### Author:  [@Yossarian22](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Yossarian22)
#### Post date: [August 16, 2004, 2:19pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-not-instant-run-off-voting/260083/1 "2004-08-16T14:19:09Z")
What are the major arguments against instant runoff voting? After learning about it ([http://www.instantrunoff.com/](http://www.instantrunoff.com/)), it seems to be the fairest way to elect officials.
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### Author:  [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)
#### Post date: [August 16, 2004, 6:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-not-instant-run-off-voting/260083/2 "2004-08-16T18:27:36Z")
I’m all for IRV but I have, in the course of my researches, encountered some contrary arguments.
From the Wikipedia ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff\_voting](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting)):
> [@](#):
>
> **Potential for tactical voting**
>
> All reasonable voting systems allow for some form of tactical voting, also known as strategic voting. Unlike some systems, though, instant-runoff voting does not satisfy the monotonicity criterion—in some situations, if a voter or group of voters decides to rank a preferred candidate lower, it can result in that candidate winning the election, whereas if they had ranked the candidate higher, according to their sincere preference, that candidate would not have won. Some other election methods, including traditional plurality elections (in which the candidate who gets the most votes wins, even if they did not earn a majority), do not have this particular drawback.
>
> In addition, voters in an instant-runoff election may use more familiar tactical voting techniques known as “compromise” and “burying”, in which they would lower their ranking of a preferred candidate to increase the likelihood of a more preferred outcome. Traditional plurality and runoff elections are also vulnerable to these forms of tactical voting.
>
> \
>
> Finally, voters may also engage in another type of strategic voting, by intentionally promoting “push-overs”, candidates they know are unlikely to win (aka “burying” the others). This can benefit voters by bringing their preferred candidate to a more winnable final runoff round, basically using the pushovers as a shield for protection of their other vote.
>
> **Effect on parties and candidates**
>
> Unlike runoff voting, however, there are no chances to deal in between rounds, change voters’ minds, or gain support of the other candidates.
>
> Giving them only one chance to do so, instant runoff preference voting encourages candidates to balance earning core support through winning first choice support and earning broad support through winning the second and third preferences of other candidates’ core supporters. As with any winner-take-all voting system, however, any bloc of more than half the voters can elect a candidate regardless of the opinion of the rest of the voters.
>
> This is considered a weakness by the advocates of a more deliberative democracy, who point to the French system of presidential election where such between-round dealings are heavily exploited and useful (they say) to draw together a very factionalized electorate.
>
> Advantages to rank preference ballot: (IRV)
>
> FEWER GAMES: Voters and parties have less opportunity for playing games in early round(s) to influence the elimination order in favor of easier competition. (Runoffs allow more flexibility in tactical votes, influencing elimination, and still having a chance to move back to a favorite in the final round)
>
> MORE POSITIVE: Candidates are discouraged from negative campaigning. (A winning candidate will usually need first, second and lower ranked preferences to win, and can’t safely afford to make enemies with no second chance vote)
> Advantages to sequential balloting: (runoff voting)
>
> EASIER TO VOTE: A runoff allows voters and factions to refocus their attention on remaining candidates in each round. (In IRV, voters must make careful choices among a large set of candidates in one ballot and may not have enough information to make informed rankings among the competitive candidates.)
>
> CHANCE FOR APPEAL: Candidates that were eliminated are given another chance to endorse and remaining candidates have another chance to court voters supporting the eliminated candidates.
Regarding the “monotonicity criterion” ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monotonicity\_criterion](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monotonicity_criterion)):
> [@](#):
>
> A voting system is **monotonic** if it satisfies the following so-called monotonicity criterion given below. In mathematics, monotonicity usually refers to the different concept of a monotonic function.
>
> The **monotonicity criterion** for voting systems is the following statement:
>
> If an alternative X loses, and the ballots are changed only by placing X in lower positions, without changing the relative position of other candidates, then X must still lose.
>
> A slicker, though looser, way of phrasing this is that in a non-monotonic system, voting for a candidate can cause that candidate to lose.
