Well, it’s nice to see this thread has been hijacked into recriminations and jingoism. No reason it should be any different from any other thread in GD today.
Here’s a great link relating to the discussion we WERE having:
United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary (Pacific War), dated 1 July, 1946http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm#teotab
relevant quotes:
Basic United States strategy contemplated that the final decision in the Japanese war would be obtained by an invasion of the Japanese home islands. The long-range bombing offensive from the Marianas was initiated in November 1944, with that in mind as the primary objective. As in Europe prior to D-day, the principal measure of success set for strategic air action was the extent to which it would weaken enemy capability and will to resist our amphibious forces at the time of landings. This led, originally, to somewhat greater emphasis on the selection of targets such as aircraft factories, arsenals, electronics plants, oil refineries, and finished military goods, destruction of which could be expected to weaken the capabilities of the Japanese armed forces to resist at the Kyushu beachheads in November 1945, than on the disruption of the more basic elements of Japan’s social, economic, and political fabric.
On 9 March 1945, a basic revision in the method of B-29 attack was instituted. It was decided to bomb the four principal Japanese cities at night from altitudes averaging 7,000 feet. Japanese weakness in night fighters and antiaircraft made this program feasible. Incendiaries were used instead of high-explosive bombs and the lower altitude permitted a substantial increase in bomb load per plane. One thousand six hundred and sixty-seven tons of bombs were dropped on Tokyo in the first attack. The chosen areas were saturated. Fifteen square miles of Tokyo’s most densely populated area were burned to the ground.
Prior to the loss of Saipan confidence in eventual victory remained high in spite of exhausting work, poor nutrition and rising black market prices. In June 1944 approximately two percent of the population believed that Japan faced the probability of defeat. The fall of Saipan could not be kept from the Japanese people. Even though the psychological effect of this disaster was far greater on the Japanese leaders and intellectuals than on the mass of the population, all indices of Japanese morale began thereafter to decline. By December 1944 air attacks from the Marianas against the home islands had begun, defeats in the Philippines had been suffered, and the food situation had deteriorated; 10 percent of the people believed Japan could not achieve victory. By March 1945, when the night incendiary attacks began and the food ration was reduced, this percentage had risen to 19 percent. In June it was 46 percent, and just prior to surrender, 68 percent. Of those who had come to this belief over one-half attributed the principal cause to air attacks, other than the atomic bombing attacks, and one-third to military defeats.
The Emperor largely escaped the criticism which was directed at other leaders, and retained the people’s faith in him. It is probable that most Japanese would have passively faced death in a continuation of the hopeless struggle, had the Emperor so ordered. When the Emperor announced the unconditional surrender the first reaction of the people was one of regret and surprise, followed shortly by relief.
Prior to the dropping of the atomic bombs, the people of the two cities had fewer misgivings about the war than people in other cities and their morale held up after it better than might have been expected. Twenty-nine percent of the survivors interrogated indicated that after the atomic bomb was dropped they were convinced that victory for Japan was impossible. Twenty-four percent stated that because of the bomb they felt personally unable to carry on with the war. Some 40 percent testified to various degrees of defeatism. A greater number (24 percent) expressed themselves as being impressed with the power and scientific skill which underlay the discovery and production of the atomic bomb than expressed anger at its use (20 percent). In many instances, the reaction was one of resignation.
The effect of the atomic bomb on the confidence of the Japanese civilian population outside the two cities was more restricted. This was in part due to the effect of distance, lack of understanding of the nature of atomic energy, and the impact of other demoralizing experiences. The role of the atomic bomb in the surrender must be considered along with all the other forces which bore upon that question with Japan.
The discussion of internal Japanese politics is particularly enlightening, including this:
In the succeeding meetings of the Supreme War Direction Council, the differences of opinion previously existing as to the Potsdam terms persisted exactly as before. By using the urgency brought about through fear of further atomic bombing attacks, the Prime Minister found it possible to bring the Emperor directly into the discussions of the Potsdam terms. Hirohito, acting as arbiter, resolved the conflict in favor of unconditional surrender.
<snip>
Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey’s opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.
Technically, it wasn’t “terror bombing”, at least as far as international law went at the time. Poland officially declared that Warsaw would be fought for to the last man, and as such, became a military target. It was after this declaration was made that the Germans began bombing the city.
*Originally posted by SenorBeef *
Oh, I agree, but “terror bombing” was the phrase of the day for the outright bombing of a city. There wasn’t even a vague attempt to claim a full blown ‘military’ target. My point was that the concept of total war is/was the full mobilization of all the resources of nations to overcome each other. To split hairs, the ‘interdiction’ efforts of Germany in Poland in September 1939 from day one involved strafing refugee columns. International law is a strange beast, and everyone has their out. As an example, the use of incendiaries on even military targets was specifically forbidden under international law at the time (and still is now), but white phosphorus was/is used extensively by all that could afford it. As an ‘out’ one could claim that it was used for spotting purposes and not deliberately targeted as a weapon. By international law, submarine warfare as conducted by both by Germany {not to slight Italian contributions} in the Atlantic and by the United States in the Pacific {not to slight British/Dutch contributions} in World War II was in direct violation of conventions at the time.
I don’t intend this by any means to be a defense of the disgusting totalitarian regimes of the Axis powers, but the targeting of civilians was accepted as the norm in World War II.