Well, I guess he was correct. There wasn’t a single civilian casualty. There were multiple civilian casualties.
Do you have a cite? I’ve never heard that mitigating civilian casualties was a factor in the Japanese planning.
Bolding mine; not true baby. From FDR on down American anti-imperialism influenced their policy in the Pacific and Europe. On British India, FDR said to Churchill “I can’t believe that we can fight a war against fascist slavery, and at the same time not work to free people all over the world from a backward colonial policy?” and told his son Elliot “I’ve tried to make it clear to Winston - and the others - that, while we’re their allies and in it to victory by their side, they must never get the idea that we’re in it just to help them hang on to the archaic, medieval Empire ideas.”
The SEAC - South East Asian Command - was not so affectionately nicknamed ‘Save England’s Asian Colonies’ by Americans who bristled at the idea that lives were being spent to keep Burma British.
The slur of choice by White Americans during the Philippine-American War was “nigger.”
The reasons why Americans chose particular slurs for particular people were not based on citable and verifiable facts, but on public perceptions. This topic’s premise is why Americans used a certain epithet for certain people, and that question cannot be answered by nitpicking historical minutiae that the people had no knowledge of.
I did not know this. Thanks?
Cite, perhaps? If it has already been given, I missed it.
No discussion of this sort can be complete without considering the word “slope”, which is what the more bigoted folk I served with in the 60s called the Japanese.
In this thread the only “people” who are unaware of history seems to be you.
Conflating Japanese and Filipinos and believing them to be ethnically identical is preposterous no matter what word you use.
No they were not.
You have your facts wrong because you claimed the Pearl Harbor fleet was enforcing a nonexistent blockade, claimed there were NO civilian casualties at Pearl Harbor, and a variety of other absurdities.
No problem. It seems I was mistaken in memory. There were two insults: nigger and gu-gu.
Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines …
By Paul A. Kramer. 128.
I’d never have conceived of the n-name being applied in the bad old days, to an East Asian people – not from any lack of contempt from whites toward such folk (and they had plenty of other opprobrious names to hand): had just imagined that it was thought not to be “a good fit”. I learn otherwise, here.
Thoughts drawn irresistibly to a series of novels which I greatly love: George MacDonald Fraser’s Flashman ones. Although the author claimed not actually to approve of most of the actions and attitudes of his appalling (though slightly likeable) anti-hero, I suspect that he enjoyed slyly being extremely politically incorrect in his writings – with the get-out, that he was recording the words of his creation Harry Flashman: who holds the standard set of assumptions of most nineteenth-century Englishmen, and in addition glories in being an utterly nasty arsehole, at which project he works diligently and lovingly.
Flashman’s supposedly-own words in the novels, suggest that in his scheme of things: all humans on earth who are not white-Caucasian, Oriental, or Native American, are classed as and referred to by him, as niggers. Going by content of the books, it would appear likely that the Philippines are one of the rather few parts of the world which “Flashy” did not get to in his very long, and chequered, career. If circumstances had taken him there, no doubt he would have been pleased to come upon yet another indigenous people to whom he could apply his beloved six-letter word…
I had previously been under the impression that “Gook” came from the Korean War, but evidently that’s not the case. As some linguistic trivia, the Korean word for “American” is “Miguk”, pronounced “Me Gook”. Coincidence is a heck of a weird thing.
Also, a major reason for basing the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii was to allow a faster response time if the Japanese (or presumably some other uppity foreign power, but the Japanese were the threat du jour) decided to attack the Philippine Islands, which were a commonwealth (read: colony) of the United States and pretty much the crown jewel of the nation’s overseas possessions (it helps that we wrested control of it through two previous wars, first with the Spanish imperialists and the then with the Filipinos who refused to accept our benevolent imperialism). The idea that the Japanese (or anyone) might launch a major naval attack on Hawaii from such a long distance was considered unlikely because of the risk and logistics involved. As it happened, the Japanese elected to go all in and attacked US forces in both the PI and Hawaii, followed by an invasion of the Philippines.
Having had the feasibility of a long-distance carrier strike demonstrated for our benefit, we decided to do a similar (but smaller and materially less effective) raid on mainland Japan a few months later.
Also, I’d argue that the Japanese not dropping many bombs on civilian targets in Hawaii had less to do with their concern for civilian casualties (nobody in WWII demonstrated any concern for such things, and the Japanese were not an exception to that), but more to due with the limited payloads of carrier-born bombers compared to heavier land-based bombers. Why waste your bomb on Honolulu when you could drop it on the USS Arizona?
I think you mean “I was wrong but don’t want to admit it, so let’s get back on topic.”
It was a political move specifically to increase the pressure on Japan. The war plans in place called for the forces in the PI to hole up and let the US build up forces and then attack. One problem which occurred was that the US started to change the plans and build up forces in the Pacific, but the forces were not going to be ready until '42.
