# Why is free will still a debate? **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [October 2, 2015, 8:51pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-is-free-will-still-a-debate/733301 "2015-10-02T20:51:33Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 6
**Author:** ![protoboard](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/fbc32d/32.png) [@protoboard](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/protoboard)\ **Post date:** [October 4, 2015, 10:12am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-is-free-will-still-a-debate/733301/101 "2015-10-04T10:12:38Z")
[QUOTE=Trinopus;18740640 No one here is arguing for a perfected godlike miraculous angelic “awakened consciousness” in terms of free will. We’re just saying that we, as humans, make decisions on a day-to-day basis that are not determined by pre-existing physical states.[/QUOTE] In that case, you are still talking about something that is by definition magical, even if it’s not always good. ---
**Author:** ![protoboard](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/fbc32d/32.png) [@protoboard](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/protoboard)\ **Post date:** [October 4, 2015, 10:19am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-is-free-will-still-a-debate/733301/102 "2015-10-04T10:19:00Z")
> [@Sitnam](#): > > If free will does not exist, then no one bares responsibility for their choices, their actions are nothing less than the conduit of all past experiences. No one wants to go down that road. That’s exactly what I believe, but of course if we couldn’t punish wrongdoers that would be a bad thing for society since people naturally demand retribution and it’s the only way to stop some from being violent and tyrannical. ---
**Author:** ![protoboard](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/fbc32d/32.png) [@protoboard](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/protoboard)\ **Post date:** [October 4, 2015, 10:20am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-is-free-will-still-a-debate/733301/103 "2015-10-04T10:20:34Z")
> [@Mijin](#): > > Well, a function of past experiences + the kind of person they are ultimately (their particular neurology). > > I don’t see any issue since after such a realization; it still makes sense to put criminals in jail (or other means of reform), it still makes sense to try to influence others’ behaviour (e.g. praise good behaviour), and we still can’t predict what someone is going to do next. I agree. Putting criminals in jail ultimately makes sense for the same reason that leper countries made sense. Though personally I think prison is very overused as a form of punishment. ---
**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\ **Post date:** [October 4, 2015, 10:34am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-is-free-will-still-a-debate/733301/104 "2015-10-04T10:34:09Z")
> [@wolfpup](#): > > The purpose of the first part of your argument is unclear. My point was to illustrate the deterministic nature of our existence, and the _subjective_ nature of free will which is just an artifact of consciousness. You’re reaffirming that with sufficient information such determinism could in theory lead to complete predictability of all behavior, which was my point, but I don’t think it’s a point that should be trivialized as it’s the core of the discussion here. I’m agreeing with you, and I don’t think I’m trivializing the point. What I’m saying is that the hypothetical of having complete knowledge of my neuronal states and sensory inputs, and using that to predict my actions is often used to support some idea of choice being an illusion. But making a prediction by these means is exactly equivalent to making a perfect emulation and asking it what it wants to do. _Of course_ it will make the same choice as me, it’s identical to me by definition. > [@](#): > > A video or a movie is always going to end the same way no matter how often you watch it because it’s trivially bounded to that singular outcome. Our interaction with the universe is equally deterministic but far less trivially and less obviously so, dominated as it is by the perspective of the aforementioned consciousness. That’s true, but I think that difference isn’t relevant to the point I was making. I was talking about making a perfect emulation of a situation and expecting something different to happen. It won’t. (And even in our quantum-mechanics underpinned universe, this statement is not false, it’s undefined, since you _can’t make_ a perfect emulation of a physical system). ---
**Author:** ![monstro](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/ba9def/32.png) [@monstro](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/monstro)\ **Post date:** [October 4, 2015, 1:28pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-is-free-will-still-a-debate/733301/105 "2015-10-04T13:28:42Z")
> [@The\_Other\_Waldo\_Pepper](#): > > Let’s not. Let’s say that _some_ people are getting beamed that stuff by a broadcaster and merely feel like they’re carrying out voluntary actions – and that some _other_ people, who feel the same way, _aren’t_ getting beamed thoughts and feelings and actions from some outside source. Which leads to this: > > If some of us _are_ remote-controlled toys with delusions of voluntariness – and some of us in fact had voluntary actions under our own conscious control – then how could we tell the difference? What is the test that could distinguish one from the other? I don’t know why I should answer your question when you didn’t bother to answer mine. I’m not the one loudly claiming that I have free will. The entity who is controlling me isn’t laughing at my arrogance, because I am not claiming anything that I can’t possibly know. I fully concede that my sense of control is merely that–_a sense_–and that there is no way I can know if it is anything more than that. But the entity who is controlling you _is_ laughing at you, because you are making this claim without having any proof of it. You are trusting your senses when we have tons of evidence that our senses are wrong. I’m allowing that I could be wrong. You, however, are not. We can’t distinguish the remote-controlled people from the non-remote-controlled people. Only the “entities” observing us can do that. But I don’t know what this is supposed to prove. I can tell you that it doesn’t prove the existence of free will, though. So I’m wondering why you think it adds anything to the conversation. Do you think it shakes me from my resolve that free will is an illusion, at least for human beings? (The above applies only if you think free will and volition are different things. If you are using them interchangably, I don’t know why you’re disagreeing with me since I have already told you that I don’t have a problem with the notion of “volition”, at least as I’ve defined it.) ---
