# Why was McClellan extremely cautious (U.S. Civil War)? **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [March 8, 2012, 5:53pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-was-mcclellan-extremely-cautious-u-s-civil-war/615174 "2012-03-08T17:53:06Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 5
**Author:** ![gunnergoz](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/e95f7d/32.png) [@gunnergoz](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/gunnergoz)\ **Post date:** [March 20, 2012, 12:45am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-was-mcclellan-extremely-cautious-u-s-civil-war/615174/81 "2012-03-20T00:45:20Z")
I don’t think it’s been mentioned yet, but McClellan was one of 3 US Army officers dispatched to observe and analyze the Crimean War. He returned in 1856 with a great deal of insight into siege operations, having witnessed the Siege of Sevastopol firsthand. It could be that seeing that siege and absorbing some of the many lessons of that war (a great many being negative) somehow led McClellan to conclude that well-fought defensive campaigns had a better chance of making a general look good than a poorly-fought offensive campaign. Just my 2 bits… ---
**Author:** ![Miller](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/miller/32/481_2.png) [@Miller](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Miller)\ **Post date:** [March 20, 2012, 1:19am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-was-mcclellan-extremely-cautious-u-s-civil-war/615174/82 "2012-03-20T01:19:59Z")
> [@Lumpy](#): > > And given that a vote for the Democrats was effectively a vote to abandon the war and that troops in the Union army were actually free to vote, it stands forever to Lincoln’s credit that he didn’t try to use the war as an excuse to postpone the election. And in that light, it’s particularly remarkable that the army went heavy in Lincoln’s favor. ---
**Author:** ![Elendil\_s\_Heir](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/7cd45c/32.png) [@Elendil\_s\_Heir](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Elendil_s_Heir)\ **Post date:** [March 20, 2012, 3:19am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-was-mcclellan-extremely-cautious-u-s-civil-war/615174/83 "2012-03-20T03:19:26Z")
> [@Lumpy](#): > > …Things did indeed look grim for the administration. At one point Lincoln flatly told his cabinet that they had to decide what they should attempt to accomplish in the few months remaining to them before the elections… He actually didn’t tell them that; he had them sign, sight unseen, a statement to that effect that he then didn’t reveal to them until _after_ he’d won the election: [http://myloc.gov/Exhibitions/lincoln/presidency/HealingTheNationsWounds/ExhibitObjects/BlindMemo.aspx](http://myloc.gov/Exhibitions/lincoln/presidency/HealingTheNationsWounds/ExhibitObjects/BlindMemo.aspx) ---
**Author:** ![Spavined\_Gelding](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/958977/32.png) [@Spavined\_Gelding](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Spavined_Gelding)\ **Post date:** [March 20, 2012, 3:21am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-was-mcclellan-extremely-cautious-u-s-civil-war/615174/84 "2012-03-20T03:21:55Z")
> [@Malthus](#): > > I sense an excluded middle here. I regret that you see it that way. To suggest that there was a viable strategy in the Eastern Theater, or any theater of the war, other than for Union forces to engage Confederate forces and to keep up the pressure until something irrevocably broke is just fundamental error. In the spring of 1864 with Grant in over all command, that strategy was finally put into effect in Virginia, in Tennessee and Georgia, in the Trans-Mississippi and along the Gulf Coast. A year later it was all over because pressure was universally applied and that pressure was maintained, local setbacks and unprecidented casualties notwithstanding. With Grant and his people in charge there would be no falling back to reorginize and reequip. It was war to the knife and the knife to the hilt. That was an approch McClellan could not understand or implement. As far as Little Mac’s experience in the Crimia was concerned, as almost any student of that sorry affair would tell you, the Crimia was the last place to learn how to wage war. ---
