Will we (a) still be in Iraq on 1/1/09, (b) have left on our own, (c) gotten evicted?

[Ryan_Liam]

Wrong. This wouldn’t be a marked difference - it would be no difference at all. The government of Vietnam was a going concern for over two years after we ended our combat role in Vietnam in early 1973.

Yet it was able to defend itself on the ground for that two years, the only help it required was air support to destroy the NVA’s Easter offensive. But the US had grown so tired of the war that in the end all funds to the South Vietnamese were severely limited and restricted. This won’t happen in Iraq, and the threat of airpower and the abilities of it to help in things such as logistics, will give the advantage to Iraqi security forces. Not to mention we won’t be cutting off the Iraqis like we did the Vietnamese.

Air power is notoriously ineffective at combatting insurgencies, as we have already found out in Iraq and Afghanistan. You bomb an insurgent’s house, and relatives, women and children get killed and maimed by the bombs. The locals see the ‘collateral damage’ you’re willing to inflict just to get a few insurgents, and they learn to hate you. You lose. If it’s known that you’re acting in support of a government, it loses.

However Airpower used correctly gives the government a strategic advantage over it’s adversairy. We win, they lose. There are obviously pluses and minuses. But that’s the situation in every war. As for Afghanistan, yes there have been instances where Airpower has killed civilians, but I bet out of the amount of operations involving it, the instances where you hear about civilian casualties are not the norm.

And it wouldn’t be just airpower alone combatting the insurgency, it would be the effective backup of Government forces because it doesn’t always have to be in relation to fighting, it can also provide quicker transport and logistics for the Iraqi Army until they can do it themselves.

This creates a force protection nightmare. Advisors and contractors will need to be protected, and not by Iraqis, whom they won’t trust.

There are going to have to be some risks involved if we’re serious in building up the ability of the Iraqi armed forces. And if this can’t be done, there are always those Iraqis willing to be trained up by our officer corps (like in Sandhurst) to do the training themselves, only that would take even longer.

The more we disperse them for effectiveness in their missions, the worse that problem gets; the more we keep them in just a few places, the less they can accomplish. Either way, we’d have to keep a lot of combat forces around just to protect the advisors, but more so if they’re actually embedded with Iraqi forces in a number of different places.

But the number of American troops in Iraq patrolling the streets would be substantially reduced, not to mention the fact that if we implemented this strategy then it would be certainly reduced in size in comparison to what we’re doing right now.

See what the British commanders told Sen. Collins (post 34). Sadr’s uprisings were in the spring and summer of 2004, when the Shi’ite population as a whole was still much more favorably disposed towards us.

This is because they know that Coalition forces won’t be around forever, and that self preservation will only come if they take sides in the factions in and around Basra.

If all we have to worry about is the active membership of the Badr Corps or the Mahdi Army, we can keep our supply lines intact. But if one of those organizations is simply the spearhead for a sizable popular uprising against us, it’s all over. That’s a very real possibility now, much more so than in 2004.

Sounds like you’re describing a Diem Bien Phu of Iraq. However, both organisations are in the Government, and both are rivals against each other. The ability of them to block Coalition supply lines is limited in relation to Coalition firepower.

The occupation phase has been underway for 3 years and 9 months. The changes during that time have been huge; each year in Iraq has been different (and worse) from the year before. And you’re saying what things might look like in three years.

Hey, I didn’t say it would get better, only that the delegation of responsibility would be given more and more to the Iraqis, whilst we winded down commitment to day to day combat. Whatever happens to the Iraqi government is down to them, not to us.

I would contend that any effort to see down the road had better be done with the expectation of that trend continuing: that our situation will continue to deteriorate rapidly and in unexpected ways. Predictions based on the expectation of anything remotely like stasis are probably useless.

Even if this is true, it’ll happen with the Iraqi Government having more responsibility for the day to day operations in it’s country. Like I said, the US in a couple of years will be in the backburner in Iraq. And even if it withdraws, will still finance and support that government for the forseeable future.