**Author:** ![BigT](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/bigt/32/12044_2.png) [@BigT](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BigT)\ **Post date:** [October 4, 2015, 1:57pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-is-free-will-still-a-debate/733301/106 "2015-10-04T13:57:05Z")
> [@monstro](#): > > Since you think I’m arguing a straw man, can you explain to me how a world without free will would differ from this one? How would individuals who lack free will behave any differently from individuals who do? > > Can you explain to me how it is possible to reconcile free will with a subconscious mind? At the very least, doesn’t acknowledging the existence of the latter give a significant nod to the idea that appearances (free will) could very well be deceiving? It would not have conscious entities in it. The mere concept of consciousness requires that there is an “I” that can have experiences and make choices. And the concept of consciousness being an illusion is incoherent, because it has to presuppose conscious entities. Who is being tricked? No, we don’t understand free will or consciousness. But so many people seem to think lack of understanding means something doesn’t exist. As for the subconscious–well, I don’t know why you think it disproves anything. The concept inherently means there are some things we do consciously think about, which means we do make choices, which means we have free will. ---
**Author:** ![monstro](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/ba9def/32.png) [@monstro](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/monstro)\ **Post date:** [October 4, 2015, 2:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-is-free-will-still-a-debate/733301/107 "2015-10-04T14:27:13Z")
> [@BigT](#): > > As for the subconscious–well, I don’t know why you think it disproves anything. The concept inherently means there are some things we do consciously think about, which means we do make choices, which means we have free will. No, the concept of consciousness doesn’t “inherently mean” that we possess control. It only means that we have awareness of (some) of our thoughts and a sense of self. Consciousness does not require anything more than that. If from an early age you had been instructed to view your consciousness as a small window that allows you to observe just _some_ of the thoughts and feelings being beamed into your head, you would have likely accepted this idea easily because there would be no reason to doubt this. And you would have grown to understand that while your thoughts, feelings, and actions feel like they are under your control, they really are a stream that you’re passively experiencing. For instance, you notice that when you wake up in the morning, the first thought that comes to mind is not something you consciously chose, and since one thought leads to another, that means none of the thoughts you experienced are ones you consciously authored. Only maturity allows you to see this, and once this happens the illusion of free will becomes clearer to you. But because you were raised to the view the consciousness as the “control center”, all other alternatives seem ludicrous to you. You can’t imagine not being in control, so you take that to mean you are in control. I can’t say I have chosen to have a more open mind than yours. But it is clearly more open. ---
**Author:** ![The\_Other\_Waldo\_Pepper](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/the_other_waldo_pepper/32/12370_2.png) [@The\_Other\_Waldo\_Pepper](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/The_Other_Waldo_Pepper)\ **Post date:** [October 4, 2015, 2:50pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-is-free-will-still-a-debate/733301/108 "2015-10-04T14:50:44Z")
> [@monstro](#): > > We can’t distinguish the remote-controlled people from the non-remote-controlled people. Only the “entities” observing us can do that. But I don’t know what this is supposed to prove. I can tell you that it doesn’t prove the existence of free will, though. So I’m wondering why you think it adds anything to the conversation. Do you think it shakes me from my resolve that free will is an illusion, at least for human beings? I do – or, at least, I think it helpfully clarified your position as one I find acceptable. And I wasn’t even _going_ for that! I just replied how I would to any such hypothetical! Take, say, how I routinely pick stuff up and move it from Point A to Point B: far as I can tell, I’m mundanely using my muscles and straining according to how much weight is involved, and nothing mysterious is going on – and if you suddenly posited an invisible telekineticist straight out of a comic book who follows me around and does all the heavy lifting while tricking me into having a sense of physical control, I’d say, _well, imagine folks who are doing their own heavy lifting; if you’re right, how could we tell the difference between them and me? Is there any such test?_ And cue your latest reply: > [@monstro](#): > > I am not claiming anything that I can’t possibly know. I fully concede that my sense of control is merely that–_a sense_–and that there is no way I can know if it is anything more than that. > [@](#): > > I’m allowing that I could be wrong. You, however, are not. > > We can’t distinguish the remote-controlled people from the non-remote-controlled people. You’re wrong about that “You, however, are not”, but put that aside for the moment; the rest of your response is _gold_: you experience a sense of control, you don’t know whether there’s a remote controller beaming it into you or whether it simply is what it feels like, and you grant that there’s no way to distinguish remote-controlled people from non-remote-controlled ones, and so you allow that you could be wrong, sure as all available evidence is compatible with either possibility. If that’s your position, then it’s (a) commendable; and it’s (b) also _mine,_ right down to allowing that I could be wrong – despite your quoted claim to the contrary. ---
