Why Do Supreme Court Justices Only Shift LEFT?

Hell, if we’re gonna talk about this, let’s do it right.

In his OP, astorian has made the following statements:
[ul]
[li]Supreme Court justices, if they shift, always shift to the left.[/li][li]Supreme Court justices “often turn out more liberal than expected.”[/li][li]Seemingly conservative justices turn out, once appointed, to have “evolved into pinkos.”[/li][li]Democrats “are almost never disappointed by their Supreme Court nominees.”[/li][li]The last Democratic appointee to turn out more conservative than expected was Felix Frankfurter (in 1939).[/li][/ul]

Now, the first sentiment is hyperbolic: By naming Felix Frankfurter as a rightward-shifting justice, astorian’s implicitly saying that since Frankfurter, Democratic appointees to the High Court have been more liberal than Republican appointees have been conservative. Right? Well, let’s see.

First, it should be noted that astorian’s characterization of Frankfurter as veering right is not entirely accurate–which is the trouble with having a strict liberal/conservative dichotomy. Frankfurter was nominated by FDR as a staunch New Dealer, and this he proved to be. His overriding judicial philosophy was that the legislature, not the judiciary, should make laws and set policy; thus, he backed much of the New Deal’s social and economic legislation. In later years, however, his minimalist approach to the bench caused him often to break with other New Dealers. In short, he broke with his personal beliefs to act as best he could as an impartial agent of the Constitution:

Similarly, he broke with the majority on civil liberties issues; voting, for instance, in favor of a West Virginia statute compelling children to salute the American flag. The best summary of his career on the bench comes from his dissent on Baker v. Carr, a redistricting case:

To sum up, then, Frankfurter isn’t easily described as either liberal or conservative–he was a classical noninterventionist, and one who served FDR’s policy needs perfectly. What happened was that under the Warren Court, the Supreme Court became much more of an instrument of social change–presuming to be guided by, or to guide, public opinion itself, with minimal legislative cues. This was antithetical to Frankfurter’s judicial philosophy, and so he battled against activist justices with whom he privately agreed–eschewing not their beliefs but the activism itself.

Now then. Let’s use Roosevelt’s appointees as a whole as the beginning of the modern Supreme Court era, and let’s see what we’ve got vis a vis individual ideologies and the expectations thereof. (The starting point is largely arbitrary; if anyone wants, I’ll take it back to Holmes, the first appointee of the twentieth century.)

There have been thirty-five justices appointed since Franklin Roosevelt took office (this counts Rehnquist twice, once as associate justice, in 1971, and then in 1986 as chief justice). Nineteen of them have been appointed by Democrats (with thirteen of the nineteen coming from FDR and Truman, and nine from FDR alone), and sixteen by Republicans (including eleven straight before Clinton took office).

Right there you can see a pattern: until Clinton, all recent justices–Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas–had been Republican appointees…no wonder there’s a perception that only Republican justices switch ideologies, considering the human tendency to focus on recent history!

I’ll examine each of the thirty-five, but first I’ve got some really good data about the twenty-four nominations from Earl Warren (1953) through Clarence Thomas (1991), including the failed bids of two Nixon appointees (Haynsworth and Carswell), Abe Fortas’ unsuccessful nomination for Chief Justice, and the Bork nomination:

The Supreme Court Compendium (1994), a statistical resource compiled by Congressional Quarterly Press, lists the perceived ideology of each of these nominees at the time of their nomination (derived, they say, “from a content analysis of editorial judgments in the New York Times, Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, and Los Angeles Times.” Iz, spare me the liberal media claptrap.) Each justice is rated from 0 to 1, with 0 being the most conservative and 1 the most liberal. Keep in mind that we’re dealing in this period with nineteen Republican appointees (including Haynsworth, Carswell, and Bork), and only five Democratic appointees (including Fortas twice). Here are the findings, with the nominee’s name, the year they were nominated, the president who nominated them, and their indice of perceived ideology. Remember, the closer the indice is to 1, the more liberal they were perceived to be at the time of their nomination.

