Why didn't trench warfare get used/work in WW II?

[casdave]

The fact that Canadian troops were considered to be part of the British Expeditionary Force and so are are generally called British may have confused you.

In fact the Canadians were reckoned to be the BEF’s elite troops having proven themselves especially so on Passchendale ridge, because of this they became used effectively as stormtroopers to make the immediate occupation of enemy positions to then be leapfrogged by the main force.

Obviously you cannot have read the link I posted or you would have found this

British and Dominion troops learned from their own experiences in combat, analysing operations carefully and adapting in consequence. From 1916 onwards the development of offensive tactics in the BEF certainly kept pace with the French and, in many respects, surpassed that of the Germans. The platoon training manual SS 143 of February 1917 has been described as “a storm trooper’s handbook.” Combined-arms assaults, infiltration, creeping barrages, barrage fire by heavy MGs all became hallmarks of Haig’s BEF in action. The BEF was also prepared to learn from the experience of others, for example translating and disseminating the influential works of leading French tacticians such as Andre Laffargue and Commandant Lachevre. By 1917 Haig’s army had acquired a battlefield skill that has rarely been equalled.

I shall, of course, leave you to re-examine that link.

You do realise that the skills that the Canadians learned were then passed on and used by the rest of the BEF thus my point stands.

It is generally acknowledged that the final 100 day assualt by the British is the blow that finished the war and that the BEF was considered at that point to be the most useful military asset in the entire Western front.

[Bosda_Di_Chi_of_Tricor]

*Originally posted by Andy *
**

Originally posted by Bosda Di’Chi of Tricor *
Any unplanned tactic is * always a disaster.

During the Falklands campaign, the Paras and Marines found a use for their anti-tank weapons (they faced no tanks and few armoured vehicles) which was trench clearing. It wasn’t a planned tactic and it was pretty successful. **

Cite, please.

[hansel]

*Originally posted by casdave *
**The fact that Canadian troops were considered to be part of the British Expeditionary Force and so are are generally called British may have confused you.
**

It didn’t so much confuse me as when I read that the British developed the creeping barrage, angry red maple leaves started swirling around my head, and I posted in a fit of hot-blooded Canuck fever. I hadn’t read the link you posted; I stumbled in here late last night, drunk on rye whisky and looking for a fight. I will read it, though. All I remember from Mssr. Berton’s book is that the original plan for Canadians was that they would be used as replacements for British soldiers; Sam Hughes, our defense minister at the start of the war, fought to keep them together as a Canadian contingent.

[Crusoe]

*Originally posted by Bosda Di’Chi of Tricor *
**

*Originally posted by Andy *
**

Originally posted by Bosda Di’Chi of Tricor *
Any unplanned tactic is * always a disaster.

During the Falklands campaign, the Paras and Marines found a use for their anti-tank weapons (they faced no tanks and few armoured vehicles) which was trench clearing. It wasn’t a planned tactic and it was pretty successful. **

Cite, please. **

MILAN anti-tank missiles were used against Argentinian bunkers and MG positions several times, not trenches specifically.

One:

While K Coy is fighting on the eastern end of the summit and coming under artillery fire, L Coy is making its way up towards the western end of Mount Harriet under heavy machine gun fire which opens up soon after they cross the start line. Milans (Milan ATGW – Matt) are successful in knocking out these and other enemy sniper positions, but it takes a number of hours and casualties from artillery, before L Coy’s half of the summit is taken still in the dark.

Two:

During the Falklands Campaign the Milan proved very successful when used against Argentine bunkers

Three (search for “MILAN”)

[ellis555]

*Originally posted by hansel *
This may be empty nationalistic jingoism, but I believe that the “creeping barrage”, where a line of artillery fire is slowly advanced with infantry following, was developed by the Canadian army at Vimy Ridge in 1917. **

I know it was employed at the Somme in 1916, and also that it wasn’t developed brand-spanking-new for that occassion. So while I’m not sure who can claim to have originated it, it wasn’t the Canadians at Vimy. Sounds more like they just pulled it off a lot better than anyone else did.

detop
That link worked; thanks. That’s the basic idea, though I kinda doubt the reinforced concrete was used. Those things seem like a lot of effort for a one-off trap.

