With trepidation, Benghazi

Not so. The proposition to which I initially responded was tomndebb’s statement that “the facts have already been presented to the satisfaction of any intelligent observer.”

I asserted that I am a reasonably intelligent observer, and I then identified facts that were not presented to my satisfaction. You and I appear to agree that there was a significant intelligence failure that led to a “protest” assessment. We appear to agree that part of that failure was crediting media reports of interviews with AAS members over the eyewitness accounts of US personnel. I want to know who made that judgment, when and why. If the best that our intelligence apparatus can come up with is reading the front page of the Times, well, there is a lot of federal money that can and should be saved.

I do not read the Senate report as saying that there affirmatively were SigInt and DoD reports reaching the same assessments, but if there were – those are other failures, and I want to know how such grossly erroneous conclusions were reached. Intelligence has a hard enough time describing events that took place, without imagining ones that never did.

I’m sure you’re reasonably intelligent. You, however, are very uninformed and bizarrely tangled when it comes to the idea that early confusion must have been an overt act.

Chaos is confusing. And a myriad of sources all telling something different requires assumptions and judgement calls. And since there were many other protests, it makes sense that there might be confusion.

It’s not significant, it’s to be expected in a chaotic situation.

That’s just nonsense. There are a lot of sources that our intelligence services use. And they have to reconcile them. Just because you don’t understand how complex something is, doesn’t mean the people doing it are stupid.

Again, you’re framing this in a silly way. Confusion isn’t imagination. Some guy sitting in a cubicle didn’t bite his lower lip, look impish and write a memo about protests.

It was a confusing situation happening at the same time as protests throughout the region. The mistake was perfectly understandable. Your not getting that doesn’t suggest the need for another investigation, it suggests the need for you to better examine the information already presented.

The report says that “CIA’s January 4, 2013, Analytic Line Review found that '[a]pproximately a dozen reports that included press accounts, public statements by AAS members, ffiJMINT reporting, DOD reporting, and signals intelligence all stated or strongly suggested that a protest occurred outside of the Mission facility just prior to the attacks.”

I imagine you want to know exactly what the signals intelligence, for example, said. I don’t see how it could be discussed to your satisfaction without disclosing the specific signals intelligence. Nor do I see why you wouldn’t trust the Republicans on the panel to have identified any misstatements or mischaracterizations in the main body of the report.

I agree that if they chose to believe the NYTimes over eye witness reports of their own people on the ground, that would be a problem. I see no reason to believe that happened.

The drone didn’t arrive on site until about 90 minutes after the attack began, so unless it was equipped with the Mk II Flux Capacitor, it couldn’t be used to observe events that preceded the attack.

I submit that some guy sitting in a cubicle, biting his lower lip, looking impish and writing a memo about protests is the best case scenario for how this intelligence failure took place. Individual incompetence is remediable.

Here are the sources for the CIA’s January 2013 assessment:

http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/benghazi2014/benghazi.pdf

Quantitatively, the dominant source for the “protest” assessment (6 of 11 sources) was press reports. Qualitatively, the dominant sources (i.e., the only ones called out by the Senate committee for their substance) were the two public statements of AAS.

Richard Parker, this statement in the Senate report is among the things that has me questioning whether the “intelligence reports” support a “protest” assessment at all. This is not the way I would write the section if I could cover my ass with anything stronger than an AAS twitter feed. Adding to my skepticism is this line in the Senate report: “In some cases, these intelligence reports-which were disseminated widely in the Intelligence Community–contained references to press reports on protests that were simply copied into intelligence products.”

Lobohan, sure, chaos is confusing. But we have intelligence services for precisely such situations, and the first role of filtering intelligence is to focus on the reliability of your sources. The CIA began the day knowing that al Qaeda’s leader had directly threatened US interests in Libya the day before. And then when the Libya alarm went off, and it was time to make assessments, this situation had trained US intelligence/diplomatic witnesses on hand, plus real-time video, plus real-time SigInt (which included, among other things, AAS contemporaneously calling al Qaeda to seek commendation). Somehow, those facts and sources were not just unsynthesized – they were, for all intents and purposes, completely ignored.

Now, is this the biggest mistake in the world? Of course not; we all can name much larger intelligence failures under administrations of every political inclination. But that does not mean that there are not lessons to be learned, corrections to be made. If “chaos” is the best explanation on offer for a gross failure in our multibillion dollar diplomatic/intelligence apparatus, this reasonably intelligent person would at least like some explanation as to the mechanism by which chaos impacted the analysis.

Agreed, this is why I query the value of a DoD report on the “protest” issue. I am not aware of DoD presence on-scene until the drone arrived.

I agree that this is a reasonable assessment, from the publicly-available knowledge.

The worldwide protests over the video were manufactured outrage, to be sure, but that’s the nature of protests generally. And it seems plausible, to me at least, that folks with foreknowledge of the protests that would take place around the Arab Spring nations used the video to recruit attackers in Benghazi and to provide some additional context for the attack itself.

the drone just verified what the people already there were reporting. It was never a protest. It was an attack from the start.

Were you there?

How exactly does a drone verify what happened 90 minutes before it arrived?

Are you suggesting they attacked the building, and then what exactly 90 minutes later?

He’s suggesting that the drone, arriving 90 minutes after the attack began, wouldn’t be able to tell if there was a protest. Because the protest would be before the attack began. And the drone wouldn’t be able to see into the past.

Because that takes witchcraft.

We already had 1st hand account of what occurred. It was an attack. Not a protest, an attack. Nothing the drone showed altered that assessment.

Don’t you even care that you’ve been shown to be wrong over and over again?

What did the drone see that verified it?

What did the drone see that verified protestors?

You’re arguing the lie put out by the WH that this was a protest. It wasn’t. There is no evidence of a protest either by those on the ground or the drone that followed.

There is no evidence of a protest.

I never said the drone verified protesters, or made the argument that you attribute to me.

You, on the other hand, made this statement:

So I’ll ask again; what did the drone see that verified there was no protest?

no protesters.

I can’t believe I have to ask this. But do you think, maybe, that the protesters might have left when the RPGs went off?