Why were PT boats not more dangerous to big warships?

They were made out of plywood. Plys of mahogany. Not manufactured sheets of plywood.

[nitpick]The movie is called They were expendable [/nitpick]

Maybe he was in it. Conjugation, you know :slight_smile:

Taking a longer view, PT boats were an evolution of the torpedo boats that had been developed from the late 19th century onwards. An effective counter had already been developed back then - the ‘torpedo-boat destroyer’, designed to be swift and powerful enough with its guns to pick off the torpedo boats before they could be a menace to the capital ships. It’s was no accident that the ‘PT boat versus destoyer’ scenario plays out as mlees describes above - the destroyer was specifically designed for just that situation.

Robert Montgomery’s character was based on William Bulkeley who was awarded the Medal of Honor. He also evacuated MacArthur, led the small boats during Normandy and as an Admiral commanded Gitmo during the height of tensions with Castro. A remarkable man.

Thank you for explaining. I read the above post and was horrified–imaging plywood I might use as the primary building material.

What about using PT boats in combined arms battles? Sure they might get turned into driftwood by themselves, but combined with other assets might be a force multiplier, particularly in night battles.

i’m surprised the Japanese didnt do this more- they had the excellent long lance torpedo, which had exceptional range.

Any navy that had the resources to do so would invest in capital ships. PT boats were useful in a certain niche but they were used primarily because they were what we had right then and there.

As mentioned upthread, the PT boats were fuel hogs. The US was never seriously short of petroleum, and only transiently short on refined fuel or the ability to ship it to where it was needed. Japan could not say the same.

And while this would need better analysis, I can’t help but think that Japan’s cultural attitudes toward war hindered their following a dispassionate cost/benefit strategy. The Japanese war mythos was that of the Heroic Sacrifice, the attack that although suicidal would inflict such crippling losses on the enemy that the defenders would be redeemed in death. A bean-counter strategy of ignobly adjusting your tactics to win by losing less than the enemy simply wasn’t part of the mindset.

Crappy torpedoes.

The Japanese never went through World War 1 like the western powers did. The Japanese army was essentially a pre-WW1 army and their tactic was little more than “everyone fix bayonets and run at the enemy screaming”. This worked better than anyone expected against isolated British and Dutch colonial outposts in the jungle and panicky Chinese, but even then units of better trained and equipped (by the Germans) Nationalist Chinese often got the better of them. When the experienced, battle hardened Japanese army first encountered the green, untested Americans at Guadalcanal they were massacred almost to the last man, even when the Japanese had air and naval superiority. In 1945 there were 1.3 million Japanese troops defending Manchuria, the Red Army crushed them utterly beneath the tracks of their IS-2s and T34s in 2 weeks.

It’s worth mentioning that the Soviets had easily manhandled the most elite Japanese troops, the Kwangtung Army, in 1939 at the Battle of Khalkhin Gol. Although ably led by Zhukov, who would go on to win four Hero of the Soviet Union awards and, notably, finish fourth in the Straight Dope’s prestigious Greatest Military Leader Elimination Game, these were indeed the 1939 Soviets, plagued by purged leadership and inferior equipment, not yet the titans of war they would become by 1943-45. And yet they smashed the Japanese lopsidedly.

The only time that I can think of where PT boats went up against capital ships was The Battle of Surigao Strait. 39 PT boats were the first part of the gauntlet Nishimura’s Southern Force of 2 old battleships, a heavy cruiser and four destroyers had to run. They attacked over the course of three and a half hours scoring no hits; their primary contribution to the battle was providing spotting reports of the Japanese ships as they made their way up the Strait. The destroyers forming the next line of the gauntlet were much more successful with their torpedo runs, the battleship Fuso broke in two and sank from torpedo hits. Nishimura’s flagship Yamashiro was also hit but able to continue, although apparently nobody bothered to inform him that the Fuso had gone under; he continued to issue orders to her thinking she was still in column behind him.

I believe this was played out in the Russo-Japanese War 1905. Both sides used PT boats and lost some ships to torpedoes, but they were not the deciding factor. PTs are basically an ambush predator, but the prey has long range arms.

The Italians had pretty good results with torpedo boats in WWI, sinking the Austro-Hungarian Szent István and Wien. The Italians also sank the Viribus Unitis with hand-attached limpet mines, in their quest to rid the world of ships with hard-to-pronounce names.

/golf clap

The last operating PT boatis just up the road in Portland, Oregon.

PT boats were not made of plywood. Hulls were double planked mahogany first layer was 1/4" next layer was 7/16" a muslin fabric was placed between layers. They used mk13 torpedoes first fired from launchers then converted to roll off type. Of the 600 plus US PT boats 0nly 99 were lost during WWII. PT boats operated not unlike airplanes. due to fuel consumption 198 gal.per hr cruising and 500 gal hr full speed
they carried 3000 gal aviation gas. do the math limited range. Their draft was less than 4’ so they operated in shallow water. This enabled them to devastate supply and transport barges used by the japs. PT boats operated at night there was no bright work on them so no need to varnish. Most were painted Green with red below the water line. Rot was not a problem as they were not in service long enough to rot.

It is a strong method of construction, really an early form of composite material. A lot of aircraft were made out of plywood at the time also, particularly Russian and German aircraft. Several of theses aircraft were actually more resistant to battle damage than aluminum construction in many ways.

It had its disadvantages, one being durability. Although thousands of the very successful La-5 were made hardly any still exist. Aircraft left exposed to the elements tended to rot away after the war. It was also heavier than stressed skin aluminum construction. Several successful designs were converted to aluminum for weight savings as resources became more available to the winning side.

Zombie.

I’d like to see a movie about zombie PT crewman arising form the dead to wreak havoc on an unsuspecting shipfull of Japanese tourists.

One simply cannot discuss the mentality of the IJN and IJA together. They were entirely different creatures, with differing objectives, strategies and mindsets.

The IJN was overwhelmingly committed to it’s version of Mahan’s naval doctrines, the kantei kessen (decisive battle) strategy in which battleships duke it out at high noon. The IJN fleet was designed around this strategy, and anticipated that its submarines would first attack, followed by land and carrier based aircraft, and finally night torpedo attacks by cruisers and destroyers could chip away at the US fleet, allowing the final battle to occur about when they had achieved rough parity.

While a Japanese version of a PT boat is interesting to contemplate, at first glance I’m struggling to see where it could have been utilized effectively. One advantage would have been their superior torpedo, much faster and more effective, but a weapon they failed to utilize its advantages fully in that they did not attempt to direct their submarines against US supply ships.