Earl Warren, 1953 (Eisenhower) .75
John Harlan, 1955 (Eisenhower) .88
William Brennan, 1956 (") 1.00
Charles Whittaker, 1957 (") .50
Potter Stewart, 1958 (") .75
Byron White, 1962 (Kennedy) .50
Arthur Goldberg, 1962 (") .75
Abe Fortas, 1965 (Johnson) 1.00
Thurgood Marshall, 1967 (") 1.00
Abe Fortas, 1968 (") .85
Warren Burger, 1969 (Nixon) .12
Clement Haynsworth, 1969 (") .16
G. Harrold Carswell, 1970 (") .04
Harry Blackmun, 1970 (") .12
Lewis Powell, 1971 (") .17
William Rehnquist, 1971 (") .05
John Paul Stevens, 1975 (Ford) .25
Sandra O’Connor, 1981 (Reagan) .48
William Rehnquist, 1986 (") .05
Antonin Scalia, 1986 (") .00
Robert Bork, 1987 (") .10
Anthony Kennedy, 1987 (") .37
David Souter, 1990 (Bush) .33
Clarence Thomas, 1991 (") .16

Well. Lots of interesting things here. Let’s see:

[ul][li]All of Eisenhower’s appointees were perceived to be moderate to liberal. This includes Brennan, one of only three men to rate a full 1–the most liberal you can get. astorian, please remove him from your list of justices who proved to be surprisingly liberal. Ditto Warren, in fact, who was a solid .75. Bottom line: nobody nominated by Eisenhower was expected to be conservative, even though Ike himself was a Republican.[/li][li]In fact, no nominee on this list was perceived to be conservative before being appointed until Warren Burger in 1969. After that, every nominee was seen as right-leaning through the Bush presidency. Further, most were seen as very conservative, the exceptions being O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. I don’t have the numbers on Ginsburg or Breyer, but I’d bet that neither were perceived to be as liberal as the Nixon/Ford/Reagan nominees were conservative–I’d say no higher than .75 for either.[/li][li]Nobody’s gone right since Felix Frankfurter, hmm? Well, correctly or not, Abe Fortas was seen by the contemporary press as less liberal when standing for the chief justiceship than upon his initial appointment to the bench just three years before–from 1.00 to .85. Conversely, Rehnquist’s rating of .05 didn’t change at all in the fifteen intervening years between nominations.[/li][li]The nature of Eisenhower’s appointees pretty much invalidate your explanation of Whizzer White, astorian. He was viewed as a moderate when taking the bench–more conservative than the Republican nominees preceding him–and proceeded, especially in later years, to vote closely with conservatives like Rehnquist on most issues. He most definitely was not indicative of a mainstream Democratic ideology in 1960, especially considering that stalwart liberals William Douglas and William Brennan were nominated before White, and stayed very much to his left every year thereafter.[/li][/ul]

Unfortunately, I don’t have hard data about the perception of Roosevelt and Truman appointees–Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, Stone, Byrnes, Jackson, Rutledge, Burton, Vinson, Clark, and Minton–at the time of their nomination. If someone wants me to, I can sketch out a synopsis of each of their appointments, and the quality of the opposition.

This post’s long enough, however, so I’ll close with one more statistical salvo: Liberal/conservative voting tendencies of every justice between 1953 and 1991. This excludes Murphy, Stone, Byrnes, and Rutledge, who finished their terms prior to 1953, and Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, who served afterwards. (I feel it’s a safe statement, though, to say that Thomas was nominated as a conservative and has more than amply filled that role, and that Ginsburg and Breyer were nominated from the center-left and have not strayed. Keep in mind also that Souter has moved distinctly to the left since his initial session, and is one of two modern justices–Harry Blackmun is the other, mostly because of his changed stances on abortion and the death penalty–who I feel have become more liberal than the initial expectation.)

