Why is it wrong for animals to suffer?

Great Debates
61

While we’re on the subject of farming, Dan, how do you feel about our obligations to weevils and other various insects that infest crops. Surely we have an obligation to respect their right to survive and not kill them however possible? Oh, wait, we don’t. And what’s with this ‘for fun’ bit? If I can kill insects because it makes economic sense to do so, I should be able to kill them because I enjoy watching their legless bodies wriggle as they are devoured by other insects.
You know, I could create a computer system that was ‘aware’ that it was being whaled on, and could respond to being beaten as a stimulus. Would that constitute pain? You know those electronic pet thingies? They demonstrate emotions. Do we have an obligation to them? Just because something has a need does not obligate us to fufill that need.
Here. Good example: if a snake will only eat live mice, is it immoral to feel live mice to a snake? The mice feel pain, fear, etc.

I’m not sure how many more ways I can rephrase this point, but if you posit that there is a difference between people and animals, then you can see that while beating your dog is a misuse of your property, beating someone else is a misuse of their property (to wit, their body). This is a different situation.

And snermy, I am a situational ethicist.

Well, snermy, provided those weaker then you don’t contain any unconsenting people, I see no problem with getting jollies beating them up. And no citing the law to determine morality on this issue. I’ve already decided not to be caught back on page one, so potential legal consequences don’t enter into it.

A question: if there is no difference between animals and people, should animals have all the same rights as people? At what point does the right of a person trump the right of an animal, and how is it graded for each animal?
Or, optionally, if you believe that there is no moral reason to protect people more than you would animals, then… well, actually, I don’t know of any moral system which posits this. If there is one (with adherents), please enlighten me.

62

Now you’re being a bit disingenious aren’t you?
How about the Jains? Ever heard of PETA? “Meat is murder”? There obviously ARE large groups of people who think animals deserve as much protection as people. But that’s not the question you asked in your OP, and I don’t see anyone but you arguing an “animal rights” stance, so I’ll just set that straw man aside where it won’t get in the way. (darn things are a fire hazard anyway.)

So back to the OP, why unecessary cruelty to animals is ethically wrong (with each respondent having different opinions on what constitute necessary I’m sure). In my case, I have two main reason, let me restate:

  1. Empathy. I can see that animals feel pain, being able to feel pain myself I know that it is extremely unpleasant. As such I feel a sympathetic reaction that that person or animal must be feeling what I have felt in the past, and on their behalf, would like it to stop.

2)It’s bad for society. People who exhibit a lack of compassion for animals, also statistically are more likely to be antisocial in various other ways with people.

Did you read that Dept of Justice link in my last post?

The point of bringing in our current legal response to animal cruelty is not that you or anyone should decide not be cruel to animals because of those legal consequences. It didn’t even discuss them.

It was that the lack of empathy that a person who enjoys harming animals displays correlates with other antisocial behavior towards people, to the degree that it is considered a warning sign of other violent behavior by both the psychiatric and law enforcement communities.

You’re arguing that the ethical distinction is, or should be, between enjoying hurting anything BUT unconsenting people (ok), and enjoying hurting nonconsenting people(not ok).

Lets see some real stats or arguments to back THAT position up.

I don’t think you’ll find them. Stats seem to show that in practise there is more of a correlation than a distinction between the two. You may be drawing that “ethical” line but it doesn’t seem to be there in how people are really behaving.

63

To mangle C. S. Lewis, ethics are people should behave, not how they do behave.
And I’m afraid that I don’t buy correlation/causation arguments like that. Are there people out there who would beat up animals for fun? Y. Are there people out there who would beat up people for fun? Y. Does being in group A automatically lead you into group B? Just because disturbed people show an interest in something does not mean that said something caused said disturbance, or even furthered it. To allude, agression against people is a rousing spot of the old ultra-violence, and agression against non-people is classical music.

64

Actually, I’d argue that we do have a prima facie obligation not to kill weevils: all things being equal, we shouldn’t cause pain to anything that can feel pain.

All things are not, of course, equal, and we have to weigh the pain that a weevil feels (or a mouse whose nest is plowed up feels) against our very real need to eat. Moreover, in order for us to satisfy just about every single interest, need, or desire that we have, we must eat first. So the plethora of needs, wants, and desires that we have outweigh the weevil’s desire to avoid pain.

But there’s a difference between satisfying these needs, wants, and desires, and pulling the wings off a fly. The latter action causes pain only to fulfill a rather insignificant desire (insignificant compared to, for example, the desire to be loved).

