Wonder how Germany managed to win the Franco Prussian war 5 years later…
By fighting France.
Jokes aside, until WWII France was a serious military power who were not to be trifled with- and the only reason the “Until WWII” qualifier is there is because so many Frenchmen were killed during WWI (which was predominantly fought in, wait for it… France) that they just didn’t have the manpower or inclination to go through a repeat of that only 21 years afterwards. Entire generations were wiped out in WWI, so you can sort of understand their point. The “Cheese Eating Surrender Monkey” thing, whilst amusing, really isn’t fair.
All’s fair in love and war… and comedy.
Both sides could have profitably studied the American Civil War, especially the last few months - many of the elements that characterised the Western Front were present there. But neither side apparently thought that they had anything to learn from those military parvenus.
Ironically the exact reverse occurred in 1917 when the US Army failed to learn from the British and French and sent ill-supported infantry charging into prepared positions all over again.
I’d suggest you read Cataclysm: The First World War as a Political Tragedy, the most interesting new WWI book I’ve come across for quite some time.
There were many peace feelers. But in each case it was the side that felt it was on top at that instant that had the domestic political capital to make an offer, but the other side felt they could not consider any such offer while they had nothing to show for all the blood and treasure they had so far expended. At no time was there a situation where both sides could simultaneously sell to their respective publics that they had “won” enough to justify the effort so far, and agree to a peace. This was not helped by the fact that Germany had no clear war aim from the very start; what would a minimal “victory” have looked like to them?
Far be it from me to go the Surrender Monkey route (you said it, not me), but if we’re talking about the France that got thoroughly rolled during the Franco-Prussian War, then I think you’re being awfully charitable towards them.
According to the link in post #77 (which I don’t know whether it’s true), Germany is the only one that made any kind of positive response to Wilson’s 1916 peace initiative. And when would anyone but the Germans have felt “on top” inough to make an offer. On the Western Front, pretty much all the fighting was done one French and Belgian soil, so it’s hard to imagine the French in particular would ever have made an offer under those conditions. And it’s equally hard to imagine the British doing so without some kind of support from France. But one would think Germany would have been satisfied to stop almost any time if the borders were redrawn around the territory they had conquered.
The Eastern Front, I know even less about. Except that the Russians did in fact bail out after their own revolution. Anyone know what were the terms? Did they cede a bunch of Territory to Germany? If they did, did they get it back after Germany surrendered some months later?
Read about the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Made Versailles look like a charitable gesture to the Germans.
The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. A map showing how much territory Russia surrendered (although it doesn’t show all of it - Russia also lost some territory in the Caucasus region). Russia also agreed to some relatively minor cash reperations.
The treaty was reputiated within a few months. It was not however directly at the demand of the Allies. Germany and the Ottoman Empire had already reputiated the treaty before their surrender to the allies in order to demand more from Russia. The Allied victory prevented them from carrying out these demands. The subsequent Treaty of Rapallo was the official peace treaty with Russia and Germany withdrew its claims against Russia under that. (But Russia didn’t get back all of their territory it had lost because some regions had declared independence.)
Bumping the thread, for this interesting Dictionary.com list of words and phrases that originated in or were popularized during WWI: From The Trenches: Words Of World War I - Dictionary.com
When the only way to win is not to play you just shouldn’t play.
I know this is a zombie.
I am reading Churchill’s The World Crisis 1911-1918, published in 1931.
Churchill was a big supporter of trying to find a way to use England’s control of the seas to “outflank” the German’s, and hit them in other areas. (Like the Dardenelles.) BTW, He also spends three freaking chapters defending his decisions about the Dardenelles, and considers that campaign as mishandled (by other folks), and a great “lost opportunity”.
Churchill (who later went to serve on the Western Front for a year or two) describes the trenches of the Western Front as a great siege line, unable to be flanked in France. Therefore, any campaigns there are essentually frontal assualts on fortified ground, which any General knows requires three or four to one in attacker/defender ratios (a number never achieved by the Entente), huge amounts of ammunition, and preperation by artillery, engineers, and so on. Campaigns in this enviornment always favor the defender. In Churchills words (page 292 in my copy): “For more than forty years frontal attacks had been abandoned on account of the severity of modern fire. <snipped real life examples> It was certain that frontal attacks unaccompanied by turning movements on the flank would be extremely costly and would probably fail. But now, in France and Flanders for the first time in recorded experience there were no flanks to turn.”
