Let’s look at that statement in the context I gave.
OK, provide a cite showing otherwise, that the aim points where chosen to maximize the damage to the military targets within a city and to prioritize that over the destruction of the city itself.
I’ve provided cites which show that the aim point of the Nagasaki bomb was directed at the city center and away from the factories and the houses of the workers.
Here’s a map of the Hiroshima AP, showing that it was centered on the city and not on the military facilities in the lower right. Perhaps the “no attempt” could be “little attempt” except that it’s certain that they would have placed the AP in the same place, regardless if where the military targets lay.
Cite. This should be a relatively easy task.
However, one factor which would make your claim more difficult to support would be
[quotes by LaMay]
(U.S. Politicians, Officials and Administrators | American Experience | Official Site | PBS).
There has been a dozen points or so which you haven’t responded to. At this stage, is there a point in continuing a discussion?
My emphasis.
I don’t think your argument can be supported but I would love to see any information.
I have no idea what Truman would have thought that the hundreds of B-29s each dropping tons of napalm were doing over enemy cities if the purpose had been anything but burning homes and killing people.
As I pointed earlier, one of my key interests in WWII was the process of and thoughts behind the decision to surrender, and the role the various factors played. I’ve never seen a good argument against the firebombing and atomic bombs which didn’t factor in the natural uncertainty by US leadership of Japanese intentions. No one knew what was going to be required in order to force them to surrender.
There was an ongoing debate on the terms for the demand for surrender. While the popular view is that the demand was for unconditional surrender, the one condition allowed was a constitutional role for the emperor. They balancing that was the timing of the surrender and the expected entrance of the Soviets into the war.
There was a large debate by scientists to try to stop the use of the bomb, but I haven’t read anything which would indicate that Truman was influenced that.
If the dairy entry were legitimate, then one would expect a better paper trail showing why the actual order didn’t contain the specified restrictions. The targeting committee had already rejected selecting a pure “military” target which was not in an urban setting (Their emphasis.) and that the psychological factor and maximum damage be the primary basis for the selection. Had an actual order from Truman be such as to override this selection process, it would have been documented.