There are plenty around (as already noted). The point is that it was not only British Generals who could be labeled “butchers” due to casualties. Throw in Russians, Austrians, Italians, Turks French and Germans. Other countries suffered pro rata casualties as well but were often under the command of Generals of the dominant powers. Initially at any rate.
As MarcusF has pointed out above, I believe Laffin should be approached with caution. I have some papers here (sorry, not from a book- a very old online reference) which lists some pretty sad errors in his analysis.
While I am on my soapbox, I would also treat books by Corrigan with a degree of caution. His style is very much “either agree with me or you are a moron”. While the books are usually quite readable he does have a hectoring style and some of his claims have very thin backing.
They did try desperately to develop better means of communication. The obvious one was unrolling a field telephone line behind the attacking troops but this rarely worked as the line got cut by shell fire (or some bloke tripping over it!). As you say flares were tried - by both sides and much earlier than 1918 - but that is very limited and only one way. Semaphore was tried, homing pigeons were tried but the front line during an attack was not a friendly environment for either signaller or bird! Coloured markers laid on the ground to be seen by aircraft were used. This actually reflected the fact that there had been advances in technology to allow an aircraft to carry a wireless set, an impressive reduction in size and weight but not yet enough to allow it to be carried by the infantry going into battle.
Not sure what you mean by “using tanks properly” in the context of the Western Front but always remember a 1917-18 tank was not comparable to a 1939-45 tank.
If you are going to look at the Naval side - don’t build the High Seas Fleet in the first place. A massive consumer of resources but not strong enough to actually defeat the Royal Navy; just enough to frighten the life out of Britain and move them towards France and - amazingly - Russia.
Interesting you mention Corrigan. I was given his Mud, Blood and Poppycock at Christmas. As you’ll have gathered I generally agree with his thesis that the British generals were much better than popular culture believes but I have to say I’ve found his style irritating. “Hectoring” is spot on.
By 1918 some two-seat aircraft (and, I believe, observation balloons) had morse code radio transmitters in them, as you note- but the receiving units were still far from infantryman-portable.
Flares were used by the Flying Corps of both armies quite extensively as they were an excellent way to signal between aircraft- even if they had voice-transmitting radios in them, there’s no way they’d be able to hear each other over the noise of the engine and the wind (WWI aircraft generally had no canopies)- and they had the bonus of being useful for destroying one’s machine if it crash-landed behind enemy lines.
I believe Heliograph was still used throughout the war as well, particularly in Palestine and Africa (yes, there was an African theatre in WWI. A Pacific one, too) where there was lots of sunlight and not as much mud to interfere with it.
People forget there was a lot of innovation in WWI, too- besides the obvious stuff like “Tanks” and “Fighter Aircraft”, there were things like “Torpedo Bombers” and “Flying Boats” and “Ship-launched aircraft”. The Sub-machine gun was invented during WWI, radio sets were- well, not miniaturised, but reduced in size enough to be mounted in aircraft, along with numerous other advances in various areas that were expanded upon in WWII.
Are you speaking theoretically or are you referring to specific information you have? According to the wiki entry on the history of the artillery barrage, they were used relatively effectively. At least in terms of getting troops across no-mans land and engaging the enemy’s trenchline before they can be mowed down by machinegun fire. You still had to deal with counterattacks and following up the advance with additional support.
Conversely, a rolling barrage can also be used to deny an enemy access to an area. But I get a sense that these barrages were complex and needed to be planned out ahead of time. It’s not like they had GPS guided computer controlled artillery.
Almost, but not quite. Without the German fleet, an Allied amphibious invasion of Germany might have been, if not possible than at least attemptible. Jutland was enough to confirm that the two navies were at a stalemate; only if one or the other suffered a catastrophe could either side hope to take the offensive at sea, and neither side wanted to take the risk. An ironic counterpoint to the trench stalemate on land.
Are we talking about heavy artillery, or did you mean that the use by attacking infantry of light mortars to target individual machinegun nests? I understand they did develop them in WW1, so I don’t know if they helped or not.
It was tried. Under the Wikipedia entry for “Elephant Gun” it says
and links to a page with a photo of one here: [1] And for that matter, even sillier things were tried.
