# World War II Buffs: WWII Strategy?

**URL:** <https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720>\
**Category:** Factual Questions\
**Created:** [March 9, 2022, 3:28am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720 "2022-03-09T03:28:15Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 20\
**Page:** 3

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**Author:** ![Max\_S](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/46a35a/32.png) [@Max\_S](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Max_S)\
**Post date:** [March 10, 2022, 7:48pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/41 "2022-03-10T19:48:07Z")

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What was the range of the German AA?

~Max

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**Author:** ![silenus](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/silenus/32/166_2.png) [@silenus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/silenus)\
**Post date:** [March 10, 2022, 8:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/42 "2022-03-10T20:03:19Z")

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26,000 ft. for the 8.8cm Flak 18/36/37/41

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**Author:** ![Max\_S](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/46a35a/32.png) [@Max\_S](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Max_S)\
**Post date:** [March 10, 2022, 8:07pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/43 "2022-03-10T20:07:07Z")

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Interesting, I knew they flew lower but I didn’t know it was that much lower. Yet B-26 Mauraders apparently outperformed the Flying Fortresses in terms of attrition.

~Max

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**Author:** ![Wallaby](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/w/dc4da7/32.png) [@Wallaby](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Wallaby)\
**Post date:** [March 10, 2022, 8:14pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/44 "2022-03-10T20:14:26Z")

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From _ **I’m Sorry I’ll Read That Again** _:

“Ok, chaps. Our maps are a bit old, but here goes.  
We want you to fly over Gaul, and drop your bombs just north of the Holy Roman Empire. Just above the ‘V’ in Land of the Visigoths”.

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**Author:** ![Limmin](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/f04885/32.png) [@Limmin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Limmin)\
**Post date:** [March 11, 2022, 12:46am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/45 "2022-03-11T00:46:50Z")

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> [@Jasmine](#):
>
> It was easier and much more rewarding to bomb factories.

I misread this as “…rewarding to bomb the bomb factories.”

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**Author:** ![Banksiaman](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/banksiaman/32/3334_2.png) [@Banksiaman](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Banksiaman)\
**Post date:** [March 11, 2022, 6:22am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/46 "2022-03-11T06:22:11Z")

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They used to go on about sabotaging ball bearing factories all the time on Hogan’s Heroes. As a teen my only knowledge of ball bearings was their use in bicycle wheel axles, so I always thought it was a more or less made-up gag. Glad to have the additional context, even if its decades late.

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**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\
**Post date:** [March 11, 2022, 12:09pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/47 "2022-03-11T12:09:37Z")

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The TLDR version is that one of the reasons it took as long as it did to start to target transportation was the prewar strategic bombing doctrine called for selectively attacking key components of of industry, as has been posted above. This is a [good summary](https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/B_0008_WATTS_FOUNDATIONS_DOCTRINE.pdf):

> [@](#):
>
> Before proceeding . I want to provide a concise statement of the theory of industrial bombardment that ACTS bomber enthusiasts had derived by 1939 . In brief. the prevailing air power doctrine at the Tactical School just prior to World ; War 11 can be formulated as follows:
> 
> > [@](#):
> >
> > The most efficient way to defeat an enemy is to destroy, by means of bombardment from the air, his war-making capacity ; the means to this end is to identify by scientific analysis those particular elements of his war potential the elimination of which will cripple either his war machine or his will to continue the conflict ; these elements having been identified, they should be attacked by large masses of bombardment aircraft flying in formation, at high altitude, in daylight, and equipped with precision bombsights that will make possible the positive identification and destruction of “pinpoint” targets; finally, such bombing missions having been carried out, the enemy, regardless of his strength in armies and navies, will lack the means to support continued military action.
> 
> At the heart of this theory lay three interlocking principles . There was, to begin with, the idea that the machinery of a modern industrial state would swiftly cease to function if certain vital elements within its more important economic systems could be destroyed. This proposition, the so-called industrial web concept, originated with Donald Wilson’ and was elaborated by Muir S . Fairchild.’ Hand in glove with the industrial web concept went the idea that sufficient precision to destroy vital links in an enemy state’s industrial web could be achieved with daylight bombardment from high altitude . Finally, there was Kenneth Walker’s deeply held conviction that well-planned, well-flown bomber formations could always get through and, hence, that such formations could be self-defending.