>
> It is considered a good thing if a voting system is monotonic. Clearly, non-monotonicity is very counterintuitive, although some do defend such systems (see Instant-runoff voting). Furthermore, although all voting systems are vulnerable to tactical voting, systems which fail the monotonicity criterion suffer an unusual form, where voters might try to elect their candidate by voting against that candidate.
>
> The Borda count and Cloneproof Schwartz Sequential Dropping are monotonic, while Coombs’ method and Instant-runoff voting are not. Approval voting is monotonic, using a slightly different definition, because it is not a preferential system: you can never help a candidate by not voting for them.
From “The Problem With Instant Runoff Voting” ([http://electionmethods.org/IRVproblems.htm](http://electionmethods.org/IRVproblems.htm)):
> [@](#):
>
> Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) has been officially endorsed by several organizations and is gaining momentum. Unfortunately, however, confusion reigns regarding its advantages and disadvantages. IRV is very good at preventing minor parties from interfering with the two-party system, but it is arguably no better than our current plurality system at expanding the two-party system and giving other parties a chance to actually win elections. Furthermore, if a third party ever does become strong enough under IRV to seriously threaten the two major parties, they could hurt their own cause and wreak havoc with our entire political system, just as they could under our current plurality system.
>
> IRV can prevent the spoiler effect, in which a minor party splits the vote with a major party and tilts the election toward the other major party, hurting its own cause. IRV therefore seems to allow supporters of minor parties to cast protest votes without “wasting” their votes. This advantage is illusory, however, because it applies only as long as those minor parties are sure to lose. As soon as one of those minor parties threatens to become a major party and actually win, its supporters vote for them at the risk of hurting their own cause, just as in the current plurality system. Under IRV, votes for minor parties are therefore symbolic at best, or dangerous at worst. An example will illustrate why.
>
> Suppose my true preference is for the Libertarian first and the Republican second. Suppose further that the Libertarians are the strongest “minor” party. At some round of the IRV counting process, all the candidates will be eliminated except the Republican, the Democrat, and the Libertarian. If the Libertarian then has the fewest first-choice votes, he or she will be eliminated and my vote will transfer to the Republican, just as I wanted. But what if the Republican is eliminated before the Libertarian? Unless all the Republican votes transfer to the Libertarian, which is extremely unlikely, the Democrat might then beat the Libertarian. If so, I will have helped the Democrat win by not strategically ranking the Republican first. But that’s the same situation I’m in now if I vote my true preference for the Libertarian!
>
> What happened in the above example is that IRV essentially ignored one of my key preferences. By voting (Libertarian, Republican, …, Democrat), I increase the chances that the Republican will be eliminated before the Libertarian. If that then happens, my preference for the Republican over the Democrat is essentially discarded or ignored. This is the fundamental problem with IRV. The only preference that is sure to be counted is my first choice. The problem gets worse as the number of candidates increases. The outcome of the election can depend in a very quirky way on the order in which candidates are eliminated for having the fewest top-choice votes. The only way a voter can be assured of not wasting his or her vote is to rank one of the two major parties as their first choice, which is precisely what happens now under plurality voting.
My own thinking is, the above arguments might have some weight, but the institutional barriers to third parties becoming major players in American politics are so all-pervasive that any reform that opens the process to them has got to help their chances more than it hurts them.
See also the following GD threads I have started, or to which I have contributed:
“A multiparty system is better than a two-party system!”
> **[A multiparty system is better than a two-party system!](https://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=269169)**
>
> I have started, or contributed to, several GD threads about electoral reforms that would open the field in American politics to parties other than the Republicrats: “What do you think about proportional representation in the US House of Reps?” ...
“What do you think about proportional representation in the US House of Reps?”
> **[What do you think about proportional representation in the US House of Reps?](https://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=261571)**
>
> What do you think about proportional representation in the House of Reps? Do you think this is a decent overview of how Proportional Representation can alter the pattern of two party politics? WikiWisdom Overview of Proportional Representation ...