ETA: and finally, I’ve heard that it turned out that the fragmentation shells used in WW1 were ineffective, and that if from the start they’d used high-explosive rounds instead it would have been more effective. True?
last but not least, a link to an old thread of mine: **WW1 refought 1918 style**
Honestly, for all those various things you just listed, I really do not think they tried hard enough. Field phones wires managed to survive in areas like Stalingrad during WW2. I think had they made some effort in either the phones or the wires themselves they could have made something that worked.
As in: more like they did at the beginning of Passchendale and less like their introduction at the Somme, but make certain the battle plan allowed for down time on the tanks.
Yeah, but I am going on with the whole ‘It is 1914/15/16 and you cannot change anything in the past, what the heck are you going to do now?’ motif.
I’m not really buying that. I can see a few raids here and there, but nothing like a real decent invasion on hostile territory. I don’t think anyone had the resources to mount such an action. I figure if you get them out there they might make some mischief and maybe even seriously damage some of the British fleet. No assurances, of course, but ‘let’s just sit here the rest of the war’ wasn’t exactly a winner, was it?
Was any of the artillery of that era self-propelled?
Fragmentation shells (shrapnel) were highly effective against infantry in the open but obviously no use against defenders sheltering in dug-outs nor was it effective in cutting the barbed wire entanglements in no-man’s land. It’s true that the Somme bombardment had much too high a proportion of shrapnel and light and medium shells - as opposed too heavy HE rounds - to be effective. Another consequence of the massive expansion of the British arms industry. A dash for numbers at the expense of quality and consideration of actual need.
Hell- they had no dress sense- mine from the 70’s I can still laugh at!
I think I stole that term from a review of his second book “Blood Sweat and Arrogance” which I liked better than “Mud, Blood and Poppycock”.
However, I think he does take aim at things he knows will irritate people but make them take notice.
As an example, he mentions that General Haking was known as “Butcher Haking” by the Australians because he ordered them to do trench raids. he conveniently ignores the Battle of Fromelles which Haking oversaw. The Australian 5th Division suffered 80% casualties in the two attacking battalions and Haking blamed the 61 st Division for not having enough fighting spirit. Haking did say that the attack did both Divisions the world of good- oh pardon me but how?
He is the sort of General- like Aylmer Hunter-Weston- who should have been castrated.
Anyway- that was O/T. Resume normal transmissions.
They made massive efforts - every commander in every army was only too aware of the communications problem - but Stalingrad is not a fair comparison in relation to the Franco-British situation of the Western Front. Field telephones were useful when defending as the Germans were both at Stalingrad and on the Western Front. Leading back from the front line trenches were complex networks of wires buried more than six foot deep that did survive (mostly) but the problem came when they advanced. You can’t bury wires six foot deep as you’re attacking so they are very vulnerable to enemy shell fire - something there was always plenty of in WW1. Dropping an artillery barrage behind the attackers was a standard German tactic - to cut off the first wave from reinforcement and leave them vulnerable to counter-attack - and this would practically always break the lines.
It’s the same problem as waiting for “enough” artillery. You’re about to launch **the **major British attack of the war on the Somme. We know now it didn’t work but it was part of a coordinate attack by Russian, French and British forces intended to win the war. Tanks have just become available so should Haig have said “No, we’ll save them until we have enough of them to launch a massed attack.” or was his actual response, “Excellent, we’ll use as many as can be got to the front to give our troops any iota of advantage we can.”? Also, how do you allow for “down time” on the tanks? Stop the attack after 12 hours to recover the broken down tanks and repair them? Only use a quarter of the limited number you’ve got in the first attack? Not sure this is practical.
I see you point. Given where they were in 1916 - say after Jutland - what to do with the High Seas Fleet? Probably no “good” solutions! Launch a futile attack and loose it at sea - hand a massive propaganda victory to the Allies? Break it up and use the men and materiel to build U-boats - but this allows the British to release resources tied up in the Grand Fleet.
Quite. A view that, overall, the WW1 commanders have been criticised unjustly doesn’t alter the fact that some of them were truly dreadful and many of them made mistakes as they learned their trade - mistakes that cost many men their lives.
