Question: could some of the USN air raids on Japanese forces have been considered vaguely comparable to kamikaze attacks? I was under the impression (which may be wrong, which is why I’m asking) that at some points the chances of surviving an attack on Japanese carriers in a dive bomber or torpedo bomber were miniscule.
The closest we came to that sort of thing were the initial torpedo attacks on the Japanese at Midway. Even there, however, while the known risk was high, the intent was to inflict damage and return. The fact that the torpedo bombers (both carrier-based and land-based) took such horrible losses had more to do with an inability to provide air cover using fighters (as the carrier divisions got separated in the clouds and the fighters at Midway were needed for air defense) than an actual intent to sacrifice the planes and their crews. Every bomber that released at its target at least attempted to return home.
Ironically, for the purposes of this discussion, there was at least one incident at Midway of a reported American suicide attack. Marine Capt. Richard Fleming was hit by Antiaircraft fire as he attacked the Mikuma and he crashed into a gun turret. He was awarded the Medal of Honor, posthumously, for that action.
I believe there were also cases of American carrier pilots knowingly continuing their mission even though they had exceeded the the amount of fuel they needed to return to their ship. Admittedly, no American pilots were intentionally sent on such a mission, but the idea of self-sacrifice was there.
Many people fail to appreciate how heavy the casualty rate was during WWII. I don’t have the exact figures in front of me, but I’d be willing to bet an average American infantry division in combat had an annual casualty rate of over 100%. I know there were divisions fighting in western Europe that had casualty rates of over 200% between D-Day and VE-Day. Facing those kind of numbers, an American infantryman who was serving for the duration of the war had to figure he wasn’t too far from being on a suicide mission.
I’ll admit I have no raw numbers to support it, but I disagree. Although certainly not pleasantly low, American casualties were pretty light in Europe. Certainly I don’t think they were losing as many men as they originally had in the unit.
Anyway, one thing I’m wondering, despite all of the Kamikaze attacks, were they really successful? Don’t tell me the Japanese took down this ship or that one, tell me about the numbers.
From what I understand, the Kamikaze’s weren’t very effective. The damage could be pretty bad, bu very rarely took a vessel out of service for any appreciable length of time. Moreover, the Japs (their WWII American style-nickname for those not in the know) lost a fully trained pilot and lost valuable planes.
OK, I may have answered my own question with Truth Seeker’s link.
Was it worth is though? They took out a number of smaller carriers, but failed to make any lsting impact on the US fleet. Moreover, they lost an enormous reserve of skill and expertise: might they have held out longer had the Japanese used their resources more effectively?
This is not quite true. Kamikaze pilots were just hastily trained and the planes were mostly obsolete and couldn’t compare with those the US were flying. Japan’s war had caused a dearth of experienced pilots as well as a shortage of up-to-date aircraft. Experienced pilots were killed due to their obsolete aircraft, and the constant bombing of Japan made it almost impossible for them to come up with planes that could handle the USAF competently.
Over 100%? 200%? How can you kill more men in a unit than really exist?
On D-day, the casualties were lighter than expected overall. Of course the landing troops had no way of knowing what to expect and there cetainly was plenty of blood spilled.
The only beach where high casualties were suffered was Omaha Beach where there were some 3,000 casualties. (See http://www.schooltours.co.uk/dday2.html ). I don’t know what that was as a percentage - although things were clearly very bad for the first wave - I dont think that it would have been as high as 75% killed. If you want to find very high casualty figures, you will probably have to look the the airborne operations. I am sure that I read somewhere that for an infantry unit in France/Germany after D-day, the overall average casualty rate was 1%. In any event, the point is that the commanders and there men had no intention of going on suicide missions - even though they accepted huge risks.
Overall, the Western allies had casualty rates that were much lower than the other nations in WWI (see http://bss.sfsu.edu/tygiel/Hist427/texts/wwiicasualty.htm)
Little Nemo referred to an annual casulty rate of over 100%, meaning that a 10,000 man division would experience more than 10,000 killed and wounded in a year. They would be replaced throughout the year, so the division would continue to exist, with a lot of new guys.
That number does sound a little high to me.
In The Mighty Eighth by Gerald Astor, the comment is made that early in the air war over Europe (1942), the 8th Air Force’s casualty and replacement rates were so high that the number of replacements brought in to fill combat losses equalled the number of personnel in the 8th if you added up all replacements every four months or so. That would be a 400% annual casualty rate. Luckily, this situation persisted for less than a year and was improved by better tactics and escort aircraft with longer range.
Also note (IIRC) that “casualty” = killed, wounded, captured, or missing; not just killed. So a casualty rate of 100% doesn’t necessarily equate to a suicide mission, but it does mean that 100% of your personnel will not be fit for combat again, one way or another.
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…and the average Japanese soldier would rather have died than surrender, …
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I’ve read, but have no cite, that Japanese actually surrendered easily when allowed. They just weren’t allowed to because of the way they treated allied prisoners caused allied soldiers to seek revenge or not think of surrender as an option. I would never surrender means that you don’t think of the enemy surrendering.