**Author:** ![Alan\_Smithee](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/2acd7d/32.png) [@Alan\_Smithee](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Alan_Smithee)\ **Post date:** [October 4, 2015, 3:47pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-is-free-will-still-a-debate/733301/109 "2015-10-04T15:47:32Z")
> [@monstro](#): > > What does the “free” come in? I don’t think you can analyze a term by breaking it into its constituent parts. We rarely talk about the will except as free, other than in cases of explicit coercion or manipulation. I think you can read “free” as excluding coercion and manipulation, or you can read it as simply part of the compound word “free will.” > [@](#): > > My cat has agency. So does a baby. Yet we, the typical Western-thinking layman, generally assume that cats and babies don’t have free will like grown human beings do. How does our agency differ from theirs? My opinion? In degree, not kind. I think a cat definitely has free will, a baby less so. I think its self-evident that we have greater ability than either to analyze data, reflect on our decision-making process, conceptualize the future, make a decision, and act on it deliberatley in the face of aversive stimuli. I also think it’s clear (though not self-evident) that cats, at least, have some limited form of those abilities, and that babies develop them over time. The fact that there is a difference between a baby’s ability to make decisions about its future and an adults (that is not limited to merely the adult’s greater capacity for physical action) tells us that there is _something_ in our minds that we have that babies lack. “Free will” is the term for that, whatever it is. > [@](#): > > What is consciousness and what is its proof? I _know_ that I experience qualia (or at least that I seem to, and that seeming would seem itself to be a form of qualia.) I know that I can reflect on my experience of those qualia, and in fact can reflect on my own reflections recursively. I infer that others also experience things and can reflect on them. It seems unlikely that I would be the only being to develop these properties, though it is possible that some people do not. > [@](#): > > I agree. So how does a world with “active” consciousness (that is to say, one controlling an individual’s thought and feelings and thus actions) differ from a world with a “passive” consciousness that is just going along for the ride? > > How can an individual know whether their consciousness is active or passive? I can decide what I am going to do in the future and then carry it out. I can change my mind. There seems to be a (limited, non-absolute) causal relationship between what I decide and what I do, in at least some instances. I can test this crudely by deciding to stand up and turn around three times (something I would be unlikely to predict, if I were merely anticipating my own future actions without causing them, and unlikely to actually do even if I predicted it) and then seeing whether I do so. I can imagine what it would be like if I were trapped in a body I did not control, and I believe it would be very different from what I experience in reality. > [@](#): > > Neuroscience has provided tools that allow us to test this in an objection manner, and the evidence indicates that no, our consciousness really does seem to be going along for the ride. I recommend reading David Eagleman’s **Incognito** to see examples of this. > > There is plenty of evidence in neuroscience. Awesome! I’ll check it out and probably put it on my list. From what I’ve read so far, there is a lot of evidence that much of what we think is conscious action isn’t, that we do a lot of things on autopilot, and that a lot of what we think are decisions are actually justifications after the fact. That suggests that our experience of free will is much more constrained than we might think. I can imagine neuroscience proving that _all_ of our experience is like this, which would indeed prove that free will either doesn’t exist or is very different than we believe it to be, but I don’t think neuroscience has gotten that far yet. And it is difficult to see how such a discovery would be reconcilable with the experiment I described above of making a conscious decision to stand up and turn around, and then doing so. It would probably depend on how I ended up conceiving of my “self” (another shaky notion that nevertheless is very difficult to discard entirely). If I conceive of the pre-conscious decision-making process as part of my (as I do now) then I might still regard it as something that could be called “free will.” If it becomes so disassociated from my conscious self, that I regard it as something “other” then I may begin to feel that I _actually am_ trapped in a body I don’t control, and therefore lack free will. (Though if I can at least control my own conscious thoughts, then I have some measure of free will, however minimal and undetectable to others.) This is subjective because one defining feature of free will is that it involves making decisions internally without coercion from outside. But there’s no innate distinction between what is internal or external to “me.” > [@](#): > > I don’t see anything wrong with not going with the most parsimonious theory when there is enough evidence to refute it. It is more parsimonious to believe that the Moon and the Sun are the same size, that they both orbit the Earth, and that the Moon doesn’t rotate at all. But it is kind of crazy to assume that is what reality is given how limited our vantage points are. Indeed, once brave individuals started questioning what their eyes were telling them, that’s when they discovered the truth. I see no reason why the notion free will shouldn’t be viewed just another untested theory that serves little practical utility. I meant to imply “most parsimonious theory that is consistent with all available evidence.” Occam’s razor, in other words. As I said, my ability to say to myself, I’m going to do something, and then do it, is pretty strong (though not irrefutable) evidence that I have free will. > [@](#): > > I don’t know what you mean by “universal aspect of human thinking.” But it seems to me that the entire field of psychology is founded upon the idea that there are universal aspects of human thinking. I mean that a universe in which a single person makes a single decision and then acts as a result of that decision is a universe with free will. (Just not much of it.) So to disprove free will, it’s not enough to prove that many of our behaviors aren’t the result of our decisions. You have to prove that _all_ our behaviors are like that. (I’m using “prove” here scientifically, not mathematically. If the best theory to account for all known human behavior doesn’t involve free will, then you’ve disproven free will to my satisfaction.) > [@](#): > > If the subconscious mind is by definition hidden from an individual, how can one claim to know its will? Let alone how “free” its will is. It would be very difficult, and perhaps impossible. But clearly the subconscious isn’t completely hidden; psychologists study it all the time. If it’s what is responsible for all of our behavior (including speech), then there is quite a lot of data we have access to. ---