The Congressional Quarterly publication analyzed each position by each justice from 1953 to 1991, and gauged those positions on a liberal-conservative scale. They broke the issues down into eleven classifications–criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, attorneys, unions, economics, federal taxation, federalism, and judicial power–as well as a blanket “civil liberties” category which encompasses criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorney issues.

Here’s their definition of what constitutes a “liberal” position:

Whew. Then they’ve got a helluva lot of numbers. Let me give you their summary of civil liberties positions, with a few of my comments thrown in:

So there you are. Of those appointed from 1953-1991 who were perceived upon nomination to be liberal, Harlan and Stewart turned out relatively moderate, as did every Truman appointee (Burton, Vinson, Clark, Minton) and two Roosevelt appointees (Frankfurter and Jackson). One justice nominated by FDR, Stanley Reed, actually proved to be conservative for at least his last four years on the bench. The rest–Douglas, Goldberg, Marshall, Fortas, Brennan, Warren, and for the most part Black–were indeed liberal on the bench.

Of those perceived initially to be moderate, Whittaker stayed true to form, while White veered a little rightward toward the end of his career (I’ve got stats on that, if you want them).

And of those perceived at the beginning to be conservative, Powell and Stevens turned out to be moderates, and Blackmun and Souter turned out to be liberals. The rest–Burger, Rehnquist, Kennedy, O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas–have stayed pretty much true to form. (Not to mention that O’Connor’s initial rating was .48–it could be argued that she’s been more conservative than expected.)

Any questions?

no questions, just applause!

I realize that bumping a thread is bad form, but I really wanted to get the responses of astorian and John Corrado on this one.

astorian: I find it interesting that your perceptions in the original post–spoken with such conviction–bear almost no resemblance to the findings of my research. Would you care to comment on the discrepancy?

John: I’m curious to hear your revised opinion on the Scalia, as well as support for your claim that “most ‘conservative’ justices would have strong moderate or liberal tendencies,” in light of the numbers I’ve presented.

Thanks, guys.

Gadarene- first off, amazing job with the references and the research. I am stunned by the depth and breadth of your post. And thanks for bumping this back up; I had forgotten about it in the course of the four-day weekend (the unfortunate effect of only posting from work). I apologize for taking so long with the reply; not only is it long, but I lost it once due to keyboard crash.

As for my Scalia hypothesis- it actually remains mostly unchanged. Note the major difference between Scalia and Bork’s appointment dates- when Scalia was nominated/appointed, the Republicans still had the majority in the Senate; when Bork was nominated/appointed, the Democrats had the majority in the Senate.

My hypothesis then still remains- when Scalia came up, the Democrats considered it a lost cause given Reagan’s popularity (remember, this is following Reagan’s landslide in '84 and pre-Iran-Contra) and the Republican majority; conversely, when Bork came up, the Democrats were once again in control of the Senate and felt they could truly flex their muscles (and, in fact, felt a need to, not merely for the ideological factors, but because they were coming close to the '88 election where they felt they had a strong chance against a Republican nominee) because Bork could not get through without at least some Democratic support.

As far as the ‘conservative to liberal’ point of view- I’m not sure it changes my point of view that much. The difference from 1 for Democratic appointees is much lower (-.22) than the difference from 0 for Republican appointees with Democratic Senates (-.39), but the difference is only -.32 for Republican appointees with Republican Senates. Still, take Earl Warren out of the mix, and that difference falls to -.18, which is much closer to the Dem with Dem difference.

In other words, discounting Earl Warren and unsuccessful Republican nominees (Bork and Carswell), and assuming that your numbers accurately reflect the popular perception of the liberal/conservativeness of the nominees, Republican nominees through Republican Senates tended to be perceived as just as conservative as Democratic nominees through Democratic Senates were liberal. Conversely, Republican nominees through Democratic Senates tended to be much more moderate, which was my general point.