**Author:** ![Trinopus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/2bfe46/32.png) [@Trinopus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Trinopus)\ **Post date:** [March 20, 2012, 4:44am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-was-mcclellan-extremely-cautious-u-s-civil-war/615174/85 "2012-03-20T04:44:02Z")
> [@Spavined\_Gelding](#): > > . . . Crimia was the last place to learn how to wage war. Well, it taught a few important lessons. It pointed up the role of the railroad in ferrying supplies, and also showed the ugly future of disease as a bigger killer than battles. If nothing else, the Crimean war was a good object lesson of things not to do… ---
**Author:** ![Sailboat](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/sailboat/32/461_2.png) [@Sailboat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sailboat)\ **Post date:** [March 20, 2012, 5:21am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-was-mcclellan-extremely-cautious-u-s-civil-war/615174/86 "2012-03-20T05:21:57Z")
> [@Trinopus](#): > > and also showed the ugly future of disease as a bigger killer than battles. > > If nothing else, the Crimean war was a good object lesson of things not to do… Eh. It showed the ugly _past_ of disease as the big killer in battles. By WWI, health standards drastically reduced “diseases of the camp.” (ignoring the Spanish Influenza of 1918, anyway. It was _previous_ wars that generally featured more deaths from disease than battle, not _future_ ones. > [@New\_Deal\_Democrat](#): > > The weapons used during the American Civil War favored defense over offense. The strategy that was usually the best was to get to the battlefield first, occupy high ground, dig fortifications, and hope the enemy attacked. McClellan may have taken this strategy to the extreme, but Lee usually made it work. The notable exception was the third day of the Battle of Gettysburg when Lee ordered Picket’s Charge. While you’re right about the weaponry, I don’t think it’s accurate to characterize Lee as taking advantage of defensive firepower as a deliberate strategy. He went over to the offensive at every opportunity (and sometimes when there wasn’t an opportunity.) He did fine on defense but he never _wanted_ to be there. And Pickett’s Charge was not some kind of weird exception – in fact, he ordered costly frontal assaults almost from the moment he took command of the Army of Northern Virginia (starting with Boatswain Swamp and Malvern Hill). > [@smiling\_bandit](#): > > It’s true, I was hard on Meade above. I don’t mean to dismiss him. He was competent and capable, although that simply wasn’t enough to win the war. He did let some absolute killer opportunities pass him by, but I can’t really blame him for not being able to push his generals more, since nobody was ever able to get them to use their heads in the first place. > [@smiling\_bandit](#): > > Now, I don’t claim Grant never made mistakes. He tried everything he possibly could, and that meant taking risks - which sometimes backfired. He made unsuccessful attacks, and some he was downright ashamed of. But that’s that breaks. No Civil War general had unbroken success, because it wasn’t possible. They operated in a time when military intelligence generally meant some half-drunk officer saw something, wildly exaggerated it, and then it got mangled going up the chain of command. But his entire career was about finding a way to keep everyody else off balance, hitting people before they expected or where they couldn’t expect it, and then pushing them into a corner. > > Nor do I dismiss Lee. He knew what he was doing, and he knew that bloody casualties would be the only way to push the Lincoln administration out of office - that it might help Peace Democrats win the election. So, faced without the option of defense, he atacked like he always did. And contrary to popular belief, he wasn’t that _good_ on the attack. He was able to mercilessly take advantage of any weakness, yes, but he also created his own biggest humiliations, as well as completely wrecking his own army _three separate times_ (in Seven Days, Antietam and Gettysburg). In all three, he also put himself in a position of extreme vulnerability and only got away with it because McClellan, and briefly Meade, were too timid to retaliate. The last two passages I quoted point to an issue I seldom see discussed when comparing the merits of various commanders…nobody is a perfect robot. You can’t expect people to always behave optimally – people have their tendencies. Generals who avoid making costly mistakes are liable to miss golden opportunities, and conversely, generals who ruthlessly seize the advantage sometimes misjudge and make costly mistakes…and you have to take the good with the bad. If you want a Grant, someone not afraid of Lee and willing to commit all-out, you’re going to endure the occasional Cold Harbor. If you want a Lee, who “will take more desperate chances, and take them quicker than any other general in this country, North or South,” you’re going to get the occasional Gettysburg. It was Shelby Foote who said (on Ken Burns’ documentary, I believe) “Gettysburg…was the _price_ the South paid for Robert E. Lee.” Aggressive generals make mistakes, nonaggressive ones miss opportunities. ---
