Wittgenstein's Box: private phenomena (incredibly f**king long)

[sleestak]

*Originally posted by erislover *
**

Mental state is the dichotomy afforded by dualism, that which we are aware of. You know, mental stuff.

Well, you are assuming that your definition of mental states is accepted across the board. It is not. You assumed that I would agree with your definition. I don’t. Until you define the term ‘Mental State’ to both our satisfaction your arguement is moot.

[QUOTE]
**
[ul][li]Awareness[]Sensation[]Emotion[/ul] and such things. The whole point of this post was to attempt to explicitly describe such things, or at least explain why they are so hard to describe. **[/li][/QUOTE]

I have already explained that, while our actual sensations may not be exact, the end product of our sensations are equivalant. At the same time you ignore rational thought and logic from your definition of mental states.

How does logic and rational thought enter into “Mental States”?

Slee

[erislover]

I’m not sure how else I can describe it. You continue to ask me, and I continue to tell you: my problem is that I can’t describe it. I am looking for a method to describe and discuss them. This is the problem. Honestly.

“Hey, Slee, what is 2+2?”
“Well, erl, until you cna tell me what two plus two is I’m afraid we can’t discuss it.”

[Measure_for_Measure]

Let me make some observations.

1. It is difficult to find references to “private phenomena” on the web.

2. The Wittgenstein quote that Eris uses is related to the “Private Language Argument”, “an argument designed to show that there cannot be a language that only one person can speak - a language that is essentially private, that no one else can in principle understand.” (Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy)

3. Wittgenstein argues that if one attaches the sign “S” to a given sensation, and marks it on his calendar every time he feels that sensation, that there will be no difference between correct and incorrect entries on subsequent days.

a) The sensations on 2 days cannot be directly compared.

b) Memory cannot confirm its own accuracy.

4. I argue that 3b) is an empirical claim that may or may not be true, but should not be assumed to be true. It is conceivable that the reliability of memory could be calibrated with verifiable measurements. Using those, a reasonable guess may be possible regarding the reliability of private memories.

5. Same argument as 4) using an example:
   Red, the phenomenon
   Define:

Red1, the color. A property of certain objects. Blah, blah waves, blah physics.

Red2, a perception of color. What happens when you expose people to the color red. Red2 exists regardless of color blindness. It can be shown, however, that different people perceive red differently.

Now, I will attempt to label a particular shade of red, red3. No problem.

Now, I will attempt to label my particular perception of this shade, red4. Or, I could label a particular perception of pain to be pain4. Or a particular taste, redwine4. Whether this is ok depends upon the accuracy of my memory. (Oh, btw, it has been shown that memory can be inaccurate w.r.t. pain. But that’s a separate empirical matter.)

Wittgenstein defines a private phenomenon as one which, by definition, outside forms of verification are excluded.

That seems to me to be a cheap trick. It is conceivable that memory could be studied using verifiable methods and its properties could be guessed at using that sort of knowledge. I contend that whether or not this is the case can only be settled following some empirical investigation.

6. Of course I may have missed the point entirely.

[erislover]

flowbark, you’re right there with me in many respects.

Private phenomena: I more or less coined the term (it doesn’t find popular use, but I have heard it before) in response to private language arguments. To discuss something we must share knowledge of some kind; this is public by any stretch of the imagination. However, I cannot argue the fact that everything I observe, take in, etc, is through an act of perception (a phenomenon), and it seems rather clear that I cannot actively discuss my perceptions (my sensations of …); thus, if we are communicating at all, there must be public phenomenon and private phenomenon.

The problem here is that I can’t find the border between them. Why, for example, do I say that needles hurt and sticks are hard. I feel pain and experience hardness, but I (appear) to do so in my hands. “Hard” and “pain” refer to my sensations, sensations that I get when I sense (see) that some event has occurred.

It just gets so messy so quickly. The private language argument is pretty damn powerful; denying that language has meaning is paradoxical, and asserting private language is not quite paradoxical but rather it seems impossible to prove (to anyone but yourself, but then, what the hell is the point in proving private language privately?). I like Wittgenstein’s attack on private language. I am not sure how it helps me understand why we cannot discuss the sensation of green but we can discuss green.

I argue that 3b) [which states: memory cannot confirm its own accuracy] is an empirical claim that may or may not be true, but should not be assumed to be true.

I’m not sure what form such an experiment would take, even in theory, that didn’t depend on the accuracy of memory in the first place (note: not necessarily that memory is perfect).

Now, I will attempt to label my particular perception of this shade, red4.

Here we are at my impass (that is, this is my problem, this problem is the motivation for this thread). What is red4? It is the sensation of red3 as felt by you. What does this word mean to me? Here is where we begin to reach the realm of public versus private (truly it seems to me that we’ve never left this boundry, but here it becomes apparent).

flowbark, what does coffee smell like? And what do those things smell like that comprise the coffee smell? Etc.

Wittgenstein defines a private phenomenon as one which, by definition, outside forms of verification are excluded.