“Instant-runoff voting: avoiding the third-party “spoiler” problem”
> **[Instant-runoff voting: avoiding the third-party "spoiler" problem](https://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=261969)**
>
> Since there’s a GD thread going on right now, “What do you think about proportional representation in the US House of Reps?” (http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=261571), I thought I would take this opportunity to open a debate on a...
“Yet another electoral-system reform: “ballot fusion,” or “cross-endorsement””
> **[Yet another electoral-system reform: "ballot fusion," or "cross-endorsement"](https://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=262650)**
>
> Right now we’ve got two threads going in GD on issues of fundamental reforms to the American electoral systems: “What do you think about proportional representation in the US House of Reps?” –...
“Should the U.S. adopt alternative, pro-multipartisan voting systems?”
[http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=170368](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=170368)?
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### Author:  [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)
#### Post date: [August 16, 2004, 6:31pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-not-instant-run-off-voting/260083/3 "2004-08-16T18:31:43Z")
BTW: The City of San Francisco adopted IRV for municipal elections by referendum two years ago, and this November the voters will use IRV for the first time to elect their Board of Supervisors. Afterwards, we will have a chance to study that election and see how the pros and cons of IRV shape out in practice, under modern American political conditions.
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### Author:  [@Giles](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Giles)
#### Post date: [August 16, 2004, 7:51pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-not-instant-run-off-voting/260083/4 "2004-08-16T19:51:02Z")
I cannot think of an example of instant run-off voting which breaks monotonicity. In addition, I find it hard to think of a case where it will work: if you reduce the votes for your preferred candidate, then on each count your preferred candidate is more likely to be eliminated and less likely to be elected. Can anyone give an example where monotonicity is broken?
I can, however think of examples of strategic voting, where it makes sense not to vote for your number 1 preferred candidate so that that candidate 2 will defeat candidate 3. In addition, I have see this kind of strategic voting happening successfully in real life elections in Australia.
Paradoxically, in real life this seems to happen in most cases where candidate 3 is a relatively poor candidate in a seat which ought to be very safe for his party, so that candidate 1 from the opposite party runs dead, and lets his party’s votes mostly go to a middle-of-the road independent candidate 2. (And I’ve seen it working in both directions in Australia, with Labor candidates losing very “safe” Labor seats and Liberal or National candidates losing very “safe” Liberal or National seats).
I think it’s a great system, partly because (in cases like these) it makes the major parties have to work hard not to take safe seats for granted, and because it means that voters can vote honestly for independents and minor parties, without being told that “they are wasting their vote”.
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### Author:  [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)
#### Post date: [August 16, 2004, 11:09pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-not-instant-run-off-voting/260083/5 "2004-08-16T23:09:06Z")
> [@Giles](#):
>
> I cannot think of an example of instant run-off voting which breaks monotonicity. In addition, I find it hard to think of a case where it will work: if you reduce the votes for your preferred candidate, then on each count your preferred candidate is more likely to be eliminated and less likely to be elected.
IRV usually doesn’t “work” in the sense of making it more likely a third-party candidate will be elected to the office, **Giles.** It works by making that a realistic **possibility,** while encouraging the third party to organize and run its own candidates. If we had had IRV for the 2000 presidential election, Nader would not have been elected president – but his candidacy could have sparked a nationwide organizing surge for the Green Party, plus winning them permanent ballot access in a lot of states, and getting a high enough (first-choice) vote share to qualify for federal matching funds in future elections. In other words, IRV can help a minor, marginal third party grow into a real, competitive party – one that sometimes **will** get its candidates into office. And it also makes things simpler for the major-party candidates by eliminating the “spoiler” problem. E.g., in 2000 Gore, instead of sweating bullets over the problem of Nader’s presence in the race, could have pitched his message to Nader supporters, to persuade them to make him their second choice.
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### Author:  [@Ms2001](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Ms2001)
#### Post date: [August 17, 2004, 1:35am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-not-instant-run-off-voting/260083/6 "2004-08-17T01:35:31Z")
> [@BrainGlutton](#):
>
> My own thinking is, the above arguments might have some weight, but the institutional barriers to third parties becoming major players in American politics are so all-pervasive that any reform that opens the process to them has got to help their chances more than it hurts them.