From my earlier post, I found a something which backed up this point:

> [@TokyoBayer](#):
>
> There are lots of good answers in the thread, but it should also be noted that the prewar development of the various strategies and doctrines for air war became obsolete because of the rapid improvements of aircraft. The cost of development was relatively cheap (the B-29 came much later. . . . ) but the results could be large.

From a Master’s Thesis [Deconstructing the Myth of the Norden Bombsight](file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/Deconstructing%20the%20Myth%20of%20the%20Norden%20Bombsight.pdf)

> [@](#):
>
> More problematic for the NBS and daylight precision bombing was the fact that testing of the mechanism was always done in ideal conditions at reasonably low altitudes, whereas, in battle, situations were rarely, if ever, ideal. Furthermore, the tactics employed by the Luftwaffe were in essence tactics that were deemed unachievable during the formative years of American bombing doctrine.8  
> **This was due primarily to wartime advances in German aircraft–and weapon design–rather than to any serious lack of insight on the part of AAF officers**. The use of 30-millimeter long-range cannons allowed Luftwaffe pilots to engage the high altitude bombers effectively from outside the range of the .50 caliber guns utilized by the Americans. Since Luftwaffe pursuit fighters were able to climb as high as the bombers, and more importantly, were fast enough to catch them, the theorized invincibility of the “flying fortresses” were further negated. In these conditions, bomber crews were expected to hand over the controls of their lumbering planes to an automated pilot leaving them exposed both to the German fighters and to ground fire for extended periods of time!

My bolding.

In addition, German AA was simply much, much better than anticipated prewar, which necessitated flying at higher altitudes. Other problems included the weather. IIRC, the Norden bombsight was tested in Texas where the number of days without cloudy cover are significantly greater than in Germany.

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**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\
**Post date:** [March 11, 2022, 12:39pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/48 "2022-03-11T12:39:53Z")

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> [@txtumbleweed](#):
>
> Factories are pretty hard to destroy, especially heavy industries. Apparently, bombs would blow the roof off the factory, but the heavy equipment inside would hardly be damaged. For example, according to Wiki, Germany produced more than double the number of fighter aircraft in 1944 than they did in 1943 (25k vs 10k) despite the intensity of the Allied bombing campaign.
> 
> Frankly, an earlier and more intense focus on petroleum supplies would have had greater impact. Nothing moves without fuel and near the end of the war the war machines of both Germany and Japan were both, almost literally, out of gas. But even there, it required direct attacks or capture of oil stocks, rather than the infrastructure.

This again was a problem that (if I understand correctly) they really didn’t understand that well until after the war. They would take photos after the raids and it would show damage to the building, but they didn’t understand they weren’t getting as much results as they thought.

I think I read someone that Germany found that they could harden factories by having sandbags and such in key places in a factory. I don’t really remember much, so take it for all that’s worth.

It look a long time to convince the USAAF to [drop mines](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Starvation) around Japan but it was highly successful.