That seems to me to be a cheap trick.

Now you are with me and Jerevan WRT rug-sweeping. I’ve come to this rug-sweeping in three forms in this thread so far, and everyone has critiqued it as such (you, Jerevan, and Slee have done so explicitly) but this is where I have been standing the whole time, asking for your help.

I am glad we are all standing together now (this isn’t a simple topic). Now that we are here: what (if anything) are private phenomenon? If all phenomenon are private, how can we communicate? Wittgenstein leads us here: if everything is sensation, and we communicate, then there must be types of sensation which can be considered public. What form do these sensations take (are they able to be categorized)? What are we doing when we try to refer to “the sensation of pain” (empty concept: there is nothing to point to …Or is there (this remains the question, rephrased and rephrased again)?)?

One final comment, back on the memory track:

It is conceivable that memory could be studied using verifiable methods and its properties could be guessed at using that sort of knowledge.

I highly doubt it. A highly motivated discussion of certainty and memory and empiricism is also given by our currently discussed author in On Certainty which I think everyone who asserts anything should read several times. But, more to the point, we would be presented with the following situation:

Memory as used in translating symblols; i.e.- I remember how to express the method in question
Memory as used for comparison; i.e.- I have several qualities/quantities/entities in mind and I remember why I am doing so, which is to compare; and when I have compared I remember what I was comparing so that I may write it down (see first comment on memory).
Memory as used to demonstrate a conclusion; i.e.- “Remember the preceeding? Because of those results, we see that memory is not to be trusted completely.”

[DAM]

Hello, I have spent two hours reading the thread[cable?] My mind is spinning with thoughts I haven’t persued. I would not have thought that so much clarity could go on for so long without any contradiction.
I hope I might lend a note of pragmatism to this fascinating tangle. Linguists have determined that utterances are understood as a series of symbols which are matched to symbols already in the brain accumulated over a lifetime of experience. Each symbol in an utterance makes sense in its relationship to the other symbols in the utterance and it makes sense as it maps to the experiences of the interpreter. ( I think this is why private[oneuser] language is a non sequiter, because language exists as a shared set of associations between symbols. Shared by a community of language users. One user can not by himself create unique associations of symbols to form utterances.)
Now here I imply that the symbols in my brain / mind for a given set of morphemes(meanings) and their relationships are the same in my brain as they are in everyone else’s who speaks the same language. Well, knowing that each person had different experiences while obtaining her symbol set or paradigm should make this patently absurd. All the experiences you had growing up defined your symbol set as well as how you respond to any given set of chained symbols contained in an utterance. And so each response is necessarily different. [you are not even the same today as you were yesterday{nor even five minutes ago}]
The differences in our perceptions of the world around us are usually ironed out by long experience which teaches us how to align our responses to the rest of the society within which we mature. Our perception of the color green therefore will of course be different. You could call it a visceral response in contrast to a biological response which we all agree is consistent. The visceral response exerts pressure to drag in every context and correcting context within which we originally developed the concept of green. So someone with a bad experience with green apples may have a particularly odd response to green. (His beetle has more legs)
The degree to which our set of internal symbols allows us to predict and control the world around us is a measure of our sanity – the efficiency of our isomorphism of symbols in our mind as it maps to objective reality. (The fact that some people remain insane in the face of obvious counter-evidence of the validity of taheir paradigm is a indication that our perceptions and interpretations of those perceptions are also subject to failure and faulty interpretation.)

What I hope to say is that the part of 'green' which is more than physical perception is decoded in the context of every experience each individual has had.  And by extension all those private phenomena are the same from person to person in sofar as they have analogous structures; and they are unique because they are derived from imperfect interpretations of what our senses tell us the world is.
Let me point out that the box containing our private reaction to green cannot be understood in isolation.  Pain cannot make sense to someone experiencing it unless she has had many different experiences to compare, contrast and evolve a final idea from.  And those many different experiences must include experiences other than pain to be meaningful.  Each of us is a bundle of cross threaded interdependent experiencial relational databases no two of us with data the same.  Most of our responses are learned.  If you want to get a look inside someone else's box, you must gather information from a wide range of expressions and responses and deduce how the symbol in her 'pain' box or 'green' box has affected those responses.  Of course you will interpret that in the context of your own experience so it won't be extraordinarily objective.  If that's what this thread is chasing -- a objective description of perception I am afraid it can't be done.  But if the debate is on the existence of wildly differing contents of boxes with the same label then we must conclude that it is certainly true, my idea of pain is not the same as yours.

And an opinion:
Memory cannot verify its own accuracy. It is a finite system. According to Godel, no finite system is sufficiently complex that it can describe itself. There will always be unverifiable assumptions made within any finite system. The criterion for judging must be based on an exterior standard. One thing memory is good for is letting us know that it has failed.

It has always confused me to hear Captain Picard say, s"Data!, Run a self diagnostic."
"My diagnostic routines are corrupted but otherwise my systems seem to be operating within expectorated prayer mats."

