[QUOTE=severus]
The Chancellor of Germany is the Prime Minister. Germany also has a President, which is an indirectly elected figurehead. So, notwithstanding Northern Piper’s comments about the difficulties of designing a new head of state, it would be possible for a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system of government to become a republic with only minimal change to their constitution, by following Germany’s example. This might actually be most easily done in countries such as Canada or Australia, who already have a Governor(-)General, i.e. an unelected official that acts as a figurehead of state. But the main question is, why should they do it? I think that’s why the referendum on republicanism in Australia failed: the system proposed was one of minimal change republicanism, and voters simply didn’t see the purpose of doing this.
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Severus, it’s interesting that you mention the example of Germany in this regard, because it took the Germans two tries to move from a monarchy to a successful republican system, headed by a President.
The first, failed, attempt was the Weimar Republic, established after World War I. That constitution continued the model of a parliamentary system, with the substitution of a popularly elected President with broad powers, similar to those possessed by the Emperor under the Imperial Constitution. The President was sometimes called the “Ersatzkaiser” (“substitute emperor”). That choice of a strong President, popularly elected, with considerable powers to choose the Chancellor, is considered to have been one of the causes of the instability of the Weimar Republic, paving the way for Hitler to seize power by constitutional means. What had been intended as extraordinary powers for the President were used on a regular basis, subverting the Reichstag as the source of power.
To the credit of President Hindenburg, he appears to have resisted appointing Hitler as Chancellor as long as possible, but some of his other choices for Chancellor were dubious: Von Papen was a committed anti-democrat, General von Schleicher an authoritiarian who encouraged President Hindenburg to rule as much as possible using his constitutional powers, and to subvert the Reichstag. Büring may not have been committed to undermining the Reichstag, but he certainly advised Hindenburg to use his extraorinary presidential powers as much as possible. See the wiki article on von Hindenburg.
That’s why, after World War II, the drafters of the Basic Law of the German Federal Republic went to pains to reduce the powers of the President. In addition to a method of indirect election, the Basic Law took away the President’s power to appoint the Chancellor, and instead provided that the Chancellor is elected directly by the Bundestag. The President is required to accept the choice of the Bundestag: Basic Law, Article 63: Election and Appointment of the Federal Chancellor.
As well, the Basic Law did away with motions of no-confidence, which had led to instablity and given the President of the Weimar Republic repeated opportunities to choose the Chancellor in a situations where no party had a clear majority. The Basic Law instead provides for constructive non-confidence: the way for the Bundestag to vote non-confidence is to elect a new Chancellor to replace the current Chancellor: Basic Law, Article 67: Constructive Vote of Non-Confidence. If the motion for no confidence is not accompanied by an election of a new Chancellor, the President’s only option is to dissolve the Bundestag for a general election: Basic Law, Article 68: Vote of Confidence; Dissolution of the Bundestag.
Thus, the successful German Basic Law did not simply substitute an indirectly elected President for the monarch, but preserve the broad powers previously held by the monarch. The Basic Law drastically reduced the powers of the President as well, stripping him of the broad powers previously held by the monarch and the Weimar President.
Now, I’m not suggesting that the fall of the Weimar Republic was solely attributed to the powers of the Reichspräsident. There were numerous other factors, notably a lack of committement to democratic, constitutional rule by many of the senior politicians in the Weimar period. Countries with long-established democratic, monarchical traditions, with constitutional conventions that restrict the strong powers of the Crown, might be able to make the transition more smoothly. Nonetheless, the German experience is a strong object lesson suggesting that simple substitution of a President for the Crown, without reducing the major constitutional powers of the Crown at the same time, can lead to significant problems.