CnoteChris, not that I am an expert of any kind either but I do remember reding the story a few months later in the major weekly magazines and it seemed plausible to me. I also remember that ambassador woman (was she the US ambassador to Iraq? I can’t remember) being interviewed and being quite defensive when she was asked questions about whether she misled the Iraqis. She did not seem to have a very clear explanation. On the other hand that could be part of the coverup of the whole conspiracy…
And regarding the US or any other country keeping the Arabs divided… I think they do a pretty good job of that themselves without any need of outside help.
Ms. April Gillespie was the U.S. ambassador to Iraq at the time. A very smart and capble woman I am told by friends.
In re her position, I’ve long harbored the suspicion that if Iraq had not annexed Kuwait but had content itself with a brief punative expedition, the expulsion of the Sabah family family and Syrian style ‘protection’ (a la Lebanon) for Kuwait, few would have shed a tear and there would have been no Gulf War. However, that did not happen.
In re Saddam Hussien, he’s not a freak-a-zoid. Just a
(quite nasty) dictator. I have it on first hand account he’s actually a charming if chilling fellow. Not mad, just terribly ruthless.
>> Ms. April Gillespie was the U.S. ambassador to Iraq at the time. A very smart and capble woman I am told by friends.
Yes? Could she play the trumpet?
Seriously now, at the time I did get the impression that the US (not necessarily her) messed up here. That there was some miscommunication. Maybe even not one single person to blame but along the line the message was not clearly relayed to SH. Maybe she got the blame because she was the last link in the chain. What does seem clear is that she did not clearly say to SH: if you invade Kuwait we will kick you ass. I remember her being very vague when asked that question.
Without a strong successor government to Hussein,
Iran would have quickly dominated the region, and Southern Iraq, full of Shiites, would have gravitated toward Iran.
The Kurds in Northern Iraq could have split off from a weak Iraqi government and formed their own state. That would have mightily ticked off the Turks, who are a vital US ally in the region.
In the first place, I’m not at all certain that France and the UK would’ve gone in with us. More importantly, we definately needed Saudi Arabia. To my understanding, an overwhelming majority of our air sorties were flown from Saudi bases. If they were to revoke basing privileges, our job would have become a lot tougher, militarily. Occupying Baghdad is a frightening proposition.
If we hadn’t stopped, we would no longer be “liberating” anything. We wouild be “invading” and “occupying” Iraq, as well as infringing on its sovereigntry and setting up a government that suits our needs. Needless to say, maintaining domestic and international support for the war becomes much more difficult the further along these lines we go.
As for your theory about why we got into the war, it’s pure conjecture (which is not to say that it’s necessarily wrong). While it’s certainly plausible, I’ve seen no substantial evidence to support it. If you’re looking for a nefarious American plot, I can think of two that I prefer to yours.
– Oil prices (the obvious answer). Bush was an oil man, with long-standing political allegiances to oil companies.
Most of the U.S.'s oil is domestic (Texas, Alaska), not imported, so we could have weathered a seller’s market in oil relatively well, but Exxon and Mobil (etc.) could expect (or at least fear) major fiscal hits. They said jump, Bush said, “how high?”
Of course, I’m not sure I buy this theory. We were a de facto ally of Iraq during the war with Iran. While we might expect some increase in oil prices, I see no reason to believe that Hussein would have imposed prohibitive oil prices or been at all unreasonable to U.S. interests.
– Maybe we did it for money. The U.S. actually turned a small profit on the war itself (subsidies from allies etc. outpaced our total expenses). Of course, it’s doubtful in the extreme that we could have predicted such a thing, so the theory isn’t a likely one . . . but I like it.
Point of information: that’s “CIA,” (Central Intelligence Agency) not “CYA.” I’m curious as to what you thought CYA stood for (or was it just a typo?).
Slight disagreement and hijack here. The US was not simply ambivolent about Iraq and Iran fighting. They encouraged Iraq in the first place and provided arms and intelligence during the war.
Nah matt, I just keep getting confused with the YMCA.
Back to the main thrust:
How about ‘liberating’ the Iraqi people.
Just to re-state, I don’t believe Baghdad was ever on the military agenda because Saddam (reduced and controlled) is too good to be true for US foreign policy objectives and (at that time) for the armaments industry. I like Nabber4’s brief contribution but can’t help wondering what the response might be by the oppressed majority of civilians and enlisted men in Iraq should a more liberal alternative have been offered to them. Democracy in the Islamic world might not be overly widespread but there’s plenty of room between Saddam and full enfranchisement. One might ask, in a democratic sense, whether there is there a whole lot of difference between liberating Kuwait (and delivering its people to a relatively benevolent but non-democratic ruling family) and liberating Iraq from Saddam.