Yes, everyone grossly underestimated the Japan military abilities, and no one really thought that PH would be attacked. Everyone was expecting the attack to come to the PI, which makes Dugout Doug’s response even less understandable.
This exactly. A lot of people (myself included) have said that one of the greatest mistakes Japan made was not taking out the dry dock and submarine facilities, but I’ve read calculation which have shown that their carriers simply could not have carried that many bombs, even had they thought about it.
It certainly wasn’t out of any concern for the Japanese living in Honolulu. The navy attache attacked to the Honolulu consulate, who provided intel and was interned for the duration of the war, said that the internment of the Japanese Americans during the was was ironic because Japan considered them to be untrustworthy as well.
The big mystery has always been why the Japanese Navy didn’t bomb the huge fuel depot.
With that fuel, and related infrastructure, destroyed, the USN would have been far more crippled than it was. Imagine having to fuel a fleet in the far Pacific, from ports on the mainland.
Not part of the plan for attacks 1 &2 and there was so much more glory in sinking a battleship.
And, the idea was to shock America into giving up. Some Imperial leaders actually thought if they hit us hard enough we would just say “oops, sorry about those trade restrictions” and roll over.
True, I think there’s some secret that Dugout Doug and FDR carried to their graves.
Yes, it wasnt about sparing civilians- it was about the shock & awe of sinking battleships.
Just as a bit of trivia, aside from the lovely appellation “goo-goo” which morphed into “gook” sometime after or during the war, another thing to come out of the Philippine-American War was the ubiquitous American military sidearm of the 20th century, the .45 M1911. The .45 was developed specifically because the pistols in use at the time were found lacking in stopping power particularly against Moro guerillas that had a habit of attacking at night hopped up on drugs. The Philippine-American War officially only lasted from 1899-1902; the Moro Rebellion continued until 1913.
They’re still having some problems in that part of the Philippines to this day, though I don’t know if it’s been more or less constant or just an off-and-on thing.
Pretty much this. Or in greater detail:
It’s actually not that big of a surprise.
For the Japanese, they simply were calculating that they could win the war quickly.
Their objectives were to “destroy” the Pacific fleet;* invade Hong Kong and Singapore to drive out the British and to allow them to attack the DEI; invade PI to remove the US from the area, protect their shipping lanes and allow them to attack the DEI from the east as well**; and then capture British bases and other islands in the South Pacific to allow them to create an impenetrable defensive ring.
They believed that the US would rush in to save the PI, they could further destroy the USN and when the US would see that defeat was inevitable, rather than wait to rebuild, the US would sue for peace. It worked really well during the Russo-Japanese War, so why not now.
When the US placed the oil embargo on Japan in response to their invasion of Indochina, it started the countdown to war. The IJN only had a (IIRC) two-year peace-time supply of oil. The longer they postponed war, the worse off they were. The Midway operation burned up a peace-time year’s worth of fuel.
People argue that Japan would have been better off simply attacking DEI, but that really was untenable. They needed to go through British colonies to get there.
The US was undergoing its largest peace-time military buildup in anticipation of war, Roosevelt had warned Japan that the US would act in defense of other countries, and the US was sending its ships to the areas where there would be conflict. Back in early 1941, the US ambassador to Japan was warning that local commanders could take moves which would drag the US into war.
The worst possible situation for Japan would be for them to attack Malay, Singapore and Hong Kong, get the DEI and leave the Philippines alone. One or two years later and the US would be able to crush the IJN, strangle the oil and attack the homeland from thousands of miles closer.
The imperial military planner never believed that it would be a protracted war. As one of the IJN officers said afterward that they never considered attacking the oil farm because they weren’t thinking that far ahead.
On the US side, an attack on the oil storage tanks wouldn’t have been that bad. The Japanese planes were not using armor piercing rounds on their machine guns so they couldn’t have simply shot them up. As with the other facilities, they didn’t have sufficient bombs to destroy them.
The US was building a secret underground storage facility and using tankers, they could have gotten by.
Notes:
*There were differences in opinion in the objective of attacking the US fleet. While Admiral Yamamoto is credited with the foresight of understanding the importance of naval air power, he still believed that sinking the battleships would do more to crush the US will. As a veteran of the Russo-Japanese War, he was a firm believer in the “decisive victory” (kantai sessen) strategy, in line with the influential navel thinker, Alfred Mahan, which called for defeating the opponent’s battleships in one shot.
The younger officer who did the actual planning was more concerned about the US carriers and devoted proportionally more resources to them.
**As was typical within the imperial armed forces, there was little agreement between the branches. The IJA wanted to invade the DEI through Malaysia and the IJN through the PI. The army was able to obtain oil from Manchuria sufficient for its limited needs. The navy required much more, and was charged with the defense of the country, so they were more concerned about the US, its rival for power in the Pacific.
They compromised and did both.