The American people have no moral obligation to sacrifice themselves for the sake of some minor powers on the Baltic. If it’s perceived to be in our geopolitical interest, we’ll do it. If it’s not, we’ll find a way out of it.
We’re not bound to do anything.
The point of the alliance is mutural defense against attackers. If you are uncertain on this, it may explain why your understanding of events differ so much from everyone elses.
I must have missed the part where Georgia and Ukraine joined NATO? The bit where NATO countries made treaties to defend them?
Do you understand wht I am trying to communicate when I say that the situations are not even remotly equivalent? That trying to reason based on the assumtion “This is going to proceed exactly like it did in Georgia and Ukraine” is going to lead your reasoning seriously astray?
So can the UK. So can France. South Africa, Iran and Israle are a way down that road as well. And even North Sodding Korea. It is no longer a mark of being a superpower. Hell, that pegs Russia exactly at the level of the UK militarily. If nukes get involved, both can obliterate the other.
The problem with this imaginative scenario is it requires a Russian invasion to work. Without Russian troops in the country holding guns to their heads, the Estonians aren’t going to feel the need to submit to Russian demands. And keeping the Russians from invading is what NATO is all about.
Let me repeat. You’re wrong. Completely 100% wrong.
Uhm. I think you’ve failed to understand what the words “international treaty” and “alliance” mean.
On a different note, I think we’re underestimating the importance of the Baltic countries.
Again, how is this not applicable to all alliances? Whomdo the American people have a moral obligation to fight for?
Russian invasion? No. “Self-defense paramilitary formations” from Estonian citizens. Wink wink.
“The Estonians”? Look at Narva. 95% Russian-speakers, 80% ethnic Russians, and only 40% or so Estonian citizens. And that’s just one place. There are more.
“Imaginative”? Doesn’t require much imagination, since it just now played out.
Not that I’m any sort of expert here, but I tend to be sympathetic to the OP’s position. I doubt if at this time Putin has a plan mapped out for reconquering the old Soviet/Russian Empire, but I think he would be happy to do it, and if events unfolded such as allowed him to do it, he would. So if an opportunity arises to take a step in that direction, he takes it. And if another opportunity arises to take another step he takes that too. And if, after several small steps, his assessment of NATO/Western resolve changes in light of their reaction to his earlier moves, then his subsequent moves would reflect this new assessment.
On another note, I’m surprised that no one has raised - and my apologies if someone has and I missed it - Western European reliance on Russian energy. This has, from what I’ve read, seriously impacted their ability to impose serious sanctions on the Russians, and one would expect that it would continue to be a hindrance.
WADR, it’s your comparison which is laughable.
I imagine everyone agrees that NATO cares more about Latvia than about Mali. But the difference in the cost of confronting the Malians versus confronting the Russians is off the scale.
A lot of people care quite a lot about North Korea, but all sorts of nations who have shown a willingness to get heavily involved in less critical situation shy away from confronting them.
It cuts both ways, but it’s not exactly the same cut.
The idea is that Putin might make the assessment that the risk of nuclear holocaust resulting from annexing these various states is low enough that he could take the risk. By contrast, NATO attacking Russia in response would carry a much higher likelihood of large scale and possibly nuclear war.
IOW, Putin and the major Western European States/US would look at it the exact same way. Neither would directly attack the other for fear of massive and possibly nuclear war. But either might take steps that threaten or offend the other, gambling that the other would be afraid to escalate to a direct attack.
An example of the reverse situation might be the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia over Kosovo. The Russians were quite displeased about it, but were unwilling to attack NATO over it. The suggestion here is that the Russians could do the same in reverse.
Estonian state structures are approximately 1734 times more solid than those in Ukraine two months ago. It’s easy to stir trouble in a poor, semi-democratic country that has just seen its president overthrown. Try that in Estonia, and you’re facing a strong, legitimate government where people have comparatively little reason to complain.
Of course. Because those 98% of Crimean residents (you know, the ones that voted to join Russia) were horribly oppressed by the other 2%.
Estonian Russians have a LOT more “reasons to complain” than the Ukrainian ones. In Ukraine, the “oppression” of Russian speakers is mostly Russian propaganda. In Estonia, it has a lot more basis in reality.
Are you ever going to provide a single cite for anything you argue in this thread?