Sure, but as long as you’re reforming the system, why choose a voting method with all these known problems, when there are other systems that will serve the same purpose? Condorcet voting and approval voting both help third parties, without the flaws of IRV.
> [@Giles](#):
>
> I cannot think of an example of instant run-off voting which breaks monotonicity. In addition, I find it hard to think of a case where it will work: if you reduce the votes for your preferred candidate, then on each count your preferred candidate is more likely to be eliminated and less likely to be elected. Can anyone give an example where monotonicity is broken?
Let me repost the example I gave in [a previous thread](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=253556&highlight=libertarian):
> [@](#):
>
> Suppose there are three candidates in an Instant Runoff election: a Republican, a Democrat, and a Libertarian. The votes are as follows:
>
> 8 people vote #1 Republican, #2 Libertarian, #3 Democrat.
> 5 people vote #1 Democrat, #2 Republican, #3 Libertarian.
> 4 people vote #1 Libertarian, #2 Democrat, #3 Republican.
>
> The Libertarian has the fewest #1 votes, so he is eliminated. His four votes are given to the Democrat, who now wins, 9 votes to 8.
>
> Now suppose two of the Republican voters decide to rank the Libertarian in first place instead. The votes are now as follows:
>
> 6 people vote #1 Republican, #2 Libertarian, #3 Democrat.
> 2 people vote #1 Libertarian, #2 Republican, #3 Democrat.
> 5 people vote #1 Democrat, #2 Republican, #3 Libertarian.
> 4 people vote #1 Libertarian, #2 Democrat, #3 Republican.
>
> This time, the Democrat has the fewest #1 votes, so he is eliminated. His five votes are given to the Republican, who now wins, 11 votes to 6.
>
> See what just happened? By ranking the Republican lower, those two voters caused him to win! This means that under IRV, you still can’t vote your true preference; you must try to predict how everyone else will vote, and vote strategically, otherwise you’ll end up hurting the candidates you want to help (and vice versa).
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### Author:  [@Atticus\_Finch](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Atticus_Finch)
#### Post date: [August 17, 2004, 2:30am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-not-instant-run-off-voting/260083/7 "2004-08-17T02:30:43Z")
Sure, in certain scenarios preferential voting (what we call IRV here in Australia) can lead to an apparently aberrant result if many people vote strategically.
However, most people don’t vote strategically. They just go into the cubicle and choose the party they like the most and work down from there. Meanwhile, a few clever people from each party are plotting to manipulate the result, but their votes would largely cancel each other out. Therefore, strategic voting is not really a factor here.
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### Author:  [@Ms2001](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Ms2001)
#### Post date: [August 17, 2004, 2:55am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-not-instant-run-off-voting/260083/8 "2004-08-17T02:55:56Z")
> [@lambchops](#):
>
> Sure, in certain scenarios preferential voting (what we call IRV here in Australia) can lead to an apparently aberrant result if many people vote strategically.
But that’s not the real problem. IRV has the same flaws whether you vote strategically or not. The problem is that sometimes, ranking a candidate higher will make him more likely to lose (or vice versa), and it’s hard to know when.
> [@](#):
>
> However, most people don’t vote strategically. They just go into the cubicle and choose the party they like the most and work down from there.
Exactly: most people don’t vote strategically, so instead of using IRV’s flaws to their advantage, the flaws will work against them. Those people who go into the booth, rank their favorite party #1, and work down from there may end up _hurting_ their favorite party instead of helping it.
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### Author:  [@Atticus\_Finch](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Atticus_Finch)
#### Post date: [August 17, 2004, 4:58am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-not-instant-run-off-voting/260083/9 "2004-08-17T04:58:23Z")
How could a vote for anyone at #1 end up hurting a party, given a largely two-party system?
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### Author:  [@Atticus\_Finch](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Atticus_Finch)
#### Post date: [August 17, 2004, 5:18am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-not-instant-run-off-voting/260083/10 "2004-08-17T05:18:38Z")
To clarify, **Mr 2001** , do you have some real life examples of an illlogical outcome in a place that employs preferential voting / IRV, perhaps in Australia?
