# Will the idea of non-MAD nuclear war be a "thing" in the coming decades **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [November 1, 2016, 2:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/will-the-idea-of-non-mad-nuclear-war-be-a-thing-in-the-coming-decades/770363 "2016-11-01T14:43:04Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 9\ **Page:** 2
**Author:** ![Tzigone](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/839c29/32.png) [@Tzigone](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Tzigone)\ **Post date:** [November 2, 2016, 11:18am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/will-the-idea-of-non-mad-nuclear-war-be-a-thing-in-the-coming-decades/770363/21 "2016-11-02T11:18:05Z")
Oh yeah, and forgot to say I expect budget for this fiction plays a significant part in the broadcast being so different. But really, that’s the question I had - are BBC breaking news broadcasts really like that or would it seem as “off” to a British viewer? ---
**Author:** ![LSLGuy](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/lslguy/32/5813_2.png) [@LSLGuy](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/LSLGuy)\ **Post date:** [November 2, 2016, 12:50pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/will-the-idea-of-non-mad-nuclear-war-be-a-thing-in-the-coming-decades/770363/22 "2016-11-02T12:50:43Z")
> [@AK84](#): > > … > Yeah, I think that was a case of different historical experiences. I don’t think the USSR wanted to fight a nuclear war (I would say the US was; and is, way more gung ho on that score), its just that they had, in recent memory a genocidal war imposed on them, so for them a mass casualty war was not theoretical, it was within the memory and experience of most of the leaders. They thought that if you had to have a genocidal war, might as well be prepared to fight it. On the other hand, the US has traditionally be the imposer in genocidal warfare (against Native Americans), so would see little point in preparing for such a conflict. > The problem with that scenario is the problem with all nuclear weapons, especially tactical ones. The usage of even a tactical nuclear weapon has strategic implications. To optimize the effect of tactical nukes, you need to delegate release authority to local commander (say at Corps level) since the situation on the ground changes rapidly (Moscow will still be there in the hour it takes political HQ to approve a strike, but that Armoured brigade you wanted to hit might have already broken through by then or dispersed). So, most nations have-on paper at least, plans to delegate authority to sub-commanders. > > However, knowing the strategic implications of the use of nuclear weapons,do you really think that when the time really comes, the political leadership will be willing to delegate? As opposed to _"you may not release nukes without express permission, I don’t care what the prewar plan said_". Agree completely with your assessment of Pakistan v India. As to the US/SU history, you’re also spot-on. The US / NATO at the time I was involved with all this believed they had less quantity and more quality than the SU/WP, but also believed that the extra quality wasn’t enough to make up for the lesser quantity. As such US/NATO tactical nukes were seen as the topper-upper to raise our power up to the level that would deter SU/WP adventurism. This was the late Brezhnev to Andropov to Chernenko era. The thing that most concerned me at the time was the apparent disconnect between our rhetoric about response versus their rhetoric about attack. And vice versa. It seemed as if both sides had playbooks purpose built to drive the situation out of control. As you say, there’s always some chance that A) the prewar rhetoric are mostly disinformation or war college wishful thinking and didn’t / doesn’t represent the actual plans. Or B) when the fighting gets going the politicians pull back on the military’s leash harder than planned. Sadly, there’s a third possibility C) the military gets loose of the leash, or at least the hardliners prevail in the cabinet/politburo-level debate. e.g. What if Gen Turgidson really had persuaded President Muffley to send in the rest of SAC? ---
**Author:** ![Quartz](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/quartz/32/267_2.png) [@Quartz](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Quartz)\ **Post date:** [November 2, 2016, 1:01pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/will-the-idea-of-non-mad-nuclear-war-be-a-thing-in-the-coming-decades/770363/23 "2016-11-02T13:01:32Z")
> [@AK84](#): > > Incidentally, [here is a simulated BBC broadcast](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=glsCBBDBwZw&feature=youtu.be) (from July of this year) regarding how a “limited” war ends. Not one to watch with the kiddies, though. It’s chilling. ---
**Author:** ![Grey](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/b782af/32.png) [@Grey](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Grey)\ **Post date:** [November 2, 2016, 1:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/will-the-idea-of-non-mad-nuclear-war-be-a-thing-in-the-coming-decades/770363/24 "2016-11-02T13:27:39Z")
Interesting articel by Fred Kaplan regarding the [rethinking of American nuclear weapon policy.](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2016-08-01/rethinking-nuclear-policy) ---
**Author:** ![bump](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/7c8e57/32.png) [@bump](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/bump)\ **Post date:** [November 2, 2016, 2:40pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/will-the-idea-of-non-mad-nuclear-war-be-a-thing-in-the-coming-decades/770363/25 "2016-11-02T14:40:54Z")
> [@DinoR](#): > > Another vote for it’s your blind spot. As LSLGuy points out the Soviet Union had doctrinal usages that didn’t see a full exchange. The US did before MAD became the driving doctrinal plan. > > Even after the implementation of MAD there were developments of tactical weapons and lower yield, enhanced radiation warheads (aka “neutron bombs”). The US still hasn’t adopted a no first use policy; you don’t bother to say you’re willing to use nukes preemptively, or design less damaging ones, if you think any use is guaranteed global destruction. I never had the impression that the US discarded its tactical nuclear weapon doctrine on the adoption of MAD; my impression was that there was a tacit assumption that tactical battlefield use would inevitably escalate into full-on strategic use. They still had all sorts of plans in place for nuking bridges, troop concentrations, airfields, rail yards, etc… in the Germanies, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, as any sort of conventional WWIII unfolded, if the nuclear cherry was popped. I think the difference was that initially, there was a notion that tactical use of nukes wouldn’t or couldn’t necessarily escalate, because the Soviets had very few nukes. Then, there was a stretch starting in the 1960s when the Soviets achieved near parity in nukes, and this tacit assumption was founded. ---