This site makes it sound like the ammo wasn’t perfected until just prior to WWII, though tank-specific guns were in use during late WWI.

And this site is just cool.

-ellis

[detop]

*Originally posted by ellis555 *
That link worked; thanks. That’s the basic idea, though I kinda doubt the reinforced concrete was used. Those things seem like a lot of effort for a one-off trap.

Thanks for the links ellis, you’re right, the Russian front one is cool !
Like I was saying, from your description of usage, it sounds more like a partisan tactic, and that poster seemed to be from the beginning of the war, when tank defenses were still in their infancy.

[hansel]

*Originally posted by ellis555 *
**
I know [the creeping barrage] was employed at the Somme in 1916, and also that it wasn’t developed brand-spanking-new for that occassion. So while I’m not sure who can claim to have originated it, it wasn’t the Canadians at Vimy. Sounds more like they just pulled it off a lot better than anyone else did.
**

I think you’re correct. According to this link at the Veterans Affairs Canada website, the Canadian army at Vimy was the first armed force to practice the careful drill of following the barrage at the precise pace and distance that would allow them to hit the enemy trenches at the exact moment the barrage was no longer a danger.

Using the gathered information, the creeping barrage fired an intense wall of artillery gunfire at the German guns and position. This intense fire crushed everything in its way. To remain protected from both its own and German fire, the Canadian infantry closely followed the wall of fire. As the barrage advanced, so did the troops. With precision, they moved ahead 100 yards every three minutes. This precise timing meant life or death. Advancing too fast or too slow could result in a soldier’s death. Going too fast meant death by his own artillery fire. Going too slowly left the soldiers unprotected and open to German gunfire.

[tomndebb]

Crusoe, at the risk of sending this thus far pleasant exchange of information toward GD, I think Bosda has the better end of this point.

Anti-tank weapons have been used against reinforced bunkers since at least WWII. While metal armor is hardly the same material found in bunkers, the need to blow holes in objects designed to repel bullets or shells means that weapons designed to overcome one are usually decent weapons to overcome the other.

The British MILAN does not seem to have been used against trenches per se (unless I missed that point in the links).

I’m not sure that Bosda’s position on ad hoc tactics is unassailable, but I don’t see the MILAN vs bunker duel as a serious threat to his position.
(I’m also not sure where Bosda draws the lines for “unplanned” tactics. 15th Air Force fighter bombers in Italy began driving squads of German infantry into the open by dropping their external fuel tanks on barns and using incendiary ammo to set the places on fire. My memory is that it started when a frustrated fighter jock got tired of losing his strafing targets to conveniently positioned barns. Is that “unplanned”? Or does it fall under the umbrella of “really big” Molotov Cocktail?)

[Alessan]

Bosda, here’s an amusing anecdote.

It’s June 1999, and the Israeli Army is pulling out of Southern Lebanon. On a hilltop fortress in the eastern sector, a Paratroop platoon is clearing out - loading the remaining equipment, revving up the APCs, wiring up explosives. Several miles away, on another hilltop, sits an anti-arcraft unit. One of the soldiers spots a force of some 20-40 Hezbollah troops creeping up on the infantrymen. He alerts his commander.

The AA officer takes a look, radios the Paratroopers, asks them to keep their heads down for a couple of seconds, lowers the barrel of his 20mm Gatling cannon, lets it rip. The inevitable happens.

The troops are in too much of a hurry to count body parts, so they never quite find out how many were actually killed, and how many got away. It’s obvious, though, that the threat was eliminated - if not vaporized.

Now, is this the purpose for which the weapon was designed?

Definitly not.

Is this generally a good tactic to use?

Again, no. Miniguns are not the most efficient antipersonnel weapons, and besides, it’s a waste of ammo.

Was it the right thing to do at the time?

Hmm.

Well… it worked, didn’t it?

In summery - I don’t know much about doctrines of other military forces, but the IDF teaches that the ability to improvise, to be resourceful, is one of the prime military virtues - right up there with Dedication and Discipline. There may be a a manual explaining the proper use of every weapon, but the people who wrote the manual are not right here, right now, facing this specific enemy on this specific terrain with these specific means at their disposal. You are.