**Author:** ![Malthus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/85f322/32.png) [@Malthus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Malthus)\ **Post date:** [March 20, 2012, 2:28pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-was-mcclellan-extremely-cautious-u-s-civil-war/615174/87 "2012-03-20T14:28:09Z")
> [@Spavined\_Gelding](#): > > I regret that you see it that way. > > To suggest that there was a viable strategy in the Eastern Theater, or any theater of the war, other than for Union forces to engage Confederate forces and to keep up the pressure until something irrevocably broke is just fundamental error. What, no alternatives whatsoever other than bludeoning frontal offensives? If this is the case, it would seem the generals of WW1 learned the lesson well. ---
**Author:** ![Bartman](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/779978/32.png) [@Bartman](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Bartman)\ **Post date:** [March 20, 2012, 6:57pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-was-mcclellan-extremely-cautious-u-s-civil-war/615174/88 "2012-03-20T18:57:16Z")
> [@Malthus](#): > > What, no alternatives whatsoever other than bludeoning frontal offensives? If this is the case, it would seem the generals of WW1 learned the lesson well. If you think the Overland Campaign was nothing but bludgeoning frontal offensives, I would suggest you have misunderstood the Overland Campaign. Throughout the entire campaign Grant was attempting maneuver warfare. Half the battles were started by Lee, not Grant. And the times where there were Union frontal offensives, there were reasons to expect them to work. The Mule Shoe would have worked if the Union could have coordinated better. And Cold Harbor, while a terrible mistake, was formulated on the idea that Lee’s army had functionally broken down. It hadn’t; but Grant had good reason for thinking it had. Do you have a specific strategic suggestion on how the campaign should have been conducted? Where and how should have Grant moved the Army of the Potomac so as to avoid the terrible bloodshed, while still keeping a hand on Lee? ---
**Author:** ![Trinopus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/2bfe46/32.png) [@Trinopus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Trinopus)\ **Post date:** [March 20, 2012, 8:41pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-was-mcclellan-extremely-cautious-u-s-civil-war/615174/89 "2012-03-20T20:41:12Z")
> [@Sailboat](#): > > Eh. It showed the ugly _past_ of disease as the big killer in battles. By WWI, health standards drastically reduced “diseases of the camp.” (ignoring the Spanish Influenza of 1918, anyway. It was _previous_ wars that generally featured more deaths from disease than battle, not _future_ ones. . . . Except for the American Civil War, where ([according to at least one cite](http://www.civilwarhome.com/casualties.htm)), disease casualties exceeded battle casualties. That’s all I meant by saying that the Crimean War pointed to the future. ---
**Author:** ![Little\_Nemo](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/little_nemo/32/3120_2.png) [@Little\_Nemo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Little_Nemo)\ **Post date:** [March 20, 2012, 10:20pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-was-mcclellan-extremely-cautious-u-s-civil-war/615174/90 "2012-03-20T22:20:02Z")
> [@Bartman](#): > > If you think the Overland Campaign was nothing but bludgeoning frontal offensives, I would suggest you have misunderstood the Overland Campaign. Throughout the entire campaign Grant was attempting maneuver warfare. Half the battles were started by Lee, not Grant. And the times where there were Union frontal offensives, there were reasons to expect them to work. The Mule Shoe would have worked if the Union could have coordinated better. And Cold Harbor, while a terrible mistake, was formulated on the idea that Lee’s army had functionally broken down. It hadn’t; but Grant had good reason for thinking it had. The Crater was another example. An innovative idea that could have succeeded if it had been executed better. ---