**Author:** ![Alan\_Smithee](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/2acd7d/32.png) [@Alan\_Smithee](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Alan_Smithee)\ **Post date:** [October 4, 2015, 4:06pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-is-free-will-still-a-debate/733301/110 "2015-10-04T16:06:49Z")
> [@monstro](#): > > For me, the difference between volition and free will is that the former does not presume that I am consciously controlling (“willing”) anything. It is all about the subjective experience of me being in control, and outsiders perceiving me to be in control. In contrast, the notion of free will presumes that my voluntary actions are indeed under my conscious control–that my conscious mind is actually the one calling the shots. When I see my cat licking herself, I understand that she’s carrying out that behavior voluntarily. But does she consciously decide to lick herself, like an individual with free will would? How can I possibly know that? It’s just a lot safer to say she exhibits volition just like I do, instead of proclaiming I have something special that she doesn’t have just because she can’t speak English. See, this is why I think you are unintentionally creating a straw man. Or at least we’re talking past one another. You make a distinction between volition and free will, but what you call volition is what I’m saying exists when I say “free will exists.” As far as I can tell, it’s what Daniel Dennett and other philosophers are arguing for when _they_ say “free will exists.” And when most people hear or read arguments from you or from professional philosophers saying that free will doesn’t exist, what they understand those arguments to be saying is that we lack what you call volition. AFAICT, _no one_ actually holds the position that you’re arguing against. ---
**Author:** ![Alan\_Smithee](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/2acd7d/32.png) [@Alan\_Smithee](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Alan_Smithee)\ **Post date:** [October 4, 2015, 4:31pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-is-free-will-still-a-debate/733301/111 "2015-10-04T16:31:20Z")
> [@Alan\_Smithee](#): > > See, this is why I think you are unintentionally creating a straw man. Or at least we’re talking past one another. You make a distinction between volition and free will, but what you call volition is what I’m saying exists when I say “free will exists.” As far as I can tell, it’s what Daniel Dennett and other philosophers are arguing for when _they_ say “free will exists.” And when most people hear or read arguments from you or from professional philosophers saying that free will doesn’t exist, what they understand those arguments to be saying is that we lack what you call volition. AFAICT, _no one_ actually holds the position that you’re arguing against. Ok, on rereading, I may be wrong, but it’s not clear. I’ll post more later. ---
**Author:** ![monstro](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/ba9def/32.png) [@monstro](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/monstro)\ **Post date:** [October 4, 2015, 4:41pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-is-free-will-still-a-debate/733301/112 "2015-10-04T16:41:49Z")
> [@Alan\_Smithee](#): > > I don’t think you can analyze a term by breaking it into its constituent parts. We rarely talk about the will except as free, other than in cases of explicit coercion or manipulation. I think you can read “free” as excluding coercion and manipulation, or you can read it as simply part of the compound word “free will.” I’d argue that we don’t know if we are being coerced or manipulated if we aren’t consciously in control. Someone asks if I want a bowl of ice cream or a plate of canned asparagus. I salivate over the former and gag over the latter. I have not chosen either of these visceral responses. They just happen. So is it not true that I am being coerced to select the ice cream? It just doesn’t feel like coercion from my vantage point. But that’s what it is. I could choose to override this and go with the asparagus, yes. But for me to do this, I’d have to be coerced by a fear that is even worse than puking. Like fear of dying from eating too much ice cream. Barring that fear, I’m going to always go with the ice cream. > [@](#): > > My opinion? In degree, not kind. I think a cat definitely has free will, a baby less so. I think its self-evident that we have greater ability than either to analyze data, reflect on our decision-making process, conceptualize the future, make a decision, and act on it deliberatley in the face of aversive stimuli. I also think it’s clear (though not self-evident) that cats, at least, have some limited form of those abilities, and that babies develop them over time. The fact that there is a difference between a baby’s ability to make decisions about its future and an adults (that is not limited to merely the adult’s greater capacity for physical action) tells us that there is _something_ in our minds that we have that babies lack. “Free will” is the term for that, whatever it is. Babies and adults differ in their use of language. I can ask an adult, “Hey, what’s the thought process you used to carry out this action” and he or she will provide an explanation. It might be a crazy explanation, but they can at least provide one. A baby cannot do this because they have not developed spoken language yet. But for all I know, they are perfectly aware of their thoughts and their sense of agency. Just the same as my cat, or the person with locked-in syndrome. Self-evident does not mean “this is what is real.” > [@](#): > > _know_ that I experience qualia (or at least that I seem to, and that seeming would seem itself to be a form of qualia.) I know that I can reflect on my experience of those qualia, and in fact can reflect on my own reflections recursively. I infer that others also experience things and can reflect on them. It seems unlikely that