That isn’t an answer to the question; that’s stating why an answer is important. The question, to quote Bricker;
[QUOTE=Bricker]
When Scalia “compares” gay behavior to other types of behavior that most of society still regards as morally depraved, he’s doing the same thing: not saying that the two behaviors are equivalent, but asking what rule precludes us from forbidding same-sex sexual relations, but allows us to forbid, say, bestiality, or incest. What, he is asking, are the characteristics of the rule that supposedly limits government power in this respect?
You know a steer is a castrated bull right?
Have you ever been kicked by a horse?
You approach the hind end of a horse with amorous intentions that the horse objects to, you could be kicked halfway across the pasture! And the hooves would likely land on some delicate parts of your body, too!
I’d think a horse could easily & effectively make it’s non-consent known.
I fucked up the formatting above, so let’s try that again.
[QUOTE=jtgain]
Very simple: States are allowed to pass morals laws related to sexual behavior because since the founding of the country laws have been passed outlawing sodomy, bestiality, cohabitation, adultery, fornication, prostitution, and incest. Nobody until 1986 seriously thought that such laws were unconstitutional; the founders didn’t think so, and they are not unconstitutional.
They may be unwise given changing times, and when times change, the best way for laws to change is through elected representatives in the legislature.
[/QUOTE]
That isn’t an answer to the question; that’s stating why an answer is important. The question, to quote Bricker;
[QUOTE=Bricker]
When Scalia “compares” gay behavior to other types of behavior that most of society still regards as morally depraved, he’s doing the same thing: not saying that the two behaviors are equivalent, but asking what rule precludes us from forbidding same-sex sexual relations, but allows us to forbid, say, bestiality, or incest. What, he is asking, are the characteristics of the rule that supposedly limits government power in this respect?
He’s not comparing the acts --** he’s asking what the rule is, and inviting the reader to consider that a far-reaching rule would have effects beyond the instant case.
[/quote]
** What, he is asking, are the characteristics of the rule that supposedly limits government power in this respect?
Would you be willing to stipulate that if a party that had the* capability* to resist an action did not resist, that they therefore consented to that action?
What is Scalia’s rule? Like I said, the simple rule is that society may outlaw sexual behaviors it considers deviant. Don’t like the law? Elect new legislators.
Or were you asking the confines of the majority rule? Again, like Scalia said, hell if anyone knows with all of the flowery language in there. It might protect adult incest, but a petitioner would have to pay for a bunch of lawyers, filing fees, and kill a few trees to find out the status of a law that probably won’t be enforced anyways.
Also included laws forbidding marriage between a white person and a black or native american indian, too.
Up until 1976, when the US Supreme Court finally declared such laws unconstitutional.
Most of the Founders from 200 years earlier wouldn’t have agreed. (They could screw a black woman (like Thomas Jefferson) but certainly never marry one.) With his strict observance of the founders original intent, Scalia too might still accept such laws (though I don’t suppose he’s say that in front of Justice Thomas).
So Scalia’s answer to the question of “What are the characteristics of the rule that supposedly limits government power in this respect” is “There is no such rule; there is no standard that sets apart homosexual relations and the various other things on that long list.”?
Now we aren’t talking about morals laws, but race based laws. Racial laws are subject to strict scrutiny. Very bad news for the proponents.
Correct. But he is not saying that there is no difference as a matter of constitutional law or in his own opinion; just that states may regulate such things as they always have. Straight people don’t get a free pass either. Adultery, cohabitation, and fornication were very common prohibitions as well. Equal opportunity bullshit laws that your and my state are capable of repealing.
With the forthcoming changes in Hawaii & Illinois (and maybe New Mexico), about 48% of the US population lives somewhere with equal marriage rights for GLBT people. So it’s coming, and with increasing speed. But a decade may be too fast – i imagine some of the slave states or cow states will still have anti-gay marriage laws on the books then.
I’m not an American, so not my state.
What I don’t get is this; if he’s saying that there is no way to seperate out homosexual acts and all those other things as a matter of law, how is that not saying that there is no difference as a matter of law? If two things cannot be differentiated under a certain set of standards, then by those standards, aren’t they equivalent? If I have an apple, and a bucket of paint, and they are the exact same shade of red, then if my only standard is colour they’re functionally equivalent, aren’t they? Isn’t “there is no difference as a matter of constitutional law” exactly what he’s saying?
There is a way to separate them: by declaring that homosexuality is a protected right subject to strict scrutiny like race.
The problem is that Kennedy won’t say that. He won’t say that because there is simply no constitutional basis to say it. Race is subject to strict scrutiny because of its foundations in the 14th amendment and was the very purpose for that amendment’s enaction. Gender sort of creeped in there unannounced starting in the 1970’s and the Court uses Intermediate scrutiny for that. (even though it was never considered for 110 years and the Equal Rights Amendment was proposed to deal with that deficiency).
But the Court hasn’t brought itself to say that a sexual orientation is subject to such a level that a legislature can’t touch it. Lawrence used what is called in the legal community as a “rational basis with teeth” standard to describe what is still a mystery to legal scholars as to how sexual orientation is treated. It used such broad and flowery language that Scalia rightfully said that no morals laws could exist under the rationale.
So it remains a blurry concept, but Scalia is not saying that homosexuality is AS deviant, or even deviant at all, but just not protected under the constitution.
But that has more to do with when someone brought a case before the SCOTUS. Had a case been brought 20 years earlier, it probably would have lost, too. Brown, remember, was decided well before Loving.