**Author:** ![Malthus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/85f322/32.png) [@Malthus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Malthus)\ **Post date:** [March 20, 2012, 11:29pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-was-mcclellan-extremely-cautious-u-s-civil-war/615174/91 "2012-03-20T23:29:06Z")
> [@Bartman](#): > > If you think the Overland Campaign was nothing but bludgeoning frontal offensives, I would suggest you have misunderstood the Overland Campaign. Throughout the entire campaign Grant was attempting maneuver warfare. Half the battles were started by Lee, not Grant. And the times where there were Union frontal offensives, there were reasons to expect them to work. The Mule Shoe would have worked if the Union could have coordinated better. And Cold Harbor, while a terrible mistake, was formulated on the idea that Lee’s army had functionally broken down. It hadn’t; but Grant had good reason for thinking it had. > > Do you have a specific strategic suggestion on how the campaign should have been conducted? Where and how should have Grant moved the Army of the Potomac so as to avoid the terrible bloodshed, while still keeping a hand on Lee? No I do not think that. It’s not the argument I am making. I was responding to this: > [@](#): > > To suggest that there was a viable strategy in the Eastern Theater, or any theater of the war, other than for Union forces to engage Confederate forces and to keep up the pressure until something irrevocably broke is just fundamental error. You guys are overly sensitive to Grant’s military reputation. I am not saying Grant was a senseless butcher, or whatever you are reading between the lines. I realize that this has been said by others, but I am not echoing them. I am merely stating that the evisceration of the South could potentially have won the war and did not require attacking everywhere, all the time, full force by the Army of the Potomac. [Before you say more - not that I’m claiming the army of the Potomac _did_ attack everywhere, etc.!] ---
**Author:** ![Tamerlane](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tamerlane/32/7602_2.png) [@Tamerlane](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Tamerlane)\ **Post date:** [March 21, 2012, 12:05am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-was-mcclellan-extremely-cautious-u-s-civil-war/615174/92 "2012-03-21T00:05:07Z")
> [@Malthus](#): > > I am merely stating that the evisceration of the South could potentially have won the war and did not require attacking everywhere, all the time, full force by the Army of the Potomac. I’ve gotten my share of broken teeth making this same argument before. I was inclined to let you take all the lumps this time **Malthus** , but since this keeps popping back up to the top of the forum, for the sake of solidarity\* I guess I can live with a few more bruises. It would seem to me the main counter-argument people are making against Grant threatening rather than attacking is that it would surrender the initiative to Lee. The thing is, I just don’t see what Lee could realistically do with that initiative while under threat from Grant. Boldly abandon Richmond and strike in an unexpected vector? Not likely - I doubt Davis would ever have countenanced that, even if Lee were inclined to do so. Richmond was too symbolic. Losing the capital would have been a huge propaganda blow. Take the initiative and attack Grant’s _much_ stronger army? Grant was not McClellan - the most likely result would probably be another Gettysburg. Grant would have every advantage reacting to such a thrust ( well, putting aside his less competent subordinates ). It would have accomplished the same general thing as the Overland Campaign, only with the odds tipped in Grant’s favor. Detach units to support other campaigns? Already outnumbered nearly 2:1 it would have made Lee that much weaker and as noted Union intelligence was much improved. It seems such a move would likely be detected eventually and afforded Grant the opportunity to assault a much weakened Army of Virginia. Again tipping the odds in his favor. And would an extra corps really have made that much difference against, say, Sherman in the Atlanta Campaign? Maybe, but again it doesn’t seem likely - Johnston would just have been a little less outnumbered and still up against a better general. It still seems to me _in hindsight_, that Grant maneouvering to constantly threaten Lee while Sherman guts the Confederacy from the underside would serve the same purpose as the Overland Campaign with potentially fewer losses. Force Lee into a dilemma, where he had to either divide his forces and risk a devastating attack in a weakened condition or risk annhilation attacking a much stronger enemy under a first-class general. The counter-arguument of course ( aside from the ones that state that I’m so stupid I must need help breathing 😛 ) is that this is in hindsight. Grant and Lincoln didn’t seem to fully appreciate Sherman’s strategy at the time and Lee’s reputation was so formidable they didn’t dare give him a chance to pull a miracle out of his ass. Which is fair enough. But I think the argument that the Overland Campaign as implemented was the best possible option is questionable. - I still tend to think you are wrong about some of the impacts of the Mongols on Russia and the putative impact of a more successful Mongol conquest in Europe ;). ---