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### Author:  [@Ms2001](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Ms2001)
#### Post date: [August 17, 2004, 5:54am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-not-instant-run-off-voting/260083/11 "2004-08-17T05:54:08Z")
> [@lambchops](#):
>
> How could a vote for anyone at #1 end up hurting a party, given a largely two-party system?
Well, the point is to transition to a multiparty system, right? Even if we assume that IRV’s flaws won’t show themselves until third parties gain more support, what’s the point of adopting a voting method that can only be trusted during the transition period?
> [@](#):
>
> To clarify, Mr 2001, do you have some real life examples of an illlogical outcome in a place that employs preferential voting / IRV, perhaps in Australia?
Real life examples? Nope. Frankly, I’m not sure how one would tell whether a real life outcome is “illogical” without interviewing each voter to find out his motivations, or at least recounting all the ballots and evaluating them under another voting method.
Still, I’ve shown how IRV can lead to counterintuitive results in theory, and I haven’t seen any reason to believe those problems wouldn’t occur in real life. The Condorcet method (among others) is easier to tally, produces more intuitive results, and works exactly the same in the voting booth; I have no idea why anyone would prefer IRV when there are alternatives.
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### Author:  [@vanilla](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/vanilla)
#### Post date: [August 18, 2004, 3:46am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-not-instant-run-off-voting/260083/12 "2004-08-18T03:46:36Z")
Yes, whoever loses should instantly run off. 😛
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### Author:  [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)
#### Post date: [August 18, 2004, 6:57am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-not-instant-run-off-voting/260083/13 "2004-08-18T06:57:06Z")
[QUOTE=Mr2001]
Well, the point is to transition to a multiparty system, right? Even if we assume that IRV’s flaws won’t show themselves until third parties gain more support, what’s the point of adopting a voting method that can only be trusted during the transition period?
[QUOTE]
Obviously, because there has to **be** a transition period! The relative merits of IRV, the Approval Voting system and the Condorcet Method can be discussed **after** we have thoroughly and permanently broken the back of the two-party system!
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### Author:  [@Giles](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Giles)
#### Post date: [August 18, 2004, 2:15pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-not-instant-run-off-voting/260083/14 "2004-08-18T14:15:49Z")
> [@Mr2001](#):
>
> The Condorcet method (among others) is easier to tally, produces more intuitive results, and works exactly the same in the voting booth; I have no idea why anyone would prefer IRV when there are alternatives.
My understanding of the Condorect method is that with it you have to compare each pair of candidates, and the candidate wins who beats all the other candidates.
My criticisms of it are:
(1) Sometimes no candidate would win against all the other candidates. If you have three candidates, and three voters, with these preferences:
A 1 3 2
B 2 1 3
C 3 2 1
then A beats B, B beats C but C beats A. That means you have to find some other method to brealk the tie. (With IRV as used in Australia, the method of breaking the tie in this case would be to eliminate one of the candidate with the lowest number of votes, choosing one at random – with just three voters like this, that makes the vote completely random, but in practice, this isn’t a problem when you have thousands of votes).
(2) With a lot of candidates (10 or 12 is not an unusual number for a single-member electorate in Australia), you would have a lot of counts to make, so it would conbsiderably increase the work.
(3) It would also increase the work required of the voter, unless a voter wanted to just follow a party list. It is common in Australia to use “optional preferential” voting: that is, you are just required to vote “1” for your preferred candidate, but may vote 2,3,4, etc., for other candidates. With IRV, if I know my candidate is one of the two likely to be in the final count, I can safely vote just “1”. With Condorect, I might worry about all the other possible pairwise combinations, and so need to fill up my ballot paper (making sure that I don’t make an error in the numbering), or I might have an option to vote for a party list (as is done in the Australian Senate or the NSW Legislative Council, where there are PR systems, and where there can be hundreds of candidates to vote for).