Any validity to this?
Bushido was the Japanese warrior code that had grown up with the samuri, and was a persistent influence in Japanese military culture up through the end of WWII. Loyalty and obligation to duty were fundamental parts of this warrior code of conduct. The Baka bombs have already been mentioned, but for your additional consideration you might look at the Japanese POW uprising at Cowra or consider the final mission of the superbattleship Yamato as described by Russell Spurr in A Glorious Way to Die. Briefly, the POWs at Cowra were not thought to have serious hope of making it back to their forces but had a need to atone for being captured, and the entire complement of the Yamato knew they were on a hopeless, suicidal endeavor, but to die for the emperor made one’s life complete.
My figures, while admittedly based on my memory, were from Citizen Soldiers by Stephen Ambrose. Unfortunately, I don’t have access to my copy, but it’s a popular book and I’m sure someone here can find the table I saw.
It took me longer to log in than it did to find these figures, but here you are:
Casualty rates for six “typical” American infantry divisions in the North-West European theater.
2nd Infantry Division
Days in Combat: 303 days
Casualties
Killed: 2,999
Wounded: 10,924
Missing: 109
Captured: 1,034
Battle Casualties: 15,066
Non-Battle Casualties: 10,818
Total Casualties: 25,884
Casualty Percentage
of Total Strength: 183.7%
78th Infantry Division
Days in Combat: 125 days
Casualties
Killed: 1,547
Wounded: 5,958
Missing: 371
Captured: 14
Battle Casualties: 7,890
Non-Battle Casualties: 4,367
Total Casualties: 12,257
Casualty Percentage
of Total Strength: 87.0%
99th Infantry Division
Total Days in Combat: 151 days
Casualties
Killed: 1,130
Wounded: 3,954
Missing: 421
Captured: 598
Total Battle Casualties: 6,103
Non-Battle Casualties: 5,884
Total Divisional Casualties: 11,987
Casualty Percentage
of Total Strength: 85.1%
1st Infantry Division
Days in Combat: 292 days
Casualties
Killed: 1,973
Wounded: 11,448
Missing: 951
Captured: 631
Battle Casualties: 15,003
Non-Battle Casualties: 14,002
Total Casualties: 29,005
Casualty Percentage
of Total Strength: 205.9%
29th Infantry Division
Days in Combat: 242 days
Casualties
Killed: 3,720
Wounded: 15,403
Missing: 462
Captured: 526
Battle Casualties: 20,111
Non-Battle Casualties: 8,665
Total Casualties: 28,776
Casualty Percentage
of Total Strength: 204.2%
104th Infantry Division
Total Days in Combat: 178 days
Casualties
Killed: 1,294
Wounded: 5,305
Missing: 385
Captured: 27
Total Battle Casualties: 7,011
Non-Battle Casualties: 6,396
Total Divisional Casualties: 13,407
Casualty Percentage
of Total Strength: 95.1%
Casualty Statistics From: ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY WORLD WAR II EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, US ARMY Center for Military History.
I’ve read, but have no cite, that Japanese actually surrendered easily when allowed. They just weren’t allowed to because of the way they treated allied prisoners caused allied soldiers to seek revenge or not think of surrender as an option. I would never surrender means that you don’t think of the enemy surrendering.
Any validity to this? **
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They certainly didn’t surrender easily on Iwo Jima. Small groups of soldiers holed up in caves would refuse to surrender and occasionally shoot at the US Marines until the marines finally had to use flamethrowers to eliminate them. Many Japanese officers committed suicide rather than surrender, and many of their troops made suicidal charges at superior numbers of American troops in order to die fighting. Japanese civilians (including women clutching babies to their chests) threw themselves off cliffs into the sea despite the pleas of the Marines to surrender rather than die needlessly - I’ve seen the films and they make for disturbing viewing. Even the History Channel doesn’t show them very often.
Granted, many Japanese soldiers would have surrendered and were prevented by their officers from doing so. Many others refused to even consider surrender, and a (very) few continued to refuse to surrender right up into the 1970’s. Here’s the first cite Google gave me: (yeah, I know, but I don’t feel like messing with the HTML right now) http://history1900s.about.com/library/weekly/aa120700a.htm
This becomes somewhat more understandable if one realizes that many, many Japanese civilians did not consider surrender a fate better than death – and not because of some foreign mindset, but because they sincerely believed that they would be brutally tortured and raped by Allied soldiers if they surrendered.
And wouldn’t this be thanks to the Japanese gov’t’s own propaganda? (If not awareness of how their own soldiers had behaved in China . . . but then again, they probably weren’t aware of that . . .)
It is worth mentioning, I think, in reference to the OP, that my ‘uncle-in-law’ served in the US Navy in WW II and said that a kamikaze they pulled out of the water was stoned out of his mind.
Well yes, of course, but I don’t see why that would make the behavior of Japanese civilians any less understandable. If anything, it should make it more so – they believed what their government told them, as most citizens of most nations tend to do.