FYI, I believe Terr is - or originally was - a native Russian. So I think he gets a pass on a lot of what may seem to require cites for others.
For what. Oppression of Russian speakers in Estonia? It is common knowledge. I personally think it is justified due to the previous Russification policy. If you insist:
or from Amnesty International: http://report2009.amnesty.org/en/regions/europe-central-asia/estonia
I may well be proven wrong in the coming months, but I just don’t see enough of a ‘push’ factor for Estonian Russians. I can see why people in Crimea would want to join Russia: it meant changing a relatively poor, politically unstable country for a middle-class one. But Estonia is no Ukraine - socially, politically, economically.
It’s easy for me to say, but I’d rather be a Russian in Estonia than a Russian in Russia. And there has to be a ‘critical mass’ of pro-Putin citizens in Estonia in order for annexation to be a possibility
Thank you, but I was really thinking more of your repeated argument that the North Atlantic treaty isn’t worth the paper it is written on.
I suspect we could have a conventional war with Russia without it going nuclear. But it couldn’t be fought on Russian territory. But the decision makers in the West probably would not be willing to fight such a war over the Baltics. In part because they would be afraid it could go nuclear, but also because countries like Germany are much more concerned with their energy bills than they are with protecting the Baltic Republics. For that matter, the American public would not want to go to war over Estonia. But every American President from Truman to Bush II would have fought a war over any NATO member being attacked or asserting Article 5. It’s always been the President’s job to be formidable in the face of Russian aggression even when the people are disinterested. But the current President, I do not believe he would be willing to go to war with Russia over the Baltic Republics.
Article 5 is not automatic, people assume it is, but it isn’t. There are a lot of loop holes that a reticent West could use to escape its NATO treaty obligations, my suspicion personally is that they would use them.
Much of the reporting in the foreign policy press these days indicates that the traditional cabinet ministers in Russia no longer have significant power. Sergei Lavrov was not informed at all of Russia’s invasion of Crimea until after the international press had already started reporting on the story. At several points it’s been obvious the Russian Defense Minister has had minimal involvement with the Crimean action or the build up around Ukraine’s border. Instead, we see a picture of Putin running his own diplomatic game with no input and Putin communicating directly with commanders in theater and not even consulting his defense ministers.
Instead a small group of cronies appear to be the only people giving Putin input, and their input appears to be pure Russian nationalism and backslapping while agreeing with whatever Putin says.
That in itself makes it seem somewhat likely that Putin would try to do something with the Baltics. But I’m not prepared to predict the likelihood of that, I’m just trying to see if it makes sense for Putin to do it. Frankly, I think it does. Whether or not it would be the end of NATO, I don’t know–like I’ve said I think the US and the major Western European powers will always be tight. But it could mean the end of NATO where Russia cares about NATO, which includes countries we’ve developed close relationships with–like Poland.
Like I’ve noted, and as some seem ignorant of in this thread (Strange appears to know the reality), Putin has been investing in a modern military, with lots of specialized training that is perfectly geared for doing an operation like they did in Crimea. Putin has had the wars in Chechnya and South Ossetia/Georgia to learn where his military is weak, and Putin was reportedly unhappy with the Russian military’s performance in both of those conflicts and he’s done basically everything in his power to rectify weaknesses.
It’d be really easy for him to foment some form of rebellion in a Russian enclave in one of the Baltics, using irregulars that he denies are tied to Russia. If a part of the Baltics breaks away and then decides to join Russia, is that a violation of Latvia’s sovereignty? The way it’s supposed to work is if Latvia asserts Article 5 (and I would imagine they would), NATO is supposed to get to work. But NATO’s true powers (the U.S. and Western Europe) could easily look at that situation and say “welllllll, this looks like a domestic problem.” At that point I don’t see NATO membership making any sense for any country east of Germany. Those countries will recognize that in the face of Russian aggression, our words have no meaning. This means they will have to forge their own path. Some countries I suspect would have to capitulate to Russia in some way. Poland has been spending more and more on its military ever year, and if the Baltics fell I think they’d go into overdrive.