[RTFirefly]

@Ryan_Liam

Yet it was able to defend itself on the ground for that two years, the only help it required was air support to destroy the NVA’s Easter offensive. But the US had grown so tired of the war that in the end all funds to the South Vietnamese were severely limited and restricted. This won’t happen in Iraq, and the threat of airpower and the abilities of it to help in things such as logistics, will give the advantage to Iraqi security forces. Not to mention we won’t be cutting off the Iraqis like we did the Vietnamese.

How that supports your claim that, after our anticipated departure, “the government we helped foster is still standing, which is a marked difference from Vietnam (Obviously)”, I’m sure I don’t know.

However Airpower used correctly gives the government a strategic advantage over it’s adversairy. We win, they lose. There are obviously pluses and minuses. But that’s the situation in every war. As for Afghanistan, yes there have been instances where Airpower has killed civilians, but I bet out of the amount of operations involving it, the instances where you hear about civilian casualties are not the norm.

There are few ‘correct’ uses of air power against insurgencies. It’s hard enough for a foreign power like us to know who’s who when we’re on the ground. From the air, it’s well-nigh impossible. All we can really know is, “that’s a house we’ve seen insurgents in.” Knowing who else might be in there when we drop our bombs is damned near impossible.

There are going to have to be some risks involved if we’re serious in building up the ability of the Iraqi armed forces.

There’ve already been risks involved. Note the 3,000 Americans dead, the 25,000 wounded. What you’re seemingly proposing is that American trainers go out in Iraq, unprotected other than by Iraqis. That’s not risk, that’s courting death.

And if this can’t be done, there are always those Iraqis willing to be trained up by our officer corps (like in Sandhurst) to do the training themselves, only that would take even longer.

This must mean something. Or maybe not.

But the number of American troops in Iraq patrolling the streets would be substantially reduced, not to mention the fact that if we implemented this strategy then it would be certainly reduced in size in comparison to what we’re doing right now.

The difference being that American troops patrolling the streets protect one another. Trainers scattered amongst Iraqi units would be relying on the Iraqi units to protect them from other Iraqis, and whether they’d be able to trust the troops they would be training is conjectural at best.

No, you need U.S. troops to protect the trainers. Otherwise, it’s not quite a suicide mission, but it’s certainly a good deal more dangerous than what passes for conventional combat in Iraq.

This is because they know that Coalition forces won’t be around forever, and that self preservation will only come if they take sides in the factions in and around Basra.

So you’re saying that the Shi’ite population is really just as pro-American as they were three years ago??

Sounds like you’re describing a Diem Bien Phu of Iraq. However, both organisations are in the Government, and both are rivals against each other. The ability of them to block Coalition supply lines is limited in relation to Coalition firepower.

I’m trying to see how the fact that the Badr Corps and Mahdi Army are both in the government, and are rivals, helps your argument.

We are about to take sides - with Hakim, against al-Sadr. Do you think the Badr Corps is going to come to our aid if Moqtada leads a popular uprising against us?

Hey, I didn’t say it would get better, only that the delegation of responsibility would be given more and more to the Iraqis, whilst we winded down commitment to day to day combat. Whatever happens to the Iraqi government is down to them, not to us.

No, but you more or less assumed things wouldn’t get worse either. There’s no reason to believe things won’t get worse.

Even if this is true, it’ll happen with the Iraqi Government having more responsibility for the day to day operations in it’s country. Like I said, the US in a couple of years will be in the backburner in Iraq. And even if it withdraws, will still finance and support that government for the forseeable future.

With advisors and stuff. Remember your advisors? The ones who’ll stay there training the troops as Iraq gets far worse than it is now.

[tagos]

And note how, in the real Vietnam War, not the fantasy one - the ARVN collapsed like a pack of cards the instant it was put under any pressure. Any army that requires B52’s to survive a ground assault by another force without air support is clearly not worth the name. The ARVN soldiers weren’t prepared to fight and we have no reason to believe the Iraq Army will be any more willing to fight for its own puppet govt rather than the factions its components are drawn from.