> [@](#):
>
> **Operation Starvation** was a [naval mining](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_mine) operation conducted in [World War II](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II) by the [United States Army Air Forces](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Army_Air_Forces), in which vital water routes and ports of Japan were [mined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_mine) from the air in order to disrupt enemy shipping.
> 
> . . .
> 
> Eventually most of the major ports and straits of Japan were repeatedly mined, severely disrupting Japanese [logistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logistics) and troop movements for the remainder of the war with 35 of 47 essential convoy routes having to be abandoned. For instance, shipping through [Kobe](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kobe) declined by 85%, from 320,000 tons in March to only 44,000 tons in July.[[4]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Starvation#cite_note-4) Operation _Starvation_ sank more ship tonnage in the last six months of the war than the efforts of all other sources combined. The [Twentieth Air Force](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twentieth_Air_Force) flew 1,529 sorties and laid 12,135 mines in twenty-six fields on forty-six separate missions. Mining demanded only 5.7% of the XXI Bomber Command’s total sorties, and only fifteen B-29s were lost in the effort. In return, mines sank or damaged 670 ships totaling more than 1,250,000 tons.
> 
> . . .
> 
> After the war, the commander of Japan’s [minesweeping](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_mine#Mine_sweeping) operations noted that he thought this mining campaign could have directly led to the defeat of Japan on its own had it begun earlier. Similar conclusions were reached by American analysts who reported in July 1946 in the [United States Strategic Bombing Survey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_Bombing_Survey_(Pacific_War)) that it would have been more efficient to combine the United States’ effective [anti-shipping submarine effort](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pacific_War#Submarine_warfare) with land- and carrier-based air power to strike harder against merchant shipping and begin a more extensive aerial mining campaign earlier in the war. This would have starved Japan, forcing an earlier end to the war.

Even better than just mining the ports and straits, combining that attacks on the railways would have that much more effective.

The US made the mistake of not targeting tankers and refineries in DEI earlier in the war. They were not able to repair them as quickly as what Germany was doing.

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**Author:** ![Jasmine](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/jasmine/32/2964_2.png) [@Jasmine](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Jasmine)\
**Post date:** [March 11, 2022, 1:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/49 "2022-03-11T13:27:02Z")

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> [@Limmin](#):
>
> I misread this as “…rewarding to bomb the bomb factories.”

Actually, it would be more rewarding if your bombs set off the bombs that they are making so that, in essence, they would be helping to bomb themselves! LOL

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**Author:** ![Mk\_VII](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/5f9b8f/32.png) [@Mk\_VII](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mk_VII)\
**Post date:** [March 12, 2022, 3:13pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/50 "2022-03-12T15:13:53Z")

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Filling bomb casings with explosive doesn’t usually take place in the same factory that makes them. The explosives and propellant factories are usually a good way from habitation.

Air Marshall Harris had an impatience with what he called ‘panacea’ targets which had at various times, been urged on him - supposedly vital industries whose disruption would cause the whole of German industry to fall over in an exhausted heap. Not least because it was beyond his powers to damage these industries significantly.

The real ‘panacea’ turned out to be oil - but only in the last six months did it have a significant effect and the ground war, which strategic bombing was supposed to make unnecessary, was already sweeping across the German border by that point.

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**Author:** ![bob\_2](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/bob_2/32/3341_2.png) [@bob\_2](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/bob_2)\
**Post date:** [March 12, 2022, 3:55pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/51 "2022-03-12T15:55:57Z")

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> [@Mk\_VII](#):
>
> Filling bomb casings with explosive doesn’t usually take place in the same factory that makes them.

Maybe not today, but during both World Wars and before that, manufacture of explosive ordnance was generally carried out in a single complex.

I have been to three sites in England and Wales. One was abandoned after WW1 and many of the buildings are still there, buried in sand as the whole site was built on sand. The other two are both now industrial estates. One, Rotherwas near Hereford. still has some of the now derelict buildings where up to 70,000 shells a week were produced during WW2

> **[Eerie images of crumbling building that was once a WWI bomb factory](https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3626007/Eerie-pictures-crumbling-building-one-Britain-s-bomb-factories-supplying-70-000-shells-week-WWI.html)**
>
> Royal Ordnance Factory Rotherwas, Herefordshire, has been ravaged by neglect since it was shut down in 1967. The historic site employed 12,000 workers during both world wars.

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**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\
**Post date:** [March 13, 2022, 10:51am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/52 "2022-03-13T10:51:40Z")

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> [@Jasmine](#):
>
> Actually, it would be more rewarding if your bombs set off the bombs that they are making so that, in essence, they would be helping to bomb themselves! LOL

That’s how many of the warships were sunk.

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**Author:** ![Whack-a-Mole](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/whack-a-mole/32/141_2.png) [@Whack-a-Mole](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Whack-a-Mole)\
**Post date:** [March 13, 2022, 4:01pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/53 "2022-03-13T16:01:45Z")

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> [@TokyoBayer](#):
>
> That’s how many of the warships were sunk.