Meanwhile, can you either address the following point, or admit that you’ve not defined meaningful criteria by which all humans, and no other animals, deserve protection?

(I’ll only add to this one repeated point: any “slippery slope” argument that includes infants must explain why it doesn’t include dogs or other mammals).

Daniel

65

You certainly did mangle C.S. Lewis, he was quite vocal on this topic:.

“But the most sinister thing about modern vivisection is this. If a mere sentiment justifies cruelty, why stop at a sentiment for the whole human race? … Once the old Christian idea of total difference in kind between man and beast has been abandoned, then no argument for experiments on animals can be found which is not also an argument for experiments on inferior men. If we cut up beasts simply because they cannot prevent us and because we are backing our own side in the struggle for existence, it is only logical to cut up imbeciles, criminals, enemies, or capitalists for the same reasons.”==C.S. Lewis, Vivisection, 1947

66

Aha. Now, you must draw the line. You’ve conceded that human’s desire to eat meat trumps meat animals’ right to not be slaughtered. Can you provide a sliding scale of ranked desires and ranked animals? More importantly, how and why would you rank animals and desires on this scale?
Try this one: Assume that a person is mentally disturbed, and needs to mangle something at intervals in order to remain sane. Would his need to remain sane trump the rights of an animal that he mangles?

The core of my argument is that animals cannot own themselves in the way a person can. Hurting a person without their permission is theft. (Well, tresspassing and vandalism, technically.) The pre-conditions to this argument is that
a) people can own property (irreducable. Article of faith, if you will)
therefore:
b) people own themselves

c) animals cannot own property (I haven’t seen any animals that can. Teleport me into Brinland and we’ll talk)
therefore
d) harming an animal is not an offence against the animal.
A fundamental premise of your (Daniel’s) arguments is that a need for something translates into a right to it. To put it bluntly, that’s wrong, factually and morally. Just because there are people who need my money to live does not obligate me to give it to them.
Snermy:
I know that I’m starting to sound like His4ever here, but if you buy into the premise that people can own property and animals can’t, then there is a difference between cutting open (unconsenting) people and cutting open animals.

67

Again, nonsense. Article of faith? Can infants in any meaningful sense own property? Explain, or refute, this bizarre idea.

And you misunderstand what I’m saying, profoundly. The rights a being has are negative rights: that is, you’ve got an obligation not to violate them, but you don’t have an obligation to go out of your way to fulfill them.

You’ve got an obligation, in other words, not to starve a child to death. You don’t have an obligation to ensure that every child on earth receives adequate nutritional care. You’ve got an obligation not to tear a bunny rabbit to pieces slowly and painfully. You don’t have an obligation to prevent a coyote from tearing a bunny rabbit to pieces slowly and painfully.

If this question interests you, I’d recommend the book The Case for Animal Rights. It examines these issues is great detail, spending the first 60 pages arguing that Fido can believe that the bone he buried in the yard is meaty and delicious.

Daniel

68

Insofar as property is defined as crib toys, yes. :slight_smile: Actually, I’m not sure if/when/where children can legally own property. But in a philosophical sense, yes, they can.

And now, the final jeaopardy question: What is the difference between someone else tearing a bunny rabbit to pieces slowly and painfully, and a cyote tearing a bunny rabbit to pieces slowly and painfully?

I presuppose property rights becasue they work better then the lack of them. My morality is prefaced by “#include <capitalism>”, if you will.

69

Robert, when I ask you to give an explanation for how infants can meaningfully own property, reasserting that they can doesn’t count.

As for the difference between a coyote and a human adult tearing a rabbit apart, this one is easy. Is it unethical for me to strike you down and kill you? Sure. Is it unethical for a bolt of lightning to strike you down and kill you? Of course not.

That’s because I’m a moral agent: I’m a being capable of making moral judgements, and so it’s sensible to judge my actions morally. A bolt of lightning is not a moral agent: it’s not a being capable of making moral judgements, and so it’s nonsensical to judge its actions morally.

There’s another category of beings, moral subjects: these are beings incapable of making moral judgements, but who can be acted on morally. Infants and the comatose fall in this category: an infant cannot act unethically, but it is unethical to torture an infant. A person who causes an infant pain is prima facie acting unethically. A lightning bolt that causes an infant pain is not acting unethically.

I submit that adult mammals are moral subjects.

Daniel