I would be the only being to develop these properties, though it is possible that some people do not. But reflection isn’t the same as control and authorship. For every thought and feeling that feels like “mine”, I’ve also felt thoughts and feelings that didn’t feel like mine. Now, someone could argue that’s because I have a (slightly) disordered brain. If I had a “normal” brain, everything would feel like mine. But this is quite presumptuous, right? Perhaps my “disordered brain” allows me to see the seams in the illusion that “healthy” people are unable to see. > [@](#): > > I can decide what I am going to do in the future and then carry it out. I can change my mind. I would argue that you only feel this way, and that it is impossible for you to know what the reality is. As long as you have a consciousness, you will always have a “just so” explanation to rationalize why you’ve done something. My mind changes all the time. But am I consciously changing it? For me to do this, I’d have to step out of my self so that I can be cognizant of my cognition’s cognition. And, well, I can’t do such a thing. So all I can confidently say is “My mind has changed.” > [@](#): > > There seems to be a (limited, non-absolute) causal relationship between what I decide and what I do, in at least some instances. I can test this crudely by deciding to stand up and turn around three times (something I would be unlikely to predict, if I were merely anticipating my own future actions without causing them, and unlikely to actually do even if I predicted it) and then seeing whether I do so. I can imagine what it would be like if I were trapped in a body I did not control, and I believe it would be very different from what I experience in reality. How did you come up with this test? As you were formulating this response, did this “turning around three times” idea just pop into your head? Or did you spend a lot of time going through all the possible scenarios–all eleventy-trillion of them? If it’s the first, then how can you say you made a decision? If the idea just popped into your head, then it doesn’t seem like your consciousness should be getting any credit for putting your body into action. Because your body is likely being controlled by whatever “entity” sent you that idea in the first place. You just feel like you’re carrying out a voluntary act because of your awareness of it. And I think you can see why this would be an important illusion to have. Otherwise you’d always feel like a puppet on a string, never knowing what’s going to happen next. I think you’d get a lot of David Eagleman’s book. ---
**Author:** ![monstro](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/ba9def/32.png) [@monstro](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/monstro)\ **Post date:** [October 4, 2015, 4:47pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-is-free-will-still-a-debate/733301/113 "2015-10-04T16:47:47Z")
> [@Alan\_Smithee](#): > > See, this is why I think you are unintentionally creating a straw man. Or at least we’re talking past one another. You make a distinction between volition and free will, but what you call volition is what I’m saying exists when I say “free will exists.” As far as I can tell, it’s what Daniel Dennett and other philosophers are arguing for when _they_ say “free will exists.” And when most people hear or read arguments from you or from professional philosophers saying that free will doesn’t exist, what they understand those arguments to be saying is that we lack what you call volition. AFAICT, _no one_ actually holds the position that you’re arguing against. Why are they using “free will” when “volition” is actually what they mean?! I know you backpeddled in your next post, but I take offense at your accusation I’ve been arguing a straw man. I have painstakely defined my terms while so many other people in this thread haven’t been bothered to do so. If you think free will is the same thing as my definition of volition, then great! But I don’t think the two things are the same thing at all. This debate is a lot broader than Daniel Dennet and “other philosophers.” I’m not arguing a philosophy. I’m arguing scientifically. Specifically, from the perspective of neuroscience. ---
**Author:** ![Alan\_Smithee](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/2acd7d/32.png) [@Alan\_Smithee](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Alan_Smithee)\ **Post date:** [October 4, 2015, 6:33pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-is-free-will-still-a-debate/733301/114 "2015-10-04T18:33:47Z")
> [@monstro](#): > > Why are they using “free will” when “volition” is actually what they mean?! > > I know you backpeddled in your next post, but I take offense at your accusation I’ve been arguing a straw man. I have painstakely defined my terms while so many other people in this thread haven’t been bothered to do so. If you think free will is the same thing as my definition of volition, then great! But I don’t think the two things are the same thing at all. This debate is a lot broader than Daniel Dennet and “other philosophers.” I’m not arguing a philosophy. I’m arguing scientifically. Specifically, from the perspective of neuroscience. I’m sorry if I offended you. I have great respect for you, and I don’t think you are arguing in bad faith. You have indeed defined your terms carefully, but your definition of free will, while common among non-compatibilists, isn’t used by anyone else, AFAIK. That’s fine as far as it goes; non-compatibilists, including you, are free to define terms as you wish. If those terms have established, widely recognized definitions in neuroscience, that’s good news that I wasn’t aware of. The problem is that no one actually is arguing in favor of that version of free will. Arguing against a position no one has taken is precisely what I mean when I say “creating a straw man.” Neuroscience can’t tell us the correct definition of “free will.” That’s a purely semantic argument, and there is no real right or wrong, although as I explained in my first post, there is potentially an objective fact about how _most people_ use and understand terms, and about which terms promote communication. I think (though I need to review your posts carefully and ask some follow-up questions) that we agree on the neuroscience, at least in broad strokes (and where we don’t, I’m eager to learn from you). I think we mostly agree on what the world is like, and are arguing over what words to use in describing it. But I’m not sure, especially because I think I initially misread your definition of volition. I want to follow up, but I have other things in real life competing for my attention and the thread is moving quickly. I’ll do my best. ---