_“There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today.”_

~ Royal Navy Vice Admiral David Beatty (Battle of Jutland, WWI, after several of their ships outright exploded from their ammo magazines detonating)

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**Author:** ![SunUp](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/ea5d25/32.png) [@SunUp](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SunUp)\
**Post date:** [March 13, 2022, 4:25pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/54 "2022-03-13T16:25:54Z")

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A good trivia factoid: every ship sunk at the Battle of Midway was sunk by the explosion of one or more Japanese torpedoes.

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**Author:** ![bump](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/7c8e57/32.png) [@bump](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/bump)\
**Post date:** [March 14, 2022, 2:41am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/55 "2022-03-14T02:41:22Z")

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This is the real answer here. Basically until about the first part of 1944, the 8th AF was trying to hit specific chosen industrial targets in the thinking that they were bottlenecks or critical industries of some kind.

One thing that I read that got to _why_ the rail campaign was so effective, was that it shut down German transport of coal, which is what their home economy was powered with. So not so much just shutting down goods transport, but starving the economy of coal powered energy.

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**Author:** ![Jasmine](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/jasmine/32/2964_2.png) [@Jasmine](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Jasmine)\
**Post date:** [March 14, 2022, 11:27am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/56 "2022-03-14T11:27:42Z")

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> [@TokyoBayer](#):
>
> That’s how many of the warships were sunk.

In the movie, “Midway”, one of the Japanese carriers was portrayed to have sunk that way. The fires hit the fuel and ammo, and “BOOM”!

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**Author:** ![Chronos](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/chronos/32/134_2.png) [@Chronos](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Chronos)\
**Post date:** [March 14, 2022, 2:12pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/57 "2022-03-14T14:12:22Z")

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> [@Just\_Asking\_Questions](#):
>
> What’s funny about that is, they could just look around and see the same tactic wasn’t working for the Germans, so why would they think the German people were any different?. The British populace was quite willing to “take it” for the war effort. Stff upper lip, tough old gut and all that.

That’s a mistake that has been made by every military in history, since the invention of war. We’re tough patriots whose resolve will only be strengthened by being attacked. They’re spineless cowards who will give up as soon as faced with any hardship.

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**Author:** ![griffin1977](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/977dab/32.png) [@griffin1977](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/griffin1977)\
**Post date:** [March 14, 2022, 2:19pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/58 "2022-03-14T14:19:52Z")

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So as I understand it, on the British side at least, it was down to [“bomber” Harris.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sir_Arthur_Harris,_1st_Baronet) He thought (rightly, at the time) that they didn’t have the accuracy to bomb specific tactical targets like railways, and so the best way to use the British bomber fleet to affect the war was the mass bombing of entire German cities.

The irony is by the end of the war he was wrong, this was demonstrated by the fact that during the lead up to, and immediate aftermath of, D-Day Harris was overruled and, against his advice, the British bombers were used to attack targets like railroads in France. And the aiming technology and skills had advanced enough that the bombing of these specific targets was really effective, but rather than change strategy permanently to that kind of bombing, once D-Day was over bomber command went back to mass bombing of cities.

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**Author:** ![Max\_S](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/46a35a/32.png) [@Max\_S](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Max_S)\
**Post date:** [March 14, 2022, 3:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/59 "2022-03-14T15:43:44Z")

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> [@SunUp](#):
>
> A good trivia factoid: every ship sunk at the Battle of Midway was sunk by the explosion of one or more Japanese torpedoes.

Is that true? I thought the U.S. landed an air-launched torpedo on an oil tanker.

~Max

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**Author:** ![gnarator](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/gnarator/32/8266_2.png) [@gnarator](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/gnarator)\
**Post date:** [March 14, 2022, 3:45pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/60 "2022-03-14T15:45:32Z")

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Nightime raid by a PBY Cat. Don’t think the ship sunk. Checking…  
ETA: damaged but not sunk.

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