**Author:** ![AK84](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/85e7bf/32.png) [@AK84](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/AK84)\ **Post date:** [November 2, 2016, 3:16pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/will-the-idea-of-non-mad-nuclear-war-be-a-thing-in-the-coming-decades/770363/26 "2016-11-02T15:16:06Z")
> [@LSLGuy](#): > > Agree completely with your assessment of Pakistan v India. > > As to the US/SU history, you’re also spot-on. > > The US / NATO at the time I was involved with all this believed they had less quantity and more quality than the SU/WP, but also believed that the extra quality wasn’t enough to make up for the lesser quantity. As such US/NATO tactical nukes were seen as the topper-upper to raise our power up to the level that would deter SU/WP adventurism. This was the late Brezhnev to Andropov to Chernenko era. > > The thing that most concerned me at the time was the apparent disconnect between our rhetoric about response versus their rhetoric about attack. And vice versa. It seemed as if both sides had playbooks purpose built to drive the situation out of control. > > As you say, there’s always some chance that A) the prewar rhetoric are mostly disinformation or war college wishful thinking and didn’t / doesn’t represent the actual plans. Or B) when the fighting gets going the politicians pull back on the military’s leash harder than planned. Sadly, there’s a third possibility C) the military gets loose of the leash, or at least the hardliners prevail in the cabinet/politburo-level debate. e.g. What if Gen Turgidson really had persuaded President Muffley to send in the rest of SAC? One way things are different from you era is the fact, that then everything was known and gamed out. You knew how the Russians might react and the contingencies; if they threw what we call a googly and you a curveball (:D), it would at least be within the bounds of the known. Since 9-11 especially, neither side has expected to fight each other. Until 2014 hit and now thats a real possibility. However, unlike before, no one know where, when and how conflict might arise and that is very destabilizing. Its like the difference between a railway track and an airplane, you know where railways will lead, you don’t know where a plane might go. Syria today. Ukraine tomorrow. Might Vlad decide to help his neighbor, Kim the Third? Or think to stoke up Mexican unrest in the drug war, to tie up US resources? As to the second, you are right about the General Ripper scenario. But, traditionally, military men have been much less blood thirsty than civilian leadership (see Alan Brooke telling Churchill to get stuffed when he suggested using poison gas in retaliation for the V2s). However, political leadership (and by political I include both civilian elected officials and military chiefs of staff) like to maintain at least the illusion of control. The CDR of 2nd ACR in Germany who is getting rogered by the Russkies may desperately want nuclear support for instance, and plans might include letting SACEUR give it to him. But, I think that Washington will when push comes to shove, write them off istead of using nukes to save them. ---
**Author:** ![Hector\_St\_Clare](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/b5ac83/32.png) [@Hector\_St\_Clare](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Hector_St_Clare)\ **Post date:** [November 2, 2016, 4:24pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/will-the-idea-of-non-mad-nuclear-war-be-a-thing-in-the-coming-decades/770363/27 "2016-11-02T16:24:31Z")
> [@AK84](#): > > Incidentally, [here is a simulated BBC broadcast](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=glsCBBDBwZw&feature=youtu.be) (from July of this year) regarding how a “limited” war ends. > > For added realism, they make it seem as if its an interruption in normal programming, so it starts at about 10 mins. Do watch it till the end. **AK84** thanks for pointing me to that. It was a very creative scenario, but I still don’t think it’s likely. I can’t see the United States launching a nuclear attack on Kaliningrad, much less Russia attacking London, Leeds, Birmingham, etc… The United States, Britain, etc. have too much to lose from a full-on nuclear war, and I don’t think Russia has enough to gain, unlike during the Cold War. And as you point out for India and Pakistan, the consequences for both sides would be horrific. ---
**Author:** ![AK84](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/85e7bf/32.png) [@AK84](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/AK84)\ **Post date:** [November 2, 2016, 4:35pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/will-the-idea-of-non-mad-nuclear-war-be-a-thing-in-the-coming-decades/770363/28 "2016-11-02T16:35:24Z")
> [@Hector\_St\_Clare](#): > > **AK84** thanks for pointing me to that. It was a very creative scenario, but I still don’t think it’s likely. I can’t see the United States launching a nuclear attack on Kaliningrad, much less Russia attacking London, Leeds, Birmingham, etc… The United States, Britain, etc. have too much to lose from a full-on nuclear war, and I don’t think Russia has enough to gain, unlike during the Cold War. And as you point out for India and Pakistan, the consequences for both sides would be horrific. The point is that\* they don’t start at tha\*t. They start with a few potshots at each other and it escalates from there faster than leaders can react. [QUOTE=Quartz] Not one to watch with the kiddies, though. It’s chilling. [/QUOTE] It was bad enough when watching it as something that could have happened in the past. It’s another thing to think of it as something that can happen in the very near future. ☹ ---
**Author:** ![Velocity](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/velocity/32/18006_2.png) [@Velocity](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Velocity)\ **Post date:** [November 2, 2016, 7:40pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/will-the-idea-of-non-mad-nuclear-war-be-a-thing-in-the-coming-decades/770363/29 "2016-11-02T19:40:18Z")
Hard to say on which side the deterrence math works out. On the one hand, it isn’t worth any country’s risk to get nuked. But on the other hand, wars like WWI killed millions over one bullet aimed at Archduke Ferdinand. Nobody would have said that the Archduke’s killing was worth 10 million deaths, but it snowballed from there. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/will-the-idea-of-non-mad-nuclear-war-be-a-thing-in-the-coming-decades/770363.md?page=1)