**Author:** ![monstro](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/ba9def/32.png) [@monstro](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/monstro)\ **Post date:** [October 4, 2015, 8:20pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-is-free-will-still-a-debate/733301/115 "2015-10-04T20:20:01Z")
**Alan Smithee** , so you don’t think people automatically equate consciousness with a control center? When people say they have carried something out on their own volition, I really don’t think they are using my definition of volition, but rather a definition that speaks to self-control and self-agency. Those things are illusory, in my opinion. We do not have enough evidence that the thing we call our consciousness is anything but a passive observer. If this isn’t at all a controversial idea, then I don’t know why folks have given Sam Harris (or me in this thread) such a hard time. ---
**Author:** ![Alan\_Smithee](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/2acd7d/32.png) [@Alan\_Smithee](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Alan_Smithee)\ **Post date:** [October 4, 2015, 9:41pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-is-free-will-still-a-debate/733301/116 "2015-10-04T21:41:24Z")
> [@monstro](#): > > Why don’t you ask me before telling me what I’m going to say? > > I can distinguish a voluntary act from an involuntary act based on the subjective experience of each. A voluntary act feels like it is under my control. I can explain its purpose (whether or not that explanation is the right one is besides the point). It does not feel alien or intrusive or ego-dystonic. An involuntary act doesn’t feel this way at all. > > So when I say I went to Bojangles under my own volition today, I am saying that the action was carried out with my awareness and consent. > > But I don’t experience this when I’m having a tic, or when I’m carrying out a basic reflex (yawning, sneezing). I don’t feel like these things are under my control. I feel like they are without any purpose and that they came from out of nowhere. > > For me, the difference between volition and free will is that the former does not presume that I am consciously controlling (“willing”) anything. It is all about the subjective experience of me being in control, and outsiders perceiving me to be in control. In contrast, the notion of free will presumes that my voluntary actions are indeed under my conscious control–that my conscious mind is actually the one calling the shots. When I see my cat licking herself, I understand that she’s carrying out that behavior voluntarily. But does she consciously decide to lick herself, like an individual with free will would? How can I possibly know that? It’s just a lot safer to say she exhibits volition just like I do, instead of proclaiming I have something special that she doesn’t have just because she can’t speak English. > > The following analogy came to me while I was showering a few minutes ago: > > Let’s say that our thoughts, feelings, and actions were being beamed into us by entities observing us from another dimension. While we do possess a consciousness and a sense of self, our brains pretty much serve as an elaborate transistor radio. The information being beamed into our brains seems like it is being generated by us. But it isn’t. Actually none of the information in our brains is self-generated. The sole purpose of our primitive consciousness is to create the illusion that all the thoughts, feelings, and actions swirling around actually belongs to us and are under our control. Maybe we work better when we think we’re in control. > > Let’s say that from the moment we are born, the control of each of our brains is given to a single individual. Every thought, feeling and action this individual beams into your brain feels like it belongs to you simply because you have never experienced a different “broadcaster”. So whenever you carry out this entity’s signals to act, those actions feel voluntary. > > But let’s say one day, another entity takes over the controls of your brain and starts beaming in their information. You may not consciously recognize this information as foreign and different, but maybe your brain can’t properly interpret the signals, which prevents you from coming up with a good “just so” story to justify your actions. And the end result is that you either perceive yourself to have impaired volition, or other people perceive you be impaired. > > In neither scenario are you acting with free will, because you aren’t actually in control of anything. > > Do I believe we’re remotely controlled toys? No, there is no evidence to support this. But what is the test that would disprove such a thing? This post is where I began to question whether I understand what you are saying. When I first saw it, I didn’t read it carefully, and I thought you were saying that there _is_ a difference between having a tic and deciding deliberately where to go for dinner. But when I reread it, I wasn’t sure. You seem now to me to be saying that there is only the appearance of a difference, and that “volition” only refers to the existence of that (illusory), not to any real underlying difference. IOW, we think that making a carefully considered choice is different than experiencing a tic or reflexive muscle spasm, but in reality, the only difference is in the story we tell ourselves. Is that right? But surely that CAN’T be right! You know more than I about neuroscience, and I concede that a lot (perhaps most or nearly all) of what we do is more like a tic than what we think of when we think about making a deliberate decision, but surely SOME decisions ARE made with SOME input from the conscious mind. You asked earlier if my example of deciding to stand up and turn around three times was one I thought of by considering all eleventy billion possibilities or whether it just popped into my head. The answer is neither. I certainly didn’t consider every possibility, or even more than a minute subset of them, but I did think of several and consider each one before picking the one that seemed most likely to have the desired effect. Now, I didn’t choose which several possibilities would pop into my head (just like you may not have chosen to dismiss pizza when deciding where to eat; it just didn’t occur to you) but I did weigh the options according to a set of (not entirely consciously chosen) criteria, and I was at least somewhat aware of at least some elements of the process. (We agree on this much, right?) Surely you don’t think that my mental self-dialog had no effect whatsoever on my choice, do you? Was there no feedback whatsoever between the set of neurons sensing the decision making process and those that participated in making the decision? If it is the case that the neurons responsible for my conscious awareness of deciding had no possibility of influencing the decision-making process itself, then I agree that there is no such thing as free will as I have conceived of it. But if there is any feedback whatsoever, however rare or tenuous, then to just that extent, I have what I refer to as free will, however constrained or occasional. ETA: I have more to say in response to your later posts, but I think I’ll wait to see your response to this before going further down the rabbit hole. ---