"President Reagan do you remember promising that if your memory should fail, you would step down as president?"
"I don't recall saying that."

[Justhink]

Incredible progress on this thread cheers I went on vacation the day after my last reply and have only since recently aquired internet use. I had a small window to reply, but the flood of data was so overwhelming at the time, as to be of novel proportions.

To DAM:

“The degree to which our set of internal symbols allows us to predict and control the world around us is a measure of our sanity.”

This bumps right up against the crux of the PP articulation. Just because a person can predict and control does not mean that they will! Since they will not do it, there is no verifiable evidence (minus their PP) that they are indeed sane. Their PP may be transcendant of action, resulting from the boredoms of extreme cognitive age. You have a situation again, where cognitive depth and mental retardation appear strikingly similar and quite possibly indistinguishible externally (for some time to come at least).

I’ve developed a theory over the course of time that states this (so much anyways):

The self-recursive form of sentience requires an internally perpetual state of meaning to be externalized, thus becoming resource dependant. It is to say, that a lack of meaning actually gives rise to our self-awareness of our meaning – we are a lack of what we seek! chuckle

I believe that the earliest self-recursive idea to emerge was that of intentional suicide, to achieve an objective. Witnesses observing this behavior first-hand must have been oddly captivated. This is what allowed for the explosion of what we now call: ‘the type of awareness that let’s us know that we are alive’. Since, via this theory; desire fulfillment ‘without hyopocrisy’ (for lack of a better term that makes everything outrageously wordy) renders catatonia; one can state with confidence, that the greater one achieves an absoute state utilizing logical consistancy; the closer to catatonia they are moving. It means that there must exist self-recursive undefined terms, in order to allow sentience the elasticity to flow in a self-recursive fashion. Distribution of these terms, is as valuable to life for the species of self-perception as material foods for the digestive system. This concept fundamentally increases the explanitory power of what types of opinions and actions determine desire fullfillment in life, without dissolving that life. I haven’t wholly articulated the base algorhythm yet; however - it can be rudimently explained as thus:

That which is true, must be corrupted in order to feed and maintain a self-recursive indentured system. Those who exhibit a specific algorhythmic property of inconsistancy will attract the most attention from self-recursive beings; thus centralizing material resource flow, and accumulating capitol reserves.

It is to say, that in the world of sentience; the biggest idiot inherets the earth.

I am convinced that absolute sanity yeilds stasis; as absolute insanity is already evidenced to yeild stasis. (states of absolute cohesion and non-cohesion respectively - varied through forms of potencey and predictability).

To come back to the snippet of text from DAM at the beginning:
Absolute sanity is essentially a pure state of PP, indistinguishable from dementia - with everything else in between essentially a corruption of a renewable and automated resource of meaning. Our very perception of self relies on an externalization of this process as a resource! When it comes to determining who has the “highest” or “most correct/superior” PP (by observing consistancy vs. inconsistancy), the answer will always remain non-transparent for sentient beings. The meaning that individuals derive as value (for sentiences’ life support anyways) is so pathetic; that to gain the wealth and individuals you want in your life, is to literally sit down; craft logical corruptions that will hook the indentured system (primarily through algorythms that yeild ‘hypocracies’) and then basically drill a hole through your brain to somehow forget that you programmed yourself as such. While command level access is superior, it will result in existential collapse at the point in which it becomes drastically useful. Instead, a memory delete mechanism is required, or as we find currently; people simply learn behavior that works, invert the reasons why it works and live a merry life, without decompiling reasons and actions simultaneously for logical consistancy and validity for excecuting the action without collapsing existentially.

-Justhink

[TVAA]

*Originally posted by Justhink *
**
There will never be an opposite to a “tree” or a “television”.
**

It depends. I doubt that there’s such a thing as an ‘anti-tree’ or ‘anti-television’. The opposite of a tree, however, is a not-tree. The universe is almost entirely composed of not-trees, except for relatively small areas on this planet.

[erislover]

DAM, hi! I’ll accept the compliments on this thread, though all of us deserve them of course!

Linguists have determined that utterances are understood as a series of symbols which are matched to symbols already in the brain accumulated over a lifetime of experience.

And philosophers have agreed, and that is precisely what has led us to our present problem. Is it right to assume that if a person has the same brain states (as determined by hypothetical, by MRI, etc) that they feel the same way? “How do you feel?” [pin prick]

“Ow!” But clamp a certain someone’s nipple and watch them become sexually aroused. Are they responding different physically? If they responded to this with, “Oooh, that feels good!” and I responded to a shoulder rub with, “Oooh, that feels good!” are we to assume that “somehow” our physical states are equivalent just because the words are the same? Because the use is the same? We wouldn’t suggest that it felt good in the same way, though.

Let me point out that the box containing our private reaction to green cannot be understood in isolation. Pain cannot make sense to someone experiencing it unless she has had many different experiences to compare, contrast and evolve a final idea from.

