True I suppose, “have no choice” is too strong. However, I do feel a compulsion to at least attempt to be comfortable with things which I know to be true. Even if the book said “you are an insufferable moron Mike. Everybody hates you, you have a face like a Picasso, you smell like drain, everything you believe is stupid, offensive bollocks and you have four minutes to live.” I would at least make some effort to come to terms with this reality.
It’s true that the opening lines you suggested would be rather more vague than I would like. If I ask a fortune teller what will happen to me in the future and they reply “something”, I will not necessarily be satisfied. I will however concede that they are probably correct.
To describe “something” as “one logical possibility” is IMO, to downplay the inclusiveness of the category “something.”
I don’t claim that reality simply knew which something to be somehow. The question “why is there this something rather than another something?” is, I think, rather better than the one we are discussing.
That is a commonly voiced question in physics (popular physics at least), but it’s nothing like “why is there something at all?”
Stop focussing on the “nothing” aspect of the question. We can’t conceive of nothing so it is not helpful to focus on it. Rephrase the question as “why is there existence?” Same question, but it doesn’t get bogged down in the alternative and our inability to conceive it.
I will not. That’s what this thread is about. If you don’t like the subject, feel free to raise tangential questions, or to start a new thread, but don’t tell me I’m not allowed to address the subject of my own thread.
“why is there existence?” is no better in my view. As I’ve said repeatedly, I think it’s circular. “There is something” is true always and everywhere. By your own admission, no scenario can be conceived of where it isn’t true.
I really don’t think this snippiness is warranted. I tend to think RP’s comment was meant in a rhetorical sense, as in “perhaps there’s a better way to get at the issues here”.
You seem to feel that you have uncovered some kind of logical flaw in the question itself, and I don’t think you are convincing anyone. It’s certainly not circular. What you have said here seems to amount to no more than a refusal to accept that hypotheticals are valid questions.
My point was that Krauss’s “nothing” is clearly something where a set of physical laws exist; it is by following these laws that what he defines as “something” can arise.
If Krauss is correct, it’s certainly extremely important physics, showing how the physical laws that we observe can arise from a much deeper more fundamental state. But, in principle, I don’t think it’s metaphysically any different from explaining how disease arises from unseen germs. Krauss’s deeper more fundamental state already exists, governed by physical laws, and therefore simply does not correspond to what the word “nothing” means in the question “why is there something rather than nothing”.
Seems like I’m at least somewhat willing to accept hypothetical questions.
The claim that I’m not convincing anyone (how do you know? I think maybe you’re projecting.) doesn’t trouble me much. Many times in my life I have been unable to convince people of demonstrably true things.
I think it would then be a valid discussion to try to figure out WHY it HAD to be space-time mass-energy. But I’m OK with all but the last sentence from your book. There has to be something. What we don’t know is why we have this something as opposed to a different something, and that’s the main goal of fundamental physics to figure out.
Let’s remember, we’re talking about the creationist types making an assertion that “something can’t come from nothing.” I think that dead horse is not coming back to life, right? Is there anyone who can try to support that assertion?
Perhaps, in a debate, you should take thinks less literally and personally, and more rhetorically? My point was that I don’t think you have made your case that there’s a logical contradiction in the question; and an invitation to try to convince me that there is.
I think we are still talking past one another here. I am not claiming that Krauss’s nothing really is absolute nothing. Again, I don’t think absolute nothing is a meaningful concept. If you look back towards the start of the thread, you’ll see a few people posted links to articles by physicists and philosophers explaining why they think this as well. That’s not an appeal to authority, I just think they probably explain it far better than I can.
I’m not sure how I was supposed to know that “you aren’t convincing anyone” meant “you aren’t convincing me.” but thanks for the clarification as to your meaning.
To be honest, I’m not sure what angle to approach convincing you from. I’ve made a few attempts at analogies, rephrasing the questions/statements to highlight the problem etc. Perhaps if you go into more detail about where you think I’m mistaken we could make more progress.
Why is “there is something” have to be true always and everywhere? We know there is something because we experience it, but why must there be something? My point about what is conceivable and what is not is that this is a failure of our brains, not a reflection on what is true. We can not conceive of the nothingness of death, yet it happens, or at least we have no reason to think it doesn’t. Just because we can’t comprehend the idea of no existence does not make it an invalid concept.
