First of all, that doesn’t prove that there isn’t such a thing as a “procedural filibuster”–just that it could, if the majority leader so wishes, be converted into a “real” filibuster. (my argument is strengthened by the fact that you’re citing to a reference all about the procedural filibuster to argue that there is no such thing).
But beyond that, i’m having trouble finding how the majority leader actually demands a “real” filibuster from the wiki cite you’ve offered. I have also looked at the CRS report it references for the relevant point.
So maybe you can explain to me how that process works–since I can’t figure out how the majority leader does demand a “real” filibuster–except by not moving for cloture (which doesn’t stop someone else, including a filibusterer, moving for cloture). Can you point out where in the report I should be looking?
In trying to follow the various points of view in this thread, may I request that participants follow an agreement on terms? These are three that I’d like defined:
A “procedural filibuster” - ie. a mechanism through which the minority party could prevent the majority party passing a bill without 60 votes, without there being even the technical possibility of the minority party being forced to “actually” filibuster - would not be a type of filibuster at all, it would just be a 60-vote supermajority requirement. My understanding of the Senate (which admittedly is basic) is that there is no such requirement. Any ‘type’ of filibuster always entails the possibility of a “real filibuster” eventually, it just never goes that far in practice. So as I understand it the “procedural filibuster” is just a convenient mechanism for allowing the majority party to waive its right to force the minority party to actually filibuster a bill.
And unfortunately no, I don’t know where the cite is within that CBS link, I was citing the Wikipedia link. If that Wikipedia passage is wrong then I’m wrong too. But it agrees with how I previously thought the Senate worked.
I’m using “real”, “true”, “actual” or “all hands on deck” filibuster to mean the classic image of a filibuster: when minority party senators have to stand up and read the phone book for 23 hours straight and all the majority senators have to sleep in the chamber. A procedural filibuster is one that doesn’t require that scenario.
But that is the problem–the procedural filibuster is, in effect, a 60 vote supermajority requirement that can be applied more or less without cost. Every time I hear something about the senate in the news, 60 votes are described as needed to pass a bill. That is the state of play today–60 votes are needed to do anything even marginally in dispute.
Well, first, I think the procedure in the cloture rule alone is enough to show that there is some kind of “procedural” filibuster–a way to prevent a vote on a bill without continuous debate–that is distinct from the majority simply declining to bring the bill to a vote.
But perhaps more practically–we just had a huge fight over a health care bill. If there was a way to make it harder to filibuster it, and hence easier to break the filibuster wouldn’t it have been done? So far as I know (and I’ve been paying attention), nobody has been reading cookbooks into the senate record.
But that makes no sense–I don’t see why any “procedure” is necessary to do something the majority can simply do without any procedure–decline to bring the bill to the floor for a vote. It doesn’t get any easier than that.
And this is the problem with the senate today, IMHO–as I understand it, it works with an effective 60 vote requirement due to procedural filibusters. I think that is not how most people understand it–they think a filibuster is a dramatic, costly thing that rarely happens.
I forgot about the nuclear option and Gang of 14 negotiations, so let me amend my statement a little. Even though abuse of the filibuster could come back to bite Reps in the ass, I see it as doubtful that Dems would go as far as them when in the minority. Perhaps for issues the Dem caucus sees as vital we might see these abuses, but not for run of the mill appointments and bills. In most cases, Dems will eventually cave in a way that I don’t see Reps doing. So there’s less of a risk to Republicans if they just oppose reforms and wait until they’re in the majority again, then just wait for Democrats to cave on most things. They could take the risk (not an unreasonable one IMO) that the Dems usually won’t act like they did. Then they deal with problems and filibusters as in the past, without substantial change to the rules.
This is a different issue - in order to “make it harder” to filibuster a bill by reducing the number of votes needed to end cloture to, say, 55, or 51, senators would indeed have to try to change senate rules, which requires (I think) a 67-vote majority. But that’s not what I’m talking about.
Right, in practice it has basically become something like a 60-vote supermajority requirement which can be invoked without cost. But in theory there is no supermajority requirement: there is only the threat of a “real” filibuster, and nothing more. But because a real filibuster is so damaging to both parties nowadays, the majority party never takes it that far.
Here’s a political scientist explaining what I’m trying to argue:
The bottom line is, there’s no such thing as an independent “procedural filibuster” which can never be forced to a “real filibuster”. And there’s no 60-vote supermajority. There is the “real filibuster”, and that’s it; but because a real filibuster is so damaging to both parties, the majority party tends to abandon or change a bill rather than force the filibuster.