In fact, the CA SC ruled similarly in 1948 in Perez v Sharp
The founders all lived before the 14th amendment was passed, so that’s not much of an argument. There is no such thing as the Founders’ “original intent” of the 14th amendment. And remember, Saclia is a textualist first, not an originalist.
Upon rereading your post, I didn’t answer your direct question.
If homosexuality can be outlawed under the constitution that puts it in the same category as failure to use a seat belt, jaywalking, and failing to file an income tax return.
To ask: How do we separate gay sex from seat belt use? is asking the wrong question. If it ain’t protected, it can be outlawed. It doesn’t mean that all illegal behaviors can be compared.
This is silly. The answer to this question has already been given. The truth is that what is considered a civil right is determined by what most people think. God isn’t going to step down tomorrow and protect your civil rights, even if there is a god and he really considers to be civil rights what you consider to be civil rights.
So in the end, you have two options. You fight in the legislature (or fight to have it put directly to a vote as a ballot measure), or you fight in the courts. But remember that judges are elected too (or are appointed by elected officials). We’ve brought up cases of courts ruling in race matters against state laws, but remember that it is doing so with national support. And then of course there’s the issue of whether the executive obeys the courts. They generally do these days in the United States, but they haven’t always, and they still don’t necessarily in some parts of the world.
Both have been working fairly well for supporters of same sex marriage in many states. Perhaps at some point there will be a federal law passed extending this right, or a supreme court case that increases the scrutiny given to such cases. But I guarantee that this is how same sex marriage will come about: not by divine judgement, but by enough people getting together and deciding that it’s not so bad after all.
You can declare that you have a universal right to marry as loudly as you want, but if the clerks and the men with badges aren’t going to defend that right, you have nothing.
When the courts rule that SSM is constitutional, they get called an activist judiciary.
When the legislature votes that it’s legal, they get called a rogue legislature.
When the people vote that it’s ok, they are called misguided and lied to.
The people that want it voted on only want it voted on when it goes their way. I remember the calls that judges shouldn’t decide it, the elected officials should. When they decided it was ok it suddenly had to be the ‘will of the people’. The people voted in three states for it and now it still shouldn’t be ok because of ‘natural law’ (whatever that even means)
Again, though, that’s not answering the question.
[QUOTE=Bricker]
When Scalia “compares” gay behavior to other types of behavior that most of society still regards as morally depraved, he’s doing the same thing: not saying that the two behaviors are equivalent, but asking what rule precludes us from forbidding same-sex sexual relations, but allows us to forbid, say, bestiality, or incest. What, he is asking, are the characteristics of the rule that supposedly limits government power in this respect?
He’s not comparing the acts – he’s asking what the rule is, and inviting the reader to consider that a far-reaching rule would have effects beyond the instant case.
[/QUOTE]
You’re closer this time, given that you’ve actually mentioned the rule - a declaration that homosexuality is subject to strict scrutiny as a right. But Scalia is asking how we make that rule simultaneously accept homosexuality as a protected right, but also not bestiality or incest. He’s asking, not just for the rule, but for the characteristics of that rule such that it means A but doesn’t mean B and C. And, given that last sentence there from Bricker, he seems to consider this to be a difficult thing to do; the implication being that if we allowed homosexuality as a protected right we might by creating such a far-reaching rule by accident also protect those other things. Again, making the importance the characteristics, the language or basis of the rule, that seperates or does not seperate out these various behaviours.
It’s Scalia’s question, so I suppose if you’re correct then that’s his problem. That aside, I think you’re skipping steps here. Scalia isn’t saying that the nature of homosexuality as a subject means that it is difficult to seperate out by law from use of a seat belt, jaywalking, etc. He’s not saying that a law that protects homosexuality also might protect non-seatbelt wearing; perhaps he does mean that, but that’s not what he says. He specifically uses certain examples of two things which would be, to him, difficult to seperate (legally) from homosexuality.
Yeah, the seatbelt example is not a good one. Wearing a seatbelt or not isn’t a moral issue-- it’s a safety issue. Walking around nude in public is a better one.
But I think it’s important to understand that Scalia picked something like beastiality over nudity because he is a showman and he enjoys shocking people. He is saying that we make laws proscribing certain behaviors all the time when those behaviors don’t hurt anyone else, but simply reflect the morals of the community. Without the judicial action of making gays a suspect class (which the court has not done), then it makes no judicial sense to rule in favor of SSM when the legislature has ruled otherwise.
Would it be fair to summarise that as saying that there are no inherent differences between homosexuality and bestiality, nudity, etc. as can be used to seperate them all out for the purposes of allowing one while not forbidding others? What i’m taking from Bricker’s summation of Scalia’s viewpoint is that, in Scalia’s view, there either is not or may be not a unique feature of homosexuality that does not also exist in those various other things, thus we need to be very careful when enacting some law or interpreting it in some way because allowing one could be allowing the other.
Pretty much. But it’s more that he’s asking why can we forbid all those other things and not forbid homosexual acts? That may be a distinction without a difference, but I think that’s more the way he’s putting it.
In that sense, then, why would it be incorrect to say that Scalia isn’t calling homosexuality and all those other things equivalent, given that he sees no difference great enough to definitively and safely seperate them? Isn’t he, if he issues a warning about potentially letting B through the gap when permitting A, necessarily saying that A and B share characteristics to the point that they’re possibly inseparable?