Kramerbooks - one DC’s fine independent bookstores - sells reprints at the cash register. It’s considered an impulse purchase. 
Thank you, Mk VII!
That’s a fantastic read. I even welled up a little at one point.
I don’t think it is correct to say the British and Americans “didn’t get along.” We got along a whole lot better than most alliances but, of course, there was friction. Heck, the US army and the US navy didn’t always get along that well if you go looking for examples of that friction.
The Brits allowed a huge army from another nation to all but occupy their country based on the promise that we would go home afterward. I doubt they would have allowed a similar sized Soviet army the same liberties. The US kept that promise, although we may have taken a few womens and left a few babies. That has always seemed like an unusually close relationship to me.
15 years? You didn’t exactly leave very quickly…
China was part of the US back then.
Cite.
I dont understand what you mean by birth? If you mean the American Revolution, GB had been one of the most serious enemies of the US until WW1, where things changed (granted they had already changed before that, but not militarily).
Most posters here are arguing over clashes between officers and commanders of both armies, when I first read your post, I didnt think of that, I thought of clashes between British and US governements. The US sure made a point of having Britain pay in full for the help they provided, and were looking to terminate the British Empire, and replace its influence on valuable regions with its own. Britain was not in the best position to negociate.
P.S:ranking GB as a third rate power today seems totally ludicrous. They’re not a superpower, granted, but they remain a strong middle power.
Maybe he meant “third rate” as in postwar military power. With Germany and Japan smashed flat, and France recovering from occupation that gives in order:
- Soviet Union
- United States
- Britain
I would say Britain and the U.S. were by any means “serious enemies”. After the war of 1812, both decided it was mutually beneficial to get along, although for a long time we didn’t hesitate to shake the Monroe Doctrine in their face. It is not widely acknowledged, but British investment was largely responsible for the huge American westward expansion of the 19th century. It makes a pretty picture to paint the brave poineer as a rugged individualist, but it was British money that stocked the ranches, built the railroads, mined the minerals, backed the canal and irrigation projects that built the western half of the U.S. America in those days was land-rich but cash-poor, and had to turn to English investors and Scottish bankers to finance the nation-building.
You are entirely correct that it is nonsensical to rank the UK as a “3rd-rate power”. When Americans say something like that they are showing their provincialism and a general lack of knowledge. Shortly after Bush the lesser formed his “coalition” to invade Iraq and signed up Tony Blair to the cause, a reporter at a national publication (I think it was* Newsweek*) made a deplorable error…words to the effect of “Although England is a declining nation, it is still gratifying that they were the first to offer assistance” . What an utterly ignorant statement! England (or more precisely the UK) is not a declining nation, it is a mature nation. Those who say that Britain “lost their empire” simply don’t know the facts. Britain didn’t “lose” an empire, they set their empirial holdings on a course to self-sufficiency and spun them off deliberately as independent nations while still retaining mutual aid and a measure of control through treaties and financial investment. Even today the Commonwealth of Nations, of which Britain is largely the guiding influence, covers much of the world and is a major player in world affairs. One supposes this will be the case for many years to come…even concievably after the supposed “world leadership” of the U.S. wanes.
SS
Great cite!
Against British advice, the Americans made some disastrous military decisions, quite who actually made those decisions I don’t know, but it must have added to the feeling of the newcomer being brash, wilful and naiive.
The early US operations in North Africa were a case in point, but far more serious was the US refusal to use the convoy system of merchant shipping around US coastal waters, which directly resulted in huge shipping losses by U-boat, and was simply down to an obstinate refusal to accept what seemed as obvious common sense advice from a highly experienced ally.
All sorts of reasons for US navy failures, but there really can be no excuse for not carrying out resource free precautions such as not sticking to regular shipping route, not sailing under blackout, not sailing in convoy - the British had done far more with far less - some of this has been glossed over but I have seen various documentaries that submit a convincing argument that the refusal to take advice was down to US military dislike of Britain and much if the information released to the public during this time was more about covering up personal embarrassment rather than stategic propaganda.