**Author:** ![smiling\_bandit](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e9a140/32.png) [@smiling\_bandit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/smiling_bandit)\ **Post date:** [March 21, 2012, 1:56am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-was-mcclellan-extremely-cautious-u-s-civil-war/615174/93 "2012-03-21T01:56:10Z")
> [@Trinopus](#): > > Except for the American Civil War, where (according to at least one cite), disease casualties exceeded battle casualties. That’s all I meant by saying that the Crimean War pointed to the future. While they did, vast6 strides were made in military medical training, technology, and organization during the course of the war, and as a proportion of all casualties, disease was less a factor than any previous war with sufficient records, stretching back several centuries of European history. The Civil War was a major turning point in the fight against disease, and within a few years the discovery of the bacillus would further revolutionize medicine. > [@Malthus](#): > > I am merely stating that the evisceration of the South could potentially have won the war and did not require attacking everywhere, all the time, full force by the Army of the Potomac. > > [Before you say more - not that I’m claiming the army of the Potomac _did_ attack everywhere, etc.!] Dude, these two statements are about as contrary as it gets. You really aren’t making any sense, and you display no understanding of the numerous factors which went into the decision. > [@Tamerlane](#): > > Boldly abandon Richmond and strike in an unexpected vector? While it was unlikely, this is exactly what Lee had done not once, but twice previously. And even in this late stage of the war they still made advances down the Shanandoah. > [@](#): > > Take the initiative and attack Grant’s much stronger army? Uh, yes. As in, the very thing Lee in fact did do several times? > [@](#): > > Detach units to support other campaigns? It wouldn’t have been required. Merely moving some troops had greatly weakened or turned around Union campaigns in the West several times. Seriously, we’re not making up wild possibilities here - this is what had actually happened, repeatedly, over the course of the war, when the Union army in the East was quiet. > [@](#): > > Grant and Lincoln didn’t seem to fully appreciate Sherman’s strategy at the time You mean the same Grant who listened patiently to Sherman’s plans, considered the risks, and then told him to go ahead an do anything he needed to do? > [@](#): > > Force Lee into a dilemma, where he had to either divide his forces and risk a devastating attack in a weakened condition or risk annhilation attacking a much stronger enemy under a first-class general. Yeah, sure, if you have magical knowledge of when and where he would be. Somehow, that never worked out. Except for McClellan and he still managed to botch it up. No, the problem we have with your view here is that you manage to completely ignore three major factors: (1) What Lee had done up to that point, (2) What Lee had the capability to do, and (3) What Lee did in fact go on to do. That is to say, you are sitting there arguing Lee could not possibly to do any of the things he did before the campaign, tried to do during the campaign, and actually accomplished in the course of it. That’s a really bad argument. I like theory, too, but Lee threw out the book on military theory, wrote a new one, and included a bunch of loopholes just to screw with people, and even then wasn’t too fond of the rules. I mean, if you’re going to ignore history, there’s not all that much we can debate in a discussion on the Civil War. ---
