The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
The first sentence of the 14th Amendment says:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. [emphasis added]
To hold that the Citizenship Clause confers birthright citizenship on anyone born in the United States is to ignore the phrase “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof”: a selective misreading of plain English. No argument rooted in the Constitution can support automatic birthright citizenship. The only question is how broadly to read the jurisdiction phrase in the Citizenship Clause. Logic, assisted by the Senate floor debate, answers this. The U.S. Supreme Court has since clouded the picture with its relatively few rulings on the Citizenship Clause, but despite what we are often encouraged to believe by some justices and law professors, the Constitution does not mean only what the Supreme Court says it does. Even so, the Court has never held that the Citizenship Clause automatically confers U.S. citizenship on all children born within the territory of the United States.
The Ratification Debate
The 14th Amendment, ratified on July 9, 1868, is the second of the three Reconstruction amendments to the Constitution ratified in the years immediately following Union victory in the War Between the States. A primary concern of the amendment’s proponents was the extension of civil rights to recently freed slaves. Senators feared that state legislatures would assert that, not having been born U.S. citizens, emancipation did not make freedmen citizens of their states (hence of the United States; state citizenship was a prerequisite to U.S. citizenship). To forestall any denial of citizenship to freed blacks and to overturn the Dred Scott decision[iii] explicitly, the 14th Amendment’s proponents introduced the Citizenship Clause.
Nevertheless, they were well aware that a blanket grant of birthright citizenship was not consistent with American tradition and could lead to a demographic transformation in the event of high immigration. To prevent it, the senators included the jurisdiction phrase. The floor debate[iv] reveals their concerns and their views of how far birthright citizenship should extend.
Introducing the proposed amendment, Senator Jacob Merritt Howard of Michigan stated that he believed the Citizenship Clause was “simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already, that every person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to their jurisdiction, is by virtue of natural and national law, a citizen of the United States.” He went on to say specifically whom he considered that natural and national law excluded:
This will not, of course, include persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, who belong to the families of ambassadors or foreign ministers accredited to the Government of the United States, but will include every other class of persons.
The only, tenuous, way to read Senator Howard’s statement to support birthright citizenship for the children of illegal aliens or, indeed, most legally resident aliens is to assume that the only foreigners or aliens he meant are those belonging to the families of diplomats. The simpler reading is to construe the sentence as what it is: a list of excluded categories.
Senator James Doolittle of Wisconsin was troubled by Howard’s language, not because he wanted to find a way to include any foreigners or aliens, but because he wanted to ensure that American Indians remained excluded. Howard (and, ultimately, the Senate) thought Doolittle’s proposed clarification unnecessary. As Howard pointed out:
Indians born within the limits of the United States, and who maintain their tribal relations, are not, in the sense of this amendment, born subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. They are regarded, and always have been in our legislation and jurisprudence, as being quasi-foreign nations.
It is, or should be, clear that language denying citizenship to people born within the United States on the theory that they were subject to ‘quasi-foreign nations’ must exclude the children of people who have broken this country’s laws in entering it, and whose whole allegiance is to entirely foreign nations.
Senator Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania spoke at length about the limits of citizenship and the rights of states (and, by extension, the federal government: senators in 1866 still acknowledged that the powers of the federal government were those expressly delegated to it by the states in the Constitution) to control who may enter from abroad:
[A foreigner in the United States] has a right to the protection of the laws; but he is not a citizen in the ordinary acceptance of the word.