**Author:** ![Alan\_Smithee](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/2acd7d/32.png) [@Alan\_Smithee](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Alan_Smithee)\ **Post date:** [October 4, 2015, 9:55pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-is-free-will-still-a-debate/733301/117 "2015-10-04T21:55:25Z")
> [@Trinopus](#): > > The thing is…that isn’t what I mean. In absolute Newtonian determinism, there aren’t any choices. We all move along pre-established trajectories like billiard balls or planets. “Choice” is meaningless. Billiard balls don’t get to choose which direction they will bounce…and thus there isn’t any point in them evolving large, complex, expensive, and wholly illusory decision-making mechanisms. > > Again, though, why bother with intelligence if it doesn’t avail anyone of anything? > > A good many of us see a third alternative: our minds actually are decision-making machines, and our personalities and selves are part of this intelligent process. We make choices, and have volition. > > It doesn’t violate any laws of physics. Indeed, the fact that our intelligence and choices are so very clearly limited by physical laws – a drunk person does not make decisions that are as wise as the same person makes when sober – that suggests the physicality of the entire thinking – and choosing – operation. > > Newtonian predetermination is for insects. People make choices all the live-long day, and some of them are even good ones. > > I see a huge false dichotomy in “Predeterminism or else Magic.” I believe in the third choice: physically limited and physically empowered intelligence with choices as a means of expression of that intelligence. > > ETA: just as with **monstro** , I’m falling into the trap of arguing against you as if you’re promoting absolute Newtonian determinism. Actually, I suspect you’re holding a fourth view, determinism, but not absolute Newtonian determinism. It gets complicated! This post confuses me. I don’t think decision-making or intelligence are contrary to strict Newtonian determinism. A billiard ball doesn’t consider different possibilities. We do. Intelligence and decision-making evolved because they are useful, not because they are unpredictable. A computer can do things a calculator can’t. A calculator can do things a billiard ball can’t. A computer can evaluate things according to preset criteria and make a choice. I can (with effort) evaluate and choose the criteria by which I make future choices. They and I are all deterministic (chaos theory and QM notwithstanding). ---
**Author:** ![drad\_dog](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/aeb1de/32.png) [@drad\_dog](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/drad_dog)\ **Post date:** [October 4, 2015, 10:19pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-is-free-will-still-a-debate/733301/118 "2015-10-04T22:19:41Z")
Saying there is no free will always looks backwards, and justifies itself by saying it was all meant to happen. No matter what someone else says. If I lay in bed all day because there’s no changing events, they would say I was a slugabed and was going to do that all along. It’s circular, but it never predicts a future event with certainty. Isn’t the default position that this (No free will) needs to be proven? Can someone distinguish between Free Will, volition, and affecting events? Re the OP: We make decisions all the time, and we think it resembles will. So this argument will never stop unless it is agreed we have free will after all. ---
**Author:** ![The\_Other\_Waldo\_Pepper](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/the_other_waldo_pepper/32/12370_2.png) [@The\_Other\_Waldo\_Pepper](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/The_Other_Waldo_Pepper)\ **Post date:** [October 4, 2015, 10:44pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-is-free-will-still-a-debate/733301/119 "2015-10-04T22:44:55Z")
> [@drad\_dog](#): > > Can someone distinguish between Free Will, volition, and affecting events? Well, if I affect events such that someone winds up dead, you may ask me whether I did it consciously and on purpose – and I’ll reply _no, I didn’t mean for that to happen_ or I’ll say _yes, I did it of my own free will_. And if it’s the latter, you can ask _yeah, but did you do it of your own volition?_ And I’d reply _yes, I did it of my own free will; did you not hear me the first time?_ ---
**Author:** ![monstro](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/ba9def/32.png) [@monstro](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/monstro)\ **Post date:** [October 4, 2015, 11:29pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-is-free-will-still-a-debate/733301/120 "2015-10-04T23:29:51Z")
> [@Alan\_Smithee](#): > > This post is where I began to question whether I understand what you are saying. When I first saw it, I didn’t read it carefully, and I thought you were saying that there _is_ a difference between having a tic and deciding deliberately where to go for dinner. But when I reread it, I wasn’t sure. You seem now to me to be saying that there is only the appearance of a difference, and that “volition” only refers to the existence of that (illusory), not to any real underlying difference. IOW, we think that making a carefully considered choice is different than experiencing a tic or reflexive muscle spasm, but in reality, the only difference is in the story we tell ourselves. Is that right? > > But surely that CAN’T be right! Why can’t that be right? Tell me exactly what about that is so hard to believe? I have a tic