Churchill advocated that no Entente attack occur before mid-1916 at the earliest, due to the untrained nature of the new armies raised by England, as well as a critical (his words) ammunition shortage England was experiencing at the beginning of 1915. This was not to be. France wqas calling the shots on that front, and Joffre was totally against any idea of allowing the Germans to remain in possession of French soil.
Churchill also describes the war in the west as being in three phases: The initial German attack in 1914, the stalemate of 1915-1917, and the final German gamble and endgame of 1918.
For some reason, I had never considered the Western Front as a single idea and entity the way Churchill describes it here. A solid front 350 miles long, guarded by millions of mens, and thousands of cannon.
The Generals of all sides knew from all their training and real world (recent previous wars) examples that frontal assaults suck, yet they couldn’t abide not taking the war to the enemy. Frontal assault was the only option left on that front, so that’s what they tried.
One of the tragedy’s was lack of proper intel, too. Enemy casualty figures were always estimately way too high. The Great planners of these offensives consoled themselves with the idea that while they were suffering thousands of dead and wounded, so too was the enemy. They assumed that a war of attrition was a viable strategy in this context. The numbers bear out (as calculated after the war, once everyone had access to the other sides records), though, that the attackers on this front generally suffered two (or more) to one in casualties compared to the defender. Under this metric, a strategy of attrition is not viable (for the side that generally is the attacker more often).
I wouldn’t know, but are you sure it was just “some psychological pressure” taken off the French?
What if, for instance, without the Somme, Germans would have made a breakthrough at Verdun?
Adieu Paris. No great loss, though–just ask the Brits any other time in the previous 700 years. 
But that’s up to the politicians and diplomats, not the generals.
See Paths of Glory.
Also Eric, by Terry Pratchett:
“The consensus seemed to be that if really large numbers of men were sent to storm the mountain, then enough might survive the rocks to take the citadel. This is essentially the basis of all military thinking.”
Why do you think Churchill (who had daily access to General Haig) wrote differently?
mlees: Not sure what you mean. What did Churchill write differently?
Incidentally, Churchill did not have “daily access to Haig”. In 1914-15 Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty - no direct connection to Haig who was one of the General French’s subordinates. When Churchill rejoined the army in France in December 1915 it was as a battalion commander - not daily contact with Haig as the new CinC of the BEF. Churchill was only in France until March 1916 - only a month actually with his battalion in the trenches - and when he returned to Parliament in mid-1916 first he was on the back benches and then Minister of Munitions from mid-1917 neither role involved daily contact with the commander of the BEF.
But… but the Steam achievements, man !
:smack: I meant Kitchener. Sorry.
Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Kitchener (Secretary for the State of War, IIRC), Fisher (First Sea Lord), and Prime Minister Asquith (among others) were part of a Cabinet level committee that met at least twice weekly to discuss and debate war strategy. (To the level of even detailing when and where major attacks were to be undertaken, which military units were going to deploy were, arranging supply for all that, etc.) On top of those meetings, there were also less formal meetings by individual cabinet members at other times as well. Kitchener warned (in the begining of 1915) that the Western Front was a “siege line that could not be breached”, if Kitchener’s wiki page can be believed. I doubt that Churchill and Kitchener were mavericks in this opinion, at least on the British side.
Joffre… I don’t know enough about. 
As other people point out in this thread, The French drove events on the front then, and both the French politicians and the French Generals would not stand around waiting and hoping that the Germans to be so kind as to throw their Army away by attacking prepared, fortified positions.
As with a lot of topics in discussion, it seems to me that there is no “easy” single sound-bite answer to the question Why were lives wasted in frontal assaults?. Many things drove the decision to go to war, and many things were involved in shaping where and how it was fought.
For example: Russia was in dire trouble at the start of 1915. Their army had been pushed back many miles and suffered much casualties. The Russian army was severly short on ammunition, food, even weapons such as rifles. Churchill relates that there was a serious fear in London that Russia would be knocked out of the war once the eatern front thawed. Churchills idea was to force open the Dardenelles so that supplies could be rushed to Russia (via the Black Sea). At the time, Turkey had deployed only a few dozen light-ish cannon, and strung some mines acroos the straits. On paper, it looked like a determined push by a naval force could succeed. His only problem was he forgot to factor in “murphey’s law (battlefield variant)”. But anywho, the decision of “when and where” was partially driven by events outside of the control of those that had to make those decisions.