As for veering in one direction or another- given your info from 1953 to 1991, we have:

Liberals who stayed liberal: 7
Liberals who turned moderate/conservative: 8
Liberals appointed post-Truman who turned m/c: 2 (appointed by a Republican)

Conservatives who stayed conservative: 6
Conservatives who turned moderate/liberal: 4

Now, in the post 1960 hypothesis I made, that means 3 liberals staying liberal, and no liberals turning conservative, for a 100% ‘retention’ rate, compared to a 60% ‘retention’ rate for the conservatives. Of those 4 conservatives who ‘turned’ moderate, all were appointed through a Democratic Senate.

As for pre-60, and especially pre-52: I consider the Southern conservative faction within the Democratic party large enough to make it hard to determine whether the ‘liberal’ Democrats had enough power to pass a candidate without facing a Democrat-Republican coalition against it, so I certainly don’t extend my hypothesis prior to '60.

In essence, then, I think your facts generally support my hypothesis (again, as relates to 1960 and beyond), with the caveat that we’re dealing with a very small set of data to extrapolate from.

As for your other question, regarding how ‘strongly liberal’ I consider Ginsberg and Breyer- when were they appointed? I consider Ginsberg pretty liberal and Breyer pretty moderate-liberal, but I think Breyer was appointed after the Repubs took over Congress (however, as I’ve shown before, I don’t have a great grasp as to when SCs were appointed). To forestall the rebuttal, if Breyer was appointed pre-Republican Senate, I’d point out that Clinton had proven with budgets and Health Care that he had problems getting things through the Democratic Senate, and therefore was more likely to send forth a moderate candidate with a better chance of winning.

Thanks, John; it looks like we’re pretty much in agreement.

A couple of minor caveats:

I still hold that the primary reason for the ease with which Scalia was nominated was the accompanying nomination of William Rehnquist to the chief justiceship. Senate Democrats basically viewed Rehnquist as either a bigger threat or a more winnable battle (I forget which; I’ll check when I get home), and conserved their resources by letting Scalia alone. A mistake, in my opinion, since Scalia’s more emphatically conservative than Rehnquist and could–with his protege Thomas–shape the course of the court for decades to come.

Regarding your calculations of ideological deviation: Why take Warren out of the mix, and not Brennan or Harlan? All were Eisenhower appointees. I’d dispense with all of them for such a calculation, personally, as Eisenhower throws a monkeywrench in the numbers by being only nominally a Republican–I read something saying that he likely could have won the nomination from either party, but chose the Republicans in part because he could appeal to those tired of the Roosevelt/Truman Democratic era.

Also, don’t forget about Sandra Day O’Connor and her near-moderate reputation at nomination; she could skew the numbers a bit too, given the (as you’ve acknowledged) incredibly small sample size.

There’s a very good book called Pursuit of Justices that I’m reading right now which gives a full account of the selections of Ginsburg and Breyer. So does Closed Chambers. It’s not exactly as you’ve described–basically, the administration backed itself into a corner on the nominations with its indecision, and then chose people who were relatively moderate and as nonconfrontational as possible (still gunshy after the spectacles of the Bork and Thomas nominations, and after the administration’s own struggles with Zoe Baird, Joycelyn Elders, and (can’t remember his name) the subsequent Surgeon-General nominee. At any rate, neither Breyer nor Ginsburg have shown themselves to be the kind of ideological stalwarts (for good or ill) that the liberals had in Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas, and that the conservatives have in Rehnquist, Thomas, and Scalia.

Last, you say:

The question of sample size is extremely pertinent here, as you’re talking about three liberal appointees (Goldberg, Marshall, and Fortas), two moderate or nearly-moderate appointees (White, who I’d argue has veered a bit right, and O’Connor), ten conservative appointees (Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, Scalia, Bork, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas), and two for whom it’s too early to really tell (Ginsburg and Breyer). If there had been as many liberals as conservatives, and those retention rates remained the same, you’d have a case. As it is, it’s a little like saying that a player who hits .370 in a hundred at-bats is having a better year than one who hits .350 in four hundred at-bats.