Why would the Nord Stream pipelines have been sabotaged?

I am afraid you are confused about how the EU works, which is normal, as it is very complicated. The EU and the USA are not comparable at all in their respective law adopting mechanisms. The EU does not pass any laws, they adopt directives that have to be transposed into national law (by the member’s Parliaments) or regulations, which are immediately applicable from the entry into force, but are not so much laws as rather administrative in nature. This is a very simplified version, I know, but any more details would be hijacking. Suffice to say you are wrong.

There is a lot of speculation going on and very little knowledge, but I would be very surprised if what you imply was true. The EU sabotaging those pipelines is absurd on many levels. Time will tell, of course, and I am ready to eat my words should I be wrong. But then the EU would have made a colossal mistake.

Ehhh… it’s indisputably true that loss of NordStream benefits Ukraine more than anyone else. But it’s also true if Ukraine were exposed as the saboteur, it would harm them like it would harm no other country. Europe and the US might scale back their support, it would damage their international credibility as the “good guy”.

This was done by an actor who stood to gain from the sabotage, and nothing to lose by being exposed as the culprit.

Putin had this done to prevent any potential internal rivals from undermining him. He doesn’t want Gazprom or any other oligarchs from cutting a deal that might end up with Putin falling out the 3rd and 8th story windows.

Radio Free Europe, for what it’s worth…

NATO, EU Say Gas Pipeline Leaks Are ‘Sabotage,’ But Stop Short Of Pointing Finger At Russia

What’s the effect of gas on marine life?

It wouldn’t take nearly that much, if you used it intelligently, and plenty of explosives and other destructively-energetic chemicals are very easy to make or otherwise obtain.

Which also means that every economic side-effect also affects them. There are doubtless many industries that will be hurt by the loss of these pipes, and Vanguard owns a big chunk of them, too. Will the net effect be positive or negative? Only a fool would be confident of the answer to that.

To me, I think the big question is, why now? Anyone who’s capable of doing this now (and there are many) was also capable of doing it in February. Whatever the motive was, it must account not just for why it was done, but why it wasn’t done sooner. Which does seem to make that other pipeline opening up seem relevant.

Yeah. This is basically noise to Vanguard investors.

Why? A country being unfairly attacked strikes back at dormant but valuable infrastructure without hurting any people. Who’s going to declare, “Attrocity! From decent society you will be banished!” I can’t see anyone in America caring if Ukraine attacked the pipeline. Some people in Europe will be disappointed but they will have to explain why since their public policy is basically, “we won’t be taking gas from that pipeline.”

I agree. The pipes have already been disabled. Everyone has adjusted already. Outside of Orban or someone like that, I don’t think anyone’s been expecting it to ever come back anytime in the next few years.

I’ll have to disagree with that.

  1. That attack is not harmless. In the event it seems no lives have been lost, but the leaks might have sunk (by loss of buoyancy) or caused to explode unlucky vessels. The estimate of the greenhouse impact due to methane I have read is ‘one third of the yearly AGW impact of Denmark’.

  2. It was in international waters but in the EEZs of Sweden and Denmark. Not a friendly thing to do to friendly nations.

  3. The closure of NordsStream 1 was by choice of Russia, the closure of NordStream 2 the choice of Germany. Blowing up both serves to take policy options from both. Germany would be OK with taking away policy options from Russia, but blowing up infrastructure in order to take away policy options from Germany would be an unfriendly act, even if Germany has no intention of exercising those policy options.

  4. NordStream 1 is owned by Gazprom (51 %), German companies Wintershall and E.ON Ruhrgas (15.5 % each), Dutch company Gasunie (9 %) and French company Engie (9 %). Insurance will probably not cover acts of war. So it’s an economic blow to German, Dutch and French companies. (NordStream 2 is wholly Russian owned)

  5. The public opinion in Western Europe is not irrelevant. The US is foremost in military support but Ukraine needs Western Europe’s billions of aid to keep the free part of the country operational. The US plans on taking 180k Ukrainian refugees; Germany has already taken 1.1 million. Ukraine is supplied with natural gas from Central and Western Europe (EU countries have invested much this last decade in making pipelines reversible). At present and since 2015 Ukraine comsumes Russian gas laundered through the books of Western and Central European companies (which makes Ukraine decrying them buying Russian gas just a bit hypocritical); when the consumption of Russian gas in Europe is wholly drawn down Ukraine needs European-sourced gas. It is not a good idea for Ukraine to commit acts of war against any European countries.

Well, they can have very temporary access to high explosives when French Intelligence plants it on one of their ships. Sinking of Rainbow Warrior.