**Author:** ![Malthus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/85f322/32.png) [@Malthus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Malthus)\ **Post date:** [March 21, 2012, 2:20pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-was-mcclellan-extremely-cautious-u-s-civil-war/615174/94 "2012-03-21T14:20:39Z")
> [@smiling\_bandit](#): > > Dude, these two statements are about as contrary as it gets. You really aren’t making any sense, and you display no understanding of the numerous factors which went into the decision. I supect I am “making sense” to those with the will to read my posts fairly. Point is I am replying to _SB’s_ statement above, not _what Grant actually did_. There is a difference between posters here and Grant, notwithstanding you guys’ vigourous defence of the man. 😃 Now, I’m not claiming to be a better Civil War general than Grant. Perhaps a better general than _Burnside_ - I don’t want to display _false_ modesty. 😉 But the notion that ‘all attack, all the time, by everyone’ is not only the best but the _only_ strategy (which one again, is not Grant’s, but one raised here on the Dope) is I think not supportable. It is remarkably similar to the approach taken by some WW1 generals. ---
**Author:** ![Malthus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/85f322/32.png) [@Malthus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Malthus)\ **Post date:** [March 21, 2012, 2:25pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-was-mcclellan-extremely-cautious-u-s-civil-war/615174/95 "2012-03-21T14:25:43Z")
> [@Tamerlane](#): > > I’ve gotten my share of broken teeth making this same argument before. I was inclined to let you take all the lumps this time **Malthus** , but since this keeps popping back up to the top of the forum, for the sake of solidarity\* I guess I can live with a few more bruises. > > It would seem to me the main counter-argument people are making against Grant threatening rather than attacking is that it would surrender the initiative to Lee. The thing is, I just don’t see what Lee could realistically do with that initiative while under threat from Grant. > > Boldly abandon Richmond and strike in an unexpected vector? Not likely - I doubt Davis would ever have countenanced that, even if Lee were inclined to do so. Richmond was too symbolic. Losing the capital would have been a huge propaganda blow. > > Take the initiative and attack Grant’s _much_ stronger army? Grant was not McClellan - the most likely result would probably be another Gettysburg. Grant would have every advantage reacting to such a thrust ( well, putting aside his less competent subordinates ). It would have accomplished the same general thing as the Overland Campaign, only with the odds tipped in Grant’s favor. > > Detach units to support other campaigns? Already outnumbered nearly 2:1 it would have made Lee that much weaker and as noted Union intelligence was much improved. It seems such a move would likely be detected eventually and afforded Grant the opportunity to assault a much weakened Army of Virginia. Again tipping the odds in his favor. And would an extra corps really have made that much difference against, say, Sherman in the Atlanta Campaign? Maybe, but again it doesn’t seem likely - Johnston would just have been a little less outnumbered and still up against a better general. > > It still seems to me _in hindsight_, that Grant maneouvering to constantly threaten Lee while Sherman guts the Confederacy from the underside would serve the same purpose as the Overland Campaign with potentially fewer losses. Force Lee into a dilemma, where he had to either divide his forces and risk a devastating attack in a weakened condition or risk annhilation attacking a much stronger enemy under a first-class general. > > The counter-arguument of course ( aside from the ones that state that I’m so stupid I must need help breathing 😛 ) is that this is in hindsight. Grant and Lincoln didn’t seem to fully appreciate Sherman’s strategy at the time and Lee’s reputation was so formidable they didn’t dare give him a chance to pull a miracle out of his ass. Which is fair enough. But I think the argument that the Overland Campaign as implemented was the best possible option is questionable. > > - I still tend to think you are wrong about some of the impacts of the Mongols on Russia and the putative impact of a more successful Mongol conquest in Europe ;). Fair enough, and more or less exactly what I was getting at - with the exception of the Mongol debate of course. 😃 Naturally any speculation about whether a better strategy could have been used suffers from hindsight-itis. My own suspicion is that the present rather empassioned, not to say febrile, defence of Grant is a reaction against the excessive calumny heaped on him in the past as a “butcher”. It’s just a swing of the popular pendulum. ---