I agree, in some ways, and disagree in others. On one hand, such fuzzy concepts (that is, ones that are difficult to define) seem to be an accumulation of experiences where the word, for example “pain”, was used. But is it right to say that that is what pain is? We recognize it in an instant (recognize what?); the pin pricks, we exclaim “Ow” or somesuch.

So we learn the word through its varied use, but it still seems to refer to a singular notion or feeling (though that feeling might vary in degree).

If that’s what this thread is chasing – a objective description of perception I am afraid it can’t be done.

Why not? This is what troubles me. We say things like, “Those leaves are the most lovely shade of green I have seen yet this spring.” So simple! And here we are saying that we can’t share such sentiment? Or are we saying that what that sentence expresses is not what we would instantly think it does?

Justhink

we are a lack of what we seek!

Not so funny! I often toy with the idea that consciousness is the negative space of perception… everywhere I “look” (with my eyes, ears, introspection, etc) I see things that are not my consciousness. But I am clearly conscious. Thus, consciousness is the negative space of all my perceptions.

As for the rest of it… no comment.

[erislover]

Oh, and, I’m not sure I follow your logic, Vorlon.

[Justhink]

Vorlon,
I didn’t write it at the time, even though it was going through my head - I’ll have to run back and remember why I left it out; many times I exclude things because they open up entire avenues of explanation that seem too overwhelming for posts here (my posts are usually pretty long as is).

These types of terms only possess negation as an ‘opposite’.
With polar forms, their respective networks are all positively defined.

eris: Aye. I was a bit suprized at the angle these general profundities struck you. I assume that solipsistic recognitions like the old; “you can never prove you have been alive for longer than one second”, are usually what innitiates this. I’m under the impression that you’ve probably heard this before; so it puzzled me how this network eluded you until then. One of the issues regarding your concern here is that this is a branch of the idea “do we even exist?” It’s a much broader topic than this focus, and it becomes difficult to address only this topic without ‘opening the field’ so to speak.

As for the ‘lack of humor’ ::: That was my joke! It’s the most unfunny thing in the world; which ironically makes it somewhat hopelessly funny.

There are many tangible physical metaphors for this phenomenon – think about the visible spectrum of light vs. the ‘actual’ spectrum of light. The color we see is every color except that color; which is why we see it… it is the only wavelength able to escape the object to which we are veiwing.

There is a phenomenal amount of evidence supporting the idea that everything human is fundamentally a lack of everything humans strive for or simply ‘see’. Our observance of self is morbidly bound to being seperated from the attainment of any actual goal we can formulate. To accomplish the goal, is to dissolve our recursion (unless you corrupt term definitions). Humans don’t survive or thrive on intelligence; but rather by counter-intelligence. Even if we (by our technology) can download ourselves into all types of forms and bodies; travel to any destination in the universe unscathed and enter all times and locations for exploration – that degree of fitness is fundamentally attached to corrupting the very logic used to assemble these structures.

I’d articulate that conciousness is made positive by dividing.
Think about your goal as representing the number “1”.
‘You’ are the number 7.
Your consciousness is, in this sense, the number: 142857
The method of your creation is the process of division in base 10.
When any of these four points are expressed to maximum capacity; you lose the other 3.

You either become your goal repeating into infinity
You become your body repeating into infinity
You become your identity repeating into infinity
Or… you become process itself repeating into infinity
Like a scratched record…
It’s those damn nine’s that you have to cross to reach the number one again. If you do manage to somehow make it to the ‘other-side’; you simply have managed to divide your own identity by your goal; at which point you are no further than where you started. (unless you superficially add your goal to number, when you are simply the number of your goal away from achieving your goal - thereby simulating attainment for the ego while not actually collapsing into the state at which the goal is achieved)
(((3*(7^2))+3)+(7^4))+1=142857
(((7^2)+1)((7^2)+2)+1)((7^2)+7)+1=142857
There are quite a few ways to do this if you cancel out the redundancies of dividing or multiplying the entire equation by a number.
It’s to say; that no matter how hard you try, without adding and/or subtracting… all these little ‘fudges’ along the way are the only things holding these perceptions together.

shrug
-Justhink

[DAM]

In the OP the best form of the question (IMHO) was stated as,

---

"If done contextually, I think most people will agree that it is simple to match meaning with object. But in the case of PP, the object is unavailable for pointing; this must be so, by the very nature of PP: the “box” shields all eyes but our own… [there remains] the requirement that one demonstrate, then, where meaning actually comes from in the case of PP.
_________________________erislover

I believe I misstated the core goal of this thread when I said,

---

If that’s what this thread is chasing – a objective description of perception. I am afraid it can’t be done.
____________________________DAM quoted by erislover

---

Why not? This is what troubles me.
_______________________[troubling reply by erislover:]