Note also that you also need special rules where a voter makes a mistake in the numbering. If a voter numbers the 10 candidates as 1,2,3,4,5,7,8,9,9,10, with IRV you can either declare the whole vote informal, or you can say the vote works validly up to the 5th preference, and is invalid thereafter, or you can say that the vote works up to the 8th preference, and is invalid thereafter. What would the rules be in Condorcet? And how do you explain them so that all those involved understand them?
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### Author:  [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)
#### Post date: [August 18, 2004, 9:18pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-not-instant-run-off-voting/260083/15 "2004-08-18T21:18:27Z")
Look, no voting system, in terms of translating the individual voters’ wishes into collective decision-making, is going to be **perfect.** No cite, but I once read an article in _Scientific American_ where mathematicians demonstrated that it is logically **impossible** to devise a flawless voting system. Sure, PR might have its flaws. The important thing is that it’s **a better system than we’ve got now.** And I think a system where the voter gets a chance to rank-order candidates by preference – to actually express his or her **choices** in a finely nuanced way – will be easier to sell to the public than, say, an approval-voting system where the voter only gets to check yes-or-no on each candidate in the race.
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### Author:  [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)
#### Post date: [August 18, 2004, 9:20pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-not-instant-run-off-voting/260083/16 "2004-08-18T21:20:03Z")
Sorry, I meant to write, “Sure, IRV might have its flaws.”
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### Author:  [@Ms2001](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Ms2001)
#### Post date: [August 19, 2004, 1:09am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-not-instant-run-off-voting/260083/17 "2004-08-19T01:09:38Z")
> [@BrainGlutton](#):
>
> Obviously, because there has to **be** a transition period! The relative merits of IRV, the Approval Voting system and the Condorcet Method can be discussed **after** we have thoroughly and permanently broken the back of the two-party system!
But why use a voting method that we’ll have to trash as soon as the back is broken, when we could instead use a method that’ll work before, during, and after the transition?
> [@](#):
>
> Look, no voting system, in terms of translating the individual voters’ wishes into collective decision-making, is going to be perfect. No cite, but I once read an article in Scientific American where mathematicians demonstrated that it is logically impossible to devise a flawless voting system. Sure, PR might have its flaws. The important thing is that it’s a better system than we’ve got now.
Thing is, there are many systems better than the one we have now, and although none are perfect, some of them are better than others. “Hey, it’s better than what we have now” isn’t a reason to pick IRV over Condorcet; it’s a reason to pick _one of several systems_ over plurality voting.
> [@Giles](#):
>
> My understanding of the Condorect method is that with it you have to compare each pair of candidates, and the candidate wins who beats all the other candidates.
>
> My criticisms of it are:
>
> (1) Sometimes no candidate would win against all the other candidates. If you have three candidates, and three voters, with these preferences:
> A 1 3 2
> B 2 1 3
> C 3 2 1
> then A beats B, B beats C but C beats A. That means you have to find some other method to brealk the tie.
True. Two methods for breaking the tie are described [here](http://www.electionmethods.org/CondorcetEx.htm).
> [@](#):
>
> (2) With a lot of candidates (10 or 12 is not an unusual number for a single-member electorate in Australia), you would have a lot of counts to make, so it would conbsiderably increase the work.
Well, it’d be more work than our current plurality voting, but less than IRV. With plurality voting, you need N counts for N candidates. With Condorcet, you need N\*(N-1) counts, one for each matchup. With IRV, you need **N factorial** counts, one for each possible ordering of candidates.
Suppose you’re running a polling station in an election with 10 candidates. Under our current system, at the end of the day, you send the counts for each candidate to election headquarters - up to 10 numbers. If we used the Condorcet method, you’d need to send in up to 90 numbers. But if we used IRV, you’d need to send in the number of votes for each unique ballot ordering (which could be over 3.6 million if your precinct is large enough) - if you had 1000 ballots all marked differently, you’d need to send in 1000 numbers.
Once the ballots are counted, the counts can be entered into a computer and evaluated quite easily.