[tomndebb]

I suspect, Alessan, that we need a bit of clarification from Bosda for where he draws the line to delineate an “unplanned tactic.” Certainly, I would cut him some slack regarding solitary events where a weapon was used outside its design scope. A gun is a gun when firing at targets of opportunity. I suspect that when he refers to tactics, he means something more than just shooting with the “wrong” weapon.
(For example, in Crusoe’s example, had the MILAN been used to enfilade a trench, tearing through the bodies of Argentine defenders as it passed down the length of the trench until it finally exploded where the trench angled off, that would be an unplanned tactic, whereas I have contended that using a weapon designed to penetrate a hard point is not an unplanned tactic simply because the hard point is of a different construction.)

[Crusoe]

*Originally posted by tomndebb *
**I suspect, Alessan, that we need a bit of clarification from Bosda for where he draws the line to delineate an “unplanned tactic.” Certainly, I would cut him some slack regarding solitary events where a weapon was used outside its design scope. A gun is a gun when firing at targets of opportunity. I suspect that when he refers to tactics, he means something more than just shooting with the “wrong” weapon.
(For example, in Crusoe’s example, had the MILAN been used to enfilade a trench, tearing through the bodies of Argentine defenders as it passed down the length of the trench until it finally exploded where the trench angled off, that would be an unplanned tactic, whereas I have contended that using a weapon designed to penetrate a hard point is not an unplanned tactic simply because the hard point is of a different construction.) **

Rather than repear the entire ‘unplanned tactic’ discussion, I’ll just say I was only pointing out how MILAN was used. Trench clearing, no. Bunker-busting, yes. Unplanned tactic? Well, there are certainly better examples (German 88mm guns used as anti-tank weapons and so on).

It’s not quite as interesting making these points the second time, is it? Ah well.

[Bosda_Di_Chi_of_Tricor]

An unplanned tactic is a tactical procedure that was not developed at the command level, but is generally utilized, and accepted at the command level.

The Israeli AA gun thing was not generally used, so it doesn’t fit the definition.

The MILAN thing is an unplanned tactic, as it was generally used. But the British surely must have realized that the Argentines would dig in. And they didn’t bring specialized equipment to deal with it. This is a severe command failure, because, though the MILAN stunt worked, I feel confident in saying that there would have been fewer casualities if proper preparation had taken place.

Please remember that victory goes to the side that prepares & trains the most. An unplanned tactic indicates holes in that preparation. Dangerous holes.

[casdave]

In the case of the British trying to assault the Argentine at Goose Green, the overlooking heights were very lightly defended, the earthworks were minimal, just a spotting post.
The Argentine forces had expected the main attack would be on Port Stanley and this was a surprise assault.

Special forces/ reconnaisence reported this back and as a result the Paratroop regiment was ordered to make best speed to take the area as soon as possible, as a result they did not have time for the mortar crews to keep up.

It was the newspapers who changed all that, The Sun printed headlines that the paras were on their way to attack, it even said where they were at that moment and as a result the Argentine forces dug in, unbelievably irresponsible, freedom of the press also means knowing when to report and when not to report.

It is another of many reasons I would not buy that shitty paper and why I destroy any copies lying around at work.

[ellis555]

*Originally posted by hansel *
**

Using the gathered information, the creeping barrage fired an intense wall of artillery gunfire at the German guns and position. This intense fire crushed everything in its way. To remain protected from both its own and German fire, the Canadian infantry closely followed the wall of fire. As the barrage advanced, so did the troops. With precision, they moved ahead 100 yards every three minutes. This precise timing meant life or death. Advancing too fast or too slow could result in a soldier’s death. Going too fast meant death by his own artillery fire. Going too slowly left the soldiers unprotected and open to German gunfire.

**

You’ve gotta have some balls to pull that off. That, and a lot of faith in your artillerymen. Who you’ve probably never met. Hmmm…I think I’ll stay back here, thanks. You guys go on ahead.

As for the debate going on here, I’d have to say that Crusoe’s mention of the German 88mm should pretty much seal it in his favor. AA guns employed against tanks? As their eventual predominant use, even - in his Inside the Third Reich, Albert Speer (Hitler’s Armaments Minister) mentions the difficulty of defending manufacture against Allied air attacks as all the AA guns were needed against the Russian tanks.

This site provides some info on 88mm versus armor. Which also leads me to conclude that second to porn, strange military sites rule the internet.

-ellis