After Jutland, the High Seas Fleet took a a long time to get back to full strength, but even so it is difficult to see it going against the Grand Fleet which was getting stronger. And after 1917 it was supplemented by heavy units from the USA. Additionally, Germany was feeling the pinch from the blockade so vital components were virtually not available.
In saying that, the High Seas Fleet was a big investment but it probably cost the UK as much to match it by not releasing destroyers or men to combat submarines. These were all tied up at Scapa Flow or with what was Beatty’s command.
(I did like a quote from a German sailor after the High Seas Fleet was interned at Scapa Flow- “If you spent 4 years here you deserved to win the war”) Probably apocryphal .
I hate Firefox.
MarcusF I tried to send you a PM but you seem to have them turned off. I have a few books here about the Great War which I can happily post to you rather than buying them- just drop me a note.
I think some was mounted on tracked chassis but I don’t think there was anything equivalent to the armoured self-propelled artillery of later periods. Not something I’ve looked into so somebody with more detailed knowledge may be along to correct/amplify this. (Although I suppose you could think of the first tanks as self-propelled 6-pounders!)
Generally guns were pulled by large teams of horses although tracked vehicles were used to pull the heavies pieces. Either way it was very difficult to move them up over the broken ground of the battlefield and the crews were very vulnerable. Even harder was to bring up the endless supplies of ammunition they needed. Generally they were supplied by specially built light railways from the major depots at the railheads.
Disagree. Occasional efforts to reduce casualties with tanks and the German storm tactics came late in the war, preceded by numerous “big push” human wave attacks that ended in misery, re-learning lessons that had been amply demonstrated at Gettysburg, Franklin (Tennessee), and Cold Harbor, over 50 years before.
Concur with this.
Ok, disagree again. 
The artillery barrage was launched in the clear knowledge that heavier guns counted more than lighter guns, and high explosive counted much more than ball shrapnel, and almost all the guns were lightweight guns and the vast bulk of the ammunition was shrapnel. In light of this known deficiency (bigger guns and more high-explosive shells were being made, but no one wanted to wait) the plan emphasized that the shrapnel would at least cut the wire, although it was notorious for not having done so in other battles. This is the famous definition of stupidity – trying the same thing and expecting (more like hoping for) different results.
Again, they knew the defensive fire from the trenches would cause humongous casualties – that’s WHY everyone was in trenches by 1916. The planned Somme advance wouldn’t even break all the way through the German reserve trench line, anyway, because it was beyond artillery range (very deliberately, by German calculation).
The ‘mistake’ the Somme commanders made, such as it was, lay in not realizing that the likely loss of so many men would wear down their own war effort so sharply, which it did. They certainly had to know the loss was all but certain and that the best case gain would be minimal. That willingness to accept shattering loss of life for no gain at all or at best a poor, short-term gain…to send others to their deaths rather than think of something different…is exactly why they’re remembered as bloody-minded.
Many of the British units came under machine-gun fire while advancing across open British-held ground to their start positions, and their dead lay entirely on ground that was Allied before the assault began. It remains to this day the worst disaster ever to befall the British military, and it’s not like they were fighting for the crown at Hastings…just a few yards of mud, some psychological “pressure” taken off the French forces, and a demonstration of “willingness to fight” – i.e., that British judgment was every bit as bad as French and German.
In retrospect, it was a bad idea, but it was also a bad idea before it was tried and plenty of people knew it.
What else could they have done? Exactly, of course, what they subsequently did – lie low and think of something different. The Germans eventually came up with their infiltration or “storm” tactics even without tanks; the British came up with tanks; hell, the Union army had used Emory Upton’s assault column pretty effectively to break trenches, 52 years before the Somme, and next year tried mining at the Crater, which was bungled but theoretically tactically sound. Alternatives to massed frontal assault were out there, even without waiting for technology, and people very quickly developed them…right AFTER all those boys died. They could have bloody done it BEFORE sending them to their deaths, and everyone knows it.
edit: I see that the fragmentation shells vs wire issue has already been discussed.