Why not? If each of our PPs is a constantly changing referencial symbol then it will cause different symbol associations to occur each time we try to interpret objective experience. Those symbol associations are what we use to define meaning. Even the (supposedly objective) tree pointing exercise will not positively nail down the meaning inside someone’s “tree” box. because now it includes a shade of meaning which is influenced by who did the pointing and which tree was pointed at. (for both individuals involved) So, since the beetle in the box is constantly changing we cannot know objectively how someone’s box is filled. In fact to assume that something you say means the same to you as it does to the person who hears you is assuming too much. My creative writing teacher used to insist that the poem in your mind which motivated what appears on paper has no relationship to the poem in any reader’s mind. A large part of the excitement of this thread is attempting to derive a common paradigm for the individual phenomenon of PP.
_________________________________________________________________
But clamp a certain someone’s nipple and watch them become sexually aroused. … If they responded to this with, “Oooh, that feels good!” and I responded to a shoulder rub with, “Oooh, that feels good!” are we to assume that “somehow” our physical states are
equivalent just because the words are the same? Because the use is the same? We wouldn’t suggest that it felt good in the same way, though.
____________________erislover

A very telling example. I hope I didn’t imply that the surface utterance was a direct and simple function of deeply defined symbols. Of course the same sentence does not imply the same motivation. Sentences are such a limited means of communication that it shouldn’t surprise us that one sentence can have many different meanings. Even in the same context. (words don’t).

One thing that’s interesting is that in context a response such as the one above, which might be considered non-standard, taken with an exhaustive census of other responses to other stimuli would give you a precise description of what is inside the pain box. There are some rather disturbing methods used by law enforcement which measure an individual’s response to rapidly projected images of aberant behavior in order to estimate what is in specific boxes. (do not ask for details they would be censored anyway)

Our ability to measure sanity is not the question but, our ability? to understand the range of experiences tied up in someone else’s beetle box. I maintain that without God-like abilities to analyse all the relationships in the mind of an individual we cannot define or reveal any one of those relationships. Which is why Witgenstein used unobservability as a feature of his definition of PP.

…

quote shift:

---

This is what allowed for the explosion of what we now call: ‘the type of awareness that let’s us know that we are alive’. Since, via this
theory; desire fulfillment ‘without hyopocrisy’ renders catatonia;
__________________________justhink

Well… yes… If desire fulfilment is aimed at self centered satisfaction then increasingly more intense stimuli is required to satisfy the need for variety as each experience loses relevance in the need for repetition. That is because self centered satisfaction is aimed at stimulating the pleasure center in the brain. Yes catatonia is the logical conclusion. But ‘other-centered’ satisfaction – that which seeks the happiness or success of others (typically called altruistic behavior) does not require increasingly intense versions of a private thrill. Its satisfaction is experienced as an accumulation of accomplishments each of which never ceases to have relevance. They build and glorify. This thread is a grand example: each contributor is enhanced by the opportunity to contribute and receive, this thread will never be forgotten in the search for a better and more satisfying thread. In fact that search is what will make it memorable.
_________________________________________________________________
The meaning that individuals derive as value (for sentiences’ life support anyways) is so pathetic; that to gain the wealth and individuals you want in your life, is to literally sit down; craft logical corruptions that will hook the indentured system (primarily through algorythms that yeild ‘hypocracies’) and then basically drill a hole through your brain to somehow forget that you programmed yourself as such.
________________________justhink

I deny that we deceive ourselves in order to make this thread interesting.

um… what do you mean by self-recursive? The linguistic definition of recursive language means that units of speech can be used as sub-units of speech. – a noun may consist of an adjective and a noun; a sentence may consist of a clause and a sentence; in other words parts can be reused in larger parts yielding a potentially infinite number of utterances. In computer programming, a recursive language is one which can use the output of a function as input to the same function. Both definitions can be seen as the same with a little imagination. But I can’t see why you are refering to us humans (I assume you are one) as recursive beings, and self-recursive seems redundant. What is a non-recursive being, and a non-self-recursive being?

I do not want to change the thread merely clarify the terms. – how about indentured? forgive my inexperience. Is algorythmic inconsistency – inconsistent behavior such as exercising for health and refusing to eat healthy food?

on a final note: the definitions of those terms are necessary because we are trying to understand how terms such as these acquire meaning. My point is that while the circles of meaning included in many terms such as these may correspond from individual to individual they never exactly correspond. As a language sharing community we hope that most of our circles for each term overlap significantly (between users not between terms). The contents of the box are the same from individual to individual in direct relation to the co-incidence of those circles. If those circles are well matched by an individual he is judged sane by the rest of the language sharing community. Sanity therefore is an externally applied label. If my box for “world” contains the adjective “flat” I am not insane until I meet a community of “world” users whose “world” boxes share the adjective “cubic”, or “spherical”.
Why am I not insane? Because my box is entirely adequate to color my accumulation of other concepts such as “space”, “star”, “green” or “pain”.

I am not sure what dualism is, but it seems to me that the concept of PP necessarily requires that an objective unknowable(that is not perfectly knowable) exterior reality must exist. If it were possible to entirely know objective reality then all beetle boxes would contain the same thing.

