It’s horseshit, basically. America ‘held back’ because the majority of it’s people until fairly late in the war were opposed to US intervention. This was due in part because of American isolationism in the post WWI era and probably due as well to the Great Depression that was still ravaging our economy through the 30’s. This was seen in poll after poll, though by 40 or early 41 those margins had narrowed quite a bit. And we were creeping towards intervention…in fact, we had already started a covert war with the German navy prior to Pearl Harbor. But we weren’t deliberately holding back, certainly not on the assumption that coming in later would make things easier for us.
The shred of historical validity to the idea the US ‘held back’ to let the Soviets soften up the Germans is the common Soviet/Russian belief that the Anglo-Americans could have opened a full second land front prior to 1944, say in 1943, but deliberately didn’t do so to let the Soviets bear more of the burden. Noting that the North African and Italy campaigns were minuscule and small diversions of German ground combat power compared to the Eastern Front; the German ground effort in the West post Normandy was significant compared to the East though still smaller.
This Soviet/Russian view though is of questionable validity. It took the time it took to ready a sufficient Allied force for Normandy, and shipping. It might have been done at much greater risk the prior year, but countries look out for their own interests. It’s not that reasonable to expect the Anglo-US to have accepted a much higher probability of failure in invading Europe just to help the Soviets. It also ignores the non-negligible effect on Germany’s overall war effort of having to fight naval and air wars in the West all along.
Anyway that can be debated. But the idea the US should have automatically declared war on Germany the minute the Germans attacked Russia in June 1941, only 6 months before the US actually did formally go to war with Germany anyway, is ridiculous.
US ‘holding off’ entering the war is more of a Brit/Commonwealth ‘pop history at the pub’ kind of trope, because at least in that case there’s 2 yrs to talk about not 6 months as v. the USSR’s entry against the Germans. Or, why didn’t the USSR declare war on Germany in Sep 1939…because they were in league with the Germans to carve up Poland at that time. 
Why didn’t Britain enter the war when Japan invaded China? Were they holding back so China and Japan could weaken each other?
I’m not seriously saying Britain had any obligation to defend China. But I get annoyed by the opinion some Britons have that they alone entered the war at the proper moment and everyone else was “late”.
I am sure that is true but can think of no serious examples of it. People are interested in the stories of their cultures and nations (when it interests them at all.)
This “why, oh why don’t people acknowledge what the Soviet did in WWII” thing is an old song, and a standard one suing by people who want to imply they’re smarter about World War II than other people. It’s long past being boring, and as has already been pointed out, those quick to point out that more fighting was done at Stalingrad than Tobruk usually cannot name a single pitched battle in the Second Sino-Japanese War, or relate a single fact about India’s war experience.
Netflix has a series ‘Tanks’ that shows the Free French arriving in Normandy in Allied landing craft, wearing American uniforms and driving American tanks. And the war on the Western Front seemingly ends there. Needless to say it was a French production.
I think that one shows a pretty natural level of focus on the warriors of the country it was made in, maybe less than usual even overall. But as usual shows like that are mainly good for the footage itself, at least it there’s any that’s original, and not as much for the narration.
The 2nd French Armored Division M4A2 medium tanks are disembarking USS LST-517. There are also well known photos of that, taken at the Normandy beaches August 2.
That’s the number given for WWII American military casualties in the European theater.
“Soviet blood, British bravery and American steel” makes for a catchy phrase though. :dubious:
On a more serious note: it’s foolish to say that the eastern front in WWII hasn’t figured in American popular culture, seeing that anyone who grew up watching “Hogan’s Heroes” knows it was a really bad thing for Germans to be sent to the Russian front. 
I certainly have no desire to diminish the sacrifices and bravery of the Americans who fought in WWII. The number of 586,628, it should be noted, is casualties, which includes both dead and wounded. The first line (the ‘Total’ line) in the same chart notes that there were a total of 592,170 Americans who lost their lives in all theaters of World War II.
By most estimates, the total number of Soviet dead, which includes both military and civilian deaths, is at least 20 million and perhaps as many as 27 million.
Upthread I mentioned TV tropes and here’s a link. Plenty of examples of what I’m talking about there.
And no, I don’t think it is simply a matter of people only knowing what their country did; it’s often a misconception of what happened e.g. the *Friends *quote of “You’d be speaking German if it wasn’t for us” is a common sentiment.
And there is nothing snobbish about trying to correct a misconception.