I don’t think I ever made that argument. The question “what if there was no cheese” is a hypothetical one, and makes perfect sense because cheese is a thing which can be present or absent. “Something” is not. “Something” is too large a category to be meaningful in this context. Whatever is, is something.
I never claimed that non-existence was an invalid concept. Just that it has to be applied to something which might otherwise exist. When I die, it will be me who does not exist. If you say that all things do not exist, including space and time etc, then the concept of existing/not existing vanishes.
Again, how does this state of complete non-existence differ from the current situation in Narnia, or Mordor? How could we usefully distinguish the two types of non-existence?
Edit: To clarify (optimistic, I know.) is the nothing before the universe physically separate from the nothing in Narnia? Are they occurring simultaneously? In the same location?
I’m no Creationist; I think I already mentioned I’m an atheist.
But I’m not prepared to handwave problems just because some people feel they might give theists an “in”.
You get the same problem with consciousness; where some people feel that any acknowledgement of significant aspects of consciousness that we don’t understand must be saying “Proof of souls!!1!”
For the problem of “something” and “nothing”, my opinion is that there is an explanatory gap there. And nothing humans have said so far has bridged that gap, certainly not “god dunnit!”, which just adds a turtle, and raises many more questions.
But taking a step back, there’s no need to belabor this point, since everyone, including the OP, seems to agree “Why does this something exist, and not something else?” is a meaningful and unsolved metaphysical question.
While the OP is determined to make a distinction between these two questions, I frankly don’t care about that distinction, because in my opinion you solve one of those questions, you solve them both. So an acknowledgement that at least one of the two questions “Why does anything exist?” and “Why does this something exist?” is a worthy question to ask, is absolutely sufficient for me.
When you die, from your perspective, the entire universe will cease to exist. For you, it will be the exact same nothingness that you seem to have a problem with.
My concept of non-existence includes space and time etc and yes the concept of existing/not existing would also not exist. Why is this a problem?
Narnia and Mordor exist on paper, on film, and in the imaginations and memories of people. The type of non-existence postulated as an alternative to this universe would be true nothingness. No space, no time, no laws of physics, nothing.
Going back to your OP, it seems to hinge on language. How can there be nothing when to be implies that nothing is a thing. That is just a failure of language to adequately cope with the concept of nothingness.
What is your basis for distinguishing between counterfactual hypotheticals that are valid/invalid.
“What if no cheese” is something that we have experienced at least temporarily, so that’s not really counterfactual in quite the same way.
But “what if no Hitler” is counterfactual. There was a Hitler. Do you think a hypothetical that imagines “no Hitler” is more valid than a hypothetical that imagines nothing at all? Does it hinge on any criterion that is more objective than whether somebody feels that they are capable of imagining it?
I understand that the issue is now settled for you. I’d just like to have one more attempt at explaining why I differentiate those to questions.
The second one is (I hope) not something that can be “answered”, it encapsulates the entire endeavour of science and philosophy. To continually explore and understand more deeply and also more broadly, in finer detail and with clearer perspective. With no end goal in sight.
The first is (for the reasons I have apparently failed to sufficiently elucidate) a dead end. A convenient, man-made gap to hide a God in. There is no way to approach it and so he need never be disturbed there.
You say “from my perspective” and “for me”. There will be no me so what can you possibly mean by this? Did I have a perspective before I was born?
The concepts of those places exist in peoples minds. Depictions of them exist on paper and on film. I’m not talking about the concept, or depictions, I’m talking about the places themselves. The ones that don’t exist. What boundary, physical or conceptual, separates them from any other hypothetical state of non-existence? Or are they one and the same?
I wasn’t clear. When I said “what if there was no cheese?” I was imagining no cheese anywhere at all, ever, so I don’t make a relevant distinction between that and the “what if no Hitler?” counterfactual.
This is why I keep going back to the concept of “nothing” in spite of protestations that I should not. It really is the only concept about which the sentiment “there is X” can not be meaningfully said.
It’s not a feature of the English language, it’s a feature of the concept. The concept “Hitler” refers to a thing, the concept “cheese” refers to a thing, the concept “ambiguity” refers to a thing, even if that thing is entirely abstract. The concept “nothing”, no matter how you phrase it, no matter what language you use, cannot refer to it’s conceptual opposite.
Postulating superior minds with superior imaginations doesn’t help.