-DAM

[DAM]

Justthink, are you saying that congnitive health involves consuming paradoxes as resources while denying the inconsistency of the paradox? You seem to have created an EigenEntity out of sentience, which we mere physical entities are bio-supporting by giving them a physical matrix within which to exist. What am I? chopped liver?

I reread the thread again, and I had a few new thoughts. here are a few of the most salient quotes:

1)flowbark: There is no external referrent by which to gauge the “correctness” (accuracy, truth, diversity, universality, etc., use whatever measure you like) of the internal PP – which is the core of the/your problem,

2)erl When two people understand the same thing, then, we are forced to the conclusion that one’s brain state (or series of states) corresponds to another’s in some way.

A traditional sense of explaining an isomorphism like this is to have a map or other sort of mediator… like language. But since we’ve discerned that language of PP can’t refer to a that, this forces us back to a dualistic state of existence, or a rejection of PP.

Our conclusion does seem to be this dichotomy: we accept dualism with PP, or we reject dualism and PP.

3)erl And here, too, we seem to agree. When I stop to examine the limits of shared understanding, I feel compelled to note that every act of communication somehow involves a beetle-box,

4)jerevan Because until we have explained everything, and shown that only physicalism is needed to do so, how can we make such an assumption?

5)flowbark
6. Of course I may have missed the point entirely.

6)erislover If all phenomenon are private, how can we communicate? Wittgenstein leads us here: if everything is sensation, and we communicate, then there must be types of sensation which can be considered public. What form do these sensations take ?

reactions:

1. The correctness of the PP is its ability to describe accurately the accidents of existence. ie. why the world around you acts the way it does. Everyone thinks his own PP is pretty good at that or they would (like erislover) be seeking to change or augment it/them.
   2a) Language of PP can’t refer to what? It seems unclear what you are refering to. 2b) If dualism covers more reality than we can accurately perceive with our senses then yes. The perfect perception of objective reality would mean that all of our PP would be the same.
2. Every concept in our mind was derived by logical analysis of information presented by our senses (which by the way are subject to failure).
3. Clever.
4. beginning to be an accurate description of my apprehension of this thread and justhink’s articulations. Can I have it for a signature?
   6)The meaning of each PP is arrived at after many incredibly infirm attempts to assume the meaning. Which turns out to be correct or at least to yield workable results and therefore is taken for correct. I am in Honduras trying to learn Spanish without a teacher. I observe that attempts to use sounds which have no intrinsic meaning when I utter them acquire meaning when I observe the reactions of the language community around me. Now I may (and have) made wrong assumptions about the meanings of some of the words I hear and it can take a long time to discover that error, because the incorrect paradigm I created works in a limited fashion in a wide variety of situations. It is when it fails to work in a new situation that I am able to review the unfounded assumption which created the error in the first place. I believe that as with language all things we “know” are arrived at after a similar trial of the assumption that that thing is true and observing the assumption’s effect on the world around us to receive confirmation that it is true. Which leads to a rather paradoxical conclusion (which I believe is the heart of erislover’s question), “you cannot know if something is true until you assume it is true and act on that assumption.”

DAM

[DAM]

In the OP the best form of the question (IMHO) was stated as,

---

"If done contextually, I think most people will agree that it is simple to match meaning with object. But in the case of PP, the object is unavailable for pointing; this must be so, by the very nature of PP: the “box” shields all eyes but our own… [there remains] the requirement that one demonstrate, then, where meaning actually comes from in the case of PP.
_________________________erislover

I believe I misstated the core goal of this thread when I said,

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If that’s what this thread is chasing – a objective description of perception. I am afraid it can’t be done.
____________________________DAM quoted by erislover

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Why not? This is what troubles me.
_______________________[troubling reply by erislover:]

Why not? If each of our PPs is a constantly changing referencial symbol then it will cause different symbol associations to occur each time we try to interpret objective experience. Those symbol associations are what we use to define meaning. Even the (supposedly objective) tree pointing exercise will not positively nail down the meaning inside someone’s “tree” box. because now it includes a shade of meaning which is influenced by who did the pointing and which tree was pointed at. (for both individuals involved) So, since the beetle in the box is constantly changing we cannot know objectively how someone’s box is filled. In fact to assume that something you say means the same to you as it does to the person who hears you is assuming too much. My creative writing teacher used to insist that the poem in your mind which motivated what appears on paper has no relationship to the poem in any reader’s mind. A large part of the excitement of this thread is attempting to derive a common paradigm for the individual phenomenon of PP.
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But clamp a certain someone’s nipple and watch them become sexually aroused. … If they responded to this with, “Oooh, that feels good!” and I responded to a shoulder rub with, “Oooh, that feels good!” are we to assume that “somehow” our physical states are
equivalent just because the words are the same? Because the use is the same? We wouldn’t suggest that it felt good in the same way, though.
____________________erislover

A very telling example. I hope I didn’t imply that the surface utterance was a direct and simple function of deeply defined symbols. Of course the same sentence does not imply the same motivation. Sentences are such a limited means of communication that it shouldn’t surprise us that one sentence can have many different meanings. Even in the same context. (words don’t).