This profile of Afmiral Ernest King demonstrates the problems well enough
Then why didn’t he ever tell FDR about Bracewell and his Dalek “Ironsides”?
I’ll drink to that. It’s good to know that there was a corresponding booklet issued to our side as well to explain about Americans.
I remember reading Gunner’s Moon, the memoirs of air-gunner John Bushby, which briefly touched on the arrival of the US air forces. RAF personnel were initially suspicious of the brash, loudmouthed Americans and thought them boastful for their unrealistic claims of enemy fighters shot down - until realizing that the Americans were only making the same mistakes they’d made earlier in the war, such as mistaking a plane trailing oil smoke for one going down in flames, or gunners from two or more planes each claiming the same enemy destroyed. Then they began to admire the Americans’ courage in persisting with daylight raids despite the high casualty rates, and decided that whatever the Yanks were getting paid they were earning it.
You also have to add that throughout the war, the US was also looking after its own interests, however they probably did not factor in that British intelligence in Russia was very effective.
There was an episode where Roosevelt invited Stalin to a meeting either in Alsaka or Siberia, with the specific aim of ensuring that Churchill would not be able to attend - Roosevelt apparently felt that he had his own ways to handle Stalin and that Churchill might be an obstacle, this was in late 1943.
There is every liklehood that this invitation became known by the British, indeed Roosevelt had written to Churchill sometime previous stating that he felt he could handle Stalin better - Churchills views on Soviet Russia were quite well known, and very accurate, though not terribly useful in diplomatic deals with Stalin.
The British would no doubt have had some reservations they could not openly disclose since they were supposed to be out of this particular loop.
This meeting did not take place, as far as I know, but Churchill certainly did meet Stalin some time later to try sort out the situation of Eastern Europe, which areas would be under Soviet influence and which would not, hard to imagine the US would have been keen on this.Perhaps this was in response to US overtures to Stalin.
Anyway, it was pretty clear that Roosevelt didn’t have anything like the influence his self conifdence has led him to believe, thats a given when you look as the outcome of Yalta.
So what we have is US and UK having their own priorities toward their war aims, and these were also coloured by the pre-war view of British colonialism by the US at the highest levels in US circles.
Now that would be a fascinating read!
One of my favorite unintentionally hilarious bits (I think I picked this up as an impulse purchase somewhere): “The British have phrases and colloquialisms of their own that may sound funny to you. You can make just as many boners in their eyes.”
Because the 2 countries had significantly different ideas about how to win the war (largely based on their past history), and each country supported ideas based on their overall idea of how to win the war, ideas which the other found near-incomprehensible.
Britain thought the war would be won by a war of attrition, attacking Germany at the ‘edges’, and eventually wearing down the Germans. Britain was a worldwide empire, with mainly naval power securing this empire. And such a strategy keeps the actual combat zones smaller, with less troops involved and less supplies needed, and concentrating forces in a limited area. This was important to Britain because at this time they had a limited number of soldiers available, and their industrial war production was already pretty stressed.
The USA thought the way to win the war was to go as directly as possible for the heart of Germany, with air bombing of their homeland industry, and an attack with large land armies toward their borders. Compared to Britain, the USA is largely a land-based economy, with most of the activity taking place within North America. A large army to ‘protect their borders’ was important to Americans. And they had the industrial capacity to provide massive amount of guns & supplies to support their soldiers.
Given these viewpoints, the British pushed for ‘edge’ operations like the invasion of North Africa, the campaign against Rommel in Egypt, the invasion of Sicily and then up Italy, a proposed invasion of Norway, etc. The Americans pushed for ‘direct’ operations, like the extensive bombing campaign against German industry, and the Normandy invasion and land attacks toward Germany.
With these different viewpoints, they often had a hard time even understanding each other. Americans saw British proposals for attacks around the Mediterranean as frittering away men, equipment, & time on minor sideshows; while the British saw American proposals like daylight bombing of Germany or a direct cross-channel invasion spending vast amounts of supplies & soldiers on hasty & extremely risky gambles that could turn catastrophic. It’s no wonder they often disagreed!