The problem is that we can only think about the world in terms that are essentially computational—i.e. we start from some information, process it, and return different information. This is just the way modeling works; understanding stuff is, roughly, just creating a sort of computational simulation of it.
But that doesn’t mean it’s the way the world works. Indeed, in order to ground the computation our minds perform, we need non-computational processes, as otherwise, we land squarely in an infinite regress (computations grounded in computations grounded in computations…).
The problem is, within a computational model, it always makes sense to ask for some fundamental set of facts, say a system of axioms, from which every property of the model can be derived. Thus, for a computational model, something always comes from something; and since that’s the only way we can reason about things, it seems to us that something always must come from something, period. There must be some base facts, some axioms, such that no further question is possible, and those must determine all that goes on. But for each such set of base facts, we can ask: but why?
This is essentially the question of why there is something, and not nothing. Why are there fundamental facts at all? Why not none?
The usual answer is that those facts must be necessary—i.e. they could not possibly be different. I don’t think that’s really sufficient.
Rather, I believe that the question itself is just mistaking the map for the territory: it simply doesn’t follow that because there is some set of fundamental facts to all our models of the world, and to every way we can reason about the world, then there must be some fundamental facts to the world as such, period. That conclusion simply isn’t warranted.
So the problem of why there is something instead of nothing may be a pseudo-problem, imposed simply by our way of reasoning about the world. If we could apprehend the world directly, without some form of mental model, the question simply wouldn’t occur to us; but since we can’t, since we’re caught up looking at the world through a computational looking glass, there seems to be a necessity for final facts.
Thus, the question cannot be answered; but that’s OK, since it also doesn’t point to an actual problem.
It’s often claimed that information might, in some way or another, foundational to the world. But it’s exactly the other way around: information only exists in the world as it is being modeled. Take the set of all numbers: it has very little information content—as can be seen that I’ve just described it using just a couple of words. But subsets of that set can have near-arbitrarily large information content: basically, the information content there is equal to a formula, or computer program, that picks out every element of that subset, and those can be quite complex.
Moreover, the subset’s complement has the same information content: if I’ve picked out the subset, I can just as well pick out its complement. So we split the set of natural numbers, which has very little information, in two, each of which has a huge information content. It’s like ripping a piece of paper in two: the piece itself is easily described, but it takes a quite complex description to describe the precise shape of the tear.
This information yields the ‘fundamental facts’ of each piece. Now, every model only ever grasps a subset of the things in the world—in fact, by necessity: since models are computational, while the world isn’t (in order to ground the computations going on), every model only ever models a part of the world. Every model thus has a certain non-zero information content, a certain set of fundamental facts. But the world doesn’t: it’s like the white piece of paper, only more so. ‘Everything’ and ‘nothing’, being complements of one another, have the same information content: zero.
So the ‘world’ as we talk about it exists as a computational entity with a nonzero information content in necessarily incomplete models of the world as it is in itself. The former necessitates the fundamental question: why those fundamental facts? Why any?
The latter, however, don’t, and so long we don’t confuse the two, we’re good.