One thing that’s interesting is that in context a response such as the one above, which might be considered non-standard, taken with an exhaustive census of other responses to other stimuli would give you a precise description of what is inside the pain box. There are some rather disturbing methods used by law enforcement which measure an individual’s response to rapidly projected images of aberant behavior in order to estimate what is in specific boxes. (do not ask for details they would be censored anyway)

Our ability to measure sanity is not the question but, our ability? to understand the range of experiences tied up in someone else’s beetle box. I maintain that without God-like abilities to analyse all the relationships in the mind of an individual we cannot define or reveal any one of those relationships. Which is why Witgenstein used unobservability as a feature of his definition of PP.

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quote shift:

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This is what allowed for the explosion of what we now call: ‘the type of awareness that let’s us know that we are alive’. Since, via this atheory; desire fulfillment ‘without hyopocrisy’ renders catatonia;
__________________________justhink

Well… yes… If desire fulfilment is aimed at self centered satisfaction then increasingly more intense stimuli is required to satisfy the need for variety as each experience loses relevance in the need for repetition. That is because self centered satisfaction is aimed at stimulating the pleasure center in the brain. Yes catatonia is the logical conclusion. But ‘other-centered’ satisfaction – that which seeks the happiness or success of others (typically called altruistic behavior) does not require increasingly intense versions of a private thrill. Its satisfaction is experienced as an accumulation of accomplishments each of which never ceases to have relevance. They build and glorify. This thread is a grand example: each contributor is enhanced by the opportunity to contribute and receive, this thread will never be forgotten in the search for a better and more satisfying thread. In fact that search is what will make it memorable.

um… what do you mean by self-recursive? The linguistic definition of recursive language means that units of speech can be used as sub-units of speech. – a noun may consist of an adjective and a noun; a sentence may consist of a clause and a sentence; in other words parts can be reused in larger parts yielding a potentially infinite number of utterances. In computer programming, a recursive language is one which can use the output of a function as input to the same function. Both definitions can be seen as the same with a little imagination. But I can’t see why you are refering to us humans (I assume you are one) as recursive beings, and self-recursive seems redundant. What is a non-recursive being, and a non-self-recursive being?

I do not want to change the thread merely clarify the terms. – how about indentured? forgive my inexperience. Is algorythmic inconsistency – inconsistent behavior such as exercising for health and refusing to eat healthy food?

on a final note: the definitions of those terms are necessary because we are trying to understand how terms such as these acquire meaning. My point is that while the circles of meaning included in many terms such as these may correspond from individual to individual they never exactly correspond. As a language sharing community we hope that most of our circles for each term overlap significantly (between users not between terms). The contents of the box are the same from individual to individual in direct relation to the co-incidence of those circles. If those circles are well matched by an individual he is judged sane by the rest of the language sharing community. Sanity therefore is an externally applied label. If my box for “world” contains the adjective “flat” I am not insane until I meet a community of “world” users whose “world” boxes share the adjective “cubic”, or “spherical”.
Why am I not insane? Because my box is entirely adequate to color my accumulation of other concepts such as “space”, “star”, “green” or “pain”.

-DAM

[erislover]

Damn, DAM, that quoting style is hard on the eyes. I’ll respond after I sort through it.

[TVAA]

In one sense, we can define words and concepts to mean whatever we like them to. In another sense, though, words and concepts can be incorrect.

For example, I can include through association the sensation of ‘dryness’ and the concept of ‘water’, but if I use the symbol ‘water’ to represent the chemical compound made of two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen, I’ll fail to correctly describe the characteristics of that compound.

If I use a word to refer to both a concept and an ‘object’, and the attributes of the object don’t match the attributes I bring together under the label of the word, then I would argue that I’m using that word incorrectly.

[Gartog]

Suddenly my faith in the Straight dope is restored and I remember why I joined.

Some thoughts.

Tree pointing: If I may use the word ‘cat’ in this example. If I ask you all to think of a cat you will probably think of a specific cat, perhaps one you have owned. Your PP of the concept ‘cat’ will be different to that of anyone else. Even I someone thinks of the same cat, their experience of cat (their PP) will be different.

It’s the same with the tree, although we can all agree what a tree (or Cat is) and can materialistically define it, our individual PP’s will be different.

Bearing this in mind how is it possible to communicate at all, let alone complex ideas such as pain?

I will suggest that in order for us to communicate our PP’s (our beetles) must be similar. I believe that if we come from similar cultural backgrounds our PP’s will be similar enough that we can.

An interesting though occurs to me, are our PP’s defined(and therefore limited) by the language we use? Can we experience something that we cannot describe?
I think where I’m heading with this is somewhere along the lines of . . To understand each other even a little our PP’s of concepts must be similar. Therefore the fact that we do understand each other suggests that our PPs must be similar.