disorder. Tics are a thing I live with. I experience motor tics, verbal tics, and even cognitive tics. My experience of my voluntary movements and my tics are quite different, as I described earlier. I tic without knowing I’m ticcing sometimes. I am aware of the more grandiose ones (like when I bop my head backwards). But I’m not always aware when I’m squinting or grimacing. Or when I’m being echopraxic. Sometimes I am aware I’m mimicking someone’s actions. But sometimes I’m not. I wouldn’t have known this if someone hadn’t pointed out that I was “doing it again”. And my initial reaction was, "Nuh-unh!!! The idea that I could be moving without knowing I was moving was frankly disturbing to me, so I couldn’t believe it. Then I realized something. Pretty much all my so-called voluntary movements happen without my awareness. I’m typing right now now, and I’m aware that my fingers are in a flurry. But I am not conscious of each movement. I’m guessing if I was, I wouldn’t be able to type so fast. Whenever I am aware of what I’m doing, I kind of freeze up, choke. It’s almost like consciousness impedes action more than it enables it. I’m guessing if I were aware of every single one of my tics, I’d be too afraid to leave my house. I’d be too embarrassed, too ashamed. What’s my point in all of this? I don’t know. I guess I’m sharing with you why I don’t have a problem believing that my consciousness is playing tricks on me, telling me stories that I can’t verify all by my lonesome. If I am capable of moving without knowing I’m moving, then how can I say that I–my conscious mind–is actually the one calling the shots? And how can I say that I am able to defy the prediction of a deterministic model if I–my conscious mind–is not the one making the actual decisions. > [@](#): > > You know more than I about neuroscience, and I concede that a lot (perhaps most or nearly all) of what we do is more like a tic than what we think of when we think about making a deliberate decision, but surely SOME decisions ARE made with SOME input from the conscious mind. So surely you must be able to describe a decision like this, right? Because I can’t. I cannot imagine a thought process that begins with a thought that I consciously generated, without any “outside” influences. I don’t have all the possible thoughts swirling around in my consciousness, just waiting for me to sift through. No, I have only a very limited number of thoughts in my consciousness at any given time. I don’t choose what these are. And I don’t consciously control the emotional valence associated with each. So when do I–my conscious mind–make the decision? I can pick the idea that makes me feel the best, but that’s not a free choice, right? That’s me being coerced. > [@](#): > > You asked earlier if my example of deciding to stand up and turn around three times was one I thought of by considering all eleventy billion possibilities or whether it just popped into my head. The answer is neither. I certainly didn’t consider every possibility, or even more than a minute subset of them, but I did think of several and consider each one before picking the one that seemed most likely to have the desired effect. Now, I didn’t choose which several possibilities would pop into my head (just like you may not have chosen to dismiss pizza when deciding where to eat; it just didn’t occur to you) but I did weigh the options according to a set of (not entirely consciously chosen) criteria, and I was at least somewhat aware of at least some elements of the process. (We agree on this much, right?) I would say that you had awareness of these possibilities and you had awareness of their different emotional charms. > [@](#): > > Surely you don’t think that my mental self-dialog had no effect whatsoever on my choice, do you? I can’t say it did. I don’t know your brain; maybe it works differently from mine. I know that when I have to choose among different possibilities, I like to think I’m picking the most reasonable option. And this is what I tell myself when I finally decide upon an option–that it is the most reasonable one. But why wouldn’t I tell myself this? Who chooses an option because it doesn’t seem reasonable, unless they are intentionally trying to be unreasonable? No one does this. Perhaps when I think I’m making a decision, I’m unaware that the puppet master (subconscious mind, mystical entity, etc.) who is pulling the strings has already made that decision for me, but they’re going to let me believe I–my conscious mind–am in charge. So they feed me the possible choices, knowing I’ll feel overwhelmed if I have to consider more than just three or four. They give the possible choices a different emotional value, knowing that I’m going to pick the choice with the highest value each and every time. And then they set back and laugh as I struggle over this simple problem. > [@](#): > > Was there no feedback whatsoever between the set of neurons sensing the decision making process and those that participated in making the decision? I don’t know. If we were to do an [experiment](http://io9.com/5975778/scientific-evidence-that-you-probably-dont-have-free-will) and ask people to make a movement while wearing a neurosciency thingamabob, and the thingamabob finds that there’s always a significant time gap between when the thingamabob first detects activation in the decision-making part of the brain and when the subject reports making the decision to move, wouldn’t this suggest that people are not reliable witnesses of their own cognitive processes? > [@](#): > > If it is the case that the neurons responsible for my conscious awareness of deciding had no possibility of influencing the decision-making process itself, then I agree that there is no such thing as free will as I have conceived of it. But if there is any feedback whatsoever, however rare or tenuous, then to just that extent, I have what I refer to as free will, however constrained or occasional. And that’s indefensible and pathetic, **Alan**. It’s like me insisting that the Sun’s orbit should be described as geocentric as long as there’s evidence, however debunkable or misunderstood, that supports it. What do you lose in giving up “free will”? If the amount of control that the consciousness has on an individual’s behavior is so tenuous and rare, how can you possibly defend the use of this term? [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-is-free-will-still-a-debate/733301.md?page=5) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-is-free-will-still-a-debate/733301.md?page=7)