But Soviet military casualties could have been far less had Stalin cared about such things. He was not elected nor subject to pressures faced by Churchill nor FDR. Soviet soldiers got no furlough nor leave. How many Soviet lives could have been saved had the Soviets simply encircled Berlin and waited for the inevitable surrender?
Um, the Soviets had already suffered unbelievable casualties long before they reached Berlin. The Battle of Stalingrad in 1942-1943 resulted in over a million Soviet casualties. The Siege of Leningrad from 1941-1944 resulted in over 3 million Soviet casualties.
Now, it is undoubtedly true that lives would have been saved had the Red Army not attacked Berlin. But the additional Soviet casualties caused by this action pale in comparison to earlier encounters.
Soviet soldiers were seen as expendable because there was no one and no pressure to minimize casualties. A million Soviet soldiers were executed by NKVD. The war in the east could have been fought much more carefully and smarter with far fewer casualties.
That 500,000 is less than 1/40th the Soviet toll.
That being said, some Russians bandy about their high death toll almost like it’s something to be proud of.
There’s also a paradox between the claim that the Soviets didn’t outnumber the Germans by that much, or the Red Army was better by mid war, and the quasi-pride in these gigantic casualty numbers.
In fact there’s a tendency to look at times, and ways of looking at the numbers, that understate Soviet numerical superiority and thus German tactical superiority. The Soviet-German comparison was a lot more favorable to the Soviets on operational and strategic level later in the war, stuff like concentrating the Soviet forces at the most advantageous positions, and figuring out German intentions and weaknesses, like at Kursk for example. But on a tactical level the Germans were often still distinctly superior in various areas of warfare (armor, artillery, fighter combat etc) even in 1944. That’s a large part of the explanation for the apparent paradox. It was often hoards of not that well coordinated or tactically skillful Soviet infantry and armor getting chewed up by, but eventually overwhelming, heavily outnumbered German forces in particular critical areas, even pretty late in the war.
The way of victory the Soviets learned depended on throwing highly superior combat power (not just manpower numbers but large margins of tank and artillery numerical superiority) at key German positions but tactically straight up the middle as quickly and relentless as possible, because that’s how they could win, that’s what worked. To also minimize casualties the Soviets would had really had to gain parity with German ones in maneuver and that never really happened, or not till very late.
Or IOW the ‘unknown story’ of the Eastern Front wasn’t just the Germans sucker punching the Red Army in 1941 then the RA being superior the rest of the war, but somehow suffering astronomically higher material losses, particularly, as well as human casualties than the Germans. The answer to that apparent paradox is that the Germans remained tactically superior, but the Soviets became good at amplifying their overall material superiority to overwhelming levels at the most critical points. But they suffered frightful casualties steamrollering the heavily outnumbered German formations. That continued even to the Berlin campaign.
I think you’re explaining the strategic and tactical layers without touching the operational layers. Operational planning and capabilities are where the Soviets were better than the Germans by 1943. Particularly in constantly keeping the Germans off balance and surprised by extensive and excellent use of deception in their actual operational aims. Bagration was as well played and free flowing as any of the early German offensives and by that point the German army had become much more operationally rigid, especially with “stand and die” type orders.
I’m having trouble finding a source, but IIRC the USSR population pre-war was less than double the German population, and the Soviets lost the bulk of their (existing) army in 1941 as well as millions of military aged men killed or captured. There simply weren’t enough people at that point for Russia to swarm the Germans with massive numbers at that point. As I said, 1.6:1 was the greatest disparity along the front, with most of the time being somewhat less. But the Russians used their numbers well to concentrate forces at key points and basically keep the Germans reeling from late 1942 onwards. Kursk was certainly not a triumph of German operational planning, but I guess you can make the case that the full on Russian asskicking didn’t occur until after that.
If you say so.
I won’t say the Soviets were acting out of any altruistic feelings for the west; they were fighting for their lives. And tactics had a large effect on the numbers, but even if they were halved, 419,000 vs. 14-million is but a drop in the bucket.
I find no evidence to corroborate this statement, and I actually find it hard to believe. I’ve found documentationthat states that up to 3 million Soviet POW soldiers died at the hands of the Germans, through starvation or execution, but nothing that backs up your statement.
Can you provide a cite, please?
I said
“In fact there’s a tendency to look at times, and ways of looking at the numbers, that understate Soviet numerical superiority and thus German tactical superiority. The Soviet-German comparison was a lot more favorable to the Soviets on operational and strategic level later in the war,”
I see operational in there.
Mikhaelov lists 994,300 dead killed because of conviction of military offenses.
Because the Soviets had access to Ultra intelligence.