Therefore I know enough what your idea of tree is to understand.

Thinking about this more I discover that when someone speaks of a complex idea (pain) I often ask them to elaborate so I can understand what they mean more clearly. Suggesting that our PP’s are different for ‘pain’ otherwise I wouldn’t need to ask.

In conclusion, our PP’s are similar with simpler concepts being more similar than more complex ones.

• Gartog

[erislover]

It does seem reasonable to conclude that they are similar. But I’m not so sure we agree on PP because they are similar, but rather because we are all taught essentially the same way.

For things like “green” that seems reasonable, but for “pain” it doesn’t seem so reasonable. Pain is what we call aversion to stimulii (in most cases, though of course we also try and avoid those who are tickling us).

As it stands, I can teach a child the word “pain” more or less easily than green? When looked at in terms of instruction on usage of the word the two seem to be completely different.

[Gartog]

Interesting connection.

There is of course no way to conclusively prove whether our PP’s are similar are not. (ie do we both experience green in the same way).

It’s possible that our PP are completely different but as long as we both relate our PP to the same word we would still be able to communicate - possibly.

If you PP experience of Pain was the same as my Joy, I think we would both be very confused, so I believe to some extent they must be similar.

Regarding teaching . . . . I was going to comment on the links between language and intelligence here, but I think that’s a different debate.

• Gartog

[erislover]

Do you feel it is the case that we should have to prove that PP are similar, though? I mean, what speaks against it? We react the same biologically, our usage of the word in language follows easily.

Can I say that I am as confident that you and I see green similarly as I am confident that I have a brain in my head? (I say this because I have never had an MRI or CAT scan or anything of the sort) Wittgenstien said of the latter that everything speaks for it, and nothing against it, and yet it is conceivable that were my skull to be opened up that we would not find a brain in there (no sly remarks, please ;)).

I think slee’s response works excellent for “pain”, then, but terribly for green. We all react a similar way to pain: we avoid it, or seek to stop it. Pain, we can definitely say, has an objective manifestation independent of language. But what about color sensation? This seems completely lost to me. I am not sure how we can say that the perception of color manifests itself in any way that we can say it is similar.

Yet both “pain” and “green” seem to be described as “sensations”… that is, I can have a sensation of green and a sensation of pain. Is it perhaps this, and this alone, which leads us astray? Is pain not really a mental phenomenon but a biological one that has a mental counterpart? But then, how does green differ from that at all?

We sort of have a built-in response to certain stimulii; when that stimulus is a pin prick, we seek to avoid it, and we call the sensation we get from something we want to avoid “pain”. But green? There doesn’t seem to be a built-in response to green in the same way. We cannot, for example, ask everyone what their favorite color is, because we don’t know that color perception manifests itself in a standard “favorite”. That is to say, we can verify the sensation of what we call “pain” independently from questioning people. We simply burn them or prick them and notice the reaction. But for color? I see nothing there. So that’s why I now wonder if it is right to group color with pain at all…

[erislover]

What I might want to say here is: I can conceive of the notion that you and I see green differently, just as I can conceive of the notion that my skull is actually filled with putty. But do I actually have a reason to doubt it? sleestak, is this what you were trying to get at before wrt the “simplicity” argument?

“That really hurts” but not “That is really green”. In terms of common usage, though I have said things like “That is really [color]” meaning, very intense, and someone agrees. So with regards to usage the words correspond easily.

But interesting that the teaching of the words is quite possibly very different. Imagine trying to teach someone the difference between two colors, red and blue.

I have here a red ball, and a blue ball, and I place it before them, one in each hand. I now giev a slight motion with the left hand (holding the blue ball) and say, “This ball is blue,” then with the right, “This ball is red.” But now pretend that “blue” means “right” and “red” means “left”. The sentences and situation has not changed! (yes, the blue ball was in my left hand, but since I’m showing someone the directions are reversed).

There are things which are not perceived directly, like direction. Direction has a clear use, but it is not a sensation. Which complicates matters? “What I perceive indicates that from where I am sitting the ball on the left is blue.” “What I perceive indicates that from where I am sitting the blue ball is on the left.” In one sentence, I reference the color, in the other, the direction. What is interesting to me is that the first sentence seems awkward to me with respect to the second… we, after all, don’t reference color with respect to anything… we should not say, “From where I am sitting it is blue” because sitting and placement have nothing to do with color. But isn’t that how we just taught the use of color above? By directing attention to motion, placement, and so on?

Color serves an objective part in language, like direction, like pain, but it seems to me that there is no justification for the objectivity of color whatsoever. For me, it seems, I literally doubt that we see colors the same. But the use of color-words doesn’t change!

ARGH

I run in circles on this topic. Once I let the tiniest bit of subjectivity enter into things, it seems to spread like ants through to everything. Why is it that we use color objectively but directions are relative? It is trivial to say: “Because direction is relative.” But isn’t color? It must be, if you admit that we don’t see color the same way!

I need to stop thinking about this again.