I think Poland has already built up a credible deterrence, I doubt they could stop a dedicated Russian invasion but it would be a blood bath, and they have advanced weapon systems that would both kill lots of Russians and destroy lots of expensive Russian equipment. The Poles I also think would not be willing to come to any sort of agreement with the Russians, they’ve been conquered too many times and enslaved by Russians too many times. If Russia wants Poland back it will be required to pay a very heavy blood price. Poland might link up with the Czech Republic and Slovakia in a new Eastern European military alliance designed specifically to limit Russian aggression. Hungary/Romania/Bulgaria, I don’t know. They all spend a very small amount of money on defense and have small military forces. They would probably have to capitulate to Russia in some way, maybe leave the EU even.
But none of that is possible for Russia without cracking up NATO, so to me showing NATO’s toothlessness when it comes to former Warsaw Pact countries would appear to be a win/win for Putin. If I’m Putin I don’t actually see why I don’t give it a go.
I said in case of Estonian territories seceding, “voting” to join Russia and being annexed, it is not worth the paper it is written on. Because US and EU will bend over backwards trying to find a legalistic way to characterize this as something less than an “attack”.
It is an opinion. I guess we will see.
I don’t buy that Stranger’s comments show that Russia is ready for a ground war with NATO; he was talking missile defense which might make them braver back in Moscow but wouldn’t protect their troops. And Russia being prepared for “missions like Crimea” is laughable. They had a massive fucking base in the middle of that country, caught everyone by surprise and met zero resistance. Those circumstances are unlikely to reoccur.
But forgetting all that, this hinges on a weakling American president, by your analysis. So we are going to see a Baltic takeover within the next couple of years then, by your figuring?
I think Putin is of this opinion as well, I am fairly sure you both are flat out wrong. NATO is pledged to maintain the territorial integrity of its own members. This is why I think we are going to have a shooting war, the consequences of no one can know at this point.
Capt
I think the Russians are no more willing to go nuclear apocalypse than the west is. And both parts know that.
The nukes are the only thing about the old Soviet arsenal that were well maintained since the fall of the Soviet Union. They are the guarantee of national survival, not the means of its extinction. There would come a point where the Russians put the nuclear option on the table for the west to see, and that is when a conventional war has come to the point where it threatens national survival.
Then there will be negotiations, and the nukes would be the card that keeps Russia alive as a nation. But both sides will know that a lost war means some losses must be accepted.
Russia will likly end up with some territories carved off, exactly which one will depend on exactly whom is at the other side of the table. Probably lose Baltic access regardless.
The problem is, a number of European countries see NATO as their guarantee of national survival. Thats bigger than energy supplies. The cost of chickening out on that for the US is much larger than the cost of slapping down a mid-level power with delusions of military adequacy. Unless Russia does a zerg-rush with the advantage of surprise, France, the UK and Germany together are capable of wiping the skies and seas of Russian power and then dismatling their infrastructure at leisure from a mile in the sky.
And then some pointed questions would be asked of the “allies” who sat that one out.
The EU has more people than Russia and the US together. Russias economy is the size of Italys, almost exactly. And depends on the EU as a customer to be able to hang. With Italy. Who do you think the US has the most trade with? Who do you think they’d rather piss off?
If there is a cost-benefit analysis, it’ll run: If Russia goes nuclear, its not going to leave off hitting the US in any case. No benefit either way. If Russia does not go nuclear, the EU wipes the floor with them and carves stuff off. No benefit in staying out, big disadvantage. Partciparing means the loss of some war material and soldiers for strategic advantage. A cheap war Russia is bund to lose.
I am somewhat mystified as to why you think the west would take the huge hit of losing NATO and many countries, rather than the smal one of curbstomping Russia?
This is indeed a problem. I think he’ll keep pushing untill someone pushes back. But I think hes still got too much sense to hit NATO.
That is true, but thats not a lot. His economic pee-pee isn’t large enough to make a serious impact on Russias military deficiencies, and hopefully he knows that. But trying to keep up with the military potential of the west is a historic error of theirs. It bakerupted the far more powerful Soviet Union.
Because he’ll be slapped down hard enough to lose domestic credibility and face internal challenges. Militarily, Russia is basically a power on the level of France or the UK. Little bit above them individually, below their total. They can slap around Ukraine like France could slap around Belgium, but they can’t play with the big boy alliances.
Your assumption seems based on a supposed power-level of Russia where breaking them is massivly costly. Like in the days of the Soviet Union. But they’re not there, and they dont have the economy to ever get there.
You also seem to disregard that Putins actions have already given NATO more relevance and importance than its had in 20 years.