> [@](#):
>
> (3) It would also increase the work required of the voter, unless a voter wanted to just follow a party list. It is common in Australia to use “optional preferential” voting: that is, you are just required to vote “1” for your preferred candidate, but may vote 2,3,4, etc., for other candidates. With IRV, if I know my candidate is one of the two likely to be in the final count, I can safely vote just “1”.
Hmm, my understanding was that Australia required a rank for all ballot positions. I heard something about Australia randomizing the candidates’ order on their ballots, because voters with no preference would just go down the list and rank everyone in order.
In any case, I believe you can do the same thing in a Condorcet election. If you only rank candidates A, B, and C, but leave D and E unmarked, then you’re saying A\>D, B\>D, C\>D, A\>E, B\>E, and C\>E, and expressing no preference about the matchup between D and E. You can still enter the known preferences in the matrix.
> [@](#):
>
> Note also that you also need special rules where a voter makes a mistake in the numbering. If a voter numbers the 10 candidates as 1,2,3,4,5,7,8,9,9,10, with IRV you can either declare the whole vote informal, or you can say the vote works validly up to the 5th preference, and is invalid thereafter, or you can say that the vote works up to the 8th preference, and is invalid thereafter. What would the rules be in Condorcet?
The simplest rule would be to declare the ballot invalid.
Or, I suppose you could say it works up to the 7th preference (or the 5th, if you want to be totally unforgiving), and _partially_ works thereafter.
Let’s say the candidates are named A through J and ranked in the ambiguous order you described. Even though we don’t know whether the voter prefers H to I or vice versa, since they’re both a 9, we do know that he prefers A-G over both H and I, and he prefers anyone over J. We can still enter those preferences in the matrix, even though we don’t have anything to enter for the HI matchup.
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### Author:  [@Giles](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Giles)
#### Post date: [August 19, 2004, 1:19pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-not-instant-run-off-voting/260083/18 "2004-08-19T13:19:22Z")
> [@Mr2001](#):
>
> Well, it’d be more work than our current plurality voting, but less than IRV. With plurality voting, you need N counts for N candidates. With Condorcet, you need N\*(N-1) counts, one for each matchup. With IRV, you need **N factorial** counts, one for each possible ordering of candidates.
>
> Suppose you’re running a polling station in an election with 10 candidates. Under our current system, at the end of the day, you send the counts for each candidate to election headquarters - up to 10 numbers. If we used the Condorcet method, you’d need to send in up to 90 numbers. But if we used IRV, you’d need to send in the number of votes for each unique ballot ordering (which could be over 3.6 million if your precinct is large enough) - if you had 1000 ballots all marked differently, you’d need to send in 1000 numbers.
Generally, in elections in Australia, the preferences are only counted after the number 1 votes in an electorate have been tallied. There’s a provisional count of those first preferences at the polling station, then the votes are packed up and sent in to a central tallying place for the whole electorate. So you don’t have to count n! different possibilities. On the other hand, often the result is not known for one or two weeks – though that possible delay is built into the timetable.
> [@Mr2001](#):
>
> Hmm, my understanding was that Australia required a rank for all ballot positions. I heard something about Australia randomizing the candidates’ order on their ballots, because voters with no preference would just go down the list and rank everyone in order.
Again, generally there used to be a requirement that ballot papers be numbered completely. However, to reduce informal voting, most elections in Australia use an optional preferential system now. So a vote can be formal, but can become exhausted in a preference count when all the candidates that have been given a number have been eliminated from the count.
And, yes, candidates used to be listed in alphabetical order, but now are listed on ballot papers in a random order. In elections using PR (e.g. the Australian Senate and the NSW Legislative Council), candidates are grouped by party, and the randomisation is for the party groups. Within each party group, the candidates are listed in the order decided on by the party. And a more recent innovation has been allowing voters to vote for a party list, by putting a “1” into just one square, rather than having to list al their preferences. If they vote for the party list, hen their ballot paper will be counted in accordance with the list of preferences given in advance to the Electoral Office. In practice, 80-90% of ballot papers in these elections are marked with a “1” for the party list, rather than with preferences for all the candidates, and this is because pretty well all the parties recommend such a vote to their supporters (to minimise the informal vote).