Well, I just saw a one themed set of responses to the OP and offered an alternative perspective hoping it would help engender a more rounded view. I agree, it’s ‘pretty borderline’ now, though. Bit like the difference between ‘liberation’ and ‘invasion’.
I think what we misjudged is Saddam himself. We have been quite happy for him to present a viable and potential threat but it’s a fine line between threat and actually doing the damn thing. As the Falklands demonstrates, if you send Dictators a few mixed signals they can tend to take that as a green light.
BTW, I think Junior needs to take a few lessons from Dad in pronunciation. The way Dubya says “Chinese” just isn’t up to the job. I miss the old days of SAY-Damn and A_Rabs.
In this context whatever minor effects the majors such as Mobil, Exxon et al might have suffered (and a run up in oil prices might have proven short-term beneficial to them depending on various factors), the certain effects of an oil-crisis far outweigh them. As such, I don’t think its fair to Bush to imply his decision was driven by Exxon or Mobil et al concerns.
(*: factually speaking circa 1990, I am not certain that a majority of US oil consumed came from US domestic sources, although large amounts were certainly not middle eastern in origin)
As to “liberating” the Iraqi people, I suggest that the response to an American invasion was likely to have been rather negative in the near term.
My parents worked with her in Kuwait, at the embassy, in the late 60’s, and described her as rather much the idiot back then. However, times do change us.
Manservant, when I saw her interviewed on TV she did not appear to have any good answers at all or, unlike Madeleine Albright, to handle herself well. I felt either she had really messed up herself or she was not in liberty to divulge the real info and was just squirming in her seat. In any case I did not get a good impression of her capability.
In any case, I would not blame only her. Even if it is true that she did mess up, the responsibility goes all the up up to the top.
Who said anything about an oil crisis? I seriously doubt whether one would have arisen out of Iraqi colonization of Kuwait. Anyway, like I said, I don’t buy the theory either. I do think it’s plausible, however.
London Calling:
Well, the Ministry of Truth – er, I mean, the State Department – probably could have sold that to the U.S. public. Selling it to our western allies would have been more difficult. Our Arab allies would’ve given us a stern look and walked out (probably).
In a democratic sense, maybe not a whole lot – but there is a real difference in this case. “Liberating” Kuwait involved pushing Iraq out and then leaving (so that we might return to the status quo). “Invading” Iraq would have involved occupying the nation and setting up, in effect, a new government tailored to suit our needs (much as we did with Japan after WWII). A U.S.-led occupation and re-ordering of an Arab society would have been wholly unacceptable to, at least, the Arab world.
I think the idea that the US allowed Iraq into Kuwait in order to crush them later is an idea that’s too clever by half.
1.) It assumes that we could maintain sufficient diplomatic relations in order to set up against Iraq. Given that in 1990 we had been through two years of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks that were going nowhere (if not backwards), I doubt our State Department felt that organizing an anti-Iraq coalition in the Middle East- or even amongst Europe, which was trying to deal with the newly founded democracies and unrest in the Warsaw No-Longer-Pact.
2.) It assumes that we could beat back or even stop the Iraqi military. Maybe I’m a naif who depends too much on what I read in the Washington Post, but at the time of the build-up, it was expected that we were about to send our troops into a meat-grinder. Iraq had the 7th largest army in the world, and the thought of winning the war in 100 hours with more friendly fire than actual casualties would have been laughable in December of '90. Maybe those who were in the military back then can correct me on that point.
It wouldn’t surprise me that Ms. Gillespie was incompetent enough to accidentally encourage the Iraqi action against Kuwait. But to believe that the government had the foresight to recognize that an anti-Iraqi coalition could be built, could actively stop Iraq, and then defeat Iraq with little trouble… well, you’re assuming that from a government that can’t even deliver my mail correctly half the time.
And if they were so brilliant, why didn’t they hold Iraq off for a year so that victory in the war would come that much closer to Election Day? As it was, there was a full year for Bush Sr. to twist in the wind as glories of the war faded and recognition of the recession set in…
I agree with John Corrado, but I would take issue with one point:
After the demise of the Soviet Union, there was (and still is) no military on the planet that is even comparable to ours. Sure they had the 7th largest military in the world, but that’s not such a big deal when the gap between #1 and #2 is so huge. It was gonna be a blow-out, and everyone knew it.
That said, you’re right that no one could have expected how much of a blow-out it would be. Estimates I’ve heard after the fact put U.S. casualty projections in the 5,000-10,000 range. We thought we’d get our hair mussed for sure, but there was little doubt that we would ultimately win (barring something on the order of Iraqi nuclear release).
