to him about them) and much of the attitude about the bombs was “casual.” It was assumed that an easy way to decontaminate radioactive objects would be found, and that nukes could be used for things like canal building. Hell, it wasn’t until the Sixties, IIRC, that anyone figured out that nukes had some nasty EMP effects. To sit there today, and watch folks calmly discuss using nukes like one would use say, artillery shells, is pretty damn frightening. You realize that we were merely an eyelash away from total disaster. (If you really want nightmares, imagine what would have happened if we’d developed nukes during the Victorian Era!)
Why would he be nonplussed? Nonplussed = A state of perplexity, confusion, or bewilderment.
I’m a little confused as to this “prove we can make an indefinitely large number of bombs” theory. Dropping two doesn’t establish that you have three, any more than dropping one establishes that you have more than one. The sixgun analogy doesn’t work, since there weren’t known capacities for making the things. Dropping one demonstrates that you know how to make the things, and can produce them at some unknown rate. Dropping two just demonstrates that you’ve made at least two - it provides no further information, given that the first bombing might have been delayed so as to be able to drop the second soon afterwards. And, truth be told, there were only two bombs, at the time. I’m too lazy to dig up how long it would have been before a third would have been ready.
I’m not trying to condemn the bombings - I think it’s true that they probably saved lives, both Japanese and American. I also think that it’s overwhelmingly probable that preventing Soviet inroads in the area was part of the motivation. I do think it might well have been possible to choose better targets - i.e. ones which would have produced the same results while killing fewer innocents - but it’s too easy to sit here 50 years later to be second guessing. It was a nasty war; everyone did things to be ashamed of; let’s work on learning the lessons it can teach us, not issuing useless recriminations to those who were forced to make such horrible decisions.
My recollection is that the second bomb was important to the Japanese decision to surrender. After the first bomb it was assumed that the United States only had one bomb or, if the US had more then world opinion would prevent the US from using a second one. The pace of the bombing – boom 2 3 4 boom 2 3 4 gave the impression of the US neither being limited by bomb supply nor constrained by world opinion. (I believe I read this in Downfall by Richard Franks http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0141001461/qid=1050249260/sr=2-2/ref=sr_2_2/104-0473409-8054359
but I do not have that book here)
Flipping through Behind Japan’s Surrender by Lester Brooks http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0962694681/qid%3D1050250065/sr%3D11-1/ref%3Dsr_11_1/104-0473409-8054359, I see that by the 12th, when the Japanese might expect a thrid bomb, serious negotiations had begun between the US and Japan (about the status of the Emperor under unconditional surrender) so a third bomb was unnecessary.
I do not know if the US was aware of the Japanese cabinet’s deliberations after the first bomb. I read a recent book on MAGIC last year but I do not remember it being mentioned.
As to the US bomb supply IIRC the US would have used one more on a city and then save the next one or two for tactical usage on the beachheads in Olympic/Coronet the invasion of Japan. We were building them too slowly to waste on cities if the Japanese weren’t going to surrender. (Plus given the effectiveness of conventional and incendiary bombing the only real advantage of atomic bombs was the psychological threat of one plane one bomb one city)
The cynical theory was that we had built two different prototypes – Fat Man and Little Boy – and to avoid favoring one model over the other, or depriving either development group of the sense of having made a true military contribution to the war, they committed to using them both.
Did the Japanese think we only had one B-29? Or one Bazooka? Where is the logic in thinking that Japan would believe we only had one atom bomb?
To believe this theory, it would only make sense that Japan thought we only had two atom bombs! Keep fighting until they show they have a 3rd!
At the time, atom bombs were regarded as difficult or impossible to make. Despite our propaganda releases, the Japanese had no way of knowing for sure that we had really detonated an atom bomb, as opposed to getting lucky and detonating, for example, a really big, and secret, gas liquefaction facility under the town. When the US did the same thing to Nagasaki, the credibility of that sort of tinfoil-hat explanation went out the window.
Recall that immediately after the first plane crashed into the WTC on 9/11, there were widespread reports that some sort of horrible accident had occurred. It wasn’t until the second plane hit, and the subsequent crash at the pentagon, that people began to come to terms with the “unthinkable” reality of planes as bombs. Information flow back in 45 was much slower than it is today, and consequently it took more time for the truth to filter in and for the bureaucracies involved to come to terms with unexpected and unusual events. As happened on 9/11, the second bomb sped up the process. -Just my WAG.