**Author:** ![Sailboat](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/sailboat/32/461_2.png) [@Sailboat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sailboat)\ **Post date:** [March 21, 2012, 4:31pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-was-mcclellan-extremely-cautious-u-s-civil-war/615174/96 "2012-03-21T16:31:20Z")
> [@Trinopus](#): > > Except for the American Civil War, where ([according to at least one cite](http://www.civilwarhome.com/casualties.htm)), disease casualties exceeded battle casualties. That’s all I meant by saying that the Crimean War pointed to the future. Point taken. I somehow misapprehended your use of the word “future” to be a reference to all future wars, not to the immediate future which would be the US Civil War. ---
**Author:** ![Sailboat](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/sailboat/32/461_2.png) [@Sailboat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sailboat)\ **Post date:** [March 21, 2012, 5:01pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-was-mcclellan-extremely-cautious-u-s-civil-war/615174/97 "2012-03-21T17:01:16Z")
> [@Tamerlane](#): > > It still seems to me _in hindsight_, that Grant maneouvering to constantly threaten Lee while Sherman guts the Confederacy from the underside would serve the same purpose as the Overland Campaign with potentially fewer losses. It’s arguable that most of the Overland Campaign _was_, as initially planned by Grant, “Grant maneuvering to constantly threaten Lee while Sherman gutted the Confederacy from the underside.” Grant repeatedly disengaged and moved by the flank. Sometimes Lee hit him, and on a few occasions Grant struck at Lee (I would suggest “opportunistically”), true, but I’ve argued before that you’re going to get that sort of opportunism from a Grant – aggressive commanders make the kind of mistakes to which aggressive commanders are prone. It’s worth noting that the worst of the attacks, Cold Harbor, was _conceived_ as a quick strike before the Army of Northern Virginia could organize a defensive line and entrench. It turned into the horror we remember mostly because of two factors – repeated delays that gave the Confederates lots of time to set up and entrench, and a sort of rigid inflexibility that prevented the recognition that those delays had rendered the original reason for the attack dangerously moot from working its way through the chain of command (in both directions, really). I speculate that exhaustion may have been a compounding reason nobody really took a hard look and said, “wait a minute…” > [@Tamerlane](#): > > But I think the argument that the Overland Campaign as implemented was the best possible option is questionable. I don’t think it was “the best possible option” as conducted. But I’m more sympathetic to the idea that the sort of commander who could conceive a campaign of maneuvering was liable to making opportunistic attacks that might well turn out to be mistakes. Remember that a recurrent refrain in the writings of many commanders (including both Grant and Lee) was “to maneuver the enemy _out of his trenches so we can attack him in the open._” Arguably, Cold Harbor was exactly that _in theory_ – an attempt to attack an army that was still moving into position “in the open” and had not yet entrenched. It’s just that in practice the “friction” of war turned it into another head-on assault on strongly entrenched forces. I’m with you in wishing that the campaign could have been conducted with less fighting and more marching, but I envision there’s an imaginary line somewhere between “fighting” and “marching” and as we shift away from “fighting” and toward “marching” we run the risk of shifting away from a Grant and toward a McClellan. (You can’t always get a Sherman…in fact, he was pretty unique.) > [@smiling\_bandit](#): > > No, the problem we have with your view here is that you manage to completely ignore three major factors: > > (1) What Lee had done up to that point, > (2) What Lee had the capability to do, and > (3) What Lee did in fact go on to do. At the risk of seeming needlessly contrary, I’ll point out that Grant famously lost his temper with men worried about what Lee was going to do: [QUOTE=Grant] Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault, and land in our rear and on both of our flanks at the same time. Go back to your command, and try to think what are we going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do. [/QUOTE] ---
**Author:** ![Inigo\_Montoya](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/inigo_montoya/32/124_2.png) [@Inigo\_Montoya](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Inigo_Montoya)\ **Post date:** [March 21, 2012, 5:55pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-was-mcclellan-extremely-cautious-u-s-civil-war/615174/98 "2012-03-21T17:55:01Z")
> [@Lumpy](#): > > At the time there was a military theory that the main strategy of warfare was to avoid pitched battle that could leave you with no army, but to instead concentrate on “manuverings and demonstrations” to force your opponent to respond to your feints in order to not risk being flanked, having an enemy in their rear, etc. Accordingly, McClellan counted every engagement which ended with the rebel forces withdrawing from the field as a “victory”. :rolleyes: So…LARP chess? I can’t say that I particularly disagree with this doctrine. ---
**Author:** ![smiling\_bandit](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e9a140/32.png) [@smiling\_bandit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/smiling_bandit)\ **Post date:** [March 24, 2012, 11:18am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-was-mcclellan-extremely-cautious-u-s-civil-war/615174/99 "2012-03-24T11:18:31Z")
> [@Inigo\_Montoya](#): > > So…LARP chess? I can’t say that I particularly disagree with this doctrine. Well, it does sound nice. I mean, it’s humane, intelligent, and elegant rather than involving miserable and brutal bloodshed. It just didn’t actually _work_, and that’s usually a problem in the military. In factr, no general who used this went on to great success: McClellan has been discussed, Buell went nowhere (literally, in his campaign against Chattanooga) and Halleck managed to get himself promoted, but turned out to be nothing more than a glorified clerk who spent his time manuevering his brother officers and not the enemy. It’s also worth remembering that this kind of war of manuever was not really based on experience. The Napoleonic wars had not been bloodless and manuever there usually set the enemy for a killing blow, not a cheap victory; rather, it was a reaction to the heavy loss of life in that era. Basically, if such manuevering could have won the war, it could not have done so before half the nation’s army died of _old age_. ---
**Author:** ![Little\_Nemo](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/little_nemo/32/3120_2.png) [@Little\_Nemo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Little_Nemo)\ **Post date:** [March 24, 2012, 2:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-was-mcclellan-extremely-cautious-u-s-civil-war/615174/100 "2012-03-24T14:43:56Z")
> [@smiling\_bandit](#): > > Well, it does sound nice. I mean, it’s humane, intelligent, and elegant rather than involving miserable and brutal bloodshed. It just didn’t actually _work_, and that’s usually a problem in the military. In factr, no general who used this went on to great success: McClellan has been discussed, Buell went nowhere (literally, in his campaign against Chattanooga) and Halleck managed to get himself promoted, but turned out to be nothing more than a glorified clerk who spent his time manuevering his brother officers and not the enemy. > > It’s also worth remembering that this kind of war of manuever was not really based on experience. The Napoleonic wars had not been bloodless and manuever there usually set the enemy for a killing blow, not a cheap victory; rather, it was a reaction to the heavy loss of life in that era. Basically, if such manuevering could have won the war, it could not have done so before half the nation’s army died of _old age_. Actually it was widely used during the condotierri period (Italy around the 15th century). You had all of these little city-states where the rulers hired mercenary companies rather than use their citizens for fighting. The mercenaries were in it for the money and had no interest in dying, so warfare became very ritualized. You’d maneuver around and if you gained a position of advantage, your opponent would concede you’d have won an actual battle and negotiate a truce. The two sides would get together and the side that “lost” would make some concessions to the side that “won” and a few towns would change owners. It was all very polite. It ended with the religious wars of the Reformation, when tempers heated up. Soldiers started fighting for their faith and they no longer were content to just win on points - they wanted to crush their enemies and wipe their blasphemy from the face of the earth. And when religion wore thin, it was replaced by nationalism and ideology as causes worth killing and dying for. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-was-mcclellan-extremely-cautious-u-s-civil-war/615174.md?page=4) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/why-was-mcclellan-extremely-cautious-u-s-civil-war/615174.md?page=6)