Channei 4 news in this country ran a piece last night pointing out the coincidence with the opening of the Baltic Pipeline as noted above on this thread, a coincidence not only of timing but also of geography. It might have been meant as a marker: " We can cut off not only our supplies to you, but others’ as well".

And a PS: the USSR did occupy Bornholm for a period at the end of WW2, and for somewhat longer than just removing the occupying German forces. It also subsequently made clear it had a strategic interest in Bornholm not housing troops from other NATO countries:

  1. NordStream has been the centerpiece of Germany’s energy strategy for the past 20-30 years. They pinned all their hopes on it, and Germany’s economy tends to be the anchor of the EU. Now it is gone.
  2. Ukraine’s survival now depends in large part on begging help from Europe in the forms of weapons aid and financial aid. This has already been a slow, uphill slog, hampered by every small snag in international diplomacy.

Irrelevant theatrics aside, it’s fairly obvious that the slow, fragile process of Europe providing weapons to Ukraine would be at serious risk if Ukraine were shown to be behind the saboteur. Hence, although Ukraine stands to gain most from this action, Ukraine also has the most to lose from doing so.

At this point it’s hard to describe Putin’s purpose as anything resembling “gains”… his only viable strategies now are loss avoidance and risk mitigation. By destroying the pipe, he ties up a loose end that internal rivals (maybe Gazprom) could use to cut deals behind his back. He eliminates the any real hope Russians have to restoring the economic status quo anytime soon. While his hand is hidden, he benefits from the chaos and finger-pointing. If he’s revealed, it’s no great shakes to him, he’s already gone all in destroying international norms. But it will never be satisfactorily revealed, since in our era of fake news, there’s no shortage of ways to sow doubt and deflect blame, and no shortage of rubes willing to swallow and amplify such stories.

The saboteur was of course Putin loyalists typing up any loose ends that his internal rivals could use to cut a deal with Europe. The risk/reward equation doesn’t work for anyone else.

According to this article, the blast was estimated by seismologists at 100kg equivalent of TNT. I’ve seen 300kg from other sources but let’s go with 100kg.

link

Unless you can prove that Greens have expertise, experience, and intent in fabricating the equivalent of 100kg of TNT, and mounting an undersea demo operation at 100 meter depths, this is pure fantasy. It’s not their MO, it’s not something they’re known for, it’s not expertise they’re known to have.

You are clutching your pearls about the loss of imaginary ships during a war when actual people are dying and millions are becoming refugees. Let me just say that I don’t think the broader European community shares your particular concern.

Its a pretty trivial incursion in the scheme of war and they may not have objected.

You’ve articulated clearly why some Europeans will be annoyed, which I concede, but the pipelines were not transporting any gas and there was some likelihood they wouldn’t ever have transported gas again. Most of the value you are citing was already lost.

But it’s obvious that Putin’s actions meant Germany was rethinking this strategy of “pinning all their hopes” on Russian gas (which was an overstatement to begin with). Yes, Ukraine’s strategy absolutely relies on the friendliness and cooperation of European allies. I just disagree that this pipeline blowing up is going to meaningfully threaten diplomatic relations with any of them.

My understanding is they had already done so, or were well on the way. Nordstream 2 never came into use, and Nordstream 1 had been cut back quite dramatically anyway.

I’m not talking diplomatic relations, I’m talking military aid, to Ukraine. This process has already been painfully slow and labor-intensive. Especially from Germany, which obviously doesn’t want to be involved, and has only done so in response to shaming and cajoling by other members of NATO.

However you assess the risk of Germany cutting off weapons shipments… would Ukraine see any benefit in jeopardizing that? Especially given that the pipelines were idle and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future? Whether the pipes are on or off, Ukraine needs weapons and foreign backing. They wouldn’t risk this for anything.

The military assistance Ukraine receives will be based in large measure on the diplomatic relations they have. We disagree about Ukraine whether blowing up the pipeline was a risk to those relationships. I’m not certain it was. I don’t know whether Ukraine, Russia, the US, or some other party did this but if it is later revealed to be Ukraine, I predict the response will largely be shrugged shoulders with maybe some grumbling by Germany.

The big problem with this theory is, it demonstrates far more competence on the part of the Russians than they’ve shown in any other part of this war.

It’s a very common error to look at Russia’s failures of maneuver warfare and assume that those failures apply to other modes of warfare that don’t have the same risks and challenges. See also “Russia’s nukes probably don’t work.”

For some time, the Americans have been pre-releasing possible Russians plans to pop a nuke or cause some mass-casualty false-flag attack. The idea would be to cause a shock to allow everyone to back down.

I wonder if this pipeline attack is an attempt at something along those lines.