It is interesting to see the strategic and tactical limitations of such ships. I suppose another plausible layout would have been with a flight deck on the bow, with guns amidships and stern. But then the issue of plane recovery comes into question.
I think they would have been useful on a lighter scale, say a cruiser hybrid. That, or if floatplane-based attack aircraft were viable (which they are generally not, vs wheeled naval aircraft)
But if all you want is the ability to carry a few scout craft around, why not build an ungunned escort carrier? That’s going to be much cheaper than the hybrid. Then convert the hybrid hull to full battleship. Or full aircraft carrier. Then the escort carrier can be optimized to handle the scout seaplanes or what have you.
So because the Bismarck got a fluke shot in - the one lucky strike that killed Hood, it was a “true” battleship. With the forces the RN was amassing I’m not sure the Bismarck had much “real” effect on the war other than giving the UK a bad week. I’m asssuming Tirpitz had no real effect on the war either- all she did was slightly alter the escort requirements for the Murmansk convoy.
By your requirements the last real battleships would have to be the RN’s old battleships in the med prior to the Bismarck’s pathetic breakout attempt. At Matapan and Alexandria they substantially altered Italian naval plans, parylizing the Italian navy’s capital ships for the duration. And only at Matapan was there really firing, so Warspite, is therefore the last real battleship. (Granted at that point she’d already seen one wars worth of battlin’)
Time was their enemy, I think. (They hoped the Allies would “cry uncle” in 6-12 months.)
The Japanese did convert several passenger liners into escort carriers (Chuyo, Taiyo, Unyo, Kaiyo, Shinyo), plus a sub depot ship (renamed Ryuho) and two seaplane tenders into light carriers (Chiyoda, Chitose).
The conversion of the Ise took 7 months, and the Hyuga took 5 months.
It takes much longer to build an escort carrier from the keel up. (The US broke all kinds of records in ship building speed, but Japan had a skilled labor shortage, as well as a limited number of slipways.) In addition, it takes much more steel (which Japan was somewhat hurting for) for a “new build” than it would for a conversion.
The Japanese task force that came through the San Bernardino Strait consisted of 4 battleships (including Yamato), seven cruisers, and eleven destroyers. Against them was US Taffy 3, which had three destroyers, four destroyer escorts as well as six escort carriers. None of the US ships could be considered to be well-armored. Further, Taffy 3 was tasked with supporting ground operations on Leyte, so the planes were loaded with high explosive rather than armor piercing ordnance. The Japanese had no aircraft while the American aircraft were largely ineffectual. Still, the baby flattops launched their planes and tried to flee the scene. The tin cans threw up a smoke screen and fought a delaying action.
The escort carrier USS Gambier Bay was sunk, two other carriers were heavily damaged as well as a destroyer and a destroyer escort. You already know what happened to the Johnston and Samuel B. Robert; the destroyer USS Hoel suffered the same fate. The carrier USS St. Lo would later be lost to kamikaze attack by land-based aircraft; another carrier would also be damaged. The Japanese lost three cruisers, with three more heavily damaged. If the Japanese hadn’t withdrawn, they could have completely obliterated the American task force.
My reference is The Battle of Leyte Gulf by Thomas J Cutler. It’s an extremely well-written account of the entire naval action.
Well, not after they’d tried operating carriers with two pairs